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ABSTRACT 
The Labour Party was a prominent political party amongst 
coloured people for more than twenty-five years . Formed in 
1965 to contest elections for the Coloured Persons' 
Representative Council (CRC), the Labour Party at the outset 
adopted an anti-apartheid, anti-separate representation and 
anti-eRe stance. During the first five years of its 
existence, the party tried to muster coloured support for its 
policies. Its promise to cripple the CRC by refusing to 
occupy seats in the council became the rallying call. 
The Labour Party won a majority of the elected seats in the 
first CRC election in 1969 but the government nominated pro-
government candidates to all the nominated seats, depriving 
the Labour Party of an overall majority. Thwarted in their 
bid to "wreck" the CRC, Labour Party members instead took 
their seats in the council, vowing to destroy it from within. 
For the next five years the Labour Party pursued a policy of 
"confrontation. " By using a "boycott" strategy, it not only 
hamstrung the effective working of the CRC but thwarted the 
government in other areas of its "coloured" policy. 
-. 
In the 1975 election the Labour Party won an outright victory, 
giving it the power to cripple the CRC. However, it did not 
seize this opportunity. Its decision to "govern" in the CRe 
constituted a decisive step in the change from confrontation 
to cooptation. The Labour Party's continued support of the 
eRe drew widespread criticism from supporters and opponents 
alike. Its leaders tried to hold together a disaffected party 
and eventually agreed to the dissolution of the CRC in 1980 in 
an effort to paper over the cracks in party unity, and to 
forestall growing coloured opposition to the CRC at the next 
election. 
In 1983, the Labour Party displayed a decisive shift in its 
anti-separate representation stance by lending support to 
the tricameral system. By doing so, it laid itself open to 
the same charge of collaboration it had levelled at the other 
iii 
CRC parties . 
This thesis will examine the history of the Labour Party 
from its formation in 1965 as an anti-government party, 
to one of cooperation with its erstwhile opponent by 1984. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis traces the history of the Labour Party in the 
period 1965-1984 and examines its development from a 
vociferously anti-apartheid, confrontationist party, to one 
which willingly became a partner of the very government it had 
vigorously attacked and opposed for almost twenty years. 
No major works have appeared on the Labour Party and its 
role in coloured and South African politics. l A probable 
explanation for this is that the events described have 
occurred very recently. Source material in the form of books 
and other publications is not as readily available as for the 
more distant past. The argument that it is not possible to 
write an objective account of contemporary history has also 
deterred many prospective researchers. However, recent events 
focused attention on coloured people and the Labour Party. 
These included the implementation of the tricameral system in 
1984 and the participation of the Labour Party in the House of 
Representatives; the repeal in 1991 of the Population 
Registration Act which had classified coloured people; the 
defeat by the "brown" National Party of the Labour Party in 
the House of Representatives in 1992; and the competition 
between the National Party and African National Congress for 
coloured support prior to the 1994 general election. Yet, 
very little material is readily available concerning a party 
which dominated coloured politics since 1965, and which 
featured prominently in the tricameral parliament between 1984 
and 1994. This thesis aims to fill this gap in a vital period 
of South Africa's political history and endeavours to shed 
light on an important phase in the history of an enigmatic and 
prominent coloured movement. 
lThe term "Coloured" fell away with the repeal of the 
Population Registration Act in 1991. Nevertheless, in order that 
the reader may know who is being referred to in this thesis, it 
is necessary to use a term which will facilitate identification. 
Thus, the term "coloured" will be used. See below for 
explanation of the usage of this term. 
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While the Labour Party has not received specific attention, it 
has featured in a number of works. However, where it has been 
referred to, this is done as part of a general discussion on 
South African politics or on political issues affecting 
coloured people. A number of works on coloured people deal 
with the period prior to 1965 and therefore do not make a 
study of the Labour Party which was formed after that date. 2 
Those theses and books which do refer to the Labour Party in 
some detail have only done so as part of a major study on 
other political issues affecting coloured people. Examples 
are the removal of coloured voters from the common roll in 
1956 and the consequences of that action,3 the formation and 
functioning of the CRC, and the implementation of the 
tricameral system in 1984. However, none of the works dealing 
with the period under review in this thesis have made a 
detailed study specifically of the Labour Party. 
Of books which specifically deal with coloured politics in the 
period under review, the Labour Party is not the principal 
subject of discussion. Van der Ross, founder of the Labour 
Party, has comprehensively documented coloured political 
mo~ements since the founding of the African Political 
Organisation (APO) in 1903, but even he hardly makes reference 
to the Labour Party. In his more recent work on coloured 
political movements, the Labour Party is dealt with in cursory 
2An example of such works are, D.P. Botha, Die Opkoms van 
ons Derde Stand (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1960); H.P. 
Cruse, Die Opheffing van die Kleurlingbevolking: Aanvangsjare, 
1652-1795 (Stellenbosch: CSVSA, 1947); J.S. Marais, The Cape 
"Coloured" People (Johannesburg: witwatersrand University Press, 
1937); W.H. Macmillan, The Cape Colour Question: a Historical 
Survey (London: Faber and Gwyer, 1927). 
3For instance, D .M. Scher, "The Disenfranchisement of the 
"Coloured" Voters, 1948-1956" (D.Litt et Phil thesis, University 
of South Africa, 1983). This is the most exhaustive study yet of 
the circumstances surrounding the removal of coloured voters from 
the common voters' roll between 1951 and 1956. Scher refers to 
the Labour Party in the closing chapter. 
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fashion in the closing chapter. 4 Lewis discusses the reaction 
of Cape coloured people to segregation but only details the 
history of coloured politics and political movements in the 
period 1900 to 1948. He does refer to the Labour Party in the 
closing chapter, but only as part of a general survey on South 
African history.5 The other major work on coloured politics 
is that by Goldin who examines issues surrounding the 
development of coloured identity and coloured labour policies 
and patterns, and related political issues in the Western 
Cape. General reference is made to the Labour Party and its 
role in coloured politics as part of this investigation. 6 
However, while these books make a comprehensive study of a 
number of aspects of coloured politics, they do not examine 
the Labour Party in any detail. 
A number of general works on coloured people have appeared 
since the formation of the Labour Party; some of these contain 
material relevant to the period under discussion, and others 
provide background to the "coloured political problem", but in 
none of these does the Labour Party warrant any serious 
study.7 A number of works such as those by Venter, who gives 
4R.E. van der Ross's 3-part, 4-volume unpublished work A 
Political and Social History of the Cape "Coloured" People, 1880 
1970, is a detailed collection of source material and has 
served as the basis of his published work, The Rise and Decline 
of Apartheid (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1989). 
5G. Lewis, Between the Wire and the Wall: A Historv of 
"Coloured" Politics (Cape Town: David Philip, 1987). 
61. Goldin, Making Race: The Politics and Economics of 
Coloured Identity in South Africa (Cape Town: Maskew Miller 
Longman, 1987), which is based on his doctoral thesis, 
"'Coloured' Preference Policies and the Making of 'Coloured' 
political Identity in the Western Cape Region of South Africa 
with particular reference to the period 1948 to 1984." 
7For example, H. W. van der Merwe and C. J. Groenewald, 
Occupational and Social Change among the "Coloured" People in 
South Africa (Cape Town: Juta, 1976); M.G. Whisson and H.W. van 
der Merwe, Coloured Citizenship in South Africa (Cape Town: UCT, 
1972); D.P. Botha, Die Kleurling en ons Kleurlingbeleid 
(Potchefstroom: PUCHO, 1977); R.E. van der Ross, Myths and 
(continued .•. ) 
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a brief survey of the history and development of the coloured 
people,s and Thomas, who examines the workings of the Coloured 
Persons' Representative Council,9 refers to the Labour Party 
in more detail. Hugo's book, which consists of original 
documents illustrating the policies and strategies of all the 
major coloured political parties in the period 1961-1977, is a 
mine of information concerning the role of the Labour Party 
during this period, but is not a detailed study of the Labour 
Party itself. lo Allan Hendrickse's biography sketches his 
early background, culminating in his appointment as chairman 
of the Ministers' Council in the House of Representatives in 
1984. Reference is made to his role in the Labour Party in 
the 1970s but concentrates more on the man than the party.ll 
My own recent work on the political history of coloured people 
discusses the Labour Party in some detail during the period 
1965-1993 but is also not an exhaustive examination of the 
party . l2 None of the secondary sources, therefore, have made 
a detailed study of the Labour Party. 
A number of theses and dissertations refer to the Labour 
Party. Behrens' doctoral thesis highlights the role and 
working of the Houses of Representatives and Delegates and 
sheds much light on the role of the Labour Party and other 
l( ••• continued) 
Attitudes: An inside look at the "Coloured" People (Cape Town: 
Tafelberg, 1979). 
SA. J. Venter, "Coloured": A profile of Two Million South 
Africans (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1974) . 
~. Thomas, "Debates of the Coloured Persons' Representative 
Council" (Unpublished paper, 1972). 
lOp. Hugo, Quislings or Realists? (Johannesburg: Ravan, 
1978) . 
IIp. Coetzer, Awaiting Trial - Allan Hendrickse (Alberton: 
Librarius, 1984). 
l2R.H. du Pre, Separate but Unequal: The "Coloured" People 
of South Africa; A Political History (Johannesburg: Jonathan 
Ball, 1994). 
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coloured political parties in the "coloured" parliament, but 
only investigates the period 1984-1988 which largely falls 
outside the scope of this thesis. 13 Hommel's doctoral thesis 
traces the development of coloured political awareness and the 
rise of political movements among coloured people up to the 
1970s. Reference is made in a closing chapter to the CRC and 
the Labour Party is referred to only as it related to the 
functioning of that body.14 Mina's B.Soc.Sc. Honours mini-
thesis and Saks' more detailed M.A. dissertation, both make 
detailed studies of the CRC between 1969-1979 but the Labour 
Party is discussed only as it relates to that body.15 In her 
wide-ranging study of coloured politics, Freedberg also makes 
reference to the Labour Party and its role in the CRC and 
discusses in some detail the party's decision to participate 
in the tricameral system. 16 However, none of these theses and 
dissertations make any in-depth study of the Labour Party and 
it only features as one player in, or just another aspect of, 
the study of coloured politics. However, my own M.A. 
dissertation is the only known study made specifically of the 
Labour Party.17 This thesis, therefore, fills a particular 
gap in South African historiography as it is the only detailed 
13G. Behrens, 
University of Cape 
"The other 
Town, 1989). 
two Houses" (Ph.D thesis, 
14M• Hommel, "The 
Political Movements 
University, 1978). 
Organization and Evolution of "Coloured" 
in South Africa" (Ph.D thesis, York 
15B . Mina, "The CRC: Ten Years Hard Labour" (B.Soc.Sc. 
Honours mini-dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1978); D.Y. 
Saks, "The Failure of the 'Coloured' Persons' Representative 
Council and its Constitutional Repercussions, 1956-1984" (M.A. 
dissertation, Rhodes University, 1991). 
16J. 
'Coloured' 
1652-1982" 
1987). 
Freedberg, "Changing Political Identity 
People of South Africa: A Political 
(Ph.D Thesis, University of California, 
of the 
History, 
Berkeley, 
17R. H. du Preez, "The Role and Policies of the Labour Party 
of South Africa, 1975-1978" (M.A. dissertation, University of 
South Africa, 1987). 
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study of the Labour Party, its role as a coloured political 
party, and its place in coloured and South African politics in 
the period 1965-1984. 
Although the sources referred to above are not detailed 
studies of the Labour Party, they provide valuable informa tion 
on a number of aspects concerning that organisation. However, 
a major source of primary materi al came from archival 
collections, some of which contained valuable original 
material, while others were scanty and incomplete. The 
University of South Africa's archives house a number of 
collections relating to the Labour Party,l8 but the Sonny Leon 
Papers is the only major collection containing sufficient 
relevant and usable material covering the period under 
discussion. l9 The only original material provided by the 
Labour Party itself is the Labour Party Private Accession 
(P.A.29) housed at the Western Cape Institute for Historical 
Research. The Institute also contains the R.E . van der Ross 
collection which, at present, is very limited in the amount of 
material available. 
Private collections, still in the hands of the owners, contain 
the bulk of original material on the Labour Party. The major 
portion of Van der Ross's valuable collection is still in his 
possession and is not available to the public. The Leon 
family in Kimberley has a storeroom of uncatalogued and 
unsorted material which they have not placed at the disposal 
of the public. That which was considered suitable for public 
scrutiny 
Africa. 
has already been donated to the University of 
Arthur Stanley also has a number of original 
South 
l8For example, the Federal Coloured Peoples' Party 
collection (1973-1974), the N.P. Arends Collection, the S.A . 
Black Alliance Accession, the Rashid Seria Accession, the Labour 
Party Accession (donated by F . E . Peters), the Erica Theron 
Commission collection, the Labour Party collection (donated by 
P . J . Hugo), and the Tom Swartz collection. 
19Donated by L.S.(Sonny) Leon, founder-member of the Labour 
Party and its leader between 1970-1978. 
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photographs and election material but he was reluctant to part 
with it. 20 Alathea Jansen's private papers contain sensitive 
material which is not available for public scrutiny. This is 
understandable because Jansen, the former chairman of the CRC 
executive, was subjected to much criticism and open hostility 
for reasons which will be dealt with more fully in this 
thesis. Trevor George, for years a supporter of the Federal 
Party, has material on that party's electoral battle with the 
Labour Party. Norman Middleton has one of the most extensive 
private collections. However, because of his involvement in 
sports and trade union activities, his papers do not relate 
exclusively to the Labour Party. In most instances, the 
material in the hands of the owners has not been made 
available to the public or university archives because of two 
main factors: it has not been sorted and catalogued, which 
has, in addition, created the second problem of sensitive 
material which the owners do not want open to public scrutiny. 
However, limited access was provided in a few instances. 
Nevertheless, it will probably be found that the majority of 
official documents in these private collections relating to 
the Labour Party are duplicated in the official collections of 
the. party. 
Because the establishment of the Labour Party, and its role as 
a political party, took place within the framework of the 
government's policies for coloured people, matters affecting 
coloured people, and thus the Labour Party, were recorded in a 
number of official documents. Therefore, a study of thes~ 
documents were made insofar as it referred to the Labour 
Party. Hansard was an important source of information. 
Debates and Proceedings of the Coloured Persons' 
Representative Council spotlighted the role and attitude of 
the Labour Party in that body between 1969 and 1979. Events 
in the "white" House of Assembly had a bearing on the CRC and 
the Labour Party, and therefore a study was also made of 
20Richard van der Ross, Sonny Leon and Arthur Stanley were 
founder members of the Labour Party. 
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Debates of the House of Assembly . Debates of the House of 
Representatives (from 1984 onwards) largely falls outside the 
period of this thesis but limited u s e was made thereof . 
A number of government publications proved valuable and 
supplied additional information for this study.21 However, 
most of these only supplied material which provided background 
information to other events. Committee reports provided 
supplementary information, which although not dealing 
specifically with the Labour Party, provided material which 
clarified other matters affecting the party.22 The major 
commissions which were appointed during the period of the 
Labour Party's existence, issued reports which not only 
provided vital statistics and survey material, but elicited a 
response from the government, a factor which itself added 
value to the material used for this study . 23 The Republic of 
South Africa: Bulletin of Statistics and the Government 
Gazette were also consulted. 
Newspapers were a valuable source of information. Numerous 
editorials, leading articles, political reports and letters 
reflect the lively debate and interest in coloured politics 
during the period under review. The Sunday newspapers, Sunday 
21An example of these pUblications are: Debates of the 
Senate of the Republic of South Africa, Republic of South 
Africa: President's Council Reports, and Minutes of proceedings 
of Parliament, 1985-1990. 
22For example, South African Parliament: Senate Sessional 
Committees and Joint Committee Reports; Republic of South 
Africa: Select Committee Reports; Report of the Committee on 
Alternative Constitutional Proposals . 
23Report of the Commission of Inquiry into matters relating 
to the "Coloured" Population Group (Theron Commission); Witskrif 
oor die verslag van die Kommissie van Ondersoek na aangeleenthede 
rakende die kleurlinbevolkingsgroep; Interim Memorandum: 
Provisional comments by the government on the recommendations of 
the commission of inquiry into matters relating to the "Coloured" 
popUlation group; Report of the Commission of Inguiry into riots 
at Soweto and elsewhere from 16th of June 1976 to the 28th of 
February 1977. 
xvii 
Times and Rapport both published "Extra" editions containing 
exclusively "coloured" news. The numerous English daily 
newspapers reported regularly on matters involving the Labour 
Party and by and large supported it in the late 1960's and 
1970's. The Cape Herald, a "coloured" newspaper, directed a 
constant stream of criticism against the Labour Party since it 
was perceived to be collaborating with the government. The 
Afrikaans-language newspapers, especially the Cape Nationalist 
mouthpiece, Die Burger, reflected government thinking and 
supported pro-government coloured parties and defended 
government actions. These newspapers realised that the 
majority of coloured people were Afrikaans-speaking, and 
attempted to influence them as much as possible by carrying 
regular reports of happenings affecting the Labour Party which 
would influence its readers against the party. African 
newspapers such as Post, Zulu Voice, Drum and Trust, at 
various times reported on coloured politics and the Labour 
Party as it affected South African politics and its possible 
significance for, and influence on, Africans. However, this 
was so seldomly done that very little material came from that 
source. 
Various journals such as the Educational Journal, South 
African Outlook, Reality, Graphic and Bandwagon were 
especially critical of the Labour Party in the 1970's. 
However, these were mainly "left-wing" pUblications which used 
the Labour Party and its participation in the CRC as an 
opportunity to attack the government and its apartheid 
policies. Except for one or two articles,24 the major 
scientific journals, attached mostly to "white" universities 
or other institutions and establishments, largely ignored the 
Labour Party. The South African Institute of Race Relations' 
annual Survey of Race Relations in South Africa,25 however 
24For example, in Africa Perspective, No. 10 (April 1979). 
25From 1977, it was called the Race Relations Survey. 
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reported extensively on happenings in coloured political 
circles. It must be borne in mind that the Labour Party was 
only a fringe movement in South African politics in the period 
under discussion and did not feature prominently in books and 
the printed and electronic media. Its importance was 
reflected in press coverage which was sporadic and largely 
superficial. The Labour Party only began to merit serious 
attention and media coverage when it decided in 1983 to 
participate in the tricameral system. However, this study 
hopes to redress that situation. 
One advantage in writing contemporary history is that many 
of the actors are still alive. I was able to conduct 
interviews with persons who were members of the Labour Party, 
and/or the CRC or who were involved in coloured politics 
during the period under discussion. The surviving founder 
members of the Labour Party, none of whom were connected with 
the Labour Party at the time of this study, were very 
accommodating and more than willing to share whatever 
information they had. 26 Many former members of the Labour 
Party had at various times been expelled, had resigned, or had 
defected to other parties. Understandably, their views on the 
Labour Party were not always objective. Many who were still 
members of the party at the time of the interview were 
unwilling to offer comment in case it created problems between 
them and the party . Others, mindful that South African 
politics was in a state of flux, were not prepared to commit 
themselves in comment until they had a clearer vision of how 
things were going to work out. They did not want to 
jeopardise their future and those of their children by 
26They are Norman Middleton, Arthur Stanley and Richard van 
der Ross. Middleton is involved in trade union activities in 
Pietermaritzburg. Van der Ross retired as rector of the 
University of the Western Cape in 1986 and returned to politics 
in 1994 with his election to the Western Cape parliament as a 
member of the Democratic Party. Stanley did not stand for re-
election to the House of Representatives in 1989 and retired from 
public life to his home in Cape Town . I was able to interview 
Sonny Leon before his death in 1991. 
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supporting or angering players who might later take up 
prominent and powerful positions in a new government. Some 
were only willing to talk freely after the Labour Party was 
officially dissolved in September 1994. Many persons 
interviewed had at one time or another, been detained. 
uncertain as to what the position would be in the future, 
these declined to talk too much or to offer information which 
might later be incriminating or construed as controversial. 
Despite failing memory, many of the founders and early members 
of the party gladly shared that which they could recall. 
Use will be made of various terms such as "black," "white," 
"non-white," "Coloured," "Hottentot," "Bushman," "African" and 
"Indian," in this thesis. A vexing problem of contemporary 
political and historical writing in South Africa is to find 
suitable non-pejorative terms which at the same time permit 
the necessary identification of groups in the society. 
However, these terms will be used in this thesis because they 
are terms which South Africans have at one time or another 
used and understood, and which many still today use. Use 
thereof does not necessarily signify acceptance of such 
co~cepts or their implications. The term "black" will be used 
to denote those South Africans not considered "white," i.e. 
Africans, coloureds and Indians. The term "non-white" will be 
avoided as far as possible and will only be used when it is 
quoted by other sources. Extensive use will be made in this 
thesis of the term "coloured." It is therefore necessary at 
this stage to clarify the term. The Population Registration 
Act (No. 30 of 1950) defined a "Coloured" person as one who is 
not a "European and not a Bantu. ,,27 
were divided into seven sub-groups, 
Later, "Coloured" people 
viz . Cape Coloureds, Other 
Coloureds, Malay, Griqua, Chinese, Indian and Other Asiatic. 28 
27Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 5. 
28M. Simons, "Organised Coloured political Movements", in 
Occupational and Social Change among Coloured People in South 
Africa, eds., H.W. van der Merwe and C.J. Groenewald (Cape Town: 
Juta, 1976), 203, 233. 
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(Chinese, Indians and Other Asiatics were later removed from 
this grouping and placed in a separate population group). The 
Theron Commission found that: 
The expression "Coloured person" refers essentially to a 
residual statutory population category, i.e. persons who 
are not classified as "White" or "Bantu" and do not form 
part of the Chinese, Indian or other Asiatic groups 
either. statutorily speaking, the following main groups 
are considered to be "Coloured persons": Cape Coloureds, 
Malays, Griquas and "other" Coloureds. 29 
People have over the years, referred to coloured people as 
"Hotnots, Free Blacks, Cape Boys, Capeys, Basters, Bruinmense, 
Coloureds, Eurafricans, Blacks, Brown South Africans and 
Gekleurdes. "30 In the 1850s, coloured people in the Cape 
called themselves "Kaapse Mensche. "31 During the 1970s the 
philosophy of "black consciousness" led many coloured people 
to call themselves "black." However, the official designation 
"Coloured" offends many of the people so described. Some 
cannot even bring themselves to say the word. When used in 
conversation, speakers often use a well-known gesture which 
involves raising two fingers of each hand (to indicate 
quo.:tation marks), mouthing the prefix "so-called," before 
uttering the dreaded word "Coloured." When writing, they 
punctuate the word. Others use the prefix, "so-called" which 
they punctuate, or use the term "so-called Coloured" which 
they also punctuate. However to refer to the so-called 
Coloured people or to punctuate it is clumsy. 
people thus described will simply be referred 
Therefore, the 
to as coloured 
or coloured people. Use of the term does not denote 
29Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Matters relating 
to the Coloured Population Group (R P 38 - 1976),464. [Hereafter 
referred to as the Theron Report] 
30Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 4-5. 
31W.M. MacMillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton: The Making of the 
South African Native Problem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1963), 18. 
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acceptance thereof but is used solely to facilitate 
identification and ease of understanding. 
Nevertheless, even when used in this way, the term is still 
problematic because it suggests that coloured people are a 
racial entity and a homogeneous "nation" or cultural group 
within the South African population. Apart from the common 
feature of "mixed blood", the "coloured population group" does 
not constitute a unity, least of all an ethnic entity.32 The 
various components of this statutorily-defined group 
originated geographically and historically independent, and 
the "racial" composition differs widely • . It is also an error 
to assert that coloured people are so different from whites 
that they have an own identity.33 It is therefore not correct 
to speak of coloured people as a separate nation, especially 
as they do not see themselves as being "Coloured" or a 
separate nation. 34 The Theron Commission found that: 
Being Coloured ... is not essentially the result of a 
process of self-identification. It is not the expression 
of a common feeling of being different. It is the result 
of the reactions or actions of other groups.35 
Thus, other people have decided that they must be classified, 
treated and referred to as such. Lacking a common cultural 
32J.H. Coetzee, The Coloured Challenqe (Potchefstroom: 
Institute for South African Po~itics, 1975), 1-2. See also Van 
der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 1-44, in which he explores the 
myth of coloured identity. 
33National Party pamphlet, The Segregation Problem (National 
Party, n.d.) 7; C. Ziervogel, Brown South Africa (Cape Town: 
Maskew Miller, 1938), 57. 
340.D. Wollheim, ed., Theron Commission: Comment (Cape 
Town: 1977), 1; E. Theron and J.B. Du Toit, Kortbegrip van die 
Theron-verslag (Kaapstad: Tafelberg, 1977), 99-101; Behrens, "The 
Other Two Houses", 10. See also Botha, Die Kleurling en ons 
Kleurlingbeleid, 4-5. 
35Theron Report (R P 38 - 1976), 464. 
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heritage, there is little to bind coloured people together 
into a group.36 By the very nature of the creation of the 
"Coloured" population group, "Coloured" -people are not, and 
never were, a homogeneous grouping. Therefore, any reference 
to coloured people must of necessity only refer to them in a 
political context. Coloured people referred to in this thesis 
are those deemed as "Coloured" in terms of the law and the 
"Coloured" policy of the National Party. 
My approach in this thesis will be in the nature of a study of 
Labour Party involvement in politics between 1965-1984; its 
response and reaction to government policy and laws affecting 
coloured people, and the extent to which it pursued, fulfilled 
and carried out its declared aims and policies. This thesis 
intends providing a historical background to the existence of 
this major political movement and will attempt to account for 
the change from a party and policy of confrontation to one of 
co-operation with a government whose policies segregated and 
discriminated against the very people whom the Labour Party 
purported to represent. The Labour Party claimed to be the 
true coloured opposition to the government's policy of 
separate development and separate political institutions of 
representation. It promised to oppose all measures designed 
to maintain the separation of whites and coloureds. The 
Labour Party at various times also claimed to represent or 
command the support of the majority of coloured people. This 
thesis intends examining the Labour Party's claims and the 
extent to which its promises and policies were carried 
through. 
Although this thesis is not a history of the CRC, this 
institution will feature prominently in the examination of the 
Labour Party's role during the 1970's. The Labour Party owed 
its existence to the formation of the CRC, and its subsequent 
standing in the coloured community and opposition to the 
36See , Coetzee, The Coloured Challenge, 1; Botha, Die 
Kleurling en ons Kleurlingbeleid, 4-5. 
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government's "coloured policy" was effected within the 
confines of the CRC and the policy of political separation. 
This thesis will also refer to the tricameral system, but only 
as it clarifies the Labour Party's policy shifts in relation 
to its political stance of the past. Because a study of the 
Labour Party is also a study of coloured politics, political 
issues affecting coloured people in the period under 
discussion will of necessity be discussed as it relates to the 
Labour Party. 
A study of the Labour Party and coloured politics from the 
1960s is of value to the extent that it throws light on an 
era of increasing segregation and discrimination. Such a 
study will therefore highlight the frustration of a group of 
South African citizens who have witnessed the systematic 
erosion of all their political rights since 1910. Coloured 
people generally resented being classified and labelled as a 
separate group. They roundly rejected the political 
separation of whites and coloureds. Such feelings and 
attitudes have major implications for South Africans today as 
they attempt to come to terms with a post-apartheid society 
an~ a new constitutional dispensation. Coloured support of 
Africans (out of a feeling of revenge and bitterness) might 
tip the scales at future elections. However, coloured 
people's historical and cultural affinity with whites will 
probably cause them to swing in that direction, as has already 
been demonstrated in the general election of April 1994 . No 
matter what happens in this regard, it is already evident that 
a study of coloured politics will assist in the formulation of 
strategies and policies by those vying to gain political 
control in the future. 
From the time it was formed in 1965 the Labour Party sought 
to channel the anger and frustration felt by coloured people 
and present itself as the vehicle by which political equality 
could be achieved. The fact that the Labour Party was a 
purely coloured party was not one of its own choosing . Faced 
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with a vast mass of restrictive laws, the Labour Party had to 
confine its activities to the group which the government 
created through legislation. This study serves to highlight 
the role of the Labour Party between 1965-1984, against the 
background of increasing coloured frustration, disenchantment 
and bitterness. 
1 
Chapter 1 
THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
COLOURED PEOPLE TO 1964 
In 1652, Europeans employed by the Dutch East India Company, 
came to the Cape of Good Hope to establish a refreshment 
station. Upon their arrival, they found that the Cape was 
already inhabited, largely by the indigenous Khoisan. From 
1658, slaves were brought to the Cape to provide labour for 
the growing settlement. In 1688, French refugees made the 
Cape their home and they were followed in increasing numbers 
by other Europeans for decades thereafter.! Sex and marriage 
between Europeans and non-Europeans since 1652 resulted in a 
steady increase in the number of 
referred to as coloured people. 2 
people of "mixed blood," 
The origins of coloured 
people are generally traced to the blending of a number of 
cultural strains, namely Malay, Indian and African slaves; the 
indigenous Khoikhoi(Hottentots) and San(Bushmen); and European 
colonists, mainly Dutch, Germans, French ~nd English. 3 The 
!C. W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa: Social and 
Economic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 19-20; C.F.J. 
Muller, ed. , Five Hundred Years: A History of South Africa 
(Pretoria: Academica, 1984), 6; J.D. Fage, A History of Africa 
(London: Hutchinson, 1978), 348; J.G. Le Roux, Hugenotebloed in 
ons Are (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1988), 12, 
145, 177. 
2The phenomenon of inter-racial relationships is dealt with 
in detail by H.F. Heese, Groep Sonder Grense. Die Rol en Status 
van die Gemengde Bevolking aan die Kaap, 1652-1795 (Bellville: 
Western Cape Institute of Historical Research, 1984). See also 
P.J. Furlong, The Mixed Marriages Act: An Historical and 
Theological Study (Cape Town: Centre for African Studies, 
University of Cape Town, 1983), and R.E. van der Ross, Myths and 
Attitude: An Inside Look at the Coloured People (Cape Town: 
Tafelberg, 1979). 
3Report of the Commission of Inguiry regarding Cape Coloured 
Population of the Union (U.G. 54-1937), 8; J. Pampallis, 
Foundations of the New South Africa (Cape Town: Maskew Miller 
Longman, 1991), 80; Ziervogel, Brown South Africa, 10; Marais, 
Cape Coloured People, 10. 
2 
emergence of this heterogeneous group was very gradual and, in 
so far as it is due to miscegenation and race-mixture, it is 
still a continuing process. 4 Mina states that "the blending 
of these strains, coupled with the particular historical 
development of the South African social formation, generated a 
colour-caste system of class relations, ••• (with the) 
'coloured' group .•• (constituting) a subordinate colour-caste 
in the formation. ,, 5 
Up until the 1830s no mention was made of coloured people as 
such and all laws which included coloured people only made 
reference to Hottentots (Khoikhoi). The Khoikhoi had never 
been enslaved and were part of the "free" population of the 
Cape Colony but they increasingly came to be singled out as 
objects of the colonists' racial vindictiveness. 6 Between 
1809 and 1819 a number of labour laws were enacted for the 
specific purpose of protecting them from abuse levelled at 
them by their white employers. 7 Unfortunately, while these 
laws prevented, to a certain degree, the harsh employment 
practices to which the Khoikhoi had been subjected, they also 
had the effect of officially conferring an inferior status 
upqn them by singling them out under legislation. 8 Further 
Khoikhoi laws between 1819 and 1828 led missionaries and 
philanthropists to exert pressure on the British government 
and the governor at the Cape to improve the position of the 
4 A • Lemon, ",A'."'p"a"r __ t"-!.!h",e",i-=d7:: :-:--:-"'A'---::-:-'G"-e=o"'gl!r'-'a,oJp"'h!fJ.y_----'o~f=__ _ _"S~e'_!p<.!a~r!'_':a'""t~io..lo~n 
(Farnborough: Saxon House, 1976), 14. 
5Mina, "The CRC", 3. The colour-caste is dealt with in some 
detail by Mina, 3-36, Behrens, "The Other Two Houses", 18-23, and 
extensively by Goldin, Making Race. 
6J. Naidoo, Tracking Down Historical Myths (Johannesburg: 
Ad. Donker, 1989), 35. 
7Ziervogel, Brown South Africa, 47. 
8Naidoo, Historical Myths, 36. 
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indigenous people. 9 This culminated in the passing of 
Ordinance 50 in 1828 which repealed all anti-Khoikhoi 
proclamations. 
the Cape on an 
This Ordinance placed all the inhabitants 
equal legal footing and succeeded in 
of 
establishing a "colourblind" precedent which, eight years 
later, was reflected in the Colony's first elective form of 
government. 10 
In 1834, Britain initiated steps to emancipate the slaves. 
Macmillan states that, with the provisional emancipation of 
slaves, the Khoikhoi and slaves merged together as the "Cape 
Coloured people", while Marquard speaks of a "new race" being 
established by 1834. 11 The passing of Ordinance 50 and the 
final emancipation of the slaves in 1838 provided the 
foundation for political equality which became the hallmark of 
the "liberal tradition" of the Cape. Henceforth, coloured 
people would be on an equal political footing with whites 
until their removal from the voters' roll' in 1956. Further 
legislation such as Ordinance 9 of 1836, which discounted race 
or colour as criteria for the vote, and the Masters and 
Servants Ordinance in 1842, paved the way for political 
eq~ality with the elimination of any legal distinction between 
9See H .A. Gailey, "John Philip's role in Hottentot 
emancipation", Journal of African History, III, no.3 (1962). 
10Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 39; Simons, "Organised 
Coloured Political Movements", 206, Marais, Cape Coloured People, 
157; Van der Ross, Rise and Decline, 3-4; Ziervogel, Brown South 
Africa, 48. 
11Macmillan, Cape Colour Question (1927), 265-66; Ibid, 2nd 
ed. (Cape Town: A.A. Balkema, 1968), 35; L. Marquard, The People 
and Policies of South Africa (London: University Press, 1962), 
75; Van der Ross, Rise and Decline, 3; Ziervogel, Brown South 
Africa, 16; W.P. van Schoor, "The Origin and Development of 
Segregation in South Africa" in Contributions of Non-European 
Peoples to World Civilization. ed. M. Hommell (Braamfontein: 
Skotaville, 1989), 107. 
4 
white and coloured. 12 All of these measures only appeared to 
use the term "coloured" for statistical and descriptive 
purposes . There was never any indication that they were 
regarded as a new "nation" or a legally-constituted "race" 
group. 
During this time, the colonists in the Cape began to clamour 
for representative government. with the advent of a Liberal 
Government in Britain in 1846, and with the assurance of the 
Cape Governor that the rights of coloured people were secured, 
the British Colonial Secretary indicated his willingness to 
consider the colonists' request for representative government, 
with coloured people having equal rights as voters.13 The 
1853 constitution which established representative government 
at the Cape, incorporated a low franchise qualification, i.e. 
a man was entitled to register as a voter, irrespective of 
colour, if he earned £50 a year or £25 a year plus board and 
lodging. 14 Thus began a tradition of full political rights 
for coloured people. In 1892, the Franchise and Ballot Act 
raised the property franchise qualification to £75 and a 
simple "education test" was introduced (a voter should at 
least be able to write his name). These changes were aimed at 
'. 
the large number of Africans from the recently annexed 
Transkeian territories which had been incorporated into the 
Colony from 1865 onwards .15 After 1892, the franchise 
qualifications remained unchanged until 1909. 
12p. Hugo, "A Study of Arguments used in support of a Policy 
of Political differentiation between white and Coloured in South 
Africa" (M.A. dissertation, University of Stellenbosch, 1972), 
9; Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 39. 
13Macmillan, Cape Colour Question (1968), 259. 
14Scher, "Disenfranchisement of the Coloured Voters", 4; 
Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 40; Marais, Cape Coloured People, 
212-14. 
15Pampallis, Foundations, 81; Marais, Cape Coloured People, 
215. 
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In terms of the Charter of Natal of 1856, coloured people 
received a qualified franchise,16 but in the Voortrekker 
republics in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, they had no 
right or claim to the vote. l ? Efforts to secure political 
rights for coloured people in the Transvaal and Free State 
after the Anglo-Boer War led to the formation of the African 
Political (later People's) Organisation (APO) in 1903 by 
coloureds in the Cape. 1B When responsible government was 
granted to the Transvaal in 1906 and the Orange River Colony 
in 1907, the APO called on Britain to honour promises made 
before and during the Anglo-Boer War that coloureds would be 
granted political rights similar to those enjoyed by coloureds 
in the Cape. 19 Britain reneged on its promise and allowed the 
Boers in the north to retain their all-white franchise. 2o 
This resulted in an APO delegation leaving for Britain to 
plead their case before the Colonial Secretary in Britain. 
They "begged that in the Constitution about to be conferred 
upon the two ex-Republics, provision might be made for the 
enfranchisement of the Coloured People. ,,21 . The British 
16Hugo , Ouislings or Realists, 
"Disenfranchisement of the Coloured Voters", 
42-43; 
13-14. 
Scher, 
I?Scher, "Disenfranchisement of the Coloured Voters", 12; 
Hugo, "Study of Arguments", 16; Hugo, Ouislings or Realists, 41-
42; E. Theron and M.J. Swart, Die Kleurlingbevolking van Suid 
Afrika (Stellenbosch: University Publishers, 1964), 195. 
IBM. Adhikari, "Protest and Accommodation: Ambiguities in 
the Racial Politics of the APO, 1909-1923", Kronos: Journal of 
Cape History, No.20 (November 1993), 93; Pampallis, Foundations, 
82; Simons, "Organised Coloured Political Movements", 210; Lewis, 
Between the Wire and the Wall, 18. 
19Adhikari, "Protest and Accommodation", 96; L.M. Thompson, 
The Unification of South Africa, 1902-1910 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1960), 11-13. 
2oParnpallis, Foundations, 81; Thompson, Unification of South 
Africa, 11-13; Marais, Cape Coloured People, 276-77. Bunting 
notes that discriminatory legislation was as much a feature of 
British rule, just as it has been a feature of Afrikaner rule. 
See B. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich (London: 
International Defence and Aid Fund, 1986), 16. 
21Marais, Cape Coloured People, 278. 
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government considered it expedient to sacrifice the small and 
"insignificant" coloured community and yield to the wishes of 
the Afrikaners. 22 Thompson adds that "it was a decisive step 
towards the triumph of the political colour bar throughout 
South Africa. ,,23 
The question .of coloured voting rights became a contentious 
issue when the national convention met in 1908 and 1909 to 
discuss the formation of a union. Two opposing political 
principles were clearly spelt out: the Cape principle of 
common citizenship and voting rights for all and the northern 
principle of "no-equality." This question of the "non-white" 
franchise became a serious stumbling block to the formation of 
a Union. 24 Smuts and Merriman suggested a compromise that 
each province in the new Union retain the franchise laws which 
were in existence in the corresponding colony prior to the 
formation of Union. The effect of this was that all 
"non-whites" would be denied the right to" the vote in the 
Transvaal and Orange Free State but those "in Natal and the 
Cape would retain their voting rights. 25 However, all "non-
whites" were excluded from standing as candidates for eolection 
to ""the union parliament. The Cape delegates insisted that the 
"non-white" franchise in the Cape Colony be entrenched by a 
22Marais, Cape Coloured People, 278; Van der Ross, Rise and 
Decline, 35-36 . 
23Thompson, Unification of South Africa, 17. See also, 
Theron and Swart, Kleurlingbevolking, 196. 
24T •R • H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History 
(Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1987), 247; P. Randall, ed., Anatomy 
of Apartheid (Johannesburg: SPROCAS, 1970), 21; De Kiewiet, 
History of South Africa, 239. 
25D . W. Kruger, The Age of the Generals: A Short Political 
History of the Union of South Africa, 1910-1948 (Johannesburg : 
Dagbreek, 1958), 40; D.W. Kruger, The Making of a Nation: A 
History of the Union of South Africa, 1910-1961 (Johannesburg: 
Macmillan, 1969), 35-36; De Kiewiet, History of South Africa, 
239; Davenport, South Africa, 248. Because Natal sided with the 
north, "non-whites" who had the vote in Natal would continue to 
exercise it but no new voters would be added to the voters' roll. 
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stipulation that any decision to alter it could only be taken 
by a two-thirds majority of the total number of members at a 
joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament. 26 without this 
guarantee the Cape would not have entertained union. 27 The 
voting rights of Cape "non-whites" were subsequently 
entrenched in the constitution by clauses 35 and 152. 28 The 
APO and the newly formed National Native Convention sent a 
delegation to London in 1909 to persuade the British 
government not to accept a union in which discrimination on 
the grounds of colour would be entrenched. 29 Abdurahman, the 
APO leader, warned that clause 35 did not sufficiently 
safeguard the Cape's non-racial franchise. The British 
government had no desire to jeopardise the formation of a 
Union for reasons of its own,30 and so chose to ignore the 
delegation which returned empty-handed, except for a promise 
that the governor-general would be on the look-out for any law 
which the South African parliament might introduce which 
affected clause 35. 31 
After 1910, the APO engaged itself in attempts to offset the 
subordinate position of coloured people and concentrated on 
protest, petitions, deputations and election campaigns in an 
-, 
effort to increase coloured people's electoral influence. To 
this extent, the APO supported white political parties which 
championed their cause, as in the case of the Unionist Party 
26Kruger, Making of a Nation, 42. 
27V.A. Alhadeff, Newspaper History of South Africa (Cape 
Town: Don Nelson, 1985), 33. 
28Kruger, Making of a Nation, 42. 
29 Ziervogel, Brown South Africa, 53; Pampallis, Foundations, 
85; Van der Ross, Rise and Decline, 47-49. 
30See Bunting, South African Reich, 13; L.M. Thompson and M. 
Wilson, eds., The Oxford History of South Africa, vol.II (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1971), 363-64; Van der Ross, Rise and Decline, 
49. 
31Scher, "Disenfranchisement of the Coloured Voters", 34. 
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in 1915. 32 The APO later suggested that the coloured vote 
prevented a number of seats from going to the 
National Party which had been formed in 1914 . 
segregationist 
The National 
Party then claimed that the coloured vote was open to 
exploitation. This became the most powerful argument in later 
years in support of separate voters' rolls for coloureds. 33 
However, despite the outrage at the supposed exploitation of 
coloured voters by the English parties, the National Party 
itself went in pursuit of the coloured vote. The drive to win 
coloured support began in 1918 when Hertzog enunciated a major 
viewpoint, stating that coloureds should 
political and economic rights as whites. 
enjoy the same 
The NP also involved 
itself in the establishment of a coloured organisation, the 
united Afrikaner League (UAL), which was formed in 1919 to 
oppose the APO. This step heralded an all-out attempt in the 
1920s to gain the support of coloured voters in order to wrest 
political control of South Africa from the English parties. 34 
At the party's Free State congress in 192·1, Hertzog declared 
that Africans and coloureds were two totally different races 
and that coloured people were part of the whites. He favoured 
the extension of the franchise to coloured people in the other 
pro,vinces. 35 In November 1925, Hertzog, now Prime Minister, 
indicated his proposed policy towards the Cape coloured people 
during a visit to his constituency, Smithfield: 
32Scher, "Disenfranchisement of the Coloured Voters", 42. 
Van der Ross, Political and Social History of the Cape Coloured 
People, part 1, 122, quoting APO, 30 October 1915. 
33Scher, "Disenfranchisement of the Coloured Voters", 45. 
34Simons, "Organised Coloured Political Movements", 212. 
The potential strength of the coloured vote can be seen in the 
fact that by 1929, coloured voters were sufficient in number to 
turn the scales in favour of one of the two main parties in at 
least 10 of the 58 constituencies in the Cape . See L.M. 
Thompson, The Cape Coloured Franchise (Johannesburg: South 
African Institute of Race Relations, 1949), 55; Marais, Cape 
Coloured People, 279. 
35G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkelinq 
die Afrikaner, Deel VI, 1910-1924 
Pers, 1979), 464. 
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It must not be lost sight of that, in the case of the 
Cape Coloured, we have to do with a class of our 
population which, in many respects, are close to the 
European ..• he knows no other civilisation than that of 
the Europeans •.. has an outlook in life which in fact is 
that of the European and not of the native; and speaks 
the language of the European as his mother-tongue. In 
his case, there can be no segregation.~ 
Hertzog further outlined the future of coloured people: "The 
Cape Coloureds must, economically, industrially and 
politically be classified with the European •.. (and) be given 
a place in our midst. ,,37 In line with Hertzog's attempt to 
woo coloured voters, the National Party helped to form, and 
fully fund another coloured party in 1925, the African 
National Bond (ANB) .38 
In 1926, Hertzog made further attempts to woo coloured voters 
when he introduced the Coloured Persons' Rights Bill. This 
bill proposed to confirm the existing franchise in the Cape 
and permit those coloured men of the other provinces who 
fulfilled certain educational and economic qualifications to 
elect one white to represent them in parliament. Its aim was 
push coloured people closer towards whites rather than 
Africans. 39 Hertzog's 1929 Coloured Persons' Rights Bill also 
proposed to give coloured men in the northern provinces an 
36National Party pamphlet, The Segregation Problem (National 
Party, n.d.), 7. 
37Segregation Problem, 10. See also Ziervogel, Brown South 
Africa, 57; C.M. Tatz, Shadow and Substance in South Africa: A 
Study in Land and Franchise Policies affecting Africans, 
1910-1960 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1962), 
45-46, 97. 
38Simons, "Organised Coloured political Movements", 213; 
Scher, "Disenfranchisement of the Coloured Voters", 53. See also 
H.J. Lubbe, "'Vergeet die Arbeiders en wen die Kleurlinge': Die 
'Swart Gevaar'-Propaganda in Kaapland gedurende die Parlementere 
Verkiesingsstryd van 1928 to 1929," Kronos: Journal of Cape 
History, No. 18 (October 1991), 24. 
39Tatz, Shadow and Substance, 46; Bunting, South African 
Reich, 37. 
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elected representative in parliament. 4o Hertzog however 
miscalculated and his bills giving coloureds greater rights 
were never accepted. Hertzog's mistake was to provide for the 
enfranchisement of coloured women when not even white women 
had the vote. This alarmed his own supporters who then 
insisted that white women be enfranchised. This was achieved 
with the Women's Enfranchisement Act of 1930 which extended 
the franchise to white women but excluded coloured women. 
This Act, by nearly doubling the number of white voters, 
drastically reduced the relative strength of the coloured 
people's political power . 41 This was further reduced by the 
Franchise Laws Amendment Act of 1931 which removed the 
franchise qualifications required of white voters,42 and Act 
No. 35 of 1931 made it possible to challenge the 
qualifications of non-white voters. 43 
The Hertzog bills were the beginning of the systematic 
diminution of the political power of coloured people. 44 They 
had the effect of expanding the white electorate to its 
maximum, "while the non-white electorate was pegged. ,,45 While 
these measures reduced the coloured vote to a fraction of its 
fo~mer value, at the same time it acted as a spur to those 
members of the National Party who wished to remove coloured 
voters from the common voters' roll. In 1932, the Head 
40Thompson, Cape Coloured Franchise, 22 . 
41Bunting, South African Reich, 37. 
42Marquard, People and Policies, 79. 
43Hugo, "A study of Arguments", 19; Marais, Cape Coloured 
People, 280. 
44The coloured bills were introduced along with a number of 
"native" bills by Hertzog in the late 1920s. The reasons for, 
contents, and implications of these bills are discussed in 
greater detail in J . T. Cameron, "An analysis of Smuts' attitude 
to Hertzog's Native Bills from 1926 to 1936" (M . A. dissertation, 
University of South Africa, 1982) . 
45Bunting, South African Reich, 37. 
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Committee of the Cape National Party appointed a committee to 
put the case for separate representation of coloured voters to 
Hertzog.·6 However, coalition and fusion between the South 
African Party(SAP) and National Party in 1933 and 1934 
respectively forestalled such moves. 
In 1936, the governing united Party tabled bills in parliament 
which provided for political and territorial segregation of 
Africans. These measures received the support of the Federal 
Council of the "Purified" National Party(HNP), which had been 
formed after D.F. Malan broke with Hertzog when the latter 
entertained fusion between the SAP and the National Party in 
1934. 47 African voters in the Cape were subsequently removed 
from the common voters' roll. 48 Marais pointed out that 
"signs are not wanting that the policy of political 
segregation may in due course be applied to the coloured 
people. ,,49 The United Party however gave assurances that the 
coloured franchise was safe and that there would be no 
question of political segregation for coloured people. Such 
assurances did not carry much weight when viewed in the light 
of Prime Minister Hertzog's confession in 1938 that the NP did 
no\ apply political and economic segregation to the coloured 
people in the 1920s and 1930s because it needed their votes 
for the application of segregation against the Africans. 5o 
On the eve of the 1938 election, D.F. Malan stated that if his 
party came to power, coloureds would be placed on a separate 
460. Du Plessis, Afsonderlike Verteenwoordiging van Kiesers 
(Kaapstad: Inligtingskomittee van die Nasionale Party, 1954), 42. 
47 I bid, 43-44. 
48M. Roth, "The Formation of the Native Representative 
Council in 1937" (M.A. dissertation, University of South Africa, 
1979), 54; D.M. Scher, Donald Molteno: 'Dilizintaba-He-who-
Removes-Mountains' (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race 
Relations, 1979), 7-8. 
49Marais, Cape Coloured People, 280. 
50Cape Times, 6 April 1938. 
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voters' roll and all non-whites would be subject to a policy 
of segregation. 51 Nevertheless, the united Party was 
concerned about the position of coloured people in a 
white-dominated society. Thus, in 1937 a commission of 
inquiry was appointed to examine the social and economic 
factors affecting the Cape Coloured population. 52 One of the 
major recommendations of this commission was that the Cape 
Coloured franchise be extended to the rest of the country, but 
war in 1939 delayed consideration thereof. 53 In accordance 
with another recommendation, the Coloured Advisory Council 
(CAC) was established in 1943 to advise the government on 
current administration affecting coloureds and to provide a 
channel for the airing of coloured grievances. 54 
The creation of the CAC created a divisive split in the 
coloured community and caused a schism in the ranks of the APO 
which had championed the cause of coloured people since its 
formation in 1903. A group in the APO believed that, by fully 
co-operating with the government, they could secure improved 
conditions for coloured people. Those opposing the CAC argued 
that the body represented a division on racial lines; that it 
was the forerunner of further segregation;55 and that since 
the problems of coloured people were known to the government, 
51Botha, Die Opkoms van ons Derde Stand, 108-109. 
52Commission of Inquiry regarding Cape Coloured Population 
of the Union (U G 54-1937). (Wilcocks Commission). 
53Lemon, A Geography of Separation, 141. 
implementation of such a recommendation might 
from defeat in 1948 when he narrowly lost by 
alliance of Afrikaner parties. 
Ironically, the 
have saved Smuts 
five seats to an 
54G . M. Carter, The Politics of Ineguality: South Africa 
since 1948 (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1977), 360. 
55These critics pointed to the link between the 
establishment of the Native Representative Council in 1937 and 
the removal of the African voter from the COmmon roll. See S. 
Dollar, "R.F.A. Hoernle (1880-1943) and the Segregation Debate 
(1923-1943): A Brief Biography". (Unpublished Paper, Rhodes 
University, 1992), 9. 
13 
reform and not a consultative body was what was needed. 56 
Opponents of the CAC formed the Anti-Advisory Council Movement 
(Anti-CAD [Anti-Coloured Affairs Department]) so as to 
"canalise all non-European sentiment and endeavour ..• in one 
mighty stream that will expunge from the statute book all 
discriminatory legislation. ,,57 They accused the pro-CAC 
faction of being "quislings" and "sell-outs . " This marked the 
beginning of a problem which was to dog coloured people for 
the next fifty years and which was henceforth to characterise 
coloured politics, viz. the issue of collaboration and non-
collaboration. 58 
The Anti-CAD movement had strong intellectual support and 
succeeded in taking control of the APO. Both these movements 
and the Teachers' League of South Africa (TLSA), a professional 
body of mainly coloured teachers formed in 1913, supported the 
Non-European unity Movement (NEUM), an umbrella federal body 
which was at the forefront of a vociferous campaign against 
the CAC. 59 At the other end of the political spectrum was the 
Coloured People's National Union formed by George Golding in 
.1944. This movement consisted largely of former APO members 
56Hugo , Quislings or Realists, 634-35; M.G. Whisson, "The 
Coloured People", in South Africa's Minorities, ed. Peter Randall 
(Johannesburg: SPROCAS, 1970), 47 . 
57Sun, 2 March 1943. 
58Hugo , Quislings or Realists, 44; Simons, "Organised 
Coloured Political Movements", 224. 
59Venter, Coloured, 491-92; Scher, "Disenfranchisement of 
the Coloured Voters", 71. In 1960, the NEUM was banned along 
with the ANC and PAC and went into exile in Lusaka, Zambia. It 
formed a military wing, the African People's Democratic Union of 
South Africa (Apdusa). A breakaway group of the NEUM formed the 
New Unity Movement in Cape Town in 1985 and during the 1994 
general election, called for a boycott of the election. Apdusa 
still operates and held its first annual congress on South Africa 
soil since going into exile, in Umtata in December 1993. Colin 
Dweba, interview with author, Butterworth, 11 November 1994. 
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who had supported the CAC from the outset. They sought to 
improve the position of coloured people by co-operating with 
the government. Golding later became chairman of the CAC. 6o 
In 1948 the HNP (later referred to simply as the National 
Party[NP]), in alliance with the Afrikaner Party, came to 
power with a slim majority. The CAC resigned en bloc in 1950 
in the wake of the NP victory and its declared intention of 
extending a policy of segregation in the case of coloured 
people. 61 One of the NP's first tasks to entrench the South 
African social formation was to define the colou,r-caste system 
of relations in law, especially that of the coloured group as 
a subordinate colour-caste in the formation. This was done by 
means of the Population Registration Act of 1950. This Act 
defined a "Coloured" person as one who is not European (white) 
and not a Bantu. A later proclamation (R123 of 1967) divided 
coloured people into seven groups, viz. Cape Coloured, other 
Coloured, Malay, Griqua, Chinese, Indian and Other Asiatic. 62 
The Group Areas Act of 1953 further clarified the coloured 
group as consisting of "all persons who do not fall into the 
White or Native group and also all women, including White or 
Nat,ive, who are married to or who cohabit with, Coloured 
persons. ,,63 
Having defined and identified the "coloured" people whom it 
had vowed, since 1916 already, to place on a separate roll, 
the Nationalists immediately set about the task of removing 
60Scher, "Disenfranchisement of the Coloured Voters", 71. 
61Carter, Politics of Inequality, 361; Whisson, "Coloured 
People", 47. 
62Simons, "Organised Coloured Political Movements", 203, 
233; Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 5; Whisson, "Coloured 
People", 46. 
63K• Kirkwood, The Group Areas Act (Braamfontein: South 
African Institute of Race Relations, 1951), 9. In 1976, the 
Theron Commission considered the following to be "Coloured 
persons": Cape Coloureds, Malays, Griquas and .. other" Coloureds. 
See, Theron Report (R P 38 - 1976), 464. 
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coloured voters from the Cape common roll. 64 The government 
showed its hand in February 1951 with the pUblication of the 
Separate Representation of Voters Bill and indicated that it 
intended to vote it into law by a simple majority. The bill 
provided for separate voting lists for white and coloured 
voters in the Cape and Natal. 65 The Opposition challenged the 
legality of the bill on the grounds that the coloured vote was 
protected by the entrenching clauses in the South Africa Act 
of 1909. Coloured voters could only be removed by a 
two-thirds majority at a joint session of both Houses of 
Parliament (i.e. the House of Assembly and the Senate).66 The 
government countered that the Statute of Westminster of 1931 
and the Status Act of 1934 made the Union Parliament a 
sovereign legislative body. Thus the Colonial Laws Validity 
Act was no longer valid, which meant that the Union Parliament 
could pass any legislation repugnant to any law passed by the 
British Parliament. 67 The government's case was strengthened 
by a 1937 Supreme Court decision which held that, with the 
passing of the Statute of westminster, the Union Parliament 
was the supreme law-making body in the Union and that the 
court had no power to decide on an Act of Parliament duly 
pr~mulgated, printed and published. 68 The bill duly became 
64The reasons for the disenfranchisement of coloured voters 
are fully dealt with by Scher, in "Disenfranchisement of the 
Coloured Voters". See also Bunting, South African Reich, 134; H. 
Kenney, Power, Pride and Prejudice (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 
1992), 55-56; and Van der Ross, Rise and Decline, 252, where the 
motives for this action are discussed. 
65Margaret Ballinger, one of the Native Representatives in 
parliament at the time, describes in detail the uproar that arose 
as a result of the introduction of this bill. See M. Ballinger, 
From Union to Apartheid: A Trek into Isolation (Cape Town: Juta, 
1969), 398-403. 
66Carter , Politics of Ineguali ty, 124. 
67Ibid, 121. 
68p. Joyce, The Rise and Fall of Apartheid: The Chronicle of 
a divided society as told through South Africa's newspapers (Cape 
(continued •.. ) 
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law by a simple majority in the two Houses, sitting 
separately.69 
In 1952 four coloured voters challenged the validity of the 
Act in the Cape Supreme Court. This court was however bound 
by the 1937 Supreme Court decision and upheld the Act. The 
case was then taken to the Appeal Court in Bloemfontein and 
the decision of the Cape Supreme Court was overturned. The 
Act was declared invalid on the grounds that it was not passed 
with the necessary two-thirds majority as provided for in the 
Constitution. 70 Malan immediately announced that the 
government was not prepared to accept the Appeal Court's 
decision and would take steps to ensure the sovereignty of 
parliament by eliminating the "testing rights" of the 
courts. 71 Shortly after the resumption of the 1952 
parliamentary session, the government introduced a bill 
creating a High Court of Parliament, consisting of the members 
of parliament, which would review Supreme' Court decisions 
which declared Acts of Parliament invalid: The High Court of 
Parliament duly met and reversed the judgment of the Appeal 
Court. Two days later, the Cape Supreme Court declared that 
the Act creating the High Court was itself invalid and that it 
" 
had no authority to overturn the judgement of the Appeal 
Court. 72 In 1954, Malan placed the Separate Representation of 
Voters Validation and Amendment Bill before another joint 
session but this too failed to secure a two-thirds majority. 
Soon after, Malan resigned as Prime Minister. Bunting 
68 ( ••• continued) 
Town: Struik, 1990), 21; E.H. Brookes, Apartheid: A documentary 
study of modern South Africa (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1968), 117-19; Carter, Politics of Inequality, 121-23. 
69Brookes, Apartheid, 116. 
70Carter, Politics of Inequality, 127. 
7lBunting, South African Reich, 139. 
72Ballinger, From Union to Apartheid, 281-82. 
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suggests that Malan's inexplicable resignation came because he 
"baulked at the next necessary step in the struggle over the 
coloured vote," viz. to remove coloured voters by other means: 
fair or foul, legal but immoral. 73 
J.G. Strijdom succeeded Malan who died soon after. In 1955, 
Strijdom increased the number of judges in the Appeal Court 
from 6 to 11.74 Soon after, the Senate was enlarged by 
increasing the number of senators from 48 to 89. In February, 
1956 the House of Assembly and the newly-enlarged Senate met 
in a joint session to consider the contentious bill. After a 
two-week long debate, the bill was passed by 174 votes to 68, 
a comfortable two-thirds majority, and duly became law. The 
Senate Act and the measure validating the 1951 Act were duly 
contested by the opposition. The recently-enlarged Appeal 
Court rejected the application and upheld both Acts. 75 Thus, 
observes Attwell, "by gerrymandering, the coloureds were 
removed from the common voters' roll". 76 This meant that some 
45 000 Cape coloured voters were deprived 'of a right they had 
enjoyed for over a hundred years and placed on a separate 
roll. The clause in the 1909 constitution which protected the 
vote of Cape coloureds was also repealed and they also lost 
the right to be represented by their own people in the Cape 
Provincial Council. Finally, provision was made for the 
creation of a Union Council for Coloured Affairs with elected 
and nominated members,77 a pattern which followed that of the 
disfranchisement of Cape African voters in 1936 and which the 
73Bunting, South African Reich, 139. 
74Brookes, Apartheid, 121. 
75Ballinger, From Union to Apartheid, 309; 
Rise and Decline, 285. 
Van der Ross, 
76M• Attwell, Backoround to the Crisis (London: Sidgwick 
and Jackson, 1986), 91. 
77Sc her, "Disenfranchisement of the Coloured Voters", xvi; 
Hugo, "Study of Arguments", 19-20; Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 
45; Kruger, The Making of a Nation, 293. 
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Anti-CAD movement had pointed out in 1943. 
Coloured reaction to the law depriving them of their political 
rights vacillated between cowering subservience, apathy and a 
sullen refusal to cooperate with the government, to active 
resistance and organised protest against government policies . 
Members of the banned Communist Party and dissidents from the 
CPNU, led by Richard van der Ross, had kept up a spirited 
resistance to government policy after 1948. By forming 
organisations such as the Train Apartheid Resistance Committee 
(TARC) in 1948, the Group Areas Action Committee in 1950, the 
Franchise Action Committee(FRAC) in 1951 and the South African 
Coloured People's Organisation (SACPO) in 1953, these 
organisations had been able to channel coloured resistance 
against the government. 18 Thus, after the removal of coloured 
voters from the common roll, SACPO, affiliates of the NEUM and 
the Coloured People's Congress allied to the Congress Movement 
(arising out of the Kliptown Congress of '1955), were already 
active and were able to pursue a policy of opposition. They 
refused to cooperate with the government's new initiatives and 
advised supporters not to register on the separate voters' 
ro~l and to boycott elections held on that roll. 19 These 
efforts achieved a measure of success for, whereas 47 849 
coloureds had voted in the 1953 election on the common roll,8o 
only 14 694 voted in the first election held on the separate 
roll in 1958. However, the collaboration issue of the 1940s 
raised its head once again with certain coloured groups 
deciding to vote on the grounds that more was to be gained 
that way than by non-collaboration. 81 
In 1959 the government formed the Union Council for Coloured 
18Simons, "Organised Coloured Political Movements", 227. 
I~enter, Coloured, 493. 
80Bunting, South African Reich, 136. 
81Venter, Coloured, 493. Among these organisations were the 
CPNU and the Kleurlingvolksverbond, a rural organisation. 
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Affairs(UCCA), consisting of fifteen government-nominated 
members and twelve elected members, "to advise it on matters 
affecting the coloured people. ,,82 A campaign was launched 
against the council and those coloured people who made 
themselves available for nomination or election. The Torch, a 
newspaper which titled itself "the paper for the people", and 
which had a largely coloured readership, spearheaded the 
attack on the UCCA. 83 Because of the spirited opposition, no 
one stood for election to the twelve elected seats. The 
government subsequently nominated all twelve and, added to the 
fifteen nominated seats, meant that the whole body became a 
government-nominated instrument. 84 Those who accepted 
nomination to the UCCA were dubbed "quislings", "ragged 
political rejects", "political traitors", "nonentities", 
"leeches", "traitors" and various other names. 85 Calls were 
made to hound them out of "every organisation ••• every 
activity in the political, social, cultural, educational and 
economic life of the Non-White people. ,,86 Paced with such 
opposition, even the government refused td make known the 
names of the members when they were finally nominated. 87 
SeEarate representation and the UCCA proved unsatisfactory 
as a means of satisfying coloured political aspirations. 
After the initial opposition, coloureds boycotted elections 
held on the separate roll and largely ignored the UCCA. 
82Hugo , Quislings or Realists, 5. See also L.M. Thompson, 
Politics in the Republic of South Africa (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1966), 86; South African Institute of Race 
Relations, Survey of Race Relations (Braamfontein: SAIRR, 
1958-1959), 153, and (1959-1960), 132. 
83Por example, Torch, 27 October 1959 and 3 November 1959. 
84Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 45. 
85See for example, Torch, 27 October, 3 November and 10 
November 1959. 
86I bid, 10 November 1959. 
87Ibid 8 December 1959. 
--, 
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Concern at this state of affairs was reflected in 
parliamentary debates on coloured matters in the early sixties 
which were largely preoccupied with the nature of coloured 
representation in parliament. 88 Some Cape Nationalists felt 
that, while coloured voters remained on the s e parate voters' 
roll, they should be allowed to elect four coloured, instead 
of white, representatives to parliament. 89 This issue brought 
differences of opinion within the National Party into the open 
in 1960. The drive for coloureds to elect coloured 
representatives was led by the Nationalist mouthpiece in the 
Cape, Die Burger . 90 This debate engendered an atmosphere of 
optimism and hope among coloured people. However, the Prime 
Minister, H.F. Verwoerd, made it clear that he would have no 
"invasions" of the policy of apartheid in respect of coloured 
people, and that as long as he was in control, coloureds would 
not be allowed in parliament. 91 Verwoerd contended that such 
a concession would lead to biological assimilation with 
coloureds and ultimately with Africans. 92 ' He cautioned party 
members to consider the dangers in all the discussions that 
were going on about a possible new approach to coloured 
people, and urged NP leaders to realise that they "must stand 
lik.e walls of granite" on their colour policy, because the 
existence of the Afrikaner nation was at stake. 93 Despite 
88H. W . van der Merwe and R. Schr ire, eds, £R",a~c,-"e,,--:-,.;a5!±!n,,!d 
Ethnicity: South African and International Perspectives (Cape 
Town: David Phillip, 1980), 112. 
89venter, Coloured, 494; W.A. de Klerk, 
Africa: A story of Afrikanerdom (London: Rex 
253. 
The Puritans in 
Collings, 1975), 
90Burger, 23 
Kleurlingbevolking, 
July 
205. 
1960; Theron and Swart, 
9lBallinger, From Union to Apartheid, 455 . 
92K. A. Heard, General Elections in South Africa , 1943-1970 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 123 . 
93Ballinger, From Union to Apartheid, 456. See also Argus, 
23 January 1961. 
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widespread support and constant reference to the matter by Die 
Burger and the NP-supporting Sunday newspaper, Dagbreek en 
Sondagnuus, the Prime Minister and the National Party Congress 
and Federal Council refused to consider cha nges in the 
political status of coloured people. 94 
In response to Verwoerd's "granite wall" speech, a group of 
coloured pepple met in Cape Town in February 1961 where they 
decided to call a convention of coloured, Indian and Malay 
people in order to reply to the Prime Minister's speech. The 
main purpose of such a convention would be to achieve greater 
unity with Africans. 95 The government immediately banned the 
proposed meeting but upon scrutinising the banning order, the 
organisers discovered that it did not include the Malmesbury 
magisterial district. The convention was then held on 8-10 
July 1961 in an open field on the farm, Dassenberg at 
Kalbaskraal, Malmesbury, Cape. 96 The Convention Movement, 
arising out of the meeting, renewed calls for a boycott of the 
UCCA, as well as elections held on the separate voters' roll. 
Many of those involved in the Convention Movement became 
founding members of the Labour Party of South Africa. 
The Malmesbury convention did not go entirely unnoticed. In a 
speech to the UCCA in December 1961, Verwoerd referred to the 
future political status of coloured people, describing them as 
a "state wi thin a state." He intimated that coloured people 
would be given full management of their own affairs by means 
of their own parliament, executiv e and administration within a 
decade. 97 The UCCA immediately began investigating the 
possibility of establishing a legislative and executive body 
in which coloured people could enjoy representation by people 
94Heard, General Elections, 123; Venter, Coloured, 516. 
95Van der Ross, Political and Social History, 412-13. 
96Ibid . 
97Theron and Swart, Kleurlingbevolking, 206; Alpha, 6, No.6 
(June 1968), 9. 
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from their own community. The Cabinet accepted these 
principles and in 1964 proposed the formation of the Coloured 
Persons' Representative Council(CRC). This council was to 
form a link between the government and coloured people, and to 
"give advice to the government when asked to do so. ,,98 
The formation of the CRC was to usher in an era in politics 
for which coloured people were unprepared. It was to have 
far-reaching consequences, not only for coloured people and 
the government but for all South Africans. The CRC, and the 
problems encountered in that body, was to create the 
environment in which the seed of the tricameral system would 
germinate and flourish, and which would culminate in the 
political and economic upheaval of the 1980s and the eventual 
collapse of white rule. 
98Thompson, Politics in the Republic of South Africa, 86. 
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Chapter 2 
THE FORMATION OF THE LABOUR PARTY OF 
SOUTH AFRICA, 1965-1969 
The Union Council for Coloured Affairs (UCCA) proved to be 
ineffectual from its inception in 1959. Not only could the 
government not find candidates to stand for election to the 
council, but within two years indicated that it had another 
body in mind to replace the UCCA. Even the members of the 
UCCA recognised the ineffectualness of that body and drafted 
basic principles for its proposed replacement. In 1964, the 
proposed new body was revealed in the Coloured Persons' 
Representative Council Act (No . 49). This Act made provision 
for the replacement of the UCCA with a more representative 
council consisting of sixteen nominated members and thirty 
elected members. All coloured persons, male and female, from 
the age of twenty-one, in all provinces, would be entitled to 
vote for members of this council, and there would be no 
income, property or educational qualifications. The council 
would have advisory, legislative and executive powers. Apart 
from a provision in the Act that empowered the state president 
to extend the term of office of the UCCA until the Coloured 
.. 
Person's Representative Council (CRC) became operational, the 
Act was never brought into effect and five more years was to 
pass before the first election for the new council was held.! 
six coloured political parties were formed between 1964 and 
1969 to contest the first CRC election. The first party to 
be formed was the Federal Coloured People's Party(FP) in 1964. 
The FP was also the first coloured political party ever to be 
formed for the purpose of fighting an election. This party 
consisted mainly of members of the UCCA, and its leader Tom 
!Hugo, 
Information, 
Information, 
,.Q,:::u"",i",s~l",i .... n±!g~s"---,o=r"-~R,,=e-,,a,,,l~i,,,s'.'-t~s , 6 3 - 6 5 ; 
..,P:",r,:,o",g::l.r",-,=e",s",s,--,o",f=-_a",--=.p."e"o",p",l~e ( P r et or i a : 
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Swartz was also the UCCA chairman. 2 This party openly 
supported the government and its policy of separate 
development and was fully prepared to cooperate in matters 
which it deemed promoted the advancement of coloured people. 
The Federal Party intended to provide the machinery through 
which the National Party could establish some form of 
credibility for its idea that South Africa was a "multi-
national" country and that coloured people were a "nation in 
the making. ,,3 Thus, the FP would provide a means of 
representation for the "coloured" colour-caste and establish a 
cultural distinctiveness that would justify the National 
Party's claim that coloureds represented an aspirant national 
minority. 4 
The formation of the Federal Party alarmed many who opposed 
the government's policies for coloured people. For them, the 
formation of this party was "a threat to the position of the 
Coloured people with respect to their regaining political 
equality. ,,5 They saw the dangers in the FP and other similar 
groups presenting themselves as the representatives of the 
coloured people, and considered that if the FP was left 
uTIC<,pposed, "it will encourage the Government in furthering 
apartheid for the Coloured people, and it will also be able, 
with some justification, to claim that (the Federal Party) 
2Simons, "Organised Coloured Political Movements", 228; P. 
Coetzer, Awaiting Trial: Allan Hendrickse (Alberton: Librarius, 
1984), 67. 
3Hugo , Quislings or Realists, 65-71, 78-79. This idea of 
separate nations and the coloured people as a "nation in the 
making" was referred to by M. viljoen, Minister of Coloured 
Affairs, in a speech at the first session of the CRC, 20 November 
1969, and by S.W. van der Merwe, Minister of Coloured Relations 
in a paper, "Government Policy for the Coloured People," 
delivered to the Abe 'Bailey Institute for Inter-group studies, 
University of Cape Town, 17 January 1972. 
4Mina, "The CRC", 58-59. 
5Arthur Stanley, interview with author, Athlone, Cape, 10 
September 1992. 
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represents the opinion of the Coloured people. ,,6 On 9 October 
1965, a meeting was held in Lansdowne, Cape at which a group 
of coloureds decided to oppose the FP in order "to prevent 
government-supporting collaborators from hijacking the CRC and 
setting themselves up as the legitimate representatives of the 
Coloured people . " ) Those present came from a variety of 
organisations which had, over the years, voiced opposition to 
the government's policies, especially those related to 
coloured people. Among these organisations were SACPO, the 
Convention Movement, NEUM and Anti-CAD which had opposed the 
removal of coloured voters in the 1950's.8 Others had been 
members of the Congress Movement originating in Kliptown in 
1955. Many had joined the Liberal Party when it was formed in 
1953. 9 By the 1960s, a number were members of the Progressive 
Party formed in 1959. 10 
A common factor was that all of those present at this meeting, 
except for Van der Ross, were members of the Coloured Ex-
Servicemen's League, an organisation formed after World War I. 
6LPSA, Newsletter, No.1 (Cape Town: Labour Party of South 
Africa, March 1966), 3 . 
.. 
)Arthur Stanley, interview, 10 September 1992; Eastern 
Province Herald, 16 September 1994. Present at the meeting were 
H.J . Carelse, E.A. Deane, F.E. Eckstein, M.T. Fakier, W.B. 
Francis, N.P. Kearns, P.C. Kriger, L.S. Leon, K.S. Lue, N.S. 
Middleton, E.G. Rooks, D.B. Smith, A. Stanley, R.E. van der Ross 
and one other. These are the founder-members of the Labour Party 
of South Africa. See list of founder-members in, LPSA, 1966 And 
All That (Cape Town: Labour Party of South Africa, 1994). See 
also Labour Party Private Accession 29, (hereafter referred to 
as P.A. 29), general letter from F.E. Peters, National Secretary, 
8 June 1984. A profile of prominent Labour Party leaders is 
contained in the Appendix. 
8Miley Richards, Address to Labour Party Special Conference, 
Uitenhage, 17 September 1994. 
9Mohammed 
December 1993; 
Africa, 490. 
Dangor, interview with author, Johannesburg, 6 
Readers' Digest, Illustrated History of South 
10Allan Hendrickse, interview with author, Cape Town, 23 May 
1989. 
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After 1945, coloured soldiers returning from service found 
that, after risking their lives in the service of their 
country, they had to take their place in South African society 
as "second-class" citizens. ll In addition, promises made by 
Smuts of a grant of tools of their trade, technical training 
and a bicycle, were not kept. 12 Disenchanted with Smuts and 
the United Party, many joined the Ex-Servicemen's League where 
they engaged in efforts to offset their position in an 
increasingly segregationist society. Members me·t on an annual 
basis to keep the memory of their fallen comrades alive .13 At 
these gatherings, they also discussed with bitterness the 
increasing marginalisation of coloured people. 
not unusual that when the CRC was first mooted 
Thus, it was 
and the Federal 
Party was formed to contest elections for that body, that 
members of the League had already been engaged in discussions 
concerning the political future of coloured people. Because 
Van der Ross had been involved in parallel activities during 
the past few years, their paths had alreaay crossed on a 
number of occasions. Van der Ross was the founder of the 
South African Coloured Peoples' Congress in 1953, a co-founder 
of the Convention Movement in 1961, and was a well-known 
llNorman Middleton, interview with author, Pieterrnaritzburg, 
10 October 1994. 
12Ingram du Preez, interview with author, Cape Town, 30 
April 1993; Norman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. During 
World War II, Smuts promised coloured, Indian and African members 
of the Defence Force that, in return for their service, they 
would receive a bicycle when they returned horne. Many persons 
spoken to by the author over the years remember the promise of 
a bicycle but cannot recall that their fathers/husbands ever 
received it. 
13Besides annual meetings of the League, ex-servicemen 
commemorate the battle of Squarehill in September every year; a 
little-known World War I battle involving mainly coloured 
soldiers. The author attended many of these commemorations in 
the 1970s as a guest speaker. Squarehill Park, a suburb in 
Kimberley (the horne of the third leader of the Labour Party, 
Sonny Leon) was named after this battle. The author lived in 
this suburb in 1971 and carne to know of its history. Monuments 
to this battle stand in Kimberley and Pietermaritzburg today, due 
largely to the efforts of Sonny Leon and Norman Middleton. 
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academic in the Cape coloured community.14 The members of the 
league looked to him for guidance and leadership. IS 
Those present at the founding meeting decided to establish a 
political party to be known as the Labour Party of South 
Africa, and a committee was appointed to draft a constitution 
to be submitted at the inaugural conference. The interim 
officers elected were: R.E. van der Ross, president; N.S. 
Kearns, vice-president; E.A. Deane, secretary; o'.B. Smith, 
treasurer; and A. Stanley, trustee. 16 The inaugural meeting 
was held in the St George's Cathedral Hall in Cape Town on 9 
July 1966 and the keynote speaker was Jakes Gerwel, a young 
lecturer at the University of the Western Cape. 17 The 
presence at this meeting of Gerwel,18 who later became an 
outspoken critic of the Labour Party, is an indication of the 
regard in which the Labour Party was held at the time as a 
potential opponent of apartheid and the government's policy of 
racial and political separation .19 
The date of foundation of the Labour Party has been a source 
of confusion, with a number of writers indicating either 1965 
14See Appendix II for profile. 
IsNorman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. 
16Sonny Leon Papers, D. 1., "Party Officials, 1965-1970"; 
P.A. 29, General Letter from F.E. Peters, National Secretary, 8 
June 1984. Stanley, Deane and Kearns were prominent trade 
unionists in the Cape. Edgar Deane was one of the four coloured 
persons who took the government to court in 1952 on the 
legitimacy of the bill to remove coloured voters from the voters' 
roll. 
17Arthur Stanley, interview, 10 September 1992. 
18Gerwel was to succeed Van der Ross as rector of the 
University of the Western Cape in 1987 and after the general 
election of April 1994, resigned his post to take up an 
appointment as Director-General in the Office of the President. 
19A1exander confirms that ANC leaders on Robben Island 
considered the Labour Party at the time, and well into the 1970s, 
as one of the movements of the liberation struggle. Neville 
Alexander, interview with author, George, 15 October 1994. 
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or 1966 as the founding date. The correct date is important 
if historians have to later establish the period of existence 
of the party. The date also has implications for the party 
when it comes to celebrating anniversaries, e.g. the tenth or 
silver or golden anniversaries. Thus, the accurate founding 
date has to be established. The decision to establish the 
party was taken in October 1965. However, only interim 
officers were chosen and a constitution still had to be 
drafted. The party was officially launched at the inaugural 
conference in Cape Town in 1966. Arthur Stanley, who was 
present at both meetings, states that the first conference, 
held on July 9, 1966, signalled the launch of the party . 20 
However, in a 1984 application to register as a political 
party for the House of Representatives, Fred Peters, national 
secretary of the Labour Party indicated the date of foundation 
as 1965. 21 This date was also used by Allan Hendrickse as the 
date of foundation. 22 Furthermore, before the first 
conference was held, the party had already published its first 
newsletter in March 1966,23 held its first 'public meeting on 
19 April 1966,24 and had organised a number of fundraising 
dances. 25 However, Van der Ross concurs with Stanley that July 
196,,6 must be regarded as the correct founding date. 26 Thus, 
the Labour Party of South Africa was officially formed in July 
1966 with Van der Ross as its first president, M.D. Arendse as 
vice-president, E.A. Deane as national secretary/treasurer and 
2°Arthur Stanley, interview, 10 September 1992 . 
21p.A.29, Application for Registration as a Political Party 
in term of Section 36 of the Electoral Act of 1979. 
22Allan Hendrickse, interview with author, Cape Town, 23 May 
1989. 
23LPSA, Newsletter, No.1 (March 1966). 
24"A Brief Report of our First Public Meeting", by Edgar 
Deane, in LPSA, 1966 And All That . 
25LPSA, Newsletter (No.1), 6. 
26Richard van der Ross, interview with author, Belhar, Cape 
Town, 9 September 1992. 
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A. Stanley as national trustee. 27 Additional executive 
members were H. Lawrence, W.B. Francis and F.E. Peters.28 
The Labour Party claimed direct descent from the non-
collaborationist wing of the APO, the NLL, SACPO and the 
Convention Movement and advanced the view that it was 
necessary to form the party so as to fill the need for a means 
of political expression for coloured people. The party 
planned to capitalise on the leadership void created by the 
government's suppression of anti-apartheid organisations after 
the Sharpeville massacre on 21 March 1960. 29 Thus, the party 
believed that participation in the CRC would provide it with a 
legal platform from which it could attack apartheid, agitate 
for socio-economic reform, and yet, at the same time, be safe 
from the harassment that other opposition movements were 
subjected to at the time. 30 By adopting the name "Labour" 
Party, the leaders hoped to show its identification with the 
working class, which, in the South African context, generally 
referred to those who were the victims of government 
discrimination and harassment. According to Sonny Leon the 
name was chosen to put the accent on labour because the 
fou.nders of the party believed "that all Coloured people are 
workers - all work for their living, mentally or 
physically. ,, 31 Allan Hendrickse states that many of the early 
members were involved in the trade union movement and the bulk 
27Simons, "Organised Coloured Political Movements", 228; 
P .A. 29, Minutes of Special Conference, 13 May, 1967; Arthur 
Stanley, interview, 10 September 1992. 
28p.A.29, Minutes of Labour Party National Conference, Cape 
Town, 9 July 1966. Howard Lawrence later joined the Sunday Times 
and became the Labour Party's severest critic. F.E. Peters was 
elected national secretary in 1968, a post he held for more than 
twenty years. 
29Miley Richards, Address to 
Conference, uitenhage, 17 September 
Herald, 19 September 1994. 
Labour 
1994; 
Party 
Eastern 
30LPSA, Newsletter (No.1), 4; Mina, "The CRC", 62. 
31Diamond Fields Advertiser, 7 June 1969. 
National 
Province 
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of supporters in later years came from the rural areas which 
comprised mostly manual labourers. 32 The party outlined in 
its constitution its own views on the kind of labour policy it 
would like to have introduced in South Africa. 33 However, the 
use of the name "Labour" came in for scathing criticism from 
the Educational Journal: 
When it includes the description "Labour" in its 
trade-name it subjects even that much-prostituted 
word to a form of cynical abuse it has seldom had to 
suffer since Madeley's White Labour Party and 
Hitler's "Labour Front" and Her Brittanic Majesty's 
Labour Party made "Labour" a dirty word usually 
associated with anti-working man politics. 34 
The Labour Party at the outset declared its opposition to 
apartheid in all its forms and demanded full citizenship and 
universal suffrage with direct representation for all South 
Africans at parliamentary, provincial and municipal level; the 
elimination of the colour-bar; justice and equal treatment for 
all South Africans; and the political, social and economic 
emancipation of the victims of government discrimination. 35 
The party also distanced itself from all other political 
parties and groups and expressed its rejection of communism . 36 
The' above demands had a strong liberal bias, arising out of 
the early affiliation of Labour Party leaders to the Liberal 
Party. When that party began to suffer government harassment 
in the 1950s and early 1960s, the majority of these leaders 
32Allan Hendrickse, interview, 23 May 1989. 
33p .A. 29, "Constitution of 
Africa", as amended, 9 July 1966. 
Appendix I. 
the Labour Party of South 
See copy of constitution in 
34"The C.A.D's Labour Party," Educational Journal (October 
1965),1-2. 
35Survey of Race Relations (1969), 6; Sonny Leon Papers, 
A.1., The Aims and Objects of the Labour Party. 
36LPSA, Newsletter (No.1), 4; Richard van der Ross, Address 
to Labour Party National Conference, Cape Town, 9 July 1966, in 
LPSA, 1966 And All That; Diamond Fields Advertiser, 7 June 1969. 
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joined the Progressive Party formed in 1959. 37 The close 
links with coloured people can be seen in the challenge by the 
Progressive Party, in 1963, on the united Party's hold on the 
four coloured representative seats in parliament. 38 It is 
therefore not surprising that the policies of the newly-formed 
Labour Party reflected strong liberal traditions. When 
coloureds were barred from membership of white political 
parties in 1968,39 the Labour Party became, in essence, a 
"coloured" version of the Liberal and Progressive Parties. 
What made the Labour Party's declaration of opposition to 
apartheid conspicuous was that all the other parties formed to 
contest the CRC election supported the government's policy of 
.. separate" or "parallel development.. in one way or another. 40 
The Federal Party, led by Tom Swartz, was a pro-government 
party which supported "parallel development." The 
Conservative Party of South Africa(CPSA), led by C.J.R. 
Fortein, advocated "parallel development .. ·. and aimed at 
unifying coloured people as a group or nation. This party 
sought equal social and economic opportunities with whites. A 
Port Elizabeth-based party led by R.H. Fischat, also called 
its .. elf the Conservative Party(CP) and supported "parallel 
development." The Republican Party(RP), led by T. Ie Fleur, 
37Mohammed Dangor, interview, 6 December 1993; Reader's 
Digest, Illustrated History of South Africa, 484. 
38In 1966, the Labour Party's pro-Progressive Party stance 
even led to accusations that the Labour Party was funded by Harry 
Oppenheimer. See"A Brief Report of our First Public Meeting" 
by Edgar Deane, in LPSA, 1966 And All That. 
39In terms of the Prohibition of Political Interference Act 
of 1968, persons of one population group were not allowed to 
belong to a political party of another population group. The 
introduction of this Act is dealt with more fully below. 
40By the 1960s the term "Parallel Development .. had replaced 
the term "Separate Development .. which had itself replaced the 
term "Apartheid" in government terminology. Parallel development 
was more in line with present government policy which saw the 
races as parallel streams which would develop equally but never 
flow into one another. 
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largely counted the Griquas among its followers. This party 
strove for coloured unity and an identity apart from whites . 
It advocated an Immorality Act to prohibit intermarriage 
between coloured people and other "non-whites." The National 
Coloured People's Party(NCPP), a Johannesburg- based party led 
by C. Smith, saw coloured people as a separate race with its 
own identity. This party even led a witch-hunt in coloured 
residential and business areas in Johannesburg to identify 
"non-coloureds" and report them for violating the Group Areas 
Act. It too favoured an Immorality Act as advocated by the 
Republicans. 41 
The differences between the five "pro-government" parties seem 
minor and it seems reasonable to presume that they could have 
combined to form one large powerful party supporting separate 
development and a distinct coloured identity. However, these 
parties were formed around strong local personalities, and in 
the case of the Republican Party, around the Griquas who had 
always considered themselves a separate group with a distinct 
identity . 42 The formation of these parties also reflected 
local attitudes. Whereas the Federal Party comprised largely 
col-oured people in the rural Western Cape who felt secure in 
their numbers, smaller coloured communities, for example in 
the Transvaal, always felt threatened by the overwhelming 
presence of African communities living in close proximity. 
This accounts for their paranoia about "non-coloureds" in 
coloured areas. 43 The proliferation of parties with similar 
policies can also be attributed to the new-found "freedom" of 
coloured people to involve themselves in politics, which the 
41Survey of Race Relations (1969), 6; Venter, Coloured, 498. 
42Following the repeal of race classification laws in 1991, 
a group living at Kranshoek near Plettenberg Bay have tried to 
keep Griqua identity alive by reclaiming land which they lost 
under the Group Areas Act in Kokstad, a town established when the 
followers of Adam Kok III settled there in 1862. Wessel Rabbets, 
interview with author, Oudtshoorn, 18 October 1994. 
43Lily Slinger, interview with author, Johannesburg, 13 
December 1993. 
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proposed CRC Act provided. Except in the Cape prior to 1910, 
coloured people had never had the opportunity to stand for 
election to national representative bodies, and the proposed 
CRC provided that opportunity. 
The differences between the five pro-"separate development" 
parties on the one hand and the anti-"separate development" 
Labour Party on the other reflected the fundamental divisions 
among coloured people themselves. While they generally 
resented discrimination, coloured people also differed sharply 
as to whether to accept the status imposed upon them by the 
government in the hope of being at least in a more privileged 
position than other "non-whites," or whether to throw in their 
lot with other oppressed groups and create a united front 
against the government's policy of apartheid. 44 This 
diversity of attitude arose largely because coloured people 
were not a homogeneous group within the South African 
population. 45 Apart from the common feature of "mixed blood," 
the "coloured population group" did not constitute a unity, 
least of all an ethnic entity. 46 Furthermore, the "Coloured" 
population group was not a product of voluntary identification 
but of statutory race classification. 47 The various ethnic 
., 
components of this statutorily-defined group were 
geographically and historically independent by origin, and the 
44This problem is discussed in greater depth in N. 
Alexander, "Non-collaboration in the Western Cape", in The Angry 
Divide: Social and Economic History of the Western Cape, eds. 
W.G. James and M. Simons (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989),180-91. 
45Lewis, Between the Wire and the Wall, 13. 
46J . H. Coetzee, The Coloured Challenqe (Potchefstroom: 
Institute for South African Politics, 1975), 1-2. See also Van 
der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 1-44, in which he explores the 
myth of coloured identity. 
47Theron Report (R P 38 - 1976), 464; Wollheim, Theron 
Commission: Comment, 1; Theron and Du Toit, Kortbegrip van die 
Theron-verslag, 99-101. 
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"racial" composition differed widely. 48 The Theron Commission 
in its 1976 report made constant reference to the 
heterogeneity of the "Coloured " population group. By the very 
nature of the creation of the "Coloured" population group, 
coloured people were not, and never were, a homogeneous 
grouping. Culturally, coloured people identified with whites; 
sharing a common language, religion and lifestyle,49 and it 
was an error to assert that coloured people were so different 
from whites that they had their own distinctive identity.5o 
Because of their cultural affinity with whites, Van der Ross 
speaks of "the almost childish optimism which had led the 
coloured people since the previous century to believe that 
their political destiny lay with that of Whites. ,,51 As a 
result "Coloured elites aspired towards integration into white 
society, with all the privileges that this implied, not to a 
separate Coloured identity with its negative social 
implications. ,,52 However, apartheid laws after 1948 created a 
problem for those who felt that "sanity would prevail" and 
that whites and coloureds would one day again be reunited. 53 
Therefore, instead of protest and agitation, should they not 
exercise patience and wait to be reaccepted into the white 
group? At the same time, race segregation, as odious as it 
was, was applied more leniently to coloured people. Would it 
not therefore be wiser for coloured people not to antagonise 
whites lest they lose the privileges which went with their 
48Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 5, 7, 38 . Heese, Groep 
Sonder Grense examined this phenomenon more extensively. 
49Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 8. 
50Wollheim, Theron Commission: Comment, 1; Theron and Du 
Toit, Kortbegrip van die Theron-verslag, 99-101; Botha, Die 
Kleurling en ons Kleurlingbeleid, 4-5. 
51R . E . van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes: An Inside Look at 
the Coloured People(Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1979), 78. 
52Lewis, Between the Wire and the Wall, 13. 
53Richard van der Ross, interview, 9 September 1992. 
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intermediate position in the colour-caste?54 The majority of 
this school of opinion comprised the older generation, 
especially in the Cape, who had lived, worked, played, voted 
and worshipped with whites in the past; rural coloureds, who 
were poorly-educated and poverty-stricken and thus more 
dependent on whites for their livelihood; and those living in 
provinces and regions where they were outnumbered by Africans. 
Since the 1920s the government had sought to cultivate and 
promote this opinion. 55 On the other hand, there were those 
who felt that they ought to throw in their lot with Africans 
who were also experiencing similar discrimination and 
oppression. This school of opinion was to be found mostly 
among coloured people in the Western Cape and better-educated 
coloureds in other provinces. Because coloureds were in the 
majority in the Western Cape, and due to the protection 
offered by the proclamation of the western Cape as a coloured 
preference area, they did not feel threatened by Africans. 56 
Carter encapsulates the dilemma facing the coloured community 
which was reflected in the policies of coloured political 
parties in the late 1960s: 
Of all the non-European groups, the Coloured are the 
least unified, and the least effective. They are still 
torn between their desire to associate themselves with 
Whites, and their reluctant awareness that the 
Nationalists are forcing them into the same general 
category as the Indians and Africans. 57 
The six parties formed between 1964 and 1969 also fairly 
54See Adhikari, "Protest and Accommodation", 106, regarding 
the ambivalence prevailing in the coloured community on this 
matter. 
55Lubbe, "Vergeet die Arbeiders", 19. 
56Archie Vergotine, Address to Annual Conference of Cape 
Teacher·s Professional Association, Oudtshoorn, 25 June 1994; R. 
Cohen, Y. Muthien and A. Zegeye, Repression and Resistance: 
Insider Accounts of Apartheid (London: Hans Zell, 1990). 
57Carter , Politics of Inequality, 361. 
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reflected the common divisions of conservatives, liberals and 
socialists found in other groupings in other countries as 
well. Simons constructed a typology of the divisions in 
coloured politics in the twentieth century. She divided 
coloured political groupings into coloured conservatives, 
liberals and brown socialists. According to her, coloured 
conservatives generally formed three main groupings: 
conservative integrationists who advocated integration under 
white hegemony - examples were the CPNU and the Federal Party; 
conservative segregationists who advocated separation in such 
a manner that it served to maintain white domination -
examples were the ANB of 1924 and the Republican Party; 
conservative nationalists who believed that colour, race and 
nationalism coincided and that society should be patterned 
accordingly - examples being the NCPP and the Conservative 
Party. Liberals formed two main groups: radical liberals who 
advocated the prohibition of all colour bars - examples were 
the Labour Party; and reformist liberals who advocated the 
abolition of economic colour bars .and visible manifestations 
of colour discrimination - an example of which was the APO 
after the first World War. "Brown" socialists consisted 
mainly of radical socialists who wanted to abolish both the 
colour bar and the capitalist mode of production - examples 
were the APO, prior to the First World War, and the NLL. 58 
Thus, most of the parties formed after 1964 appeared to carry 
on the tradition of organisations which had gone before, with 
the "colouredist" philosophy very dominant. 59 Of the six 
newly-formed parties, all of them, with the exception of the 
Labour Party, declared their intention of going into the CRC 
to improve the lot of coloured people, hoping to eventually 
58Simons, "Organised Coloured Political Movements", 2 05. 
59Simons, "Organised Coloured political Movements", 217, 
describes colouredism as "a cultural consciousness of the 
unskilled and those leaders and followers who accept separate 
institutions and separate development as a means by which to 
improve the position of the 'Coloured' people". 
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gain equality with whites. The Labour Party on the other 
hand, tried to distance itself from "colouredism" and stated 
that it would seek equality and justice for all South 
Africans, irrespective of race or ethnic grouping. To this 
end, the preamble to its constitution dedicated the party to 
"opposing all forms of racial discrimination which undermine 
the civil liberty and social justice of the individual. ,,60 
The party's stated objectives were to strive for the effective 
participation of all people in the government of the country, 
the elimination of the colour bar in legislation and the 
development of a political arrangement in the country, such 
that all sections of the population would be fairly and justly 
treated. 61 The Labour Party's intention to fight on behalf of 
all South Africans, not just coloured people, distinguished it 
from the rest. 62 As a result, many coloureds who would 
normally have abstained from voting, or even considered 
organised boycotts and protest, felt comfortable in supporting 
the Labour Party. 
Before the Labour Party could establish itself as a political 
force, Van der Ross resigned in 1967 and accepted a post as 
ass,istant education planner in the Department of Coloured 
Affairs. At a special conference convened in Salt River in 
May 1967 to elect a successor, the party secretary explained 
that "Dr Van der Ross had not resigned his membership of the 
Party, but due to him accepting a senior position in the 
Educational Dept in the Administration of Coloured Affairs, he 
could not hold any official position in the Party. ,,63 Although 
Van der Ross himself never gave any written or public 
60p .A. 29, "The Constitution of the Labour Party of South 
Africa", as amended, 9 July 1966. 
61Ibid. 
62p.A.29, "Constitution of the Labour Party of South 
Africa", as amended, 9 July 1966. 
63p.A.29, Minutes of Special Labour Party Conference, Salt 
River, Cape, 13 May 1967. 
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explanation of the reasons behind his decision to resign, 
Stanley explains that Van der Ross, a teacher by profession, 
was not employed as a teacher at the time of the formation of 
the Labour Party and was involved in a journalistic venture 
with a number of former colleagues. This venture was not 
successful and he tried to re-enter the teaching profession. 
However, his links with an anti-apartheid and anti-government 
party were not viewed favourably by the Department of Coloured 
Affairs which controlled coloured education, and he failed to 
get re-appointed. The implied threat was that, unless he 
wished to remain unemployed, he had to sever his links with 
the Labour Party.64 The irony of this act of coercion was 
that this same department, in an effort to quell disaffection 
and forestall protest and boycott at the "coloured" University 
of the Western Cape (UWC) in 1973,65 had to go "cap-in-hand" to 
Van der Ross to ask him to accept an appointment as rector of 
that institution, a position he subsequently filled in 1975. 66 
64Arthur Stanley, interview, 1(j September 1992. 
Unfortunately, the position Van der 'Ross found himself in was the 
rule and not the exception. Coloured teachers, generally, had 
over the years found themselves caught between their desire to 
oppose discrimination and the government's segregation policies, 
and' their need to retain their jobs. After 1984, the Labour 
Party used promises of jobs and promotion to entice teachers to 
register as members. Those who opposed the party and the House 
of Representatives lost out as far as employment or promotion was 
concerned. See chapter 7 for further discussion on this matter. 
65The problems on the University campus stemmed from 
unhappiness with the concept of separate universities; the 
overwhelming preponderance of white lecturers, professors and 
heads of departments; and the refusal by the rector to recognise 
the SRC and accede to their request to affiliate with other 
student organisations. In 1973, the black consciousness movement 
took root on the campus and the appointment of another white 
rector left the university in a crisis. 
66Venter, Coloured, 343-47, 365. Interestingly, after Van 
der Ross resigned in 1967, he was invited to UWC as a visiting 
lecturer but all the students walked out before he could begin 
his address on the topic, "Coloured Culture." See Educational 
Journal (September 1967), 9. After Van der Ross was appointed 
in 1975, campus problems and student grievances were still not 
alleviated. Press reports in 1975 and early 1976 indicate that 
UWC students still clashed with university authorities, including 
(continued ... ) 
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Members at this special conference expressed their 
disappointment at Van der Ross's resignation and complained 
that, as founder of the party, he had set a bad example by not 
giving timely notification of his intentions to the executive. 
This, they argued, put the party organisation in a difficult 
position. 67 The impact of Van der Ross's sudden resignation 
can be seen in the fact that the Labour Party had no obvious 
successor. Eventually, the delegates concluded that the vice-
president, Martin Arendse, "would be the only person here 
present ... who has the capabilities, to take over the 
leadership of the Labour Party. ,,68 Arendse had been a member 
of the UCCA and had won a reputation as an opponent of 
government policies for coloured people. However, his links 
with the UCCA were disturbing to many of the party's anti-
government faction, especially as the UCCA was a fully 
nominated government body which had been vigorously opposed at 
the time of its formation in 1959. 69 Arendse's links with the 
UCCA were to count against him in the leadership struggle in 
1970. Unlike the urbane, educated and gentlemanly Van der 
Ross, Arendse was not a very popular and well-liked person but 
he was considered the best man in the circumstances in 1967. 70 
66 ( ••. continued) 
their new coloured rector, Van der Ross. See Cape Times 18 
September 1975 and 9 March 1976. Evidently, Van der Ross's role 
in the formation of the Labour Party and the party's 
participation in the CRC was not approved of by the students: an 
indication that the Labour Party's role in the CRC was being 
seriously questioned. 
67p.A.29, Minutes of Special Labour Party Conference, Salt 
River, 13 May 1967. 
68rbid. 
69See Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 673-77, for a selection 
of articles which reflect the feelings of the coloured people at 
the time regarding the UCCA. 
70Saks describes Arendse as a "blunt and irascible 
politician" and Coetzer indicates that Allan Hendrickse hesitated 
to join the Labour Party in 1969 and stand as a candidate, 
because he was not happy with Arendse's leadership. See Saks, 
"The Failure of the CRC", appendix 6i Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 
62. 
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Van der Ross's resignation was a severe blow as the Labour 
Party had hoped that he could have used his influence and his 
standing in .the teaching fraternity to garner support for the 
party. Even though the Labour Party had considerable support 
in the teaching profession, fear of victimisation and 
dismissal prevented many teachers from openly declaring their 
support for the party.71 Despite Arendse's impassioned appeal 
to teachers "not to be immune from the struggle of their 
people" and to "join the ranks of the others in their fight 
for economic improvement and social and political justice, ,,72 
the Labour Party realised that it would have to turn its 
efforts elsewhere to gain sufficient support to offset the 
Federal Party's advantage in the rural areas and defeat it in 
an election. 
The leaders of the Labour Party were drawn mainly from trade 
unions and political and community organisations which had 
opposed the government's coloured policie~ since the days of 
the Anti-CAD movement and the NEUM in 1943'. Despite the 
choice of "Labour" in its name, and despite the emphasis on 
the "workers" in its constitution,73 the leaders were 
gen.erally from the urban, middle- and professional class and 
the initial drive for support was amongst the same classes. 
71Arthur Stanley, interview, 10 September 1992. The Cape 
Herald, 6 May 1972, published a report of a survey undertaken by 
a Dr A.D. Lazarus into teaching conditions in coloured schools 
at the time, which confirms the fears of victimisation, 
intimidation and dismissal experienced by teachers who involved 
themselves in anti-apartheid and anti-government activities. For 
example, A.C. Fortuin from East London was dismissed from his 
post as a teacher in Idutywa in 1969 because he was a member of 
the Labour Party. Fortuin, interview with author, Uitenhage, 17 
September 1994. This appeared to be a problem coloured teachers 
faced in the early 1900s already. Lewis, Between the Wire and 
the Wall, 13, indicates that coloured teachers faced dismissal 
if they involved themselves in politics. 
72post, 9 May 1968. 
73P.A.29, "Constitution of the Labour Party of South 
Africa", as amended, 9 July 1966. 
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The first branches formed were all in urban areas. 74 Thus, 
the Labour Party realised that it would have to widen its net 
to increase support in the hope of defeating the pro-
government parties. However, the party faced a number of 
hurdles. Its inability to win overt support from teachers, 
who had influence in their communities, was a severe 
setback. 75 In addition, those coloureds in the Western Cape 
who would have been considered the natural constituency of the 
Labour Party were still locked into the ideals of "non-
collaboration" and "boycott" which had characterised coloured 
politics since the 1940s and which had been exercised and 
vociferously propagated as recently as 1959 with the formation 
of the UCCA. Former supporters of the NEUM and Anti-CAD 
movement, the leading proponents of boycott, were not keen to 
support the Labour Party which advocated voting in the CRC 
election. 76 Thus, the Labour Party realised that it would 
have to take to the rural areas to get sufficient support to 
win an election. 
The party came up against the government and its supporters 
when it began electioneering in the platteland. Coloured 
peo.ple in the rural areas were mostly farm workers and were 
74LPSA, Newsletter (No.1), 5; P .A. 29, Minutes of Special 
Labour Party Conference, Salt River, Cape, 13 May 1967. The 
founder-members were themselves mainly urban-based. Of the 
fifteen persons present at the inaugural meeting in October 1965, 
ten were from the Cape (eight from the Cape Peninsula, one from 
the Boland and one from Kimberley) and five from Natal (one from 
Pietermaritzburg, the rest from Durban). See list of founder-
members in LPSA, 1966 And All That. 
75Arthur Stanley, interview, 10 September 1992. 
76See Alexander, "Non-Collaboration in the Western Cape", 
180-91, and Simons, "Organised Coloured political Movements", 
202-32 for a detailed discussion of the debate regarding the 
principle of "non-collaboration" and the "boycott" as a tactical 
weapon in coloured politics. Miley Richards, Address to Labour 
Party Special Conference, ui tenhage, 17 September 1994, indicates 
that many from an Anti-CAD background were sceptical of the 
Labour Party but were attracted by its anti-apartheid stance. 
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generally impoverished. 77 It was in the rural areas where the 
government set out to influence coloured people to support the 
pro-government Federal Party. The National Party, Department 
of Coloured Affairs and farmers openly supported the FP. FP 
members and their supporters and promoters descended upon 
rural settlements, promising illiterate people increased 
pensions and food parcels if they voted Federal. 78 Farm 
labourers, and those dependent on employment by whites, lived 
with the ever-present fear of victimisation or dismissal if 
they supported the Labour Party. Their impoverished state and 
dependence on white employers meant that the majority of rural 
coloured people were trapped into giving support to pro-
government parties. Moreover, farmers ensured that Labour 
Party canvassers never got near their employers. According to 
Michael Hendrickse, "die boere het ons gejaag en op ons 
geskiet toe ons onder die kleurlinge in die plaasbuurte gewerk 
het. ,,79 The Educational Journal paints a graphic picture of 
the forces at work in this election campaign: 
Everyone knows of the forces that were used to dragoon, 
intimidate, seduce and bamboozle people into voting. 
Everyone knows of the zealous interest displayed by 
police, farmers, priests, employers, location 
superintendents, housing scheme supervisors - all without 
"improper interference" no doubt. Everyone knows of the 
pressures brought to bear upon old-age pensioners and the 
recipients of official grants or assistance of any 
kind. 8o 
The Afrikaner Broederbond was the government's trump card. 
It was essential to National Party strategy, after the 
77Venter, Coloured, 444; Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 
52. 
78"Toens" Rooy, interview with author, Balfour, 17 July 
1994. 
79Michael Hendrickse, Labour Party Special Conference, 
Uitenhage, 17 September 1994. Apparently, this happened right 
up to the 1989 HoR election. 
80"Riding A Dead Horse", Educational Journal (October-
November 1969), 1. 
43 
failures of the CAC and UCCA, that the CRC work or that it be 
seen to be a working institution. The CRC had to pacify the 
coloured electorate and defuse political frustration and 
aggression which had begun to surface. This required that the 
first elections for that body proceeded smoothly; that it 
attracted a sufficiently large number of voters, and that the 
"right" party emerge as the majority party in the CRC. In 
order to ensure that this would happen, the National Party 
embarked on a clandestine campaign to propel Tom Swartz, 
former chairman of the coloured conservative CPNU and the pro-
government UCCA, to a position of prominence among coloured 
people. This led to the establishment of the Federal Party 
and the Broederbond emerged as the instrument to ensure 
victory for the Federal Party.81 However, in 1966, the 
government had introduced a bill which made support for the 
Federal Party impossible and also unlawful. The Prohibition 
of Political Interference Bill barred persons of one race 
group from belonging to political organisations or 
participating in the political affairs of ·other race groups.82 
This bill appeared to be a retaliation for the rejection by 
coloured voters of National Party-sponsored candidates for the 
cOloured representative seats in parliament and the provincial 
council, and to undermine the Progressive Party which had made 
great strides in gaining support from coloured voters.83 The 
bill was designed to prevent members of the multi-racial 
Progressive Party from being returned as coloured 
representatives both to parliament and the Cape Provincial 
Council. 84 Vorster had already warned in 1965 that if whites 
81Norman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994, expressed 
the conviction that the Federal Party was a "government front". 
82Muller, Five Hundred Years, 473, 539. 
83LPSA, Newsletter (No.1), 1-
84M. Ballinger, From Union to Apartheid: A Trek in to 
Isolation (Cape Town: Juta, 1969), 470; Saks, "The Failure of the 
CRC", 59-62; A.G. Mezerik, ed., Apartheid in the Republic of 
South Africa (New York: International Review Service, 1967), 9; 
(continued .•• ) 
44 
used these seats as a springboard to launch attacks on 
government policy, "the time will come when the basis of the 
representation will have to be considered. ,,85 However, this 
bill also had the effect of restricting the Broederbond in its 
attempts to assist the Federal Party. If the bill were to be 
passed, it would wreck its operation to assist Tom Swartz and 
the Federal Party. The executive council of the Broederbond 
therefore put pressure on the government to abandon the bill 
for the time being. However, the Prime Minister, H.F. 
Verwoerd, appeared to be reluctant to delay passage of the 
bill. Evidently, his desire to "punish" the coloured 
electorate and undermine Progressive Party attempts to court 
them, outweighed the need to assist the Federal Party. Two 
weeks after the death of H.F. Verwoerd on 6 September 1966, 
the Broederbond got its way and the bill was withdrawn. 86 
Unfettered for at least two years until the bill was again 
introduced, the Broederbond made use of the opportunity and 
vigorously set about promoting the Federal Party. A special 
Broederbond committee was appointed to help the party in its 
election campaign in a manner which would not directly involve 
th~ government. Louis van der Walt, a full time employee of 
the Broederbond who was also in the employ of the 
Republikeinse Intelligensie Diens, the ghost section of the 
Special Branch at the time, was put in charge of the campaign. 
Funds were provided by the Christiaan de wet fund, the secret 
one million Rand fund of the Broederbond which contributed 
more than R50 000 to cover the Federal Party's election 
84 ( ••• continued) 
Bunting, South Africa Reich, 41; M. Attwell, Background to the 
Crisis (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1986), 108. 
85Cape Times, 16 September 1965. 
86Sunday Times, 1 October, 1972 and 16 November 1975; I. 
Wilkins and H. Strydom, The Super-Afrikaners (Johannesburg: 
Jonathan Ball, 1978), 160-62. 
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expenses. 87 Thus it becomes apparent that the four-year delay 
between the first CRC Act in 1964 and its amendment in 1968, 
was intended to give the Broederbond and the campaign of Van 
der Walt sufficient time to establish a powerful 
collaborationist party and ensure its election victory. 
Wilkins and Strydom, in their expose of the Broederbond, 
outlined in detail the steps taken to influence the election 
in favour of the Federal Party. This included urging Broeders 
to assist with the registration of coloured voters, 
encouraging coloureds to vote, influencing them to vote 
Federal, arranging for farmers to get their workers and 
families to the polling booths, and entrusting vehicles to 
coloured persons to transport other voters to the polls.88 
Not only did the Broederbond try to engineer a Federal Party 
victory, it also flouted the Prohibition of Political 
Interference Act when it was eventually passed in 1968. The 
Act laid down that "no person of one population group may be a 
member of any political party of which any person who belongs 
to any other population group is a member or render assistance 
in anv way across the colour line in an election ..... (emphasis 
min,e) .89 In a report on the role of the Broederbond in the 
1969 CRC election, the Sunday Times alleged that "it gave 
secret support on a large scale to the Federal Party of Tom 
Swartz before and after Parliament had passed the Act in 1968 
to prevent white political parties from interfering in non-
white politics. ,,90 
87Wilkins and Strydom, Super-Afrikaners, 160-62; Venter, 
Coloured, 503; Sunday Times, 16 November 1975. During the 1972 
budget debate, David Curry revealed that one member of the 
Broederbond had alone donated R20 000. (Between 1979-1981, the 
author was in the employ of a company owned by Christiaan de Wet 
and his son and came to know of the assistance given to the 
Federal Party in the 1960s). 
BBwilkins and Strydom, Super-Afrikaners, 160-62. 
89Ballinger, From Union to Apartheid, 469. 
90Sunday Times, 1 October 1972; Simons, "Organised Coloured 
Political Movements", 203. 
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It was not only the Broederbond which flouted the law. 
Stanley reports that when he went to hold election meetings in 
Kroonstad, he found an audience consisting mainly of Africans. 
When he enquired as to their presence at a "coloured" election 
meeting, they indicated that they wished to hear the Labour 
Party's point of view before deciding how to vote. Upon 
further examination Stanley discovered that Tom Swartz had 
visited Kroonstad earlier and had found "hundreds of Africans" 
without identity documents (pass-books) . He subsequently 
arranged with the relevant government authority to issue 
"Coloured" identity documents to unregistered Africans in 
Kroonstad, after, of course, extracting from them a promise of 
support for the Federal Party. 91 
Besides the active support of government-supporting newspapers 
like Die Burger which spoke to coloureds "in their own 
language," the Department of Coloured Affairs used its monthly 
departmental journal, Alpha, to indoctrinate coloureds into 
accepting their status and position as a separate group. The 
journal was used to "educate" coloureds regarding the CRC. It 
was at pains to explain to coloured people how this council 
wou,ld benefit them politically, socially and economically. 
Details were given of how the council would work; when and how 
the elections would take place; who could stand as candidates; 
and how and where voting would take place. 92 Alpha enjoyed 
wide (and free) distribution in coloured schools and 
government offices and institutions, especially in the rural 
areas . Thus, the Labour Party found itself up against 
formidable opposition when it went into the rural areas to 
muster support for the party. To compound its problems, the 
party also had difficulty attracting candidates to stand in 
the election. The obvious choices, teachers and ministers, 
declined to be seen to be supporting an anti-government party 
91Arthur Stanley, interview, 10 September 1992 . 
92See for example, Alpha, Vol.?, No.8 (September 1969), 
3-4. 
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for fear of victimisation. 93 Other professionals and 
businessmen did not want to jeopardise their jobs, their 
customers and their suppliers. Thus, Arendse, Stanley and 
Sonny Leon had to travel the country, painstakingly recruiting 
Labour Party candidates for the forthcoming election. 94 It 
was in this way that they met H.J. (Allan) Hendrickse who was 
later to become the party's leader in the CRC and the House of 
Representatives. 95 
An indication of the extent of the problems the party 
experienced in getting sufficient support, was its attempt to 
raise money by levying contributions from branch members and 
the holding of dances. In 1967 no money had been received 
from the newly formed branches, and of the two dances held to 
raise funds only a few members attended the first and no one 
turned up for the second. Arendse warned that lack of funds 
would lead to the demise of the party: "Branches seemed to 
have forgotten that there is a head office, and should the 
Party go out of existence then the blame must rest on the 
shoulders of the members, and particularly those who have 
founded the Party. ,, 96 A further statement indicates the 
parlous financial position which members of the executive 
" 
found themselves in: "The National Executive has, since the 
last Conference, existed on nothing and they have made many 
93Rural coloured people were generally conservative and 
ministers feared criticism and a backlash from their 
parishioners. Many ministers were also full-time teachers and 
feared victimisation and dismissal by the Education Department. 
For example, the majority of ministers of the Congregational 
Church, one of the largest denominations in the coloured 
community, are also full-time teachers. Chris Drake, interview 
with author, Fort Beaufort, 17 July 1994. 
94L .S . (Sonny) Leon, interview with author, Kimberley, 25 
September 1985. Another interview planned in 1990 could not take 
place because of the illness and subsequent death of Leon. 
95Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 64. At the time, Hendrickse was 
a minister of the Congregational Church. 
96p . A. 29, Minutes of Special Labour Party Conference, 13 May 
1967. 
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personal sacrifices to keep the Party from going into 
decline. ,,97 This is in marked contrast to the Federal Party 
which received large donations from the Broederbond, the 
government and its supporters. Thus, the Labour Party's 
success in 1969 was all the more remarkable, given these 
circumstances. 
In 1968, the government introduced a number of bills designed 
to complete the political separation of whites and coloureds . 
The Prohibition of Political Interference Act which prohibited 
whites and coloureds from belonging to the same political 
party was eventually passed. The Separate Representation of 
Voters Amendment Act effectively terminated representation 
enjoyed in parliament by coloured people. The last of the 
trilogy of Acts was the Coloured Persons' Representative 
Council Amendment Act which replaced the 1964 Act and made 
provision for a council consisting of 20 nominated members and 
40 elected members. Any coloured could stand for election to 
the CRC if he was registered as a voter for a period of not 
less than two years, if he resided in the province where the 
electoral division for which he was standing was situated, and 
if ,he was not a communist. The country was divided into 40 
electoral divisions - 28 in the Cape, 6 in the Transvaal, 3 
each in the Orange Free State and Natal. This was a fair 
reflection of the demographic distribution of the coloured 
people in South Africa. This Act signalled the government's 
intention to proceed with the CRC and provided for the first 
election to be held on 24 September, 1969 . 98 
The announcement of the eventual implementation of the CRC Act 
and the date of the first election spurred the Labour Party to 
tighten its administration and sort out its leadership 
problems. At its 1968 conference, a number of changes were 
97Ibid. 
98Hugo, Ouislings or Realists, 45; Ballinger, From Union to 
Apartheid, 468; Post, 9 May 1968. 
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made. Sonny Leon was elected to the vice-president's post 
vacated by Arendse in 1967 when the latter succeeded Van der 
Ross; Deane was succeeded as national secretary by Fred 
Peters; and Arendse and Stanley were re-elected president and 
trustee respectively. Thus, within three years, four of the 
five founder-members elected to office in 1965 had been 
replaced. 99 The new office-bearers reflected the division of 
labour, effort and commitment to the task of canvassing for 
support and building up the image of the party. In his 
presidential speech, Arendse was critical of "some people who 
had started the Labour Party but had since left ..•• (They had) 
done themselves much harm and have certainly lost a very large 
measure of respect from the whole Coloured community." He 
referred to them as renegades: "Now that we are rid of these 
renegades, the party must make up its mind to go from strength 
to strength in its fight for equality of opportunity, rights 
and justice for all. ,,100 
The departure of most of the early leaders, and Arendse's 
attack on them, is perhaps a reflection of the frustration 
experienced by Labour Party leaders in the period prior to the 
fir.st election. It must be remembered that the Labour Party 
and the other parties referred to above, had been formed in 
response to the CRC Act of 1964. These parties had expected 
an election to be held soon after but the Act was never 
implemented and the CRe never functioned. 101 Thus, between 
1964 and the passing of the CRC Amendment Act in 1968, the 
parties operated in a vacuum, not knowing if and when the CRC 
would begin functioning. This accounts for the malaise in the 
Labour Party and its inability to rouse support and enthusiasm 
and raise funds for its cause. It also created tensions in 
99 N.S. Kearns left the party in 1966, D.B. Smith was not 
re-elected in 1966, R.E. van der Ross resigned as leader in 1967; 
E.A. Deane did not .stand for re-election in 1968. 
lOOp .A. 29, Minutes of Labour Party National Conference, Cape 
Town, 11 May 1968; Cape Herald, 18 May 1968. 
101Ballinger, From Union to Apartheid, 468. 
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the Labour Party with members accusing one another of lack of 
effort and cooperation. Some complained that they were making 
great sacrifices while others were showing no enthusiasm and 
commitment. 102 However, the passing of the 1968 Act and the 
announcement of the date of the first election gave fresh 
impetus to the party's election campaign. In discussions for 
an election platform, the party decided that the boycott 
strategy previously employed by coloured organisations would 
not be followed and that the party would definitely fight the 
election. In his presidential speech to the party's 1968 
conference, Arendse explained that "it is imperative that we 
do not boycott the Council, but see to it that the most 
capable men and women are elected to serve on the Council. ,,103 
Thus was established the Labour Party's oft-repeated doctrine 
that, to boycott separate political institutions, would leave 
those bodies to pro-government parties who would set 
themselves up as the legitimate voice of coloured people and 
give the government the excuse to continue with apartheid 
because coloured people accepted it. On t 'he basis of this 
doctrine, the Labour Party decided to confront the electorate 
with the importance of voting, contending that if they did not 
vot~ they would be supporting the apartheid system. The party 
adopted a slogan which became the foundation of its election 
platform: "A Vote for Labour is a Vote against Apartheid", and 
election pamphlets and posters urged: "The CRC is being used 
to oppress our People. By not voting you support the Apartheid 
System. Put Punch into the opposition. Vote Labour. ,,104 The 
Labour Party thus styled itself the "Anti-CRC" opposition. 
The Labour Party was therefore stating that it was opposed to 
the CRC and that it would represent all those who were 
likewise opposed. Thus, a very significant aspect of the 
102p .A. 29, Minutes of Special Labour Party Conference, 13 May 
1967. 
103Cape Herald, 18 May 1968. See also Post, 9 May 1968. 
104Sonny Leon Papers, B. 2. , Labour Party election pamphlet, 
1969. 
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election campaign was the virtual absence of any form of 
organised protest and opposition as was the case with the 
formation of the CAC in 1943 and the UCCA in 1959. One must 
infer, therefore, that the opponents of the CRC did not launch 
any widespread and sustained opposition to the 1969 CRC 
elections because they accepted the Labour Party's claim to be 
the "Anti-CRC" opposition. 
However, a promise made during the election campaign not only 
increased support for the Labour Party, but created problems 
for the party for the next two decades. During the election 
campaign the party promised that it would not occupy its seats 
in the council if it won the election "in order to prove 
conclusively that the coloured people rejected apartheid 
institutions in whatever form they came. ,,105 At the time, it 
was not specified whether "winning" meant a majority of the 
elected seats or an outright majority of the combined elected 
and nominated seats. Stanley maintains, however, that this 
was never official party policy and that someone may have made 
an unauthorised promise in the excitement of the moment .106 
However, it is difficult to see how else the party could have 
captured the anti-apartheid vote as they were in the invidious 
position of having to deal with the exponents of "boycott" and 
"non-collaboration" on the one hand, and the not 
inconsiderable forces of the pro-separate development grouping 
on the other. That promise certainly attracted a lot of 
support but was to haunt the Labour Party for the duration of 
the CRC's existence. 
The response of coloured people to the proposed Coloured 
Persons' Representative Council (CRC) was surprising. The 
creation of the Coloured Advisory Council(CAC) in 1943 had 
been vigorously opposed. Various groups and organisations 
10SSunday Times, 16 November 1975; Saks, "The Failure of the 
CRC", 56. 
106Arthur Stanley, interview, 10 September 1993. 
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such as the Anti-CAD movement, AFO, NEUM and TLSA had refused 
to co-operate with the government in its plans for coloured 
people .107 Elections held on the separate voters' roll in 
1958 and 1963 had been boycotted and a number of organisations 
such as the Convention Movement and SACPO had called on 
coloured people not to cooperate in any way with the 
government, and to oppose all forms of separate consultative 
and administrative machinery for coloured people .108 In this 
vein, the UCCA received similar treatment. Yet, the formation 
of the CRC aroused great interest. This paradox requires some 
explanation. In 1943, coloured people were still largely 
integrated with whites. Even though they could not sit in 
parliament, coloureds still voted on the same roll as whites, 
at least in the Cape. The mass of race laws was still 
something of the future. There were no territorial, social 
and labour segregation laws in 1943. Coloured people were 
therefore fighting to retain what they already had and to 
prevent any erosion of what had always been theirs. In the 
late 1950's, the spate of discriminatory legislation and their 
removal from the common roll had corne as a shock to coloured 
people. However, they still hoped that the United Party would 
ret~rn to power and restore them to the position they 
previously had. 109 Protest, boycott and opposition were 
therefore necessary to restore the status quo and create a 
climate for the restoration of their rights. NOw, in the 
mid-sixties, they had no political rights and apartheid laws 
had stripped them of property and social rights as well . Any 
l~Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 44. 
108Du Preez, "The Role and Policies of the Labour Party of 
South Africa", 25. 
109 In the 1958 election, the United Party still promised 
coloured people that they would be restored to the common roll 
if the UP carne to power. However, coloured people soon became 
disillusioned with the United Party because of its indifferent 
approach to segregation, and voted increasingly for the 
Progressive Party. See for example C. J. Bundy, "The Colour 
attitudes and policies of the United Party, 1948-1960" (A long 
essay submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the 
Honours degree in History, University of Witwatersrand, 1967). 
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opportunity to regain what they previously had was eagerly 
seized at, especially if it gave them an opportunity to move, 
once again, closer to whites with whom they had always been 
closely associated. llo 
Not all coloured people were eager to accept the CRC but, in 
comparison to the reaction to the formation of the CAC and 
UCCA, the CRC met with a much greater and enthusiastic 
response. Coloureds throughout South Africa registered in 
their thousands. Figures are difficult to compare because 
only coloureds in the Cape were registered as voters on the 
separate roll in 1958 and 1963, whereas voters from all four 
provinces registered for the 1969 CRC election. However, the 
available figures still give a good indication of the interest 
in the new council. In 1958 there were 29 281 registered 
voters in the Cape. 111 In 1963 the figure dropped to 9 
818. 112 For the 1969 election, 637 587 coloureds from all 
four provinces registered as voterS. 113 The high figure could 
be ascribed to the fact that coloureds in ·all the provinces 
were eligible to vote. Yet, if one considers that of the 843 
973 eligible for registration, approximately 700 000 lived in 
the Cape, it becomes apparent that coloured people, especially 
.. 
those in the Cape, seemed more than usually interested in the 
CRC. 1I4 However, the unusually high interest displayed in ·the 
CRC was not so much a spontaneous reaction by enthusiastic 
coloureds as it was a result of coercion. To ensure that its 
latest instrument for separate representation did not go the 
same way as the CAC and UCCA, the government decreed that 
registration would be compulsory, with non-registration 
1I0Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 78. 
1I1F . Van Jaarsveld, From Van Riebeeck to Vorster, 1652-1974 
(Johannesburg: APB, 1975), 336. 
lUHeard, General Elections, 114. 
113Sonny Leon Papers, C. 1. 1. 3.2., 26 February 1980. 
114Debates of the House of Assembly (4 February 1969), Col. 
92; Department of Information, Progress of a People, 8. 
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carrying a penalty of R50 or three months imprisonment. lls 
This penalty may seem low and not sufficient to ensure 
registration on such a large scale. However, in 1969, the 
majority of coloured people were still impoverished and 
poorly-paid. R50 was more than a month's salary for many and 
a fine would have had severe economic consequences. 116 Also, 
coloured people were generally conservative and law-abiding 
citizens and were prepared to obey the law, no matter how 
unfair or coercive it was. Furthermore, the government's race 
laws after 1948, and the harsh enforcement thereof, had brow-
beaten and demoralised coloured people so that by the 1960s, 
they did not have the strength nor inclination to oppose the 
government. Thus, the seemingly enthusiastic response was not 
so spontaneous after all as the percentage polls in the 1969 
election were later to bear out. 
Because the statutory coloured population group was not a 
homogeneous group,117 it would have been surprising had there 
not been diverse reaction to the CRC. Yet, while it was clear 
that the CRC was going to be a subordinate political 
institution with limited powers, only a small section of the 
co~unity voiced opposition, branding the CRC as an attempt to 
dampen the coloured clamour for equal political rights and 
democratic representation in parliament. Since the launch of 
the Anti-CAD movement and the NEUM in the 1940s, a strong 
tradition of non-collaboration had existed among the more 
educated and politically aware coloureds, particularly in the 
115Ballinger, From Union to Apartheid, 469. 
116Venter, Coloured, 54, 461-62, indicates that in 1972, 
coloured farm labourers earned between R5 and R8 per week and 60% 
of the coloured work force earned less than R60 per month. Thus, 
the fine of R50 in 1969 comes into perspective. Van der Ross, 
Myths and Attitudes, 52, indicates that the average income in the 
Cape rural areas in 1974 was R157 p.a. There is no record of the 
government ever enforcing this provision. 
117See for instance, Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 
5,7,38. The Theron Commission in its 1976 report makes constant 
reference to the heterogeneity of the "Coloured" population 
group. 
55 
Cape. This small group, consisting mostly of academics, had 
used the Educational Journal, the organ of the TLSA, to attack 
the CAC and UCCA in the past. Now, they attacked the 
proposed CRC and the Federal and Labour Parties for choosing 
to participate. IW They labelled as collaborators, 
"quislings" and "sellouts," anyone who was prepared to support 
this body and . serve in it. ll9 Besides advocating a boycott of 
the CRC and the elections for that body, these opponents were 
however unable to corne forward with constructive alternatives. 
For the most part, all they could do was to involve themselves 
in cultural and educational activities, ':endlessly elaborating 
their own particular doctrine and damning those who disagreed 
with them as revisionists, collaborators, C.I.A. agents, 
quislings or lackeys." 120 Al though the Labour Party agreed 
with the argument put up by the anti-CRC faction, it 
nevertheless declared its willingness to use the CRC as a 
forum for articulating grievances and expressing views .121 
The Federal Party and the other pro-separate development 
parties dismissed anti-CRC opposition and accepted the 
National Party's view that coloureds were a distinct group 
with an identity separate from whites. They were convinced 
tha·t working within the framework of the CRC would improve the 
position of coloured people .122 These three opposing views 
llBHugo , Quislings or Realists, 436. 
119Federal Coloured People's Party Collection, T.F. Swartz, 
Address to Federal Party National Conference, Kroonstad, 1-8 July 
1967. The term "quisling" takes its name from Vidkun Quisling, 
the head of the Norwegian puppet and collaborationist government 
during the Nazi occupation of Norway during World War II. The 
term was first used in coloured politics in 1943 when the pro-CAC 
faction were branded "quislings" because they chose to 
"collaborate" with the government. 
120Whisson, "Coloured People", 56. 
l2lSee Arthur Stanley Private Collection, Richard van der 
Ross, Address to Labour Party National Conference, Cape Town, 9 
July 1966. 
122See Thompson and Prior, South African Politics, 95; Hugo, 
Quislings or Realists, 299-301. 
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represented the divergence of opinion within this 
heterogeneous group. However, the voices of opposition were 
drowned out in 1969 as the Labour and Federal Parties with 
their respective standpoints dominated the election campaign. 
The Labour Party duly won the election, gaining 26 of the 40 
elected seats. In the process it received 136 845 of the 
300 918 votes cast (table 1). Although the Labour Party won 
Table 1 - Schedule of 1969 Election Results. 123 
Party No. of Seats No. of 
Contested Seats won 
Labour Party 36 26 (65,0%) 
Federal Party 40 11 (27,5%) 
Republican Party 17 1 ( 2,5%) 
National Coloured 
People' Party 16 1 ( 2,5%) 
Conservative Party 10 - ( 0,0%) 
Independents 8 1 ( 2,5%) 
Spoilt Papers - ( - ) 
Total No. 
of votes 
136 845 
91 327 
30 241 
23 260 
3 216 
11 407 
4 622 
% of poll 
45,4% 
30,4% 
10,1% 
7,7% 
1,1% 
3,8% 
1,5% 
--------------------------------------------
40 40 ( 100%) 300 918 100% 
---------------------------------------------
65% of the elected seats, the pro-government parties polled a 
combined 159 451 (53,1%) votes against the 136 845 (45,4%) of 
the Labour Party, a factor which the government later 
exploited when it came to nominating members to the twenty 
nominated seats .124 The Labour Party was immediately tagged a 
"minority" party, a label it resented .125 Thus , despite 
winning the majority of elected seats, the result gave a 
different indication of the party's standing in the coloured 
community: 45,4% of the popular vote could not be construed as 
overwhelming support by coloured people. The strength of the 
Labour Party's support comes more sharply into focus when 
123Sonny Leon Papers, C.1.1.3.2., 26 February 1980, 
Statistics supplied by P.J. Keyser, Chief Electoral Officer. 
124See below. 
125Hugo, Ouislings or Realists, 83. 
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viewed in the light of the statistics in table 2. 
Table 2 - Statistical Analysis of the 1969 CRC Election126 
Number of eligible voters 
Number of registered voters 
Number of actual votes 
Votes received by the Labour Party 
Labour Party support as percentage 
of eligible voters 
Labour Party support as percentage 
of registered voters 
Labour Party support as percentage 
of actual votes 
843 973 
637 587 
300 918 
136 845 
16,2% 
21,4% 
45,4% 
The coloured population in South Africa in 1970 was given as 2 
018 453 of which 993 115 lived in the Western Cape. Of this 
figure, 598 952 lived in the Cape Town metropolitan area. 127 
At the time of the 1969 CRC election, 843 973 persons were 
eligible to vote of which 637 587 (75,5%) . registered. 
However, less than half of the registered' yoters (300 918) 
went to the polls and less than half that again (136 845) 
voted for the Labour Party. Thus while the Labour Party 
received almost half of the popular vote, this represented 
onty 21,4% of the registered voters and 16,2% of the eligible 
voters. 
The low poll was a result of a combination of political 
ignorance on the part of coloureds, particularly those outside 
the Cape who were voting for the first time; 128 apathy or the 
resentment of many in the Cape who had been alienated because 
126Sonny Leon Papers, C.1.1.3.2., 26 February 1980. 
127Department of Information, Progress of a People, 8. The 
Theron Commission put the total coloured population in 1970 at 
2 050 699. See also Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 26 . 
128See chapter 1. Coloureds in the Orange Free State and 
Transvaal had never had the franchise and after 1910, no new 
coloured voters were registered in Natal. Coloureds in the Cape 
only enjoyed a qualified franchise which excluded poorer members 
of the community and the majority of those in the rural areas. 
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of their removal from the common roll in 1956; and the anger 
of coloureds in general at the harsh application of apartheid 
laws after 1948. This was the first time that the majority 
had the opportunity to express their feelings and they did so 
by ignoring the CRC. The Educational Journal was however 
convinced that the low poll was a result of the conscious 
application of the boycott strategy which was popular in 
coloured circles: 
In a never-ending stream of big lies and small lies, 
half-truths, sophistries, home-brewed rumours, threats, 
they all - from the party to the sex-crime press -
joined forces to assure the voters and the world at large 
that the boycott was dead, that the boycott had never 
really existed except in the minds of a few doctrinaires, 
that only a handful of perverse intellectuals might 
boycott, that ex-boycotters could hardly wait to vote, 
that the so-called Labour Party was really for the 
boycott •... And then~ as a clear and indisputable fact, 
the people boycotted .12 
While the council, which was largely an elected body, was 
undoubtedly an improvement on earlier consultative bodies, it 
nevertheless symbolised the government's policy of political 
separation and for that reason, it was rejected by a large 
segment of the coloured electorate .130 A significant number 
of those who did vote registered their dissatisfaction by 
voting for the Labour Party. However, the results could not 
substantiate the Labour Party's claim to represent the 
majority of coloured people. While many might have been 
sympathetic to the Labour Party and supported its anti-
government and anti-CRC stance, that support did not translate 
into tangible results at the polls. The Labour Party was 
painfully aware that its standing as a coloured party of 
substance was being questioned and Sonny Leon, after he became 
129"Riding A Dead Horse", Educational Journal (October-
November 1969), 1. 
13OW. H. Thomas, "The Coloured People 
Separation", in South Africa: Public Policy 
Schrire (Cape Town: Juta, 1982), 157. 
and the Limits of 
Perspectives, ed . R 
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party leader in 1970, pointed critics to the 1975 election in 
which the Labour Party would show whether it was a "seven-day" 
wonder or a political force to be reckoned with.131 
However, if one takes into the account the problems which the 
Labour Party encountere d prior to the election and the forces 
ranged against it, then the Labour Party did rather well under 
the circumstances. The support it received in the election 
can be attributed to three factors. Firstly, the party 
promised not to occupy its seats in the council if it won the 
election, in order to prove that the coloured people rejected 
the CRC . 132 What the Labour Party was saying was - vote for 
us and we will destroy the CRC; a vote for us is a vote 
against separate institutions of representation like the CRC. 
Secondly, the party received support from the African, 
coloured and white opposition press which kept it constantly 
in the public eye. Thirdly, the Federal Party was widely 
considered a "sellout" party prepared to accept apartheid. 
The extent of rejection was so emphatic in some areas that the 
leader of the Federal Party, Tom Swartz, not only lost in his 
own constituency but lost his deposit as well. The only party 
lea,der to win a seat was the Labour Party' s Martin Arendse. 
Thus, pro-government parties were individually dealt a blow by 
the coloured electorate. 133 The government· s attempts to 
ensure a high voter turn-out also did not succeed - the 
government could force people to register but it could not 
force them to vote. 
The intriguing question after the election was how the 
government would react to the results which saw a professedly 
anti-government, anti-apartheid, anti-eRC Labour Party "win" 
131p .A. 29, Minutes of 
Umtata, 1-3 January 1975; 
1985. 
Labour Party National Conference, 
Sonny Leon, interview, 25 September 
132Sunday Times, 16 November 1975. 
133Survey of Race Relations (1969), 7. 
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the election by 26 out of 40 elected seats. However, the CRC 
consisted of 60 seats in all (20 nominated) and the Labour 
Party thus did not have an outright majority to "govern" in 
the new council. The 20 seats to be nominated by the ' 
government would thus prove crucial. Mindful of Labour 
threats to destroy the CRC before it began functioning, the 
government packed the council in its favour by appointing 20 
members from the ranks of the Federal Party (13 of these had 
been defeated candidates in the election) to the 20 nominated 
seats provided for in the CRC Act. This gave the Federal Party 
an instant majority in the council and control of the 
executive committee. Having won only 11 of the 40 elected 
seats, the Federal Party suddenly had 31 of 60 seats in the 
full council. 134 In a further act of cynicism, Tom Swartz, 
leader of the Federal Party, was appointed chairman of the 
executive committee despite his election defeat by a Labour 
candidate and the loss of his deposit. Thus, a pro-apartheid, 
government-supporting coloured, having be~n decisively 
defeated, was now the "Prime Minister" of the very people who 
had roundly rejected him. According to Richards, "the NP took 
the losers, picked them up off the floor and said to the 
col.oured people, 'here are your leaders'. ,,135 By this act of 
cynicism, the government destroyed any possible credibility of 
a body which it had hoped would be the final solution to the 
political problems of coloured people. Thus, when the CRC 
convened its first session in November 1969, the Labour Party 
which had convincingly won the election with 26 of the 40 
elected seats, became, instead, the Opposition. The Federal 
Party, which had lost the election, became the ruling party in 
the council. J.J. Loots, the Minister of Coloured, Rehoboth 
and Nama Relations later confessed: "I admit the council was 
134Ibid. 
135Miley Richards, 
Conference, Uitenhage, 17 
Address to Labour 
September 1994. 
Party Special 
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loaded and I would so do again if necessary."l36 
The Labour Party, critics of the government, and the 
opposition press condemned this action by the government and 
attacked the CRC as a farce. Arendse, the Labour Party 
leader, stated that South Africa was the only country in the 
world where a party which had won an election ended up as the 
opposi tion .137 Schalk van der Merwe, the Minister of Coloured 
Affairs, called critics "naive" and ·lacking an "understanding 
of political realities. ,,138 He strongly defended the 
government's actions and in an ingenious argument dismissed 
criticism of his action: 
It would be extremely naive and politically stupid of 
this government to destroy its own creation with its own 
hands, that is to say the Coloured Persons' 
Representative Council, created for this developing 
group, by filling it with representatives of a party 
whose declared aim it is not to cooperate with or even 
engage in dialogue with the lawful g.overnment of the 
country, a party which advocates complete integration, 
and, .•. has shown repeatedly .that it ·wishes to destroy 
the Coloured Persons' Representative Council .... As far 
as the charge of immorality as such is concerned ... the 
question remains whether the approximately 158 000 votes 
cast in favour of the parties which support the policy of 
separate development in the broader sense, as against 
approximately 137 000 recorded in favour of the party 
which rejects it •.• cannot be regarded as a referendum 
in favour of Government policy, so that the government 
had a moral duty to ensure that the views of the majority 
are respected by appointing members who are unbiased 
towards government policy ••.. 139 
136Cape Times, 23 March 1970. The Department of Coloured 
Relations was established on 1 July 1969 to serve as a link 
between the CRC and the government. See Alpha, Vol.7, No.4 
(April 1969), 8. 
137Survey of Race Relations (1969), 7-8. 
13BHugo, Quislings or Realists, 82 . 
139I bid, 83. When Tom Swartz lost his deposit after being 
defeated by the Labour Party candidate in the Kasselsvlei 
consti tuency , he used the same argument. See Wilkins and 
Strydom, Super-Afrikaners, 162. 
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However, this was neither a logical nor a credible argument. 
The eRe election was organised as an election and not a 
referendum. Elections in South Africa up to 1994 have always 
been won by the party gaining the majority of seats, not 
votes. The governing National Party itself had come to power 
with minority support. In the general election of 1948, the 
United Party and other opposition parties had mustered 74 
seats against the 79 of the National and Afrikaner Parties . 
Despite losing the election, the opposition parties polled 547 
437 (50,9%), compared to 443 278 (41,2%) polled by the 
National and Afrikaner Parties. Nevertheless, even though the 
National Party polled 100 000 votes less than its opposition, 
it won the election on the basis of the number of seats won 
and proceeded to govern. 140 
The Labour Party's reaction to Van der Merwe's action was to 
call off its election promise not to occupy its seats in the 
council. It decided instead to participate in the eRe and 
destroy that body from within.141 Having b"een so outspoken 
during the election, the Labour Party's about-turn drew sharp 
criticism from both supporters and critics. However, it 
shQ.uld be remembered that the Labour Party had expected to 
gain at least 31 seats to enable it to control the eRe. Only 
if it were the ruling party in the eRe could a boycott of the 
council have had the maximum impact. Yet now, if it boycotted 
council proceedings, the eRe would continue to function with a 
Federal majority. If Labour members resigned their seats, the 
government would simply arrange by-elections which, because of 
the Labour Party boycott, would then be contested by other 
government-supporting parties. 
On closer examination, however, the Labour Party's promise not 
to occupy its seats in the council was not seriously intended 
and must be considered an election ploy to impress the 
14oHeard, General Elections in South Africa, 41. 
l4lSunday Times, 16 November 1975. 
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electorate as to the seriousness of its opposition to 
apartheid and separate institutions, and an attempt to 
distance itself from the other parties who all supported 
separate development. Numerous statements by party leaders 
prior to the 1969 election showed that the Labour Party had 
every intention of contesting the election and participating 
in the CRC, irrespective of the outcome. Prior to resigning 
in 1967, Van der Ross issued a statement in which he accepted 
that separate development was "here to stay" and that the 
Labour Party will "take separate development and demand as our 
right everything the Government tells us separate development 
has to offer. ,,142 He later confirmed that one of the main 
reasons why he had formed the Labour Party was so that it 
could "get away from only being a pressure or discussion group 
and to take part in the mainstream. ,,143 In a memorandum 
submitted to the Commission of Enquiry into the Improper 
Interference and the political Representation of the various 
Population Groups in 1967 (R.P. 72-67), the Labour Party made 
the following submissions: 
The Coloured Persons' Representative Council Act is of 
great importance in considering the proposed political 
future of the Coloured people, The CRC represents the 
Government's attempt to supply the Coloured people, in 
the absence of Common Roll representation, with an 
instrument of government which will satisfy some of the 
functions of legislation and which will at the same time 
provide needed legislative experience and outlets. The 
attitude of the Labour Party to this Council must be seen 
in relation to its attitude to the Common Roll and to the 
welfare of the Coloured people. As Common Roll 
representation is denied to us, we feel that we cannot 
avoid using the machinery of the CRC in order to achieve 
such an advancement for the people and such legislative 
outlets and experience as may be achieved .144 
142Survey of Race Relations (1968), 7. 
143Richard van der Ross, interview, 9 September 1992. 
144"Memorandum to the Commission of Enquiry into the Improper 
Interference and the Political Representation of the Various 
Population Groups" in LPSA, 1966 And All That; Hugo, Quislings 
or Realists, 125. 
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In 1968, Arendse, while sketching the brief history of the 
Labour Party, stated: 
The Labour Party came into existence in order to fill the 
need for a means of political expression for the Coloured 
people of South Africa today .... Many of the Founders 
..• are men and women who have consistently opposed these 
measures of separate representation, separate Councils, 
etc ••.. But faced with the type of government action, 
they foresee that they will be cancelled out of having 
any influence on the South African political scene 
whatsoever, if they do not use the present ·machinery.145 
In his presidential address to the 1968 conference of the 
Labour Party, Arendse vowed to fight every available seat in 
the election and declared that the party would not boycott the 
CRC and leave it to "members sympathetic to the government." 
He also declared the party's intention of using the CRC as a 
"forum for the conducting of a further campaign for the 
improvement of our political status and eventual restoration 
to the common roll franchise of which we were so blatantly 
denuded. ,,146 At the 1969 Labour Party conference, Arendse 
again repeated these sentiments and Leon weighed in against 
those who advocated a boycott of the elections. 147 The Labour 
Party, therefore, had every intention of participating in the 
CRC. Leaders argued that the party was still implacably 
opposed to apartheid, separate development and separate 
institutions of political representation, but faced with the 
harsh political reality, they realised that if they left the 
pro-separate development parties unopposed in the CRC, it 
would encourage the government in furthering apartheid for 
coloured people, because the government would be able to claim 
that these parties represented the opinion of coloured people 
145Hugo , Quisling or Realists, 119. 
146post, 9 May 1968. 
!47p .A. 29, Minutes of Labour Party National Conference, Salt 
River, Cape,S April 1969. 
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in South Africa .148 Arendse expressed regret for Labour's 
participation in the CRC but insisted that even though the 
party's constitution rejected apartheid, it needed to use all 
legal means and machinery to destroy the idea that coloured 
people as a whole accepted apartheid. In order to do this, 
said Arendse, "it must enter the political field and fight the 
elections on the basis of the present set-up. This it regrets 
exceedingly, but it sees no practicable alternative. ,,149 
Thus began the Labour Party's dilemma. It rejected the CRC, 
yet decided to participate; it wished to destroy it, but found 
that it did not have the power to do so; it rejected 
apartheid, but was forced to participate in an apartheid 
institution in order to provide for its political aspirations. 
The Labour Party's dilemma also represented the dilemma of the 
coloured colour-caste. They realised that the government was 
seeking to coopt them into a loose political union with whites 
so that they could serve as a buffer against Africans. 
However, such unity meant the relegation 6f coloured people to 
a second class status vis-a-vis the white group, which, 
nevertheless, was a higher status in the stratification of 
So~th African society than that of the African group. On the 
other hand, coloureds identified with Africans as oppressed 
castes, yet, had no real affinity with them. Also, unity with 
Africans would bring them into confrontation with the ruling 
white group .150 Thus, coloured people and the Labour Party 
found themselves subjected to pulls and strains from both 
sides. The problem which faced the coloured people was: did 
one collaborate with the oppressor in the hope of obtaining 
concessions and a more favourable application of government 
148LPSA, Newsletter (No.1), 3; Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 
120. 
149Hugo , Quislings or Realists, 120. 
150See M. Adhikari, "Between Black and White: The History of 
Coloured Politics in South Africa", Canadian Journal of African 
Studies, vol.25, No.1 (1991), 106-7. 
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policy, or did one totally oppose the government and refuse to 
co-operate in any way at all, even risking their ire and the 
withholding of possible future privileges? This was a dilemma 
which the coloured people faced for much of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, and it was a problem which was to dog the 
footsteps of the Labour Party throughout the existence of the 
eRe and its successor, the House of Representatives . 
The decision by the Labour Party to fight elections for the 
eRe and subsequently to participate in that body, drew 
strident criticism from the proponents of the principle of 
non-collaboration and those who had accepted the party's 
promise that it would not occupy its seats in the council. 
They claimed that the party was selling out to the "multi-
national development strategy" of the government and the party 
was therefore pro-segregationist .151 The harshest criticism 
of the Labour Party and the CRC to date had come from the 
Educational Journal which had labelled the CRC as "the present 
form of the ' Kleurling' equivalent of Matanzima's Tribal 
Assembly." The Labour Party was described as "a creature of 
the C.A.D • •.. tribalist and segregationist •..• pro-apartheid 
..• (and) politically 'Coloured' from choice ... because it 
seeks to do business in that group area and under that 
classification. ,,152 Now, the Labour Party's response to the 
government's move to pack the council elicited sarcastic 
comment from the journal: 
Some of the collaborators, surprised and stripped naked 
by the boycott, are frantically casting about for 
something, anything, with which to cover their 
(political) pudenda, not from any sense of shame but 
merely because of the freezing draught. But there is 
151Mina, "The CRC" , 63; J. Freedberg, "Changing Political 
Identity", 191. 
152"The C .A. D. 's Labour Party", Educational Journal (October 
1965), 1. Miley Richards contends that the Labour Party was 
launched to step into the vacuum created by the banning and 
imprisonment of the leaders of the oppressed and that it was 
never launched as a "Coloured" party. Address to Labour Party 
Special Conference, Uitenhage, 17 September 1994. 
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nothing that they can do and so they might as well 
abandon all notions of dramatic gestures which might 
salvage some portion of the reputations they had or 
pretended to have. They are nailed to the scaffolding of 
Uncle Tom's Cabin and nothing can save them .153 
Despite criticism of its decision to remain in the council, 
triggered by its failure to gain sufficient elected seats, the 
Labour Party's failure to gain an outright majority was seen 
as a strategic blessing by those who felt that being in 
opposition was actually the party's best position and would 
allow it to carry out the aims and objectives in its 
constitution. George Manuel of the Cape Times articulated 
this point of view at the height of the furore over the 
nominated seats. He pointed out that the CRC was the "fruit 
of the Nationalist government's policy," that it was a 
"Government-created apartheid machine," and that its role was 
to implement apartheid in all aspects affecting the coloured 
people. Thus if the Labour Party with it~ anti-apartheid 
policy had won the election outright and proceeded to 
"govern," it would have found its position there untenable 
because it would have had to observe the constitution of the 
CRe which backed apartheid. However, in opposition, the 
Labour Party could serve as a strong pressure group, ensure 
that the pro-apartheid elements did not have things their own 
way, prevent further inroads being made on coloured people's 
remaining rights, press for less harsh application of existing 
race laws, and continue the campaign for democratic rights. 
At best, the Labour Party could use the CRC as a legal 
platform to criticise apartheid laws .154 That is what the 
Labour Party proceeded to do in the first CRC. By adopting a 
policy of "confrontation," it set out to frustrate the 
153"Riding A Dead Horse", Educational Journal (October-
November 1969), 2. 
154Cape Times, 11 October 1969. As will be discussed in 
chapter 4, a number of the party hierarchy, especially Allan 
Hendrickse, steadfastly maintained that remaining in opposition 
was the Labour Party's best ploy. 
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government and prevent the smooth functioning of the council. 
Being in opposition enabled the Labour Party to carry out its 
election promises and mount an opposition to apartheid in 
fulfilment of the vision of the men who first met in 1965 to 
form the party. 
However, as much as the various coloured parties saw the CRC 
as a medium whereby they could gain greater rights for 
coloured people and eventually draw closer to whites, the 
council was still nothing more than a device to ensure that 
not only would coloureds become physically, economically and 
socially separated from both whites and Africans, but that 
this separation would enable them to develop "an independent 
nationalist perspective, and a political identity as 
'Coloureds'." This would "demonstrate that apartheid was 
based on the reality of separate racial groups, rather than 
the creation of a few wishful thinkers." 155 Thus, government 
policy was designed to persuade sufficient coloureds that, 
even if the CRC was not the perfect solution, it was in their 
best interests to participate and to trust that the government 
knew best. The plan required enough coloureds willing to 
pa~ticipate in the CRC to allow it to function reasonably 
efficiently, or at least to create the impression that it was 
viable. For a while, it seemed that the government's plan 
would work because many of those who participated felt that 
the prestige and status which came along with the CRC, along 
with perks such as housing and cars, more than justified the 
criticism which they suffered from the rest of the coloured 
community. However, getting the Labour Party to participate 
was the government's greatest success. It allowed the 
government to point to the fact that the CRC was taken 
seriously enough that even groups opposed to that body and the 
government's policies would use it as a platform. 156 
155Freedberg, "Changing Political Identity", 191. 
156Ibid, 192. 
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Unfortunately, the hopes of the participating coloured people 
and parties soon proved to be false and the CRC did not turn 
out to be the political utopia they thought it would be. 
Thus, the participation of the Labour Party comes into 
perspective: Its presence in the CRC helped to give life to a 
body which was never designed to improve the political lot of 
coloured people in South Africa. 
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Chapter 3 
PARTICIPATION AND CONFRONTATION, 1969-1975 
The success of the Labour Party in the 1969 election was a 
remarkable achievement. It had managed to mobilise a 
considerable number of people who had never voted before. 
The overwhelming majority of coloured people had never 
undertaken the exercise of registering as voters, much less 
had experience of voting. In addition, the fledgling Labour 
Party had to withstand the combined opposition of the 
government and the Broederbond which gave full support to the 
pro-government Federal Party. Furthermore, the majority of 
coloured people were from the rural areas and most of them 
worked on the farms. Their farmer-employers, under the 
influence of the Broederbond, exerted intense pressure on 
their employees to support the Federal Party. Labour Party 
organisers who travelled around the country found that many, 
especially teachers, were reluctant to support the Labour 
Party because of the fear of victimisatiori. Stanley explains 
that "hulle was so bang, hulle trek 'n kombers oor hulle kop 
en dan praat hulle met joU."l 
In its attempts to nullify the opposition, gain support and 
project an image as the only opposition to apartheid, the 
Labour Party resorted to a promise which it was later to 
regret: It promised to destroy the CRC by abandoning its seats 
in the council if it won the election. Realising that a 
boycott would not prevent the CRC from operating, it reneged 
on its promise and remained >in the CRC. This laid the party 
open to accusations by a host of critics of immorality and 
collaboration and caused tensions within the party itself. 
Whether it should remain in the CRC and participate in its 
proceedings or not, became the central theme of discussion in 
the party for the entire duration of the existence of the CRC. 
Although the party officially expressed rejection of the CRe, 
lArthur Stanley, interview, 10 September 1992. 
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members increasingly began to argue that if they remained 
outside of the CRC, they would have no influence in matters 
concerning coloured people. On the other hand, apartheid also 
increased in intensity between 1969-1975 and others found it 
difficult to reconcile their presence in an apartheid 
institution while outside, apartheid was being applied in 
increasing measures. 2 Because this issue was never properly 
thrashed out immediately after the election, the party could 
not make up its mind as to how it would approach its role in, 
and attitude towards, the council. What they did agree upon, 
however, was that they would not accommodate the government 
and would confront it at every turn, while at the same time 
agitating for full equality for coloureds. This led to the 
adoption of a policy of "confrontation" as the Labour Party's 
compromise response to the thorny issue of participation. 
The Labour Party's leader, Martin Arendse, soon fell foul of 
the party's new confrontationist stance. Before the CRC began 
its first working session in 1970, Vorster sent a message to 
Arendse asking for a private meeting between the two. Arendse 
discussed the invitation with some of the Labour Party leaders 
wh~ recommended that he take other members with him as 
witnesses. When Arendse asked Vorster whether he could bring 
one or two members with him, Vorster refused, stating that the 
invitation was "from the leader of the National Party to the 
leader of the Labour Party," and that he had not asked for a 
delegation to meet with him. 3 He thereupon accepted Vorster's 
invitation and went alone. Arendse also had further meetings 
with Vorster which the party leadership was not informed of. 4 
He was subsequently accused of having secret talks with 
2p. Joyce, The Rise and Fall of Apartheid: The Chronicle of 
a divided society as told through South Africa's newspapers (Cape 
Town: Struik, 1990), 69-84, gives a detailed list of the 
apartheid measures applied between 1969-1975. 
3Arthur Stanley, interview, 10 September 1992. 
4John Nash, interview with author, East London, 31 August 
1993; Whisson, "Coloured People", 55. 
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Vorster on the future of the coloured people and of 
collaborating with the government, because he had not been 
given a mandate from the party to engage in such talks. In an 
atmosphere of accusation and counter-accusation, Arendse was 
ousted at the Labour Party conference in January 1970 and 
Lionel Samuel (Sonny) Leon was elected leader. 5 Arthur 
Stanley, a close friend of Arendse, insists that Arendse's 
removal was more of a "palace coup" than a matter of principle 
and that he was "ousted by a clique." Apparently, some of the 
members of the party hierarchy, among them Sonny Leon, Allan 
Hendrickse, David Curry and Norman Middleton, were not happy 
serving under Arendse, a strong and forthright leader who did 
not allow himself to be manipulated. They could not "push 
M.D. around," and so they sought to depose him and replace him 
with one of their own . 6 Hendrickse and Curry were the 
frontrunners for the vacant post but because both had strong 
followings and the election of either might have led to a rift 
in the party, Sonny Leon was elected as a: compromise 
candidate. 7 
Leon was the son of a cabinet-maker and attained the rank of 
Regimental Sergeant Major in world War II. He resented 
Nationalist-Afrikaners because they had refused to support the 
war and had in fact tried to overthrow the Smuts government in 
1943 . After 1948, Afrikaners had applied apartheid to those 
like Leon who had served in the armed forces and had been 
prepared to give their lives for their country. Yet, now, 
these coloured soldiers were treated like second-class 
5Sunday Times, 26 January 1975 . 
6Arthur Stanley, interview, 10 September 1992 i Whisson, "The 
Coloured People", 55. 
7According to Allan Hendrickse, interview, 17 September 
1994, it was never intended that Leon be a long-term candidate 
as leader, but he was charismatic and popular with the rank-and-
file so that it became increasingly difficult in later years to 
replace him. 
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citizens in their own country.B Despite his lack of formal 
education, Leon became involved in politics in the 1940s and 
established a close relationship with the united Party in 
Kimberley. He was also an active member of the Coloured Ex-
Servicemen's League. He took part in trade union activities 
and served on the Kimberley City Council until coloureds were 
removed from municipal representation in 1972. He was a 
founder-member of the Labour Party in 1965 and proved to be a 
charismatic and popular leader. 9 
The Labour Party's confrontational approach was revealed for 
the first time when the CRC's first working session was opened 
by the Prime Minister, B.J. Vorster on Friday, 13 November 
1970. The Labour Party initially decided to stage a mass 
walk-out during the Prime Minister's speech, citing the 
packing of the council with Federal Party members as the 
reason for its protest,lO but Arendse informed them that they 
faced the possibility of arrest as they l~ft the chamber. In 
terms of a new law, the Powers and Privileges Act published on 
23 October 1970, any person causing a disturbance in the 
council likely to disrupt the council's business was liable to 
a Eine of R200. It provided for the arrest of such persons, 
without a warrant, by council officers. ll In mid-October 
1970, council members had received letters informing them that 
an Act relating to their powers and privileges had been passed 
and would soon be published. However, they were not informed 
of the contents of the Act and by the morning of the Prime 
Minister's opening speech, members had not yet received 
copies. Arendse had an arrangement whereby all pUblications 
of interest to the coloured community were sent directly to 
BSonny Leon, interview, 25 September 1985; Norman Middleton, 
interview, 10 October 1994. 
9Sonny Leon Papers, Curriculum vitae of L.S . Leon; Rapport, 
18 August 1974; Allan Hendrickse, interview, 17 September 1994. 
lOCape Herald, 14 November 1970; Reality (1971), 10. 
llCape Herald, 14 November 1970. 
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him by the Government Printer and at a meeting of Labour Party 
councillors called to discuss the walk-out, he brought them up 
to date with the new development. Members decided that a 
walk-out might prove too risky, but concluded that if they 
abstained from the council chamber altogether during the 
opening ceremony, this could not constitute a disturbance 
because they would not be there in the first place .12 One 
must of course see the Labour Party's actions in the context 
of the time. The previous decade had seen a harsh government 
crackdown on all dissent. All opposition to the government 
had been ruthlessly crushed and a number of organisations had 
been banned and their leaders imprisoned. The fear of arrest 
and detention deterred many who would have liked to oppose the 
government more often and more openly. Thus, the Labour 
Party's trepidation regarding their walk-out is 
understandable. 13 
Out of these deliberations came the decision to boycott the 
opening ceremony completely.14 Labour Party members assembled 
instead at a restaurant in Bellville South while Vorster 
addressed the council. While there, they received a report 
tha,t white officials outside the council chamber had been 
overheard discussing the possible illegality of the party's 
stayaway. Allan Hendrickse responded: "All members are fully 
aware of the possible consequences. The worst that can be 
12r bid. 
13rronically, the party's first newsletter published in 1966 
had stressed that there was no danger to anyone who belonged to 
the Labour Party of "getting into trouble with the police". 
However it also emphasised that "the Labour Party does not stand 
for any sort of illegal, subversive activities •••. We shall not 
tolerate any action which will get our members into any sort of 
trouble with the law." LPSA, Newsletter (No.1), 4. See also 
Eastern Province Herald, 16 September 1994. 
14Two members declined to join the boycott. Arendse was 
instructed by his constituency not to participate in the boycott. 
J.D. Petersen, an old friend of Arendse's, resigned from the 
party, calling the boycott an insult to the Prime Minister. See 
Cape Herald, 14 November 1970. 
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done to us is to fine us each R200. ,,15 No action was taken 
against Labour Party members but during the lunch-time recess 
following Vorster's speech, councillors were suddenly provided 
with copies of the Powers and Privileges Act. This gave rise 
to speculation by Labour councillors that details regarding 
this Act had deliberately been withheld to embarrass the 
party. As their planned mass walk-out had already been 
publicised in advance of the opening ceremony, it appears that 
certain government officials were counting on the Labour 
Party's ignorance of the provisions of this Act to allow it to 
fall into a trap, resulting in the mass arrest of party 
members. Arendse's advance knowledge of the contents of the 
Act thwarted this scheme. However, the crisis generated by 
the possibility of arrest created a new sense of unity.16 
This strengthened the party's resolve to proceed with its 
boycott policy. 
Right at the beginning of a new "era" for:, coloured people, the 
pattern for the future relationship between the government and 
the Labour Party was established. Thereafter, the term 
"confrontation" became the key word in describing that 
re~ationship. However, the adoption of a policy of 
confrontation and the use of the boycott warrants closer 
inspection. The Labour Party was uneasy at having to 
participate in a body which it had long and publicly opposed . 
Thus, the confrontational attitude between 1969-1975 was more 
a fight against conscience than anything else. The Labour 
Party was embarrassed that it had to abandon its promise not 
to sit in the council and it also needed to silence critics 
who accused it of collaboration. This created a dilemma for 
the party in 1969: If it did not participate, it would be left 
15Cape Herald, 
10 September 1992. 
received a salary 
Realists, 305. 
16Cape Herald, 
10 September 1992. 
14 November 1970; Arthur Stanley, interview, 
During the first CRC, 1969-1974, councillors 
of R150 per month . See Hugo, Quislings or 
14 November 1970; Arthur Stanley, interview, 
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out in the cold because the CRC would continue to function. 
However, if it did participate, how did it justify its 
a body it rejected and had promised to destroy.17 presence in 
This dilemma was to dog the footsteps of the Labour Party for 
the next ten years of the existence of the CRC. Nevertheless, 
a number of members felt that participation would enable the 
party to carry out its stated reasons for existence, viz. to 
oppose apartheid and to show that coloureds did not accept it 
either. Thus, participation would enable the Labour Party to 
carry out the aims and objects in its constitution. On the 
other hand, it could not be seen to be assisting the 
government by allowing the CRC to function smoothly. Out of 
the struggle between conscience, ideology and pragmatism came 
the decision to confront and hamstring the functioning of the 
CRC. The result was the vociferous and strident confrontation 
with the government which characterised Labour Party 
participation during the first CRC. 
Although the use of the boycott in November 1970 as a method 
of confrontation was initially an unplanned strategy and 
adopted almost by accident, the Labour Party's use thereof was 
not-. a new one in coloured politics .18 It was used by the 
Anti-CAD and Non-European Unity Movements in 1943 in their 
opposition to the establishment of the Coloured Advisory 
Council and was regarded as "one of the most potent weapons in 
the armoury of the people struggling for liberation. ,,19 
Coloured voters in the Cape were called on to boycott the 1948 
election in protest against the united Party's "creeping 
discrimination. ,,20 In 1958, coloured voters were urged to 
17Sonny Leon, interview, 25 September 1985. 
1SWhisson, "Coloured People", 55-56. 
19M. Temba, "Boycott as Weapon of Struggle", in 
Contributions of Non-European Peoples to World Civilization, ed. 
M. Hommel (Braamfontein: Skotaville, 1989),165. See also B. 
Hirson, Year of Fire, Year of Ash. The Soweto Revolt: Roots of 
a Revolution? (London: Zed, 1981), 223. 
2oLewis, Between the Wire and the Wall, 246-47. 
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boycott elections on the separate roll and in 1959, the call 
to boycott the proposed Union Council for Coloured Affairs 
revived opposition on the scale of the 1943 anti-CAC 
opposition. 21 Boycott, then, as a "weapon of struggle" had 
become part of coloured politics by 1969 and it is not 
surprising that the Labour Party resorted to that method in 
its attempts to oppose the functioning of the CRC. 
In pursuance of its policy of confrontation, the Labour Party 
attended the first short session on 20 and 21 November 1970, 
but after its no-confidence motion was defeated, walked out gn 
bloc. This was followed by a boycott of the CRC dining-
room. 22 In 1971, Labour Party councillors again boycotted the 
opening ceremony of the CRC session at which the Minister of 
Defence, P.W. Botha, was the guest speaker. Botha was greeted 
at the entrance to the CRC buildings by a line of 
demonstrators carrying anti-apartheid placards . Inside the 
council chamber, he was faced with empty Labour Party benches. 
During his opening speech, Botha pointed to the empty 
opposition benches and harangued the Labour Party, stating 
that the boycott would achieve nothing and that it showed how 
ir~.esponsible the Labour Party was. 23 
The party also discovered that it could use 
most effectively during the budget debates. 
the boycott weapon 
During the 1971 
session, a motion was proposed opposing the budget whereupon 
Labour Party members walked out of the debating chamber and 
refused to take part in the debate . 24 The reason advanced was 
that the budget was discriminatory and did not provide for 
parity in salaries and pensions . During the 1972 session, the 
Labour Party again opposed the budget and towards the latter 
21Hugo , Quislings or Realists, 673-78. 
22Venter, Coloured, 481. 
23Reality (1971), 10. 
24Debates and Proceedings of the Coloured 
~R~e~p~r~e~s~e~n~t~a~t~i~v~e~C~o~u~n~c~i~l, vol. 8 (13 August 1971), 283. 
Person's 
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part of the session, it boycotted the debating chamber 
altogether. 25 Sonny Leon stated that it was the objective of 
the Labour Party to embark on a program of exposure and 
embarrassment, adding: "It is our duty to humanity to tell the 
apostles of Apartheid that they are destroying our country. ,,26 
The government also increased tensions in the CRC. In 1970, 
it announced plans to remove coloureds from the municipal 
voters' roll and deny them the right to sit on municipal 
councils. Bearing in mind the open hostility between the 
government and the Labour Party at the time, critics viewed 
this move as shortsighted and inflammatory. The Leader of the 
opposition in the House of Assembly condemned this move as 
containing the "seeds of further friction and bitterness 
between White and Coloured people. ,,27 Arendse pointed out 
that the CRC had not been consulted by the government - the 
very purpose for which it had been set up. Only Tom Swartz, a 
government appointee, had been consulted and he gave his full 
support to the government's move. When the coloured municipal 
franchise was finally terminated in 1972, the last vestiges of 
coloured participation in "white politics" were removed. 28 
Th~ passing of an era was noted with nostalgia by coloured 
leaders but acted as a spur to the Labour Party. Attitudes 
hardened and public statements emanating from party leaders 
became more strident. 
The government was clearly concerned that the Labour Party's 
confrontational tactics might result in it gaining sufficient 
support in the council to block approval of the budget. This 
25Venter, Coloured, 504; Debates of the CRC, vol. 16 (16 
August 1972), 455. 
26Reality, May 1971-
27Cape Times, 7 February 1970. 
28G.C.Brown, "The Abolition of the Non-racial Municipal 
Franchise in the Cape, 1958-1972: Responses and Reactions in Cape 
Town" (B.A. [Hons] Extended Essay, University of Cape Town, 1981), 
86. 
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led to the passing of the CRC Amendment Act (No. 99) of 1972 
which gave the Minister of Coloured Relations powers to ensure 
that the CRC would continue to function in such an event. 29 
with this Act, the government revoked the CRC's final say in 
the approval of its budget and vested this power in the hands 
of the government. The Minister of Coloured Relations, Jannie 
Loots, justified this step on the basis of threats made by the 
Labour Party to destroy the CRC. He stressed, however, that 
the government would only use these powers as a last resort to 
prevent the Labour Party, or any anti-government majority in 
the CRC, from halting the functioning of the council by 
refusing to pass the budget. 3o This move was embarrassing for 
the government, coming only three years after the 
establishment of the CRC. Helen Suzman, Progressive Party MP, 
reflected that the measure gave "the complete lie" to the 
government's claim that the coloured people were happy with 
the representation they had been given in the council. 31 
This step appeared to be a notable victory for the Labour 
Party's policy of confrontation, notwithstanding the fact that 
it did not have a majority in the CRC to do what the 
gov.,ernment feared . However, it was not only the attitude of 
the Labour Party which had affected government thinking. In 
1971, Tom Swartz and his Federal Party had also changed 
course. Swartz had become disillusioned because of the 
minimal attention which the government paid to the resolutions 
of the council, which exposed him as ineffective and made him 
vulnerable to attacks from the Labour Party. He had expected 
more from the government in return for his cooperation. At 
the Federal Party's national conference in Durban in June 
1971, the Federal Party adopted a more aggressive and 
29B. Mina, "The Coloured Persons' Representative Council -
Ten Years Hard Labour" (B.Soc.Sc. Hons . Dissertation, University 
of Cape Town, 1978), 92. 
30Venter, Coloured, 504; Survey of Race Relations (1972), 
17. 
31Survey of Race Relations (1972), 17. 
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assertive stance; a major departure from its earlier 
acquiescence. Swartz demanded for coloured people "everything 
that the White man has got for himself. ,,32 Changes were also 
made to the party's constitution which stressed "positive 
equal development" instead of "parallel development. ,,33 
During the 1972 CRC session, Swartz again expressed his 
frustration that his party was not being rewarded for 
supporting the government's cause by accepting CRC 
recommendations. The disillusionment in the Federal Party 
soon became evident when the Labour Party's no-confidence 
motion was only narrowly defeated by thirty-one votes to 
twenty-eight. Alarm bells rang in Federal and government 
circles shortly thereafter when four Federal members voted 
with the Labour Party on a minor issue concerning nursery 
schools. 34 The fear of a possible Labour takeover of the CRC 
alarmed the government and this led to the revocation of the 
CRC's say in the approval of its budget. 
The Labour Party interpreted this move as a victory for its 
policy of confrontation and in 1973, an emboldened party again 
rejected the budget. Sonny Leon argued: 
The powers of this Council have been taken away from the 
Council and vested in the Minister. Why ... should the 
Minister accept on our behalf a budget of this nature, 
where we have no authority to change or alter in any 
direction the contents of the budget ... the budget is 
presented to us - it is decided by the White Parliament 
and then sent down to us for acceptance. 35 
The Labour Party did not only restrict its boycott policy to 
the CRC. In 1970 it initiated a call for a boycott of the 
tenth anniversary Republic Day celebrations to be held on 31 
32Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 305. 
33Mina, "The CRC", 81. 
34I bid, 86. 
35Debates of the CRC, vol. 24 (13 August 1973), 291-92. 
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May 1971,36 and also called for a bread boycott. Neither of 
these calls met with much success,3? but this preference for 
boycott and confrontation over dialogue led to the resignation 
of the party's Natal leader, E.G. Rooks. 38 Undeterred, the 
party embarked in 1972 on a vigorous nationwide campaign of 
"boycotts and confrontation. ,,39 Its first target was the 
Shell petroleum company. Shell was accused of discriminating 
against blacks in the provision of rest rooms at its service 
stations. 40 The Labour Party's call for a boycott of the 
company's products did not however meet with much success. 41 
When it was announced that the British ballerina, Dame Margot 
Fonteyn was to give a number of ballet performances in the 
Nico Malan Theatre in Cape Town during April of that year, the 
Labour Party called on Dame Fonteyn to cancel her visit to 
South Africa because the theatre was open only to whites. To 
offset criticism, a performance at the Three Arts theatre in 
Plumstead was specially arranged by the organisers to 
accommodate coloureds. Fonteyn had alreaay signed a contract 
and could not cancel her trip. The Labour Party thereupon 
organised a demonstration at the airport to coincide with her 
arrival and a pamphlet campaign was initiated, urging the 
pUblic to boycott the special performances arranged for 
coloureds. While a large group of protestors were present at 
36post, 22 November 1970. 
3?Tom Swartz Collection, T.F. 
Party National Conference, Durban, 
38Daily News, 12 April 1971. 
Swartz, Address to Federal 
5-7 June 1971. 
39Sunday Tribune, 9 April 1972; Cape Herald, 15 April 1972; 
Argus, 29 April 1972. 
40The use of the term "black" was in line with the 
philosophy of black consciousness which came to the fore in 1969 
with the formation of the South African Students' Organisation 
(SASO), and which led to coloured people also calling themselves 
"black". See chapter 4 for the role of black consciousness in 
the coloured community in the 1970s. 
41 The Graphic, 21 January 1972; Rand Daily Mail, 27 April 
1972 . 
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the airport when Fonteyn arrived, the performance at the Three 
Arts theatre was well-attended. 42 
The Labour Party also called for a boycott of white soccer 
matches played under the auspices of the National Football 
League;43 a boycott of matches played by a visiting English 
Rugby team;44 a boycott of segregated agricultural shows,45 a 
boycott of the proposed British Lions Rugby tour due in 1974; 
a boycott of the multi-national South African Games;46 and a 
boycott of all apartheid institutions. The party further 
announced that, as part of a massive boycott campaign against 
commercial organisations which practised "pinprick" racism, 47 
posters would be placed outside business concerns which 
practised petty apartheid,48 and one million stickers 
denouncing apartheid would be stuck on public and private 
42Cape Herald, 18 March and 15 April 1972. 
43 I bid, 15 April 1972. 
44The party distributed 10 000 pamphlets in May 1972, urging 
all rugby players and rugby supporters to boycott 'Apartheid 
rugby matches' due to be played against a white team at Newlands, 
and a coloured team at Athlone stadium in Cape Town on 20 and 22 
May 1972 respectively. See Argus, 13 May 1972; Burger, 17 May 
1972. 
45Worcester Standard and Advertiser, 9 February 1973. 
46P.A.29, Minutes of Labour Party National Conference, Port 
Elizabeth, 12-14 April 1974. 
47Argus, 29 April 1972. Many of the provisions and 
applications under the Separate Amenities Act of 1953, were over 
the years euphemised as "petty-apartheid". Because they were not 
major applications but "little nuisances, little indignities and 
little humiliations", they were referred to as "pin-pricks". 
W.A. de Klerk, The Puritans in Africa: A Story of Afrikanerdom 
(London: Rex Collings, 1975), 274-76, recounts a number of these 
"pin-prick" measures. In parliament, many of these "pin-pricks" 
were spel t out. See Debates of the House of Assembly (11 
February 1983), col. 802. 
48Cape Herald, 20 May 1972; Joyce, The Rise and Fall of 
Apartheid, 81. 
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buildings. 49 While on a visit to the united States, David 
Curry, deputy leader of the Labour Party, also urged American 
politicians and businessmen to boycott South Africa. He 
called on foreign companies to disinvest and to boycott South 
African goods. 5o Many supporters heeded the party's calls but 
in the early 1970s coloured people were still largely 
conservative, and while many may have been sympathetic to the 
issues, "they were more concerned with the daily problems of 
earning a living. ,,51 Thus, despite vigorous efforts by the 
party and wide media coverage of its boycott calls, the 
party's boycott calls did not meet with much success. 
In 1972, Tom Swartz echoed the Labour Party's criticism of the 
CRC, calling it a "puppet institution without real power," and 
demanded a parliamentary vote for coloured people. Fearful of 
the consequences of losing its closest coloured ally, the 
government took note of the increasingly critical stance of 
the Federal Party leader. 52 In an attempt, to salvage the 
credibility of the CRC, deflect Federal Party criticism and 
dampen Labour Party opposition, the government proposed the 
establishment of liaison structures. During the 1971 debate 
in _.the House of Assembly on the prime minister's budgetary 
vote, B.J. Vorster had already mooted the idea of liaison 
between the CRC and parliament in the form of a CRC liaison 
committee whereby members of the CRC and CRC executive would 
liaise directly with members of the National Party Cabinet. 
Formal meetings would be held after the beginning of each 
annual parliamentary session and thereafter, every two months 
with the Minister of Coloured Relations or other members of 
49Burger, 9 May 1972; Cape Times, 18 May 1972, Cape Herald, 
20 May 1972. 
50Rand Daily Mail, 27 April 1972. 
51Al a thea 
January 1994; 
Jansen, interview with author, Cape 
Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992. 
52Argus, 15 April 1972. 
Town, 6 
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the Cabinet. 53 Thus, with the entire concept of the CRC being 
called into question, the government decided to proceed with 
the implementation of a CRC liaison committee. It hoped that 
by doing so, it would forestall criticism that the CRC was 
merely a "talk-shop where coloured councillors did the talking 
while the government did the deciding. ,,54 Critics saw wider 
implications in this move which took place at about the same 
time as debates were raging in parliament and in National 
Party circles on the political future of coloured people, and 
the concept of a coloured homeland. 55 Anthony Holiday of the 
Rand Daily Mail saw this sudden concern as springing "from a 
fear that Coloureds may finally turn away entirely from White-
created political institutions and decide to throw in their 
lot with the Black majority. ,,56 
The Labour Party summarily rejected the idea of a liaison 
committee and flatly refused to participate in any talks 
between the CRC and the government. 57 Undaunted, the 
government pressed ahead and on 23 January 1975, the Prime 
Minister held the first meeting with the CRC liaison 
committee. At this meeting, members of the CRC advanced 
ce~tain proposals which aimed at securing meaningful political 
rights for coloured people. The main thrust of the proposals 
concerned greater legislative and executive powers for the 
CRC, representation on statutory bodies, expansion of coloured 
participation at local government level, and coloured 
53Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 81, Venter, Coloured, 482, 
515. 
54Arthur Stanley, interview, 10 September 1972. 
55See chapter 4 for discussion on this matter. 
56Rand Daily Mail, 13 July 1971. See also Sunday Times, 11 
March 1973. 
57p .A. 29, Minutes of Labour Party NEC Meeting, 6 February 
1971; Burger, 21 April 1971. 
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representation in parliament on a common or separate roll. s8 
Vorster bluntly stated that one parliament for whites and 
coloureds was not acceptable as this would lead to political 
chaos, but he agreed in principle to the rest of the proposals 
which would serve to grant coloured people a "better deal."9 
Because the Labour Party boycotted the talks with Vorster, 
only members of the pro-government parties in the CRC 
attended, with the Federal Party in the preponderance. The 
agreement reached between the members of the CRC and the 
government was immediately rejected by the Labour Party as a 
"clever trap concocted by the Federal Party which will put the 
Coloured people at the mercy of the apostles of racism and 
apartheid." It contended that the proposals advanced by the 
liaison committee, and those agreed to by Vorster, was not to 
grant coloured people more rights, but to grant the Federal 
Party powers to more efficiently implement the policy of 
apartheid. 5o Clearly then, the concept of the liaison 
committee was doomed to failure if the Labour Party came to 
power. 
The vehemence of the Labour Party's attack on the talks must 
be ,seen in the light of the fact that the talks were timed to 
take place shortly before the second CRC election was due to 
be held in March 1975. The government's apparent concern for 
the welfare of the coloured people was in no large measure due 
to its desire to forestall rising opposition to the CRC. The 
talks with the CRC were designed to give the impression that 
the government was indeed talking with coloured people and 
that it was taking their problems seriously. Vorster's 
agreement to consider granting coloured people greater rights 
S8The details of the proposals were contained in a 
memorandum submitted by the CRC liaison committee to the Prime 
Minister prior to the meeting. See Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 
353-61. 
59 Sunday Times, 26 January 1975. See also Hugo, Quislings or 
Realists, 361-64. 
50Sunday Times, 16 and 26 January, 1975. 
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and a "better deal" was clearly an attempt to increase support 
for the Federal Party in the forthcoming election. Thus the 
Labour Party resorted to strident public denunciations to 
deflect any possible support from the Federal Party and once 
again establish itself as a credible opposition to the 
government. 
The vociferous criticism by the Labour Party of the CRC 
liaison committee pressured the government into rethinking the 
concept of liaison structures. It subsequently proposed that 
the CRC liaison committee be replaced by a cabinet council. 
This proposal suggested that members of the CRC executive be 
elevated to cabinet status, who, with an equal number of white 
cabinet ministers, would function as a cabinet council under 
the chairmanship of the prime minister. The pro-government 
parties in the CRC accepted the idea but the Labour Party 
again rejected such an arrangement and indicated that it would 
refuse to cooperate if it won the next election. 61 The Labour 
Party's boycott strategy eventually took {ts toll on the 
government. The latter was seriously concerned that the 
Labour Party would win an outright majority in the 1975 
election and sabotage the CRC as it had previously promised, 
and was now again threatening to do. 62 On 19 March 1975, the 
government introduced a bill which enabled the Minister of 
Coloured Relations to keep the CRC operating even if the 
Labour Party attempted to close it down by instituting a total 
boycott of the council and the executive. 63 The Labour Party 
immediately declared that in the light of this action, it 
would abandon any plans to boycott the CRC because the 
61Survey of Race Relations (1975), 12. 
62Natal Witness, 22 March 1975; Sunday Times, 23 March 1975. 
In 1974, Leon stated that the Labour Party would use the 
elections to obtain a mandate from the people for the rejection 
of separate development and the CRC. See Survey of Race 
Relations (1975), 14. 
63Debates of the House of Assembly (19 'March 1975), col. 
3009. 
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minister would simply run the council himself or appoint the 
Federal Party or other government-supporting coloureds to do 
SO.64 The party announced that it would remain in the eRe, 
whether i t won the election or not, and continue to use the 
council as a platform to expose and embarrass the 
government. 65 
It appears inexplicable that the Labour Party, which had 
threatened since 1969 to close down the eRe if it came to 
power, would now back down from that threat when victory in 
the 1975 election appeared to be within its grasp. However, 
the Labour Party had undergone a silent revolution since the 
first election in 1969 which, by 1975, had radically changed 
the character of the party. During the years between the 
formation of the Labour Party in 1965 and the first eRe 
election in 1969, Labour Party membership comprised mainly 
anti-government and anti-separate development coloureds, most 
of whom had been members of the Liberal and Progressive 
Parties and who had opposed the government in the decades 
prior to the formation of the eRe . When the Labour Party 
fought the 1969 election, its intention was to push for the 
re:O;,toration of coloured political rights and common roll 
representation - viz. liberal traditions, and this within a 
n liberal-moralistic" framework. 66 Thus, winning the election 
and sabotaging the eRe before it could begin to function was 
compatible with their philosophy . When the Labour Party 
subsequently abandoned its plan to walk out of the eRe and 
decided instead to participate, members were initially 
uncomfortable but soon realised that participation would serve 
two important purposes: Firstly, it would provide a forum in 
which they could articulate their grievances and demands, and 
secondly, provide a platform from which they could do so free 
64Sunday Tribune, 23 March 1975. 
65Rand Daily Mail, 19 March 1975. 
66Mohammed Dangor, interview with author, Johannesburg, 6 
December 1993. 
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from prosecution. The latter factor was crucial in view of 
the fact that the government had harshly crushed all 
opposition after the Sharpeville massacre of 1960. African 
resistance movements had been banned and attempts to continue 
protest had been thwarted. The CRC, on the other hand, 
provided a government-created institution in which the Labour 
Party could legally voice its dissatisfaction with government 
policy. However, this approach to participation in the CRC 
was never adequately discussed at the beginning and because 
the party did not develop a clear-cut method as to how it 
would approach its participation in the CRC, divergent views 
soon surfaced. This divergence, as early as 1970, was in 
itself evidence of the heterogeneity of coloured people and 
had already been reflected in the variety of political parties 
formed between 1964 and 1969. This heterogeneity was also 
reflected within the Labour Party. Although a historically-
collaborationist group among coloured people supported the 
openly pro-government Federal Party and, to a lesser extent, 
the other minor pro-apartheid parties,67 neither were those 
who were opposed to the government and its coloured policy 
united in the form of opposition they wished the Labour Party 
to _. take. Even though Labour Party supporters were largely 
anti-government, anti-separate development and against 
institutions of separate political representation, they 
differed as to the form their "anti" stance would take. 
Thus, even though the Labour Party settled unanimously on a 
policy of confrontation as its response to participation in 
the CRC, members differed as to the form the confrontation 
would take. The form of confrontation only began to take 
shape after 1970 when two major factors became manifest, 
67The Afrikaner Nasionale Bond and the Cape Malay 
Association in the 1920s; the CPNU and the pro-CAC faction in the 
1940s; the Kleurlingvolksverbond and pro-UCCA supporters in 1959 
and the voters on the separate roll in 1958 and 1963 gives an 
indication of a significant proportion of coloured people who 
historically were prepared to cooperate with the government of 
the day despite the fact that its policies openly discriminated 
against coloured people. See chapter 1. 
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leading to a change in the composition of the Labour Party's 
membership. The first was the infiltration of the party by 
supporters of the banned liberation movements and other 
opposition groups. The ability of the Labour Party to use the 
CRC as a legal platform for protest and opposition, free from 
the threat of imprisonment or security action, attracted the 
attention of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan 
Africanist Congress (PAC) which had been banned in 1960, and 
the black consciousness movement (BCM) which surfaced in 1969. 
These organisations saw in the Labour Party a vehicle which 
they could use to promote their interests. Organisers of 
black trade unions, which were outlawed by government 
legislation, also saw an opportunity to organise workers, 
using the Labour Party as a front. Thus from 1969 onwards, 
the Labour Party was "infiltrated" by a variety of persons 
intent on using the safety afforded by party membership to 
promote the interests of their respective organisations. 68 Of 
necessity, only coloured persons could join the Labour Party 
because of the restrictions imposed upon membership of 
political parties in terms of the Prohibition of Political 
Interference Act of 1968. 69 
Don Mattera (BCM, later Azanian Peoples' Organisation[AZAPO]) 
was the first to realise the opportunities which Labour Party 
membership afforded, and initiated the process of 
"infiltration. ,,70 By 1971, he occupied the post of National 
68Mohammed Dangor, 
Alexander, interview, 15 
interview, 6 
October 1994. 
December 1993; Neville 
69Ballinger, From Union to Apartheid, 469. Labour Party 
leaders, from Van der Ross in 1966 to Miley Richards in 1994, 
often insisted that the Labour Party was never established as a 
"Coloured" party but expressed regret that it had to function as 
one. See, "The Leader's Address to the first Labour Party 
Conference," in LPSA, 1966 And All That; Miley Richards, Address 
to Labour Party Special Conference, Uitenhage, 17 September 1994. 
70Mattera later distinguished 
of books on life in Sophiatown. 
parliament on an ANC ticket. 
himself as a poet and a writer 
In 1994, he was elected to 
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Public Relations Officer of the Labour Party.71 Les du Preez 
(BCM) stood as a Labour Party candidate in the Newclare 
constituency in 1969 and was elected to the CRC. 72 Others who 
joined the Labour Party soon after were Mohammed Dangor (ANC), 
Sam Solomon (who later joined the South-west African Peoples' 
Organisation [SWAPO 1 ),73 Don Mateman (ANC),74 and Hennie 
Ferris (ANC).75 These members rallied around Allan Hendrickse 
who had won t 'he Bethelsdorp constituency in 1969. He appeared 
to be their natural leader because of his background. 
Although a minister of religion, Hendrickse's family had 
suffered harassment under apartheid: his father's church and 
their home were demolished under the Group Areas Act;76 his 
7lRand Daily Mail, 19 April 1971; P.A.29, Minutes of Labour 
Party National Conference, East London, 6-8 April 1972. 
72Tom Swartz Collection, Table of Results: 
election. 
73Mohammed Dangor, interview, 6 December 1993. 
1969 CRC 
74Ron Swartz, interview with author, Johannesburg, 10 
December 1993, reports that when his organisation, the 
Progressive Teachers' Union(PTU), wanted to launch a campaign of 
harassment against Mateman in the early 1980s, they were warned 
by -·the ANC to keep their distance because Mateman was an "ANC 
inside man". 
75Mohammed Dangor, 6 December 1993; Neville Alexander, 
interview, 15 October 1994. According to Alexander who was 
imprisoned on Robben Island with Ferris, the latter was given 
specific instructions by the ANC leadership, also imprisoned on 
the island, to "infiltrate" the Labour Party after his release 
in 1971 . By 1978, Ferris was chairman of the Cape Region of the 
party. In 1981, he was killed in mysterious circumstances when 
the wheels came off his car. Dangor suggests that Ferris was 
"hit" by the security police. 
76Allan Hendrickse, interview with author, Cape Town, 23 May 
1989. On 17 September 1994, Hendrickse showed the author the 
site where the church stood. The parsonage which stood next to 
the church was the first to be demolished. After the church was 
bulldozed to the ground, the church school was also demolished. 
The ground remained vacant until the Group Areas Act was scrapped 
in 1991. Ironically, Allan Hendrickse and his sons, Peter and 
Michael, recently repurchased the ground on which their home had 
previously stood, and the Congregational Church also repurchased 
the ground on which the church and school had stood . See also 
(continued .•• ) 
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sister was exiled and his brother had to leave the country, 
settling in Nigeria . 77 This group came to be referred to in 
the press and within the party as the "militants.,,78 
The second factor which influenced the composition of the 
Labour Party was the influx of Federal Party supporters into 
the party. These forme r members had increasingly become 
disillusioned with their party's performance in the eRe and 
the government's treatment of that body, and over a period of 
years deserted in increasing numbers to the Labour Party . 
This trend continued right through the term of the eRe and 
into the 1980s during the term of the House of 
Representatives. 79 However, although the former Federal 
supporters were disenchanted with their party, they did not 
necessarily share the Labour Party's views on separate 
representation and the eRe. They soon began to assert 
themselves, which resulted in 
fore within the Labour Party. 
a distinct faction coming to the 
This facti'on propagated the 
view that participation was an opportunity to engage the 
government in negotiations in order to persuade it to restore 
76 ( •.. continued) 
G. Leach, The Afrikaners (London: Macmillan, 1989), 221; Allan 
Hendrickse, Address to Joint Ses sion of Parliament, 28 September 
1988. 
77Ron Swartz, interview, 10 December 1993 . Throughout the 
eRe and HoR period, Hendrickse and his family were constantly 
harassed by the security police. Hendrickse's sister's room at 
Tygerberg hospital, and farm churches used by Hendrickse's 
congregations were bugged. His brother was denied re-entry to 
South Africa because he had married an Englishwoman. Both Allan 
and his son Peter, were detained in 1976 (see chapter 4). Peter 
Hendrickse, interview with author, 18 September 1994; Leach, The 
Afrikaners, 223. 
78The "militants" were militants only within the context of 
Labour Party and eRe politics. They were not equated with the 
militants or radicals in anti-apartheid and anti-government 
movements outside the eRe and the country. 
79Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992; Mohammed Dangor, 
interview, 6 December 1993. See also Mina, "The eRe", 86; Saks, 
"The Failure of the eRe", 124; Behrens, "The Other Two Houses", 
39-40. 
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to coloured people the political rights which they formerly 
enjoyed. It proposed '"confrontation through dialogue'" by 
using the institutions and committees to engage the government 
in discussion. 8o This faction came to be referred to in the 
press and within the party as the '"moderates. ,"81 
As the Labour Party settle d into the CRC, the two divergent 
views regarding participation in the CRC began to concretise 
and party members gravitated towards the faction which 
represented their respective views. The '"militants'" saw in 
the CRC an opportunity to embarrass the government by 
hamstringing the workings of the CRC. They intended using the 
CRC as a platform from which they could launch attacks on the 
government. This faction intended aggressively confronting 
the government through the medium of boycott and stayaways 
until the government indicated its preparedness to change its 
apartheid policies regarding blacks. It was not prepared to 
engage the government in dialogue until t'his was done. For 
both factions, therefore, the Labour Party became a vehicle 
for their own agendas . 
faction held the upper 
conferences. 
Initially, 
hand in the 
however, the '"militant'" 
party, its committees and 
The division into '"moderates'" and '"militants'" was not at first 
clear-cut. In fact, between 1969 and 1976, six loose 
groupings could be identified within the Labour Party. These 
were the '"Curry-Group'" around deputy-leader David Curry, which 
represented the '"liberal-moralistic'" faction made up of the 
majority of the original founding and early members;82 the 
'"Rabie-group'" consisting of Federal Party defectors who were 
later to rally around Jac Rabie when he joined the Labour 
80Sunday Times, 16 May 1976. 
81These persons were '"moderates'" vis-a.-vis the "militants" 
within the Labour Party. 
82In later years, Curry was increasingly accused of 
'"radicalism'" and came to be identified with the '"militants". 
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Party from the Federal Party; and the Arthur Stanley/Fred 
Peters grouping of persons who had been involved in trade 
unions in the Cape . 83 These groups could be loosely grouped 
under the "moderate" umbrella. The "militants" comprised the 
"Middleton-group" around Norman Middleton who had strong 
Africanist leanings, and the "Hendrickse-group" around Allan 
Hendrickse which was a populist/Christian grouping with strong 
ANC leanings. 84 An indistinct grouping around Sonny Leon drew 
supporters from either camp, depending on the stance taken by 
Leon at anyone time. Leon had no particular ideological 
leanings and was not tied to the ANC, PAC, BCM or liberals. 
He was quite happy to promote either a "moderate" or 
"militant" line if he felt strongly about their cause. Most 
often, he went along with the "militants" but after 1975 
showed distinctly "moderate" leanings. 
Considering the number of ideological groupings within the 
party, it is a wonder that it held together at all. What 
bound them together was the opportunity which the party 
provided "to all and sundry" to use it as a front or vehicle 
for their own ends. David Curry referred to the Labour Party 
as _, a "whore" because it could be used by anyone for their own 
purposes. 85 For example, Mohammed Dangor, Sam Solomon and 
Hennie Ferris were particularly successful in using the Labour 
Party as a cover to organise trade unions. When they were 
confronted by the security police, they were able to say that 
they were engaged in organising for the Labour Party.86 
83Saks, "The Failure of the CRC", 198; Allan Hendrickse, 
interview, 23 May 1989; Mohammed Dangor, interview, 6 December 
1993. 
84Mohammed Dangor, 
Jansen, 6 January 1994; 
6. 
interview, 6 December 1993; Alathea 
Saks, "The Failure of the CRC", Appendix 
85Mohammed Dangor, interview, 6 December 1993. 
86Mohammed Dangor, interview, 6 December 1993; Ron Swartz, 
interview, 10 December 1993. 
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The "militants" steered the Labour Party on a stridently 
confrontational course. Between 1970 and 1975, they were 
responsible for the Labour Party rejecting every budget 
presented in the CRe; rejecting the liaison committee and the 
cabinet council; rejecting the appointment of the Theron 
Commission; refusing to pass the budget after the Labour Party 
gained control of the CRe in 1975; and the adjournment of the 
CRC in September 1975. In 1976 they were behind the rejection 
of Alathea Jansen and the rejection of the Theron Report. 87 
However, after the Soweto uprising in June 1976, the 
"militants" began to direct 
which gained in intensity. 
Party which the Rabie-group 
their energies to the "struggle" 
This left a vacuum in the Labour 
increasingly filled. 
The "infiltrators" from the liberation movements formed the 
core of the "militant" faction and was responsible for the 
boycotts and stayaways which the Labour Party used in 1970 and 
propagated so vigorously in 1971 and 1972.. In 1972, a number 
of Labour Party members began to ~xpress their disillusionment 
with the CRC. By then, the government had already rejected 
every recommendation of substance passed on to it by the 
CR~.~ In addition, the government had revoked the eRe's say 
in the approval of the budget. The "militants" seized the 
opportunity to exploit this dissatisfaction and began to 
advance the view that the Labour Party should withdraw from 
participation in the council. This precipitated a heated 
debate and brought into the open the divergent views on 
participation which had been simmering since the 1969 election 
and which had never been properly thrashed out. A number of 
those who openly advocated closer cooperation with the CRe and 
the government had already been expelled or had resigned. 
Among these were former leader, Martin Arendse; the councillor 
for Rietvlei, J.D. Petersen;89 and the party's Natal leader, 
87These will be dealt with more fully in chapter 4. 
~Mina, "The CRC", 81, 85. 
89Cape Herald, 14 November 1970. 
95 
E.G. Rooks. 9o Others had been on the point of expulsion but 
had returned to the party line before action could be taken. 91 
On the other side, there were those who were critical of the 
Labour Party for making use of the CRC, while expressing 
rejection thereof. This led to the formation of the Social 
Democratic Party(SDP) by the party's former Transvaal leader, 
E. Domingo, in 1972. The SDP declared itself "unashamedly and 
unambiguously anti-apartheid" and positioned itself to provide 
a home for those Labour Party members unhappy with the party's 
participatory stance. 92 
The issue of participation came to a head at the Labour 
Party's national conference in East London in April 1972. At 
this conference, an attempt was made to force the Labour Party 
to withdraw from the CRC. The youth wing of the party in the 
Transvaal (Labour Youth Organisation[LYO]) gave notice that a 
motion calling for the party to withdraw from the CRC would be 
made at the conference. 93 That the agitation to withdraw came 
from the Transvaal, can be understood in terms of the fact 
that "militants" Mohammed Dangor, Sam Solomon and Don Mattera 
were from that region. Leon expressed his opposition to the 
suggestion, slating it as "unwise" because it would be 
"playing into the hands of the Government." Furthermore, "to 
stage a complete stayaway from the council will be to the 
advantage of the Government who will then be in a position to 
force Mr. Swartz's Federal Party in a direction to suit 
themselves. ,,94 Giving the clearest indication thus far of a 
major rethink in the Labour Party regarding participation, 
90Daily News, 12 April 1971; Natal Mercury, 14 April 1971. 
91Rand Daily Mail, 12 and 19 October 1971; Natal Mercury, 13 
October 1971. 
92P .A.29, Social Democratic Party Bulletin No.2, July 1972; 
Mary Simons, "Organised Coloured Political Movements", 229. 
93Diamond Fields Advertiser, 14 March 1972; 
9 April 1972. 
94Diamond Fields Advertiser, 14 March 1972. 
Sunday Tribune, 
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Leon insisted that the party must remain in the CRC "as it 
provides us with a legal instrument to express the desires of 
the people, without interference, in our objective for 
political freedom. ,,95 His argument revolved around a matter 
which the party leadership had increasingly come to realise as 
the key reason for remaining in the CRC: membership of the CRC 
provided immunity from prosecution. While dissenters and 
critics of apartheid were being arrested on a regular basis in 
the rest of the country, Labour Party councillors discovered 
that they could "hammer the government left right and centre" 
without fear of arrest. 96 Under the rules of parliamentary 
privilege, councillors could attack the government, expose 
corruption, point out anomalies and highlight the many 
injustices their people experienced under apartheid. 97 
Leon's argument highlighted the motivation behind the two 
major views which had come to the fore in the Labour Party. 
The "moderates", many of whom still clung. to the liberal 
tradition which provided the foundation of their argument for 
CRC participation in 1969, saw continued participation in the 
CRC as an opportunity to continue the fight for equal 
po~itical rights for coloureds. The protection which eRC 
membership provided would allow them the opportunity to 
highlight the position of coloured people. The "militants" 
were not so much interested in the political plight of 
coloured people as it was in organizing resistance and 
opposition to the government: the aim being to build up a 
strong enough opposition to challenge and eventually force the 
95Diamond Fields Advertiser, 14 March 1972. In a letter to 
the Cape Herald, 3 June 1972, Leon again defended participation 
and advanced reasons why a walk-out would be disastrous for 
coloured people. 
96Arthur Stanley, interview, 10 September 1992. 
97John Nash, interview, 31 August 1993, called this "boer se 
moer" politics. He indicates that Labour Party members revelled 
in the opportunity of getting up in council chambers or at 
constituency and election meetings, and "hammer the government." 
97 
government to recognise the rights of all oppressed South 
Africans, and not just those of coloured people. 98 Sabotaging 
the CRC would be one way of causing the government some 
discomfort. Thus, while the "moderates" sought the protection 
of the CRC to press for coloured rights, the "militants" only 
needed the cover of Labour Party membership to do their 
clandestine organising. 
with the knowledge of the motion to be put to the conference, 
the party's executive asked Carter Ebrahim, the editor of the 
party's newsletter, to present a paper outlining the case for 
participation. It was arranged for the address, "The Labour 
Party and Participation in the Coloured Persons Representative 
Council," to be given before the motion took place. Ebrahim 
highlighted the main issues that had dominated coloured 
politics since the 1940s. 
raised all the grounds for 
In an ingenious move, he first 
opposition to participation in the 
CRC - that the CRC had been set up to implement separate 
development and that any association with it meant the 
acceptance of apartheid; that it was a worthless institution 
because it was powerless to enact laws in the interests of the 
people; and that Labour's presence in the CRC was incompatible 
with its demands for full democratic rights and direct 
representation on central and other governing bodies . 99 No 
matter what the reasons for participation might be, he argued, 
merely taking part in apartheid structures made the fineness 
between a "quisling" and a "realist" all the more apparent. 
What then were the differences, if any, between the Federals 
and Labour?lOO Ebrahim then went on to dismantle each of 
these arguments, pointing out the futility of alternative 
strategies and emphasised the achievements of the Labour Party 
98Mohammed Dangor, interview, 6 December 1993. 
99p . A.29, Carter Ebrahim, Address to Labour Party National 
Conference, East London, 7 April 1972; Hugo, Quislings or 
Realists, 155-59. 
lOOP.A.29, Carter Ebrahim, Address to Labour Party National 
Conference, East London, 7 April 1972. 
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since it entered the CRC, viz. that Labour's victory at the 
polls in 1969 demonstrated to the world the rejection of 
apartheid by two million coloureds; that the Labour Party 
"forced the Nationalists to expose their insincerity" by 
driving them to the immoral act of packing the CRC with 
defeated Federals. He attacked those who proposed a 
withdrawal from the CRC, likening them to fighters who would 
rather shadow-box in the dressing room than come out to fight 
and risk losing. He made out a strong case for participation, 
indicating that the party's participation had ensured that 
instead of the CRC becoming "the quiet efficient machine 
designed to smoothly implement and rubber-stamp separate 
development," it had become a public forum where the problems 
caused by that policy had been exposed and debated. To walk 
out now would give "stooges and yes-men a free hand to carry 
out separate development. ,,101 Ebrahim concluded that the 
party's insistence on participation had placed the government 
in a dilemma by forcing it to pack the council. The 
government therefore had a moral duty to either dissolve the 
CRC or call an election. "This," he added, "is Labour's 
victory" because, either way, the Labour Party would triumph 
thE< next time around .102 
The resolution to withdraw from the CRC was then put by Don 
Mattera, that "the Labour Party withdraw as soon as possible 
from the CPRC." To this Ebrahim proposed an amendment "that 
the Labour Party of S.A. remains in the CRC until such time as 
the political situation warrants its withdrawal from that 
insti tution .... ,,103 After a heated debate, both the 
resolution and the amendment were put to the vote. The 
10lrbid. 
102rbid. 
103p .A. 29, Minutes of Labour Party National Conference, East 
London, 6-8 April 1972, Sunday Tribune, 9 April 1972. 
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resolution was defeated and the amendment was carried. 104 The 
LYO disassociated itself from the decision to continue 
participation,I05 and soon after the party's national 
treasurer Paul Kleinschmidt resigned in protest .106 
The defeat suffered by the "militant" faction, which had had a 
strong influence on Labour Party policy in 1970 and 1971, was 
surprising but it was not so much an indication of the 
numerical ascendancy of the "moderate" faction in the party as 
the fact that the "militant" faction did not push their view 
strongly. At that stage, the members of the ANC and PAC who 
had infiltrated the party had concealed their affiliation in 
order not to jeopardise their work. Dangor indicates that the 
majority of the members of the Labour Party were never aware 
that the ANC and PAC had infiltrated their organisation and 
were using it as a cover. At the party's Bloemfontein 
congress in 1978, Jac Rabie appeared to have guessed what was 
going on when he warned delegates that the ANC was in their 
midst .107 Nevertheless, no one was able to' name these members 
and they were able to operate unhindered within the Labour 
Party for the entire duration of the term of the CRC. Thus, 
the "militants" did not want to belabour their point at the 
'. 
conference and risk exposure. However, they did manage to get 
delegates to accept a resolution instituting a program of 
intensive political organisation outside the CRC; intensifying 
the scale of non-violent confrontations; and identifying 
itself with oppressed groups.IOB In addition, they also got 
104Daily Dispatch, 8 April 1972; Sunday Tribune, 9 April 
1972 . 
105See P .A. 29, LYO report to NEC, September 1972. 
106See P.A.29, Memo to Secretary of the Labour Party, 23 
April 1973. 
107Mohammed Dangor, interview, 6 December 1993. 
10Bp .A. 29, Minutes of Labour Party National Conference, East 
London, 6-8 April 1972; Rand Daily Mail, 8 April 1972; Daily 
Dispatch, 8 April 1972. 
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the conference to resolve to embark on a course of 
"confrontations and boycotts. ,,109 Thus, despite this setback 
on the issue of continued participation, the "militants" were 
able to steer the Labour Party on a course of greater 
involvement in the black struggle for political rights. As a 
result, after 1972, it was easier for "militant" members to 
openly espouse the philosophy of black consciousness without 
risking exposure. Despite the wording in the party's 
constitution that the Labour Party would fight for the rights 
of all South Africans, this was the first time the party 
officially and publicly identified with Africans and the 
"liberation struggle." llO 
By debating the issue of participation, the Labour Party also 
clarified its position for the first time since its formation, 
and publicly indicated that cooperation with instruments of 
separate representation was now official policy, and that even 
though it would continue to confront and ~mbarrass the 
government, it would not walk out and abandon the CRC. 
However, the implications of participation did not trouble the 
Labour Party after its 1972 decision because it was in 
opposition in the CRC. It was only when the 1975 elections 
drew near that this presented a new dilemma for the Labour 
Party leaders. In the expectation of victory, what would they 
now do if they were the governing party? 
The Labour Party approached the 1975 CRC election with some 
trepidation. The five years in which the CRC had been in 
operation had given coloured people an opportunity to study at 
first hand the workings of their "own parliament." Numerous 
letters to editors in this period as well as statements made 
in interviews by prominent leaders in the community, gave an 
inkling of the growing dissatisfaction with the council as a 
109Sunday Tribune, 9 April 1972. 
llOSonny Leon Papers, C. 1. 1. 3, "Constitution of the Labour 
Party of South Africa", as amended, 8 April 1972. 
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representative body, as well as the behaviour and contribution 
of the various parties and its members in the council. 1ll 
Added to this was the fact that throughout the first five 
years, the government had repeatedly rejected numerous 
resolutions passed by the council. 1l2 Was participation 
therefore not just a futile e xercise? Were coloured people 
not disillusioned with the CRC as an instrument of political 
expression? ·Furthermore, the support given to the party had 
enabled it to win twenty-six of the forty elected seats in 
1969. However, the Labour Party had reneged on its promise 
not to occupy its seats in the council and had spent five 
years as the official opposition. Did the electorate consider 
this an act of betrayal? How would they view the new position 
on participation? The government had also ignored the 
feelings of the electorate by appointing defeated Federal 
Party members to the twenty nominated seats which gave the 
party a majority to govern. How would the coloured people 
react to this cynical disregard of their ;Will as expressed at 
the polls? Finally, the various pro-government parties had 
polled 53% of the popular vote. With a 45% share of the vote, 
the Labour Party had won 65% of the constituencies, mainly in 
urban areas. 1l3 Would the party be able to hold its urban 
seats and increase its share of the vote in rural areas? 
In this atmosphere of uncertainty, the Labour Party began its 
annual conference in Umtata on 1 January 1975. It took "a 
long hard look" at the state of the party, its relationship 
with the coloured community, its handling of the political 
situation in the country and its attitude towards the CRC and 
1llCape Times, 19 March 1975. 
112Burger, 21 March 1975; Graphic, 28 March 1975; Venter, 
Coloured, 480; S.T. van der Horst, The Theron Commission: A 
summary of the findings and recommendations of the Commission of 
Inquiry into matters relating to the Coloured Population Group 
(Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1976), 102. 
113Sonny Leon Papers, C.1.1.3.2., 26 February 1980. 
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other governing institutions. 114 This introspection led to 
another about-turn. The party confessed that its policy of 
refusing to serve on the various committees of the CRC and in 
other government committees and institutions, had been wrong. 
Sonny Leon thereupon announced that the party now intended to 
"get into every institution, government and otherwise, where 
we can effect any sort of change in the people's living 
conditions. ,, 115 This view was reinforced in the secretary's 
annual report: 
The Coloured Persons' Representative Council was a means 
to an end ••• (It was the Goose that laid the golden 
egg). It would be the height of folly to destroy our 
protection and legal platforms which had become an 
embarrassment to the government. If these platforms were 
destroyed what would happen to the masses. The Labour 
Party has entered this game to expose and embarrass the 
Government. It was easy to urge confrontation but we had 
to be sure we were not found wanting when the occasion 
arose .116 
This was the first public indication of a second major shift 
in policy. In 1969, besides promising to boycott the council 
chamber, and embarking on walk-outs which had frequently 
bro.ught the CRC to a virtual standstill through boycotts and 
walkouts, the party had opposed the introduction of management 
committees and had boycotted elections for these bodies. It 
had also publicly and vociferously stated that it would never 
accept nominated seats, nor would it, if it came to power, 
accept the chairmanship of the CRC executive committee or 
seats on the executive.1l1 
114p •A• 29 , Minutes of 
Umtata, 1-3 January 1975; 
Now, the party reversed its 
Labour Party National Conference, 
Sunday Times, 5 January 1975. 
1l5Sunday Times, 12 January 1975. 
1l6Sonny Leon Papers, C.1.4 . , 2 January 1975. 
117Cape Times, 10 November 1969. During the 1974 CRC 
session, the Labour Party defeated a Federal Party motion 
whereupon the Prime Minister, B.J. Vorster, offered Sonny Leon 
the chairmanship of the CRC Executive should Tom Swartz resign. 
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attitude and pledged to serve on all institutions of separate 
representation. This new approach took the East London 
resolution even further. If it planned to remain in the CRC, 
it made no sense to refuse to serve on committees of that 
body, or to reject other institutions of separate 
representation which fulfilled a similar role. 
The shift to the right was an indication of the decline of the 
influence of the "militants" in the party and a corresponding 
increase in influence of the "moderates." The party's 
decision in 1972 to remain in the CRC had led to the 
resignation of a number of "militants." This included a 
number of councillors. By mid-1973, the Labour Party only had 
twenty-one councillors as opposed to the twenty-six of 
1969. 118 This not only weakened the party's representation in 
the CRC, it also depleted the ranks of the "militants" and, 
correspondingly, their influence in the party. The strength 
of the "militants" was further depleted with the decline of 
the Labour Youth Organisation (LYO) which was strongest in the 
Transvaal. The Transvaal branch of the LYO had been the prime 
mover behind the 1972 resolution to withdraw from the CRC. 119 
In _.that year, the LYO national conference had accepted a 
resolution calling for open membership in defiance of the 
government prohibition .120 This resulted in an influx of 6 
000 new members to the LYO, but the organisation soon went 
into decline as members accused the Labour Party of being 
upholders of the apartheid system. 121 The virtual demise of 
117 ( ••• continued) 
Leon turned down the offer on the 
he would be "selling" his people. 
grounds that by accepting it 
See Mina, "The CRC", 108. 
118Saks, "The Failure of the CRC", 122. 
119Diamond Fields Advertiser, 14 March 1972; Mina, "The CRC", 
89. 
120The Prohibition of Political Interference Act of 1968. 
121p .A. 29, 
Organisation", 
Achmat Dangor, "Report of Labour Youth 
n.d.; Eastern Province Herald, 3 May 1973. 
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the LYO, which had been used by ANC and PAC "militants" as 
their mouthpiece, seriously undermined the ability of this 
group to continue to exercise a strong influence on party 
policy. By the time of the 1975 conference, the "militants" 
were dealt a further blow when ten sitting councillors did not 
attend the conference. The majority of these were 
"militants." These councillors were subsequently omitted from 
the list of Labour Party candidates to contest the March 1975 
CRC election. 122 
Another factor in the shift to the right was a more recent 
influx of former Federal Party members into the party. While 
the influence of the "militants" waned, the ranks of the 
"moderates" were strengthened when a number of Federal Party 
councillors defected to the Labour Party in 1974. 123 Former 
Federal councillors were also included in the list of Labour 
Party candidates for the March 1975 CRC election .124 The 
Federal Party presence in party membership had also 
dramatically increased when the Labour Party won a number of 
by-elections in 1973 and 1974 in former Federal Party 
constituencies .125 An important factor was the promise of 
fu~ther Federal Party defections. During the 1974 session, 
the Federal Party had lost a no-confidence motion and the 
council was prorogued before the Labour Party could capitalise 
on its victory. The Labour Party saw in all of this an 
opportunity to win over more Federal Party members. Thus a 
move to the right would encourage those who were wavering. 
Besides, the Labour Party sensed victory in the forthcoming 
elections and wanted to ensure this. Opposition to the party 
and the forthcoming elections was intensifying and there 
122p .A. 29, Minutes of Labour Party National Conference, 
Umtata, 1-3 January 1975. 
123Saks, "The Failure of the CRC", 126. 
124p .A. 29, Minutes of Labour Party National Conference, 
Umtata, 1-3 January 1975. 
u5Saks, "The Failure of the CRC", 123-24. 
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existed the probability of stronger calls for a boycott. Thus 
the Labour Party had to have greater appeal for those who 
would go and vote, and these would most likely be the rural, 
conservative coloureds and voters in Federal Party 
constituencies which had previously displayed the highest 
electoral support. Feeling the pressure from those, many of 
them its former supporters, who accused the Labour Party of 
allowing itself to be coopted, the Labour Party decided to 
strengthen its power base and ensure victory by shifting to 
the right. 
This shift did not take place without some trauma. It led to 
the resignation of a number of members, including branch 
officials and eRe councillors. In addition, ten sitting 
councillors were omitted from the list of candidates for the 
March election and these immediately joined the ranks of the 
independents in the eRe. This had repercussions when the eRe 
election was held three months later wher:i ten of the eleven 
independents contested their seats on the · same issues as 
Labour Party candidates. The two groups fought each other in 
an atmosphere of acrimony. 126 The Labour Party declared "war" 
on -. the "Labour Independents" while the latter attacked Labour 
"for trying to give the impression that they have a monopoly 
on opposition to apartheid . ,,127 
126John Nash, interview, 31 August 1993, called it a "dirty 
election" • He was one of those who had replaced a sitting 
councillor. The former councillor fought him as a Labour 
Independent and embarked on a "smear campaign", using the press, 
pamphlets and public meetings to discredit and impugn his 
character. 
127Sunday Times, 16 February 1975 and 2 March 1975. One of 
the notable omissions from the list of candidates was that of 
former leader, Martin Arendse. After he lost the leadership to 
Leon in 1970, Arendse had continued in the eRe as a Labour Party 
backbencher. He then resigned from the party, sat as an 
Independent, then returned to the party as a frontbencher. 
Following his omission from the candidate list, he resigned from 
the party "for the last time." He then stood as an Independent 
in the Tafelberg constituency but lost his deposit. Arendse 
still had a strong following in the party and many were bitter 
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The party emerged from its Umtata conference 
the one that had fought the 1969 elections. 
very different 
While it 
to 
continued to espouse opposition to apartheid, and still called 
for direct representation at parliamentary, provincial and 
municipal levels as it had done in 1969, the party now sought 
to justify its presence, rationalise its participation, and 
entrench itself in the CRC. An undated election pamphlet 
declared: 
The Labour Party decided to use every legal means and 
machinery at its disposal in order to demonstrate that 
the "Coloured" people totally rejected the apartheid 
policy. To this end it was necessary therefore to 
participate in the political machinery provided for the 
"Coloured" people because there were simply no other 
practical alternatives. The strategy of exposure, 
embarrassment and obstruction, whilst at the same time 
politicising and organising the people, enjoyed 
tremendous success . Accordingly the Party enjoys 
overwhelming support and has frustrated the envisaged 
unfolding of apartheid (separate development). 128 
The reversal of its 1969 stance created feelings of unease in 
the party. Members were not sure what the electorate would 
make of their about-face. Their nervousness concerning the 
po~sibility of a boycott of the election, but more especially 
of the party at the polls because of its new stance, was 
reflected in a wide variety of pamphlets outlining the party's 
aims and objectives and its opposition to separate 
development. The aggressively anti-eRC rhetoric of the 1969 
campaign was replaced by concerted pleas for people to vote, 
and if they did vote, to vote for the Labour Party. The 
electorate was warned that to abstain from voting was to 
support the apartheid system. A typical pamphlet carried this 
warning: "The CRC is being used to oppress our people. By not 
127 ( •.. continued) 
at the treatment he received, especially as Arendse' s 
"cooperation" stance of 1970 was now party policy in 1975. See 
P.A.29, Minutes of Labour Party National Conference, Umtata, 1-3 
January 1975; Argus, 20 March 1975; Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 70. 
128sonny Leon Papers, C. 1. 1. 6., Election Pamphlet, 1975. 
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voting you support the Apartheid system. Put punch into the 
opposition - Vote Labour. ,,129 At a meeting held in Kimberley 
on 18 January 1975, Sonny Leon also warned the party's 
election candidates that "unless the Coloured people vote for 
the Labour Party and thereby inform the White people of their 
total rejection of apartheid in whatever guise it is dressed, 
the Government will find a way to tell the world that we 
accept racial' discrimination." Leon further urged coloured 
people to give the Labour Party a "unanimous mandate to demand 
those rights which White people believe they require to enable 
them to live a decent life .•.. " He pointed out that the only 
way in which Coloured people could make their hatred of 
apartheid known without inviting attention from the 
authorities, "is to vote against apartheid by voting for the 
Labour Party in the March elections ...... He then warned that 
"any election candidate who is not a Labour Party official is 
a front man for the Federal Party and apartheid. ,,130 In its 
anxiety to ensure that the electorate wo~ld not snub it, the 
, 
party made the election, in effect, a referendum on 
apartheid. l3l 
The Labour Party's fear of an election boycott brought on by 
disillusionment and disenchantment were not unfounded. An 
organisation calling itself the Anti-CRC Committee (ACRCOM) 
surfaced in January 1975, after the Labour Party had publicly 
indicated its shift in policy. 
of the South African Students' 
ACRCOM was composed of members 
Organisation (SASO) and the 
Black Peoples' Convention (BPC), both of them black 
consciousness movements, which had a considerable following in 
the coloured community after this philosophy was embraced by 
129For example, Sonny Leon 
election pamphlet, issued between 
Papers, C.1.12.4., undated 
January and March 1975. 
130Sunday Times, 19 January 1975. 
131Rand Daily Mail, 22 March 1975. 
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coloured youths, mostly in the Cape, ~n the 1970s. 132 ACRCOM 
declared that its aim was to influence people not to 
participate in the March election and to discourage 
participation in the CRC and similar institutions. The 
organisation did not believe that a "humanitarian society 
where justice is meted out to all (could) be achieved by 
separate, multi-national or parallel development, of which the 
CRC is an integral part. ,,133 Boycott pamphlets carried the 
simple message: 
This is what the CRC has achieved 
1969 - Oppression 
1970 - Oppression 
1971 - Oppression 
1972 - Oppression 
1973 - Oppression 
1974 - Oppression 
DON'T VOTE I34 
The opposing positions taken by the Labou,r Party and ACRCOM 
meant that they were bound to clash, and they soon became 
embroiled in a war of words. Sonny Leon attacked ACRCOM's 
calls for a boycott of the CRC because this would "silence the 
protest of the Coloured people A boycott will only defeat 
ourselves and not the government or apartheid ..•. (If) people 
who would vote Labour (stayed) away from the polling booths 
the Federal Party would get into the Council .... If the 
Federal Party gets a majority in the CRC, their views ..• 
would be accepted as the view of the Coloured people. ,,135 In 
a press statement ACRCOM rebuked the Labour Party in a reply 
which, perhaps, reflected the feelings of many who opposed the 
CRC: 
132Theron Report (R P 38 - 1976), 441. The attitude of 
coloured people to the black consciousness movement is dealt with 
in chapter 4. 
133Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 473. 
134Ibid. 
135Sunday Times, 2 February 1975. 
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To take stock, Mr Leon has retrogressed from full 
parliamentary representation to four White 
representatives for "Coloureds," to the present 
institution which he himself calls "a circus" •.•• 
The attitude Mr Leon expresses that we "must use the 
legal protection afforded us" smacks of a dependency 
complex. 
He feels that we have to make use of the instruments 
created by the government as if they were the only people 
able to create instruments to free people. The truth is 
that they can only create instruments to oppress •... 
Our obsession to be protected by our adversaries 
coerced us into using their instruments .. .. . 
And finally in reply to Mr Leon's concern about the 
Federal Party gaining absolute control of the Council, 
ACRCOM feels that his concern is unnecessary since 
neither the Labour Party's nor the Federal's presence in 
the Council was intended to have any influence over its 
effectiveness. 
The CRC record shows that 99% of its motions for 
improvement and development are rejected by the 
nationalist government. 
Their presence as an "Opposition" to the Federals in 
the CRC has given this white elephant an esteem it does 
not deserve. In fact, it assisted in making this game of 
playing parliament so impressive, le,ading people into 
believing that it does serve a positive purpose in our 
struggle against oppression ., . . 136 ' 
ACRCOM's argument evidently summed up the feelings of a large 
number of coloured people, as the results of the March 
election were subsequently to show. Significantly, ACRCOM was 
the first organised opposition to the CRC since the council's 
formation was first announced in 1964. The question 
immediately comes to mind as to why there was no such 
organisation and opposition to the CRC during the 1969 
election campaign. The logical answer was that an 
organisation such as ACRCOM was not necessary at the time 
because such an organisation already existed - the Labour 
Party. This party had assumed the mantle of opposition to the 
government, the CRC and the policy of separate development. 
Moreover, the electorate had accepted the Labour Party's claim 
to be the opposition to government policy and when they voted 
in 1969, they voted for a party which advocated the 
destruction of the CRC as an instrument of separate 
136Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 477-78. 
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development. The appearance of ACRCOM in 1975 confirmed that 
the Labour Party had undergone a radical shift in policy. In 
1969 the Labour Party had railed against the CRC and the pro-
government Federal Party had had to defend that body and its 
participation therein. Now in 1975, ACRCOM was the opponent 
of the CRC and the Labour Party was the one justifying its 
presence in, and the existence of, the CRC. From an election 
promise to destroy the system, the Labour Party was now 
working "within the system" and attacking those who occupied 
the same ground it had itself occupied in 1969. 
The government was also concerned that coloureds might be 
disillusioned with the CRC, desert the Federal Party and 
boycott the election. It needed large-scale coloured support 
to dampen disaffection with their political lot and to justify 
separate political institutions. So, in the months leading up 
to the election, certain concessions were made which could be 
construed as attempts to "buy" a pro-gove,rnment vote .137 On 
23 January 1975 Vorster agreed to proposals granting greater 
rights and a better deal for coloured people .138 Soon after, 
racial barriers at the Nico Malan theatre in Cape Town were 
dropped, a move which Sonny Leon dismissed as a ruse to 
deceive ill-informed coloureds. 139 Coloureds were also allowed 
to serve on boards and councils affecting their affairs, and 
coloured representation was allowed on the Prime Minister's 
Advisory Council. 140 The Labour Party brushed these 
concessions aside and contended that the proposals agreed to 
by Vorster were not to grant coloured people more rights but 
to grant the Federal Party powers to more efficiently 
implement the policy of apartheid. l4l An examination of the 
137Sunday Tribune, 23 March 1975 
138Survey of Race Relations (1975) , II. 
139 RaI;H;10rt, 16 March 1975. 
140Sunday Tribune, 23 March 1975 
141Sunday Times, 26 January 1975. 
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election results attests to the failure of these concessions 
to influence the coloured electorate to vote for and support 
pro-apartheid parties (see table 3). 
Although the Broederbond was prevented by the Improper 
Political Interference Act from actively assisting the Labour 
Party's pro-government opposition, this did not stop the 
government from again trying to disadvantage and discredit the 
Labour Party as it had done in 1969. For example, Norman 
Middleton, one of the most radical of the Labour Party 
leaders, was arrested in February 1975 after addressing a 
Labour Party election meeting in De Aar. At the meeting he 
indicated that he was happy to see squatter shacks in De Aar 
because if the Labour Party came to power in the 1975 
election, it would move whites into those shacks. He also 
stated that if God was living in South Africa, he would have 
been imprisoned on Robben Island. Middleton was subsequently 
charged with high treason and racial incitement. The case 
dragged on for a number of years but was dismissed when it 
finally came to court. 142 
On-, 19 March 1975, the second election for the eRe was held. 
The results overwhelmingly favoured the Labour Party which won 
thirty-one of the forty elected seats and received 151 410 
(60,2%) of the 251 631 votes cast. The pro-government Federal 
Party, which contested thirty-eight seats, won eight and 
received 75 851 (30,1%) votes. One seat went to an 
independent candidate but none of the other parties gained a 
seat (see Table 3). Despite a resounding Labour Party 
victory, the figures gave evidence of voter apathy, 
disillusionment with the eRe, disenchantment with the Labour 
Party and the effectiveness of the boycott call. Of the 994 
191 persons eligible to register as voters only 521 557 
registered of whom 251 631 voted. In comparison to the 1969 
election, the number of people eligible to register as voters 
142Peter Hendrickse, interview, 18 September 1994; Norman 
Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. 
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Table 3 - Schedule of 1975 Election Results. 143 
Party No. of Seats No. of 
Contested Seats won 
Labour Party 40 31 (77,5%) 
Federal Party 38 8 (20,0%) 
Independents 11 1 ( 2,5%) 
Republican Party 7 0 ( 0,0%) 
Social Democratic Party 6 0 ( 0,0%) 
Total No. 
of votes 
151 410 
75 851 
13 413 
3 326 
2 736 
40 40 (100%) 251 631 
% of poll 
60,2% 
30,1% 
5,3% 
1,3% 
1,1% 
100% 
had increased by 17,8% (843 973 to 994 191), yet the number 
who actually registered declined by 18,2% (637 587 to 521 557) 
and less than half of the registered voters went to the polls 
(see table 4). 
Table 4 - Comparison of the 1969 and 1975 CRC Elections144 
No. of eligible voters 
No. of registered voters 
No. who actually voted 
843973 
637587 
300918 
994191 
·521557 
251631 
Increase/ 
Decrease 
. +150218 
-116030 
- 49287 
%Increase/ 
Decrease 
+17,8% 
-18,2% 
-16,3% 
Nevertheless, the results of the election came as a relief for 
the Labour Party. It increased its share of the poll and the 
number of seats from 26 to 31. The increase in seats meant 
that even if the government nominated pro-government members 
to the twenty nominated seats, the Labour Party would still 
have a large enough majority to "govern." By increasing its 
share of the popular vote from 136 845 (45,4%) to 151 410 
(60,2%), the Labour Party also effectively countered the 
government's accusation that it was a minority party. 
However, the Labour Party was still not able to substantiate 
its claim that it had the majority support of the coloured 
electorate because, although it experienced an increase in the 
143Sonny Leon Papers, C.1.1.3.2., 26 February 1980. 
144Sonny Leon Papers, C.1.1.3.2., 26 February 1980; Theron 
Report (R P 38 - 1976), 442. 
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percentage of the popular vote, it mainly increased its 
support at the expense of the other parties. 
Sonny Leon attributed the low number of registered voters to a 
"public boycott" and inefficiency on the part of the 
Administration of Coloured Affairs .145 However, it was clear 
that a number of other factors contributed to the poor turnout 
in 1975. The actions of the government during the first CRC 
had destroyed any credibility the CRC as an effective 
political instrument might have had; the Labour Party, even 
though it increased its share of the popular vote and the 
number of seats in the council, was being viewed with 
scepticism in many circles because of its inconsistent stand 
in respect of the CRC; the 1975 election saw the rise of 
strong opposition to the CRC in the form of the Anti-CRC 
committee (ACRCOM); the opposition press, which had 
overwhelmingly supported the Labour Party in 1969, had begun 
to attack the CRC as a farce; the Broederbond, having been 
exposed in the 1969 election, was , not as active in giving 
support to the Federal Party in 1975; and the coloured people, 
having trustingly decided to give the CRC a chance in 1969, 
we~e disillusioned because they felt they had been tricked 
once again. The increase in the pettiness of apartheid after 
1969 was perhaps the telling blow which militated against 
wider popular support. More apartheid laws affecting coloured 
people were passed between 1969-1975 than at any other 
time .146 
The poor turnout in urban areas, especially in the Western 
Cape, suggests that a large section of the coloured 
middle-class boycotted this election, signifying their 
discontent with institutions of separate 
the philosophy of separate development. 
representation and 
Those who voted 
elected to compromise and use the CRC for short-term gains and 
145Diamond Fields Advertiser, 19 March 1985. 
146See Joyce, The Rise and Fall of Apartheid, 69-84. 
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the hope of long-term political accommodation. The majority 
of voters were the rural coloureds who were generally 
influenced by their white employers who in turn were 
influenced by the Broederbond as was the case in the 1969 
election. Although the Broederbond was not as blatant in its 
support in 1975, Wilkins and Strydom reports that the 
Broederbond nevertheless made it clear to its members in a 
special circular dated 3 March 1975 whom they should encourage 
their coloured employees and their acquaintances to 
support .147 
From a study of the election results, the inference could be 
made that the coloured electorate rejected apartheid and 
endorsed the Labour Party as an instrument in the destruction 
of separate development. However, even though its share of 
the vote was overwhelming, this victory gave a false 
impression of Labour's popularity, as well as the extent of 
coloured rejection of Nationalist policy.' The number of 
potential voters,i.e. those eligible to register as voters, 
had increased dramatically since 1969 but the number who 
actually registered and those who eventually voted declined 
ev~n more markedly. In the 1969 election, 25% of the eligible 
voters did not register and of those who did, less than 50% 
voted. In the 1975 election, about 50% of the eligible voters 
did not register and of those who did, less than half voted. 
In most constituencies, the percentage poll was low. Reality 
analysed the results thus: 
The message to the Government is clear. The Coloured 
people don't like apartheid. They showed this by their 
massive refusal to register for the eRe roll, the massive 
stayaway of those who did register, and the massive vote 
for the Labour Party of those who did vote ••. the same 
message three times over .148 
Nevertheless, even though the Labour Party emerged a winner on 
147Wilkins and Strydom, Super-Afrikaners, 165. 
148Reality, May 1975. 
115 
most counts, it was hardly an overwhelming vote of confidence 
by coloured people. Despite the increase in the number of 
eligible voters, the Labour Party's share of the potential 
vote decreased from 16,2% to 15,2%. However, another trend 
first noticed in 1969 and confirmed in this election, was that 
Labour Party seats were mostly in Cape and urban areas. Of 
the nineteen urban constituencies in South Africa in 1975, the 
Labour Party won seventeen, eleven of them in the Cape 
Province. In contrast, six of the eight constituencies won by 
the Federal Party were rural. J49 However, the percentage 
polls in the Western Cape, where half of the coloured 
population lived, revealed a phenomenon which was repeated 
later in the tricarneral elections. The Labour Party won all 
nine Western Cape urban seats but, compared to the rest of the 
country, the percentage polls were low and declined even more 
in subsequent elections. 150 For example, in 1969, there were 
202 436 registered voters in these nine constituencies (out of 
a total of 637 587 countrywide). Even though a third (31,7%) 
of all registered voters lived in this area, barely one in • 
three (32,4%) went to the polls, with 49% supporting the 
Labour Party. Despite winning all nine seats, the total 
number of all votes received by the Labour Party in all nine 
constituencies was only 31 967. 151 In 1975, the number of 
registered voters in these constituencies declined to 176 670 
(out of a total of 521 557 countrywide) and even though these 
constituencies contained a little over one-third (33,8%) of 
all registered voters, only one in five (22,4%) went to the 
polls . This time, 81% supported the Labour Party. The Labour 
Party again won all nine seats but the total vote carne to only 
32 362. 152 In comparison the average poll in the five urban 
149Burger, 21 March 1975. 
150These urban 
Heideveld, Rietvlei, 
Cape, Tafelberg. 
seats were Bonteheuwel, Elsies River, 
Strandfontein, Kasselsvlei, Liesbeek, South 
151Burger, 26 September 1969. 
152Ibid, 21 March 1975. 
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Transvaal seats was 70%, with 75% in the two urban Natal seats 
and 66% in the two urban Port Elizabeth seats. 
These statistics are significant when assessing overall 
support of coloureds in the Cape for the CRC and the impact 
that support would have on support for the Labour Party. 
Firstly, the majority of coloureds in the Cape Peninsula, 
which contained all the Western Cape urban seats, stayed away 
from the polls. Those who did go, voted for the Labour Party. 
This phenomenon can be more easily understood in terms of the 
political history of coloured people in the Cape . For more 
than a century coloured voters in the Cape had shared the 
common roll with their white counterparts. In 1956, they were 
removed from the voters' roll after a bitter political and 
legal struggle and placed on a separate roll. 153 Between 1956 
and 1968 coloured voters in the Cape voted on a separate roll 
to elect four white representatives to parliament and two to 
the Cape Provincial Council. The principle of political 
separation was further entrenched ,by the Prohibition of 
Political Interference Act of 1968 which prohibited coloureds 
and whites from belonging to the same political party; the 
Separate Representation of Voters Amendment Act of 1968, which 
terminated coloured representation in parliament; and the 
Coloured Persons Representative Council Act of 1968, which was 
intended to provide for, and entrench, 
representation for coloured people. 154 
separate political 
The political 
separation of whites and coloureds was completed with the 
removal of the municipal franchise from Cape coloureds in 
September 1972. 155 Then, to add insult to injury, they were 
asked in 1969 and 1975 to vote for representatives for an 
apartheid institution which would remove them even further 
153See Scher, "Disenfranchisement of the Coloured Voters", 
for a detailed discussion of this issue. 
154Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 45; Ballinger, From Union to 
Apartheid, 468. 
155Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 76; Hugo, Quislings or 
Realists, 142-43. 
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from that which they previously enjoyed, viz. common roll 
representation. It is therefore understandable that so few 
Cape coloureds voted, and when they did, they voted for a 
party which promised to destroy the CRC. The government's 
action in packing the CRC in 1969 with defeated Federal Party 
members further angered coloured people and contributed to a 
poorer turnout in 1975. 156 Thus, the factors which influenced 
Cape coloured attitudes in respect of the CRC were bound to 
affect support for the Labour Party. People boycotted the CRC 
because it perpetuated political inequality, while others 
voted for the Labour Party because it promised to use the CRC 
to gain political equality, but as more people became 
disillusioned with the CRC, so the Labour Party also lost 
voters. This would account for the reason why the Labour 
Party won an overwhelming number of seats, but with low polls. 
Nevertheless, the Labour Party's feat in winning thirty-one of 
the forty elected seats meant that the government could not 
keep it out of power as it had done in 1969, for even if 
Federal Party members were nominated to the twenty nominated 
seats, the Labour Party would still have an outright majority. 
Mindful of Labour threats in the past to cripple the workings 
of the CRC if it ever came to power, the government moved to 
meet such an eventuality. On the day of the election, Schalk 
van der Merwe gave notice in parliament of a bill which would 
empower the Minister of Coloured Relations "in certain 
circumstances to exercise or perform ... the powers, functions 
or duties of the Coloured Persons' Representative Council 
or its executive, or the chairman of the executive and to 
provide for matters connected therewith. ,,157 In effect, the 
Coloured Persons' Representative Council Amendment Bill 
156See F. Molteno, "The Coloured Representative Council: Its 
place in the evolving strategy of South Africa's Rulers," Africa 
Perspective, No.lO (April 1979), for a more detailed discussion 
of coloured attitudes to the CRC. 
157Debates of the House of Assembly (20 March 1975), col. 
3009. 
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enabled the minister to keep the CRC operating even if the 
Labour Party attempted to close it down by walking out . Van 
der Merwe defended the bill on the grounds that it was "the 
declared aim of certain parties to destroy the Coloured 
Representative Council." In his view, the bill was designed to 
prevent chaos which would result from the breakdown of 
administrative and financial functions because the refusal to 
exercise powers and duties would lead to funds not being 
available for pensions and salaries .158 
The reaction of opposition parties in the House of Assembly 
and the opposition and government press followed a predictable 
pattern. Colin Eglin of the Progressive Party argued that the 
bill deprived coloured people of their rights and represented 
a negation of the Prime Minister's recent undertaking that the 
powers of the CRC would be extended .159 He labelled the bill 
"cynical in the extreme" and countered that coloured people, 
stripped of all their political rights, had used the freedom 
that remained to reject the policy of apartheid . ,,160 He 
added: "The hon. the Minister is anticipating the end of the 
road of parallel development for the Coloured people. This 
wi~l be the end of the road of the Coloured Representative 
Council. ,,161 Harry Schwarz of the Reform Party supported 
EgI~ by suggesting that the introduction of the bill at a 
time when the full election results were not yet known, was "a 
piece of cynicism . ,,162 He reiterated his belief that coloured 
people should be represented in parliament and that the timing 
158Debates of the House of Assembly (20 March 1975), cols. 
2298-302; Cape Times, 26 March 1975. 
159Debates of the House of Assembly (20 March 1975), cols . 
3009-11. 
160Rand Daily Mail, 21 March 1975 . 
161Debates of the House of Assembly (20 March 1975), col. 
3012. 
162Survey of Race Relations (1975), 15-16 . 
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of the bill harmed any effort at consensus .163 De Villiers 
Graaff of the united Party condemned the bill because it was 
"a return to baasskap," but indicated that he would vote for 
it to be read the first time to allow a debate to "let the 
whole world know that ... the Coloured Representative Council 
is just a rubber stamp, that it means nothing. ,,164 The 
opposi tion press heaped scorn on the government, 165 but the 
government-supporting press sought to justify the government's 
actions. In an article which sharply criticised the Labour 
Party, the Cape Nationalist mouthpiece, Die Burger, 
acknowledged that it was a pity the government had to resort 
to such a measure, just as it was a pity that they had 
nominated Federal Party members in 1969, but added that a 
government which neglected to prevent impending chaos in a 
section of its administration "is nie sy sout werd nie. ,,166 
The bill was not the only 
It must, 
government 
of course, 
reaction to a possible 
be remembered that notice Labour 
of the 
victory. 
bill was given before the results of the election 
became known .167 When the results confirmed that the Labour 
Party had indeed won an outright victory, Vorster warned party 
leaders "not to destroy the goodwill between Whites and 
" 
Coloured people. ,,168 Addressing a public meeting at 
Smithfield, he insisted that the government would not tolerate 
attempts by people to upset public order and peace and would 
163Debates of the House of Assembly (20 March 1975), col. 
3014. 
164Ibid, col. 3013. 
165For example, Rand Daily Mail, 21 March 1975; Cape Times, 
22 March 1975; Sunday Times, 23 March 1975. 
166Burger, 22 March 1975. 
167Notice of the bill was given on 19 March 1975 and 
introduced in the House of Assembly on 20 March. The election 
results only confirmed a Labour victory on 20 March. 
168Diamond Fields Advertiser, 21 March 1975. 
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take the strongest steps to preserve peace and order .169 Die 
Volksblad supported Vorster's warning by criticising the 
Labour Party's confrontationist posture: 
Dit is ironies dat terwyl die Regering groot welslae 
behaal om vrede in Suider-Afrika te verseker, 'n deel van 
ons binnelandse bevolking hom skynbaar op die weg van 
konfrontasie will begeef. 'n Mens kan net hoop dat die 
Kleurlinge in die algemeen genoeg sin vir verantwoorde-
likheid het om betyds van hierdie koers weg te draai en 
Mnr Vorster se hand van samewerking te aanvaar .170 
The newly-elected Labour Party member for the Eastern Cape, 
John Nash, took up the cudgels in defence of the Labour Party 
and coloured people, retorting that the Prime Minister should 
get his priorities right when he warned the Labour Party not 
to disturb goodwill in South Africa: 
The Coloured people have shown goodwill for years. We 
fought and were prepared to sacrifice our lives in the 
last war. We suffered the humiliation of being removed 
from the common roll. We even accepted the Coloured 
Representative Council and the embarrassment of being 
robbed of our right to rule in the Council after winning 
the 1969 elections. What more must we do to show our 
goodwill. The only way we can convince our electorate 
that we should not close the CRC now, is for the Prime 
Minister to show goodwill by putting us on the road to 
equal rights immediately. The electorate is prepared to 
settle for nothing less. l71 
The reaction of the Labour Party itself to the whole furore 
was one of confusion . Sonny Leon at first stated that his 
party, having gained a clear majority, would call upon the 
Prime Minister to scrap the CRC and give full parliamentary 
representation to the coloured people .172 When the party had 
had time to absorb the implications of the new bill, it 
169rbid. 
17OVolksblad, 21 March 1975. 
l7lRand Daily Mail, 25 March 1975 . 
172Survey of Race Relations (1975), 14. 
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decided to abandon its undertaking to boycott the council. 
Leon explained that a walk-out or boycott would play into the 
minister's hands because the new powers contained in the bill 
enabled the minister to run the council himself. On the other 
hand, if the minister chose not to do so, the Labour Party's 
majority in the CRe was still too fragile to withstand 
defections, which would then allow the Federal Party in 
through the back door . The Labour Party had been extremely 
confident of victory, even expecting to win up to thirty-nine 
of the forty elected seats, and such an overwhelming victory 
would have given it the ability to boycott the council and 
cripple it completely. 173 Even if the government then 
nominated twenty pro-government members, the eRe could not 
function. However, winning only thirty-one seats was not a 
comfortable margin. If the government again nominated twenty 
pro-government members, these, added to the eight Federal 
Party elected members and the one independent, only gave the 
Labour Party a potential majority of two. Although, the pro-
government forces still would not have had enough to govern, 
there still existed the possibility that one or two Labour 
councillors could defect. The Labour Party therefore decided 
to _,remain in the eRe. Leon however repeated the party's 
commitment to use it as a platform to fight apartheid and 
press for equality for coloured people, with direct 
representation in parliament - the same argument as in 
1969. 174 
Leon later acknowledged that the party erred by making its 
intentions public, thus allowing the government to take 
173Fred Peters suggested that if the Labour Party had paid 
greater heed to good organisation, it would have won at least 
thirty- five seats. Labour Party Accession, Secretary's Report 
to Labour Party National Conference, Upington , 6-8 January 1976. 
John Nash, interview, 31 August 1993, states that the party at 
one stage expected that it could win at least thirty-nine of the 
forty elected seats. 
174Rand Daily Mail, 24 March 1975; Survey of Race Relations 
(1975),17. 
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preventative measures. 175 Of course, it is difficult to 
understand such an argument as the Labour Party's intention to 
cripple the eRC if it came to power had been often and 
publicly stated for a number of years. It was the main 
platform of the party's 1969 campaign. Boycotting the eRe was 
part of the Labour Party's tradition and constituted the 
foundation upon which its attitude to the eRe was built. Not 
to make its intentions public would have deprived the party of 
its main electoral weapon and the main thrust of its anti-eRC 
platform. Ironically, the Labour Party had softened its 
stance on this point and in the run-up to the 1975 election 
had repeatedly told the electorate that it would participate 
so as to use the eRC as a platform to attack apartheid and 
press for coloured rights. Even though the boycott call still 
surfaced during the election campaign, the Labour Party was 
not serious about boycotting the council after March 1975. 
The government knew this but it appears that the cumulative 
effect of Labour Party actions and threats influenced the 
government. The party's hostility had been evident in speech 
after speech by Labour Party leaders at the Umtata conference 
held earlier in the year, and in its outright rejection of the 
CRG liaison committee. The dramatic switch to an anti-
apartheid platform by the Federal Party just before the 
election also "spooked" the government. 176 It was not 
prepared to run the risk of having its creation destroyed by 
either a Labour Party government or a united coloured front 
and so, in a panic, resorted to the controversial Coloured 
Persons' Representative Council Amendment Bill. 
Accusations were immediately forthcoming. Critics charged 
that the Labour Party had never been serious about boycotting 
the CRC and that it had used the threat as an election ploy to 
improve its image among those who considered the CRC to be a 
175Sonny Leon Papers, C. 1. 4., Sonny Leon, Address to the 
Labour Party National Conference, Upington, 6 January 1976. 
176Arthur Stanley, interview, 10 September 1975. 
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farce. ACRCOM took the Labour Party to task in a press 
statement: 
The Labour Party went to the "electorate" specifically on 
.•. two issues viz. a referendum on the rejection of 
apartheid and the closing down of the CRC if it "carne to 
power." One would have thought that post-"election" 
statements on the strategy that the Labour Party would 
employ, would conform to a plan consistent with the 
implementation of this "mandate." Instead, we hear Mr 
Leon stating that the Labour Party will "stay put to 
destroy it from within." It .•. was (not) unexpected, 
that the Nationalist government •.• would introduce 
legislation guaranteeing the continuation of the CRC .••. 
For Mr Leon and the Labour Party to have pretended that 
this was an unexpected development casts a bad reflection 
on their political acumen - especially in the light of 
similar legislation having been passed in respect of like 
bodies to the CRC e.g. the Bantustan Legislative 
Assemblies. 
The Labour Party obtained its mandate under the 
pretence that it could "close down" the CRC. Even the 
introduction of this supposedly-contentious bill does not 
justify its somersault, unless they thought the 
Nationalist government was not serious in its 
determination to implement its policy of separate 
development. Having received a clear and unambiguous 
"mandate" to close down the CRC and secondly, without 
added justification in this Bill - if ever there existed 
any - the Labour Party have misled and are misleading the 
"voters. ,,177 
ACRCOM also attacked the Labour Party's argument that, to 
boycott the council, would be to abandon it to pro-government 
elements who would claim recognition as being the genuine 
leaders of the coloured people. There was a measure of 
substance to ACRCOM's argument because support and respect for 
the pro-government parties had declined so alarmingly that 
very few would have accepted them as the genuine leaders of 
the coloured people. The pro-government elements had been so 
discredited by their performance in the CRC that even they had 
changed their position to 
the March 1975 election. 
that had the Labour Party 
an anti-apartheid one just before 
There is little evidence to suggest 
exploited its majority and walked 
177Hugo , Quislings or Realists, 478-79. 
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out of the CRC, that the eight elected Federal Party members 
could have set themselves up as the genuine leaders of the 
coloured people and be accepted and recognised as such . 
Articles such as "The Politics of Collaboration" in Bandwagon 
supported such an assessment: 
Regardless of the objective historical patterns 
underlying Labour Party history, the leadership argues 
that if they were to leave the CRC, they would abandon it 
to the Federals, who would then proceed to pose as the 
"interlocutors" between whom and the government a 
dialogue is possible. Here again, one must look at the 
assumptions underlying such an argument, namely that the 
people are fooled by the pompous words of self-appointed 
"leaders", and secondly, that the aspirations of the 
people are satisfied by pseudo-political institutions 
which deny them access to the real annals of power. The 
only way to show that dummy institutions are not 
acceptable, is to boycott them. If the Labour Party and 
its supporters boycotted the CRC and joined the genuine 
and consistently anti-apartheid and anti-racist forces in 
South Africa, the CRC would be exposed even more 
indisputably for the political mockery it is. 178 
In 1972, the Labour Party had opposed withdrawal from the CRC 
but resolved to do so "when the political situation warrants a 
withdrawal. ,,179 Many critics saw Labour's victory in 1975 as 
that "situation" and therefore expected it to carry out its 
resolution. When it did not, they accused the party of 
dishonesty. ACRCOM suggested that "the Labour Party is really 
only after this platform with its bonus of Government 
protection and other attendant 'perks' or 'fringe benefits', 
which exposes them as a bunch of conformists and opportunists 
wanting to clad themselves in anti-apartheid garb. ,,180 This 
accusation was not entirely unwarranted in 1975, but it may 
have been unfair in the preceding years. In 1969, councillors 
No.5 
178R. Elliot, 
(April 1975), 
"The Politics of Collaboration", Bandwagon, 
4. 
179p .A. 29, Minutes of Labour Party National Conference, East 
London, 6-8 April 1972. 
180Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 479 i John Nash, interview, 
31 August 1993. 
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received R150 per month and perks and fringe benefits were 
almost non-existent. However, R150 was approximately thrice 
that earned by the majority of coloured people. l8l Yet it is 
arguable whether this salary was enough to ensnare 
councillors. Statements made by Sonny Leon in his speech to 
the party's national conference in 1975 indicates that most of 
this salary was used to cover travelling expenses as 
councillors tried to keep contact with large and often far-
flung constituencies .182 Nash concurs that CRC salaries were 
paltry considering that most of it went on travelling expenses 
and the costs of running a constituency. ' He also makes the 
point that members had no real perks in those days; in any 
event, not sufficient to warrant such accusations .183 
Councillors were also expected to contribute 10% of their CRC 
salary to the party's Head Office and 5% to their region's 
coffers. 184 The fact that a number of sitting councillors 
made themselves unavailable for re-election perhaps confirms 
that membership of the CRC between 1969 and 1974 was not 
particularly appealing .185 However, councillors' remuneration 
underwent a drastic revision at the end of 1974 when it was 
announced that salaries were to be increased to R500 per month 
aft,er the election .186 This was probably part of the 
government's attempts to counter the Labour Party's threat to 
abandon its seats in the council. By making membership of the 
CRC financially attractive, the government hoped to change the 
minds of sufficient members, inducing them to remain in the 
CRC. While the increase may seem reasonable in view of the 
181See Venter, Coloured, 54, 461-62. 
182p.A.29, Sonny Leon, Address to Labour Party National 
Conference, Umtata, 1-3 January 1975. 
183John Nash, interview, 31 August 1993 . 
184p.A.29, Treasurer's Report to Labour Party National 
Conference, Umtata, 1-3 January 1975. 
18Sp .A. 29, Sonny Leon, Address to Labour Party National 
Conference, Umtata, 1-3 January 1975. 
186rbid. 
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fact that CRC salaries during the previous five years had 
remained static, membership of the CRC was still largely a 
part-time affair. 
weeks every year. 187 
caused a rethink in 
CRC sessions lasted at most about four 
Thus, the increase to R500 certainly 
members' attitudes to CRC membership. 
This was borne out when Leon castigated party members at the 
Umtata conference: "Before the handsome increases announced by 
the government, a number of sitting members indicated that 
they were not available. Suddenly they are." 188 As far as 
ACRCOM's accusation of government protection was concerned, 
Nash contends that that is precisely what the party was 
exploiting. He maintains that whereas the voices of 
opposition outside the CRC were silenced by draconian security 
laws, CRC membership allowed anti-apartheid opponents an 
opportunity to launch scathing attacks on the government 
without fear of arrest. The Labour Party was thus the channel 
through which the anti-government bloc could express its 
opposition .189 
The accusations levelled at the Labour Party could, of course, 
be expected of its political opponents and other critics, but 
an .,examination of the party's election platform in 1969, its 
confrontationist posture between 1970 and 1972, and its policy 
of boycott up to 1973 clearly indicates that the more 
accommodating stance of the Labour Party in 1975 indeed 
demonstrated a marked shift to cooperation with the system. A 
shift to the right had already been evident at the national 
conference earlier that year, and therefore the position it 
took after the March election was not entirely unexpected. 
This more cooperative stance appeared to signal the ascendancy 
of the "moderates" in the party. However, if such a shift was 
187Al athea Jansen, interview, 6 January 1994. 
188p.A.29, Sonny Leon, Address to Labour Party National 
Conference, Umtata, 1-3 January 1975. 
189John Nash, interview, 31 August 1993; 
Address to Labour Party Special Conference, 17 
Miley Richards, 
September 1994. 
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a calculated one, then it would be expected that the Labour 
Party had already decided on its strategy if, as expected, it 
won the election and took control of the CRC executive . Yet, 
statements emanating from the party indicated that members 
were not certain of party strategy in the wake of their 
electoral success .190 Leon later acknowledged that they were 
divided on what to do with their victory.l9l This confirms 
the impression that Labour Party members did not anticipate 
such a "narrow" victory. The government's CRC Amendment Bill 
therefore presented a dilemma. Thus their reaction to the 
bill was of an ad hoc nature and, consequently, they could 
offer no reasoned reply to the criticism heaped upon them. 
The confusion and uncertainty that reigned in the Labour Party 
in the days immediately following the March election must also 
be understood in the context of the circumstances prevailing 
at the time. Throughout the first CRC, the Labour Party did 
not only have the Federal Party to contend with. It was up 
against the not inconsiderable forces of the government, the 
Cabinet, the National Party and the Broederbond. Furthermore, 
all the officials of the CRC were white and they had lent 
the,ir full weight to the pro-government parties in the CRC. 
The party had also been the object of intense scrutiny by 
newspapers like Die Burger and the Sunday Times, which had 
"Extra" editions carrying exclusive ly "coloured" news. Their 
political reporters had made the Labour Party their special 
interest .192 Conrad Sidego of Die Burger usually got his 
information directly from the government and white CRC 
officials who served the Labour Party. However, Howard 
Lawrence of the Sunday Times was the thorn in the flesh of the 
190Mary Simons, "Organised Coloured political Movements", 
229. 
1915onny Leon Papers, C.1.4., Sonny Leon, Address to the 
Labour Party National Conference, Upington, 6 January 1976. 
192Arthur Stanley, interview, 
interview, 31 August 1993 . 
10 September 1992; John Nash, 
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Labour Party. 193 His column was devoted almost exclusively to 
criticism of the party as an examination of the Sunday Times 
Extra in the 1970s shows. Nash reports that certain Federal 
Party members who had defected to the Labour Party were 
suspected of being Lawrence's "informers." It appears that 
this reporter had made the Labour Party his special object of 
investigation .194 Since the first CRC election in 1969, 
Lawrence had reported every aspect which involved the Labour 
Party. He built up a special relationship with a number of 
CRC members and leading party supporters and was privy to much 
confidential information. The party leaders never knew who 
supplied him with information and it frustrated them that 
minutes after a secret meeting, Lawrence would phone asking 
them to confirm or deny decisions. He would hang around 
hotels and meeting places and glean snippets of information 
which he would later reveal in the Sunday Times .195 Lawrence 
relentlessly exposed every shift in policy and reported 
dissension and tensions in the caucus and branch meetings. He 
so dedicated himself to reporting .on the Labour Party that 
much of the behind-the-scenes in-fighting and internal 
disagreements were reported exclusively in the Sunday Times. 
Thi.s accounts for the fact that this newspaper, in many 
instances, is the only source of information regarding the 
internal problems of the Labour Party. Eventually, the Labour 
Party could bear his probing no longer and had him barred from 
the sessions of the CRC .196 Dissatisfied Labour Party 
councillors leaked information on a regular basis to these 
correspondents and the party found its discussions and plans 
splashed across the newspapers before it had even been debated 
and finalised. The party's own white CRC officials also 
193Howard Lawrence 
Labour Party in 1966. 
had been a member of the executive of the 
See LPSA, 1966 And All That. 
194p .A. 29, Sonny Leon, Address to Labour Party National 
Conference, Umtata, 1 January 1975. 
195John Nash, interview, 31 August 1993. 
1965ee Debates of the CRC, vol. 36 (22 October 1976), 1360. 
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Federal Party. 
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of its decisions by leaking information to the 
By the following day, the Federals had 
prepared themselves to counter Labour Party arguments, 
accusations and attacks on its plans and policies .197 
Thus, when the party won the election in March 1975, the 
government and its assorted agents brought their full weight 
to bear on the Labour Party. The torrent of criticism and the 
behind-the-scenes pressure from the government created a 
situation which the Labour Party had been ill-prepared to cope 
with. Newspaper reporters and government agents stalked the 
newly-elected councillors, trying to find out what their plans 
were. The caucus had to meet in secret, and between 20 March 
and 1 April, used four different venues for secret meetings. 
They also had to try to keep vital information from certain 
members of the caucus whom they suspected of being responsible 
for the leaks. These were mostly former Federal Party members 
who had won seats in the election on a Labour Party ticket .198 
It was therefore difficult under such conditions to plan a 
coherent strategy in the wake of the election victory, to 
discuss and assess the new CRe bill before parliament, and to 
formulate structured replies to criticism. 
Eventually, the Labour Party decided that it had to try and 
salvage the situation and called an official meeting of the 
caucus on 2 April 1975 to plan long-term strategy. Aware that 
its recent measures might have antagonised the Labour Party 
which might then decide to carry out threats to disrupt the 
CRe, the government made certain conciliatory gestures in the 
week before this meeting. Firstly, the Minister of Coloured 
Relations pledged that the twenty persons to be nominated to 
197At a meeting of the NEC in May 1975, Sonny Leon had to 
take the unusual step of asking the caucus to display its 
confidence in him by treating all decisions taken by the party 
in the strictest confidence. See Sonny Leon Papers, Minutes of 
Labour Party NEC meeting, 12-13 May 1975. 
198John Nash, interview, 31 August 1993. 
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the CRC would consist of the "best men." 199 Two days later, 
the minister had two letters delivered by special courier to 
Sonny Leon. 2oo One letter congratulated the party on its 
success in the election. The minister also indicated his 
willingness to recommend the appointment of Sonny Leon to the 
chairmanship of the executive of the CRC if he was willing to 
accept the position. The second letter requested Leon to 
submit the names of persons for consideration for nomination 
to the CRC. 201 Neither of these steps were magnanimous 
gestures by the government. Firstly, it was expected that the 
leader of the victorious party would gain the chairmanship of 
the executive, and secondly, the offer of nominated seats 
would have made no difference to the Labour Party's position 
as the majority party. However, by taking these steps, the 
government was clearly trying to undo the harm done when it 
passed the bill allowing it to take control of the CRC. It 
hoped to smooth ruffled feathers and placate a hostile 
opponent which had the potential to further frustrate the 
government's coloured policy and cause it untold 
embarrassment. 
NeV:,ertheless, the offers in the letters created a new dilemma 
for the Labour Party. Having decided to remain in the CRC, it 
would have been foolish to reject the offers. However, if 
they were accepted, the Labour Party would play into the hands 
of those who accused it of collaboration and of working within 
a system it had previously rejected and tried to destroy. 
Besides, the Labour Party would be reneging on an earlier 
undertaking by its national executive in November 1969 never 
to serve on the CRC executive: 
Twenty-six Labour Party members are now Councillors, 
199Rand Daily Mail, 25 March 1975. 
200Cape Times, 28 March 1975. 
201Sonny Leon Papers, C. 1.5., Minutes of Labour Party Caucus 
Meeting, 2 April 1975. 
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these Councillors can in no way escape from their duty to 
the Party, its Constitution and the electorate who 
rallied to the Party, by accepting positions on the 
C.P.R.C.'s governing body •... The Executive is no more 
than a servile instrument of the National Party ideology. 
Thus the Labour Party is necessarily forced by the 
character of the Council and by our own principled 
position to refuse to "govern." That is to say that we 
must remain in Opposition. 202 
In consultation with Allan Hendrickse, national chairman, and 
David Curry, deputy-leader, Leon dispatched a telegraphic 
reply to the minister: 
Letters received (stop) prepared to consider question of 
chairmanship and nomination of members (stop) Reply 
dependent on your willingness to meet us before final 
passage of Bill and your release of intended further 
amendment. 203 
The contents of the letters had not come as a surprise to 
Leon, nor was his reply given on the spur of the moment. On 
23 March, two weeks before the caucus met, Leon had received a 
letter from Richard van der Ross, founder and first leader of 
the Labour Party, congratulating Leon on winning the election. 
The· letter advised Leon to accept the chairmanship of the 
executive and to appoint one or two Federal or non-Labour 
members to the executive in order to rule out party 
antagonisms. The letter further suggested that Leon ask for a 
quota, possibly half, of the nominated members. Van der Ross 
added: "If you concede basic cooperation, there is no reason 
why you should not get it." He concluded by urging the Labour 
Party to use the machinery of the CRC in order to advance the 
202This was confirmed by the Labour Party's leader, Martin 
Arendse, in an address to the party's national conference, Cape 
Town, 4 April 1970 . See also Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 140; 
Cape Times, 10 November 1969. 
203Sonny Leon Papers, C .1. 5., telegram from Sonny Leon to the 
Minister of Coloured Relations, 2 April 1975. 
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welfare of the people in the practical day to day areas. 204 
Van der Ross further invited Leon to show the letter to the 
party caucus . 
The intrusion of Van der Ross into the affairs of the Labour 
Party is significant. He evidently felt very strongly about 
this matter and probably hoped that the letter, coming from 
someone of his stature and standing in the party and 
community, would influence the caucus sufficiently to allow 
for acceptance of these points. 20s In the early 1960s Van der 
Ross had become discouraged by the futility of opposition to 
the basic direction of the government's coloured policy and 
argued that apartheid should be opposed and demands made 
within that framework. 206 what Van der Ross advocated was a 
policy of working within the system. 207 This became the 
underlying motivation behind the formation of the Labour 
Party. Thus, his letter of 1975 must be seen in this light: 
it was an invocation to Leon and the Labour Party to return to 
the original ideal and work within the system. 
Although the minutes of the meeting do not indicate whether he 
did" the reaction of the members seems to indicate that Leon 
did not circulate the Van der Ross letter. As a result the 
telegram to the minister unleashed a storm of protest 
concerning the contents, and whether Leon had the right to 
take action on his own. He defended his prerogative to decide 
on the issues at stake, but resolved to follow the guidance of 
204Sonny Leon Papers, C. 1. 3.2.2., letter from R. E. van der 
Ross to Sonny Leon, 23 March 1975. 
20SSee Appendix II for profile of Van der Ross . 
206T. Karis and G. M. Carter, From Protest to Challenge: A 
documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 
1882-1964, Vol 4 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), 162. 
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the caucus. 20B Historically, the Labour Party was founded on 
the principle of opposing apartheid but had always intended 
working within the system. Leon's acceptance of the 
minister's offer was therefore a tacit admission that the 
Labour Party had dropped the pretence of opposition to 
participation in the CRC. The telegram to the Minister of 
Coloured Relations only confirmed that the party had returned 
to the ideals of its original founders. Furthermore, the 
discussions and decisions taken at the caucus meeting that 
April were to confirm that the Labour Party had indeed changed 
its position from outright opposition to one of acceptance of 
the principle of participation in separate structures. By 
1975, then, the Labour Party had succumbed to government 
cooptation. 
Although the caucus meeting had been called to discuss long-
term strategy, initial discussion was dominated by the 
minister's offers and Leon's reply. The caucus debated 
whether it was competent to make decisions on subjects which 
concerned party policy. As party policy was the function of 
the national conference or the national executive committee, 
any decision by the caucus would mean a usurpation of the 
powers of those bodies. 209 Certain members, sensing that Leon 
and a coterie of supporters were eager to push for acceptance 
of the chairmanship, pressed for the issue to be left to the 
forthcoming session of the NEC and cautioned that the 
minister's insistence that Leon reply by 4 April 1975 could be 
construed as an ultimatum or at least an attempt to dictate to 
the party and to force it into indiscretions which could 
create dissension in its ranks. Others felt that, having 
gained control of the CRC, it was logical to ensure complete 
control by accepting the chairmanship of the CRC executive as 
well as other executive positions. The argument was advanced 
20BSonny Leon Papers, C. 1.5 . , Minutes of Labour Party Caucus 
Meeting, 2 April 1975. 
209Ibid . 
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that the caucus, consisting of elected representatives of the 
people, was competent to decide on the subjects under 
discussion. Besides, they argued, deferring a decision could 
be construed as fear, weakness, incompetence and inability to 
shoulder responsibility. Deferring the matter might also give 
the minister the excuse to appoint someone else. 210 
When the subject of the chairmanship had been fully debated, 
the issue was put to the vote. A motion in favour of the 
caucus itself deciding whether Leon should accept the 
chairmanship of the executive was carried by 16 votes to 9. 
An attempt to refer the matter to the NEC was defeated by the 
same margin. David Curry and Dennis Young requested that 
their objections be recorded. A second motion allowing Leon 
to accept nomination as chairman of the CRC executive was 
carried by 17 votes to 10. There were, however, clear 
indications of divisions of opinion within the Labour Party 
about the wisdom of this move. 211 
Discussion concerning the question of nominated seats was even 
more heated. Attention was drawn to the party's consistent 
opposition to the concept of nomination. In 1969 the Labour 
Party had roundly condemned the government for nominating 
defeated pro-government members to the nominated seats and 
nominated members had been the object of constant ridicule and 
derision during the first CRC. The party had vilified the 
Federal Party for accepting nominated seats, had repeatedly 
insulted nominated members,212 and had resolved never to 
210 I bid. 
211Cape Times, 23 December 1975; Survey of Race Relations 
(1975), 17. John Nash, interview, 31 August 1993, states that 
Leon and a coterie of supporters were very eager to accept the 
chairmanship. Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994, states that 
from 1975, Leon began to show a predilection to support 
government initiatives and promote the position of the 
"moderates" in the party. 
212for example, Debates of the CRC, vol. 23 (August 1973), 
153, and vol. 27 (27 July 1974). 
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accept positions on the CRC executive. As recently as the 
1975 election campaign, the party had condemned the practice 
of nomination and of defeated candidates accepting nomination. 
How would it now answer public criticism if the Labour Party 
itself accepted nominated seats? Furthermore, accepting 
nominations would lead to a tendency towards making the CRC 
work, which would mean accepting the principle of separate 
institutions and thereby, separate development. The 
supporters of nomination pointed out, however, that the party 
had a slender majority of one in the CRC and it would be able 
to consolidate its position by accepting nominations. Caucus 
members were reminded that the party had lost control of the 
CRC in 1969 because it did not have a sufficient enough 
majority to nullify the government's appointment of twenty 
pro-government members, which gave the Federal Party control 
of the CRC. It was strongly felt that the party ought not to 
let control slip out of its hands on this occasion. Besides, 
they argued, the party would be taking out insurance against 
defections. Councillors could then not hold the party to 
ransom. 213 
Th~ voting on this issue was even closer. A motion calling 
for the matter to be referred to the NEC was defeated by an 
amendment that the caucus agree to submit the names of persons 
to be considered for nomination to the CRC. The amendment was 
carried by 13 votes to 12. This discussion evoked such strong 
reactions that the party's deputy leader, David Curry, left 
the meeting before the vote was taken and seven members 
requested that their objections be recorded. 214 That this 
213Sonny Leon Papers, C. 1.5., Minutes of Labour Party Caucus 
Meeting, 2 April 1975. 
214These were H.J. Hendrickse (party chairman), N.S. 
Middleton (deputy-chairman), F.E. Peters (national secretary), 
D. Young, J. Nash, C. Hendrickse and R. Arendse. Norman 
Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994, states that Leon's open 
adoption of a "moderate" stance resulted in the resignation of 
Curry and Hendrickse. Although they immediately withdrew their 
resignations, this rift marked the beginning of friction between 
these leaders. 
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debate even took place is evidence of the gradual cooptation 
of the Labour Party into apartheid structures. By this stage, 
it was no longer debating whether to take part in the system, 
but to what degree. At stake was not the issue of accepting 
or rejecting instruments of separate representation but how 
firmly it could entrench itself in these structures. 
This was however not the end of the matter. When the NEe met 
in Uitenhage a few days later, it agreed that the Labour Party 
should use the eRe to effect the total emancipation of the 
coloured people. It was also agreed that Leon accept the 
chairmanship of the eRe's executive committee. 
regret was expressed that nominations for the 
had been submitted to the government and Leon 
to withdraw these. 215 Leon decided however to 
However, 
nominated seats 
was called upon 
abide by the 
original caucus decision and declined to withdraw the 
nominations. The Labour Party thus committed itself to 
working within the system. It only differed in the extent to 
which it would allow itself to be ,coopted; 
The wounds caused by these two issues appeared to have healed 
be~ore the first session of the second eRe in September 1975, 
but it was clearly evident that the Labour Party was 
struggling to come to terms with the dilemma of how to oppose 
apartheid, yet serve in an apartheid institution. The great 
debate in coloured politics since 1943 - collaboration vs. 
non-collaboration - had finally caught up with the Labour 
Party. Yet, so gradual was the process of incorporation into 
the system that the party did not even consider the 
possibility that it was being coopted into apartheid 
structures. It still considered itself to be a party of 
protest and confrontation and the foremost opponent of the 
policy of separate development and instruments of that policy. 
The Labour Party still felt that by serving in the eRe, it was 
fulfilling its objective of destroying that body from within. 
215Survey of Race Relations (1975), 18. 
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However, by taking the decision to remain in the eRe; by 
accepting the chairmanship of the eRe executive and the rest 
of the positions on the executive, as well as the nominated 
seats in the council, the Labour Party strengthened a body it 
had vowed to destroy. It was now actively engaged in making 
the eRe work. By electing to "govern" and by strengthening 
its hand, the Labour Party had completed a volte face when 
compared to its stated position in 1969. At a meeting of the 
NEe in November 1969, the Labour Party had adopted a 
resolution that members view the CRC only as the final 
instrument created to deprive coloured people of direct 
representation in parliament. The resolution further stated 
that "failure to denounce this function of the council will 
forever endanger the struggle for the right to elect or be 
elected to the genuine organs of democratic Government of the 
republic. ,,216 The resolution also contained a telling 
condemnation of the eRe executive. Yet, at the very next 
election, the Labour Party not only agreed to "govern," but to 
accept positions on the executive. 
The gradual yet steady abandonment of its previously-
es~ablished position created tensions in the Labour Party, 
which finally surfaced at the caucus meeting in April 1975. 
When the second eRe commenced business in September 1975, the 
party's discomfort was clearly evident. The Labour Party had 
found the role of "opposition" comfortable during the first 
eRe. From their seats across the council chamber from the 
ruling Federal Party, Labour councillors had launched 
ceaseless and scathing attacks on the pro-government parties, 
the eRC and the government. They had given vent to a wide 
array of grievances ranging from housing shortages to 
apartheid laws,217 and had mercilessly attacked the nominated 
216Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 140. 
217venter, Coloured, 449. Nash points out that this would not 
have been possible in any other forum but the CRe and that the 
Labour Party was justified in using the CRe as a safe platform. 
(continued ••• ) 
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members and heaped scorn on Tom Swartz, chairman of the CRC 
executive. Now the tables were turned: the Labour Party was 
now the ruling party. It had allowed its defeated candidates 
to accept nomination;218 its leader had accepted the 
appointment as chairman of the CRe executive; and all the 
members of the executive were from its own ranks. Moreover, 
despite threats to destroy the CRC, the Labour Party had 
succeeded, instead, in entrenching itself in this body. 
It was not long before opponents exploited this situation. At 
the opening of the second CRC on Friday, 5 September 1975, 
students demonstrated outside the council chambers. Their 
posters challenged and abused Labour Party members, accusing 
them of showing "your true colours" and, "you're nothing but a 
sell-out in disguise. ,,219 Speaking during the no-confidence 
debate during this session, the leader of the Federal Party, 
Willie Bergins, also attacked the Labour Party for "promising 
to abolish the Council when they came to power, then 
collaborating with the apartheid system they previously 
condemned ... 220 The Labour Party's .. rule" was however short-
lived. On 9 September 1975, Leon refused to deliver the 
buqget speech and presented a motion adjourning the council to 
21l( •.• continued) 
Professor Vosloo of Stellenbosch University however considered 
the Labour Party's opposition a success for the government's 
creation of a separate political forum for coloureds because, by 
allowing free and frank public debate, and by giving coloureds 
a platform for "vocal and vigorous opposition", the eRe gave 
notice of the end of unilateral political control by whites over 
coloureds . W.B. Vosloo, "The Coloured Policy of the National 
Party," in South African Dialogue: Contrasts in South African 
Thinking on Basic Race Issues, ed. N. J. Rhoodie (Johannesburg: 
McGraw-Hill, 1972), 377. 
218Despite the generous offer by the Minister of Coloured 
Affairs, and the eager acceptance of nominated seats by the 
Labour Party, only four Labour Party members were eventually 
assigned nominated seats. Thus, the government was not so 
magnanimous after all. 
219Sunday Times, 7 September 1975. 
220Cape Times, 9 September 1975. 
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March 1976. 221 He explained his reasons in a short statement 
the following day: 
In view of the fact that the Budget before the House was 
not prepared, nor accepted, by the present Executive, and 
in view of the fact that the Budget speech, which I am 
expected to present this morning, does not represent the 
views of this side of the House, I merelJ move this 
morning the motion standing in my name. 2 
Leon explained that he had taken this step because of the 
government's failure to respond to the numerous decisions of 
the council during the period 1969-1974, and that, 
furthermore, "the Budget and Part Appropriation motion 
reflects absolute discrimination and does not provide us 
.•• with any form of parity .... We expected that after the 
Prime Minister's statement that there would be a gradual 
narrowing of the gap •••• Instead, the gap had broadened. ,,223 
David Curry, deputy leader, amplified Leon's remarks, adding 
that "the Council is tired of going to the Government year 
after year with requests that are never met. That is why the 
Council is adjourning and that is why the Labour Party has 
been abstaining from debates. We are tired of talking. ,,224 
", 
The Labour Party had, of course, targeted the CRC budget since 
the first one was presented in 1970. It had always given the 
same reasons for boycotting budget debates: that the budget 
was discriminatory and that the CRC had no say in its 
composition. Because of the actions of the Labour Party and 
221The matter of the budget was already discussed at the NEC 
meeting in July 1975 but no decision had been taken. It was 
decided to leave it to the caucus to determine what strategy 
would be adopted. This appears to have been done just before the 
budget speech was due to be presented. Sonny Leon Papers, 
Minutes of Labour Party NEC Meeting, 19-20 July 1975. 
222Debates of the CRC, vol. 31 (10 September 1975), 202-3. 
223Ibid, (12 September 1975),303. 
224Argus, 12 September 1975. 
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the fear that the party might gain control of the CRC, the 
government had, in 1972, revoked the CRC's powers to pass the 
budget and had vested these in the hands of the Minister of 
Coloured Relations. However, the Labour Party had at the 
outset realised that the budget was crucial to the functioning 
of the CRC. Before the establishment of the CRC, the 
Department of Coloured Affairs, through the nominated UCCA, 
had been directly responsible for finances relating to 
coloured people. However, the budget had always been drawn up 
according to the provisions of the policy of separate 
development. Coloured pensions were lower than those of 
whites and coloured teachers were paid less than their white 
counterparts. While coloureds were unhappy with this 
arrangement, they had no forum for expressing their 
grievances. When the CRC was established, the government 
retained the right to draw up the budget but expected the 
Federal Party to "do its dirty work" by passing inadequate 
budgets and paying discriminatory pensions and salaries. 225 
In fact, one of the many advantages of the CRC was that the 
government could perpetuate the inadequacies of apartheid, yet 
no~ have to accept sole responsibility for it. That burden 
was passed over to the CRC. This was the reason for the 
Labour Party's opposition to the budget during the first CRC. 
It had a legal platform to voice coloured dissatisfaction and 
it did so. Now, in 1975, the Labour Party was the governing 
party and the government was expecting it to pass a grossly 
inadequate budget. Therefore, the Labour Party's action in 
1975 comes into perspective: it had to refuse to pass the 1975 
budget otherwise its protest in the preceding years would have 
been called into question. Accepting the budget would have 
been political suicide because acceptance meant the Labour 
Party would be responsible for "paying" discriminatory 
pensions and salaries. The Labour Party would then, in 
effect, be condoning the principle of salaries and pensions 
225Burger, 5 November 1975; Star, 6 November 1975; Norman 
Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. 
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based on colour. 
However, the party had also been stung by criticism of its 
decision to stay in the council and accept nominated seats, 
the executive chairmanship and seats on the executive, as well 
as by accusations that it was collaborating with the apartheid 
system. What made it even harder to bear was that the jibes 
of collaboration came from the pro-government Federal Party, 
which, after the 1975 election, appeared to be more anti-CRC 
than the Labour Party . 226 Thus, refusing to pass the budget 
would also deflect such criticism. Another factor to be 
considered was that the Labour Party knew that its action 
would force the government's hand. The party hoped that, in 
view of the possibly damaging consequences, the government 
might rethink the budget and provide more money. Such a step 
would boost the Labour Party's flagging image. 
hand, if the government did decide to pass the 
On the other 
budget itself 
or authorise someone else to do so, it would be playing into 
the hands of the Labour Party which had always accused the 
government of foisting a discriminatory budget on 
which had had no say in its composition. As such 
unqoubtedly draw criticism from many quarters, the 
claim that it was carrying out its declared aim of 
CRC to embarrass the government, while at the same 
a group 
a move would 
party could 
using the 
time 
proving the CRC to be a toothless, powerless institution which 
had no meaningful political role for coloured people. Thus, 
the Labour Party's action in 1975 constituted a gamble. 
The gamble appeared to payoff when statements of support 
immediately began to pour in from many quarters. Regional 
branches of the party sent messages of support for the party's 
stand. 227 Even the "coloured" newspaper, the Cape Herald, a 
staunch critic of the Labour Party, applauded the move and 
226See for example, Saks, "The Failure of the CRC", 186-87. 
227See, for example, Daily News, 10 September, 1975, Argus, 
12 September 1975, Cape Herald, 12 September 1975. 
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called for the CRC to be closed down because "it achieves very 
little ... , is utterly powerless, ... has failed as an 
instrument to better the lot of the Coloured people has 
failed as a platform (and) has failed to politicise Coloured 
people. ,,228 The newspaper heaped scorn on the CRC because it 
gave a totally wrong image of coloured people: 
By taking Coloured individuals, by billing them as a 
'Group', by putting them on a stage to scrap it out in 
public and show a delighted audience of bigots what a 
disunited and immature 'Group' they are, the Government 
has merely succeeded in projecting a totally wrong image 
of Coloured people. 229 
The Federal Party attempted to profit from the Labour Party's 
actions. Willie Bergins, national leader and Jac Rabie, 
Transvaal leader, announced that they would arrange meetings 
with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Coloured 
Relations. Their intention was to work out ways whereby the 
Federal Party could either continue the session of the CRC and 
carry out its duties, or establish .common ground with the 
government whereby it could be considered the de facto 
representatives of the coloured people, and be available for 
cori:sultation on matters affecting this group. On 29 October 
1975, a deputation of Federal Party members subsequently met 
the Prime Minister and informed him that they were prepared to 
cooperate with him to start a new dispensation for coloured 
people. 23o 
The government reacted to the Labour Party's adjournment by 
declaring that the Minister of Coloured Relations would, in 
the interim, do the work of the CRC himself. The CRC 
Amendment Act of March 1975 had made provision for just such 
228Cape Herald, 12 September 1975. 
229Ibid. 
230Cape Times, 30 October 1975. 
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an eventuality. 231 Sonny Leon responded that it was 
"incredible (that) in these times of political turmoil the 
Government has to rely on an Act of Parliament to suppress our 
demands." He reiterated the demands of the Labour Party for 
full citizenship for coloured people and equality with whites, 
adding: "This has been repeatedly rejected by the Government 
and I see little point in continuing apartheid camouflage. ,,232 
The scene was therefore set for the ultimate confrontation 
which the Labour Party had been looking for since 1969. 
Unless the government now acceded to its demands, it would 
refuse to continue participation in the council. As the 
ruling party, such an action would paralyse the eRe. If the 
minister decided to run the eRe himself or nominate defeated 
pro-government members to fill the Labour Party seats, the 
eRe, already short on credibility, would become the object of 
even further ridicule. If the government called another 
election, the Labour Party would contest it and thereafter, 
members would again refuse to take their seats. Any attempt 
by the minister to then take over .the powers of the eRe or 
delegate it to the Federal Party or someone else, would render 
the eRe even more irrelevant than it was already becoming. 
The budget, due to be passed on 10 September 1975, was 
designed to provide funds for the eRe for the fiscal year 
starting 8 November 1975. Thus, if the budget was not passed 
by then, funds to pay for the services supported by the eRe 
would theoretically run out. In an attempt to reconvene the 
eRe and get the budget passed, the Prime Minister called for a 
meeting with the eRe executive. 233 Vorster expected to 
discuss the future of the eRe, the executive's refusal to 
reconvene it, and the proposed multi-racial cabinet council. 
The Labour Party, however, saw the political future of the 
231Rand Daily Mail, 12 September 1975. 
232Ibid. 
233Star, 21 October 1975; Rand Daily Mail, 24 and 25 October 
1975. 
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coloured people as the focus of discussion. Leon was emphatic 
that he expected meaningful concessions from Vorster otherwise 
the stalemate between the government and the CRC would be 
complete . He warned that an "unsatisfactory" meeting would 
lead to a total breakdown in communication between coloureds 
and the government. The Labour Party prepared a 36-point 
questionnaire which it expected Vorster to respond to. 234 
However, the four-hour-long talks ended in deadlock. The 
delegation demanded that Vorster spell out the details of his 
white-coloured cabinet council and to show them what the 
government's coloured policy intended for coloured people. 
Vorster indicated that the details of the proposed council 
still had to be worked out but that he hoped the Labour Party 
would assist in this task. As far as the government's 
coloured policy was concerned, Vorster refused to consider 
solutions to the problem of coloured citizenship, and instead 
invited future generations to solve this problem. 235 "Where 
else in the Western democratic world," queried Venter, "would 
the electorate tolerate such a ridiculous refusal to face 
reality and the decision to bequeath it to posterity? ,,236 The 
delegation declined to participate in any plan unless they 
co~ld be shown where it would lead. Leon explained that "the 
Prime Minister made it clear the Government will not depart 
from its policy of separate development. Therefore in no 
circumstances can we expect to be part of the law-making 
process of our country. ,,237 David Curry was even more blunt: 
"The Government wants us to compromise without any compromise 
234Rand Daily Mail, 20 October 1975. 
235Eastern Province Herald, 13 December 1975. 
236Venter, Coloured, 532. Vorster appears to have continued 
a tradition set by Smuts who, in the 1940s, also refused to spell 
out the goal of the government's coloured policy in respect of 
coloured political rights, replying instead: "You and your 
children will arrive in the end." See War on Traitors, pamphlet 
issued by Anti-CAD Committee, 1943. 
237Argus, 21 October 1975. 
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from the Government's side. We are not prepared to do it. ,,238 
On the day following this meeting, Sonny Leon launched a 
bitter attack on the government, claiming that relations 
between the government and coloured people had reached a 
"flashpoint. ,,239 He warned that coloured people were 
"frustrated to the eyebrows" with their indefinite second-
class status and would go to any length to attain equality 
with whites. The time was past for "pussyfooting. ,,240 He 
then called for a referendum among white voters on the issue 
of full citizenship rights for coloureds and threatened that 
if the government continued to impose second-class status upon 
coloureds, they would have no choice but to join forces with 
blacks. 241 He threatened that "the Blacks and with them the 
Coloured people realised that their only weapon was their 
labour, and unless there was a swift change of direction in 
the Government's race policy, this weapon would be used. ,,242 
Leon's "black alliance" threat met with a cool response from 
his proposed allies, as yet unnamed. Zulu Voice praised him 
for his courage in "standing up to Pretoria's bureaucracy" and 
for confronting the government on the issue of citizenship 
rights, but castigated him for using the formation of a black 
alliance with which to threaten the government. The newspaper 
indicated that blacks resented being used by ambitious 
politicians or any other persons for their own ends. 243 
On 23 October 1975, two days after Leon's threat, the 
238rbid. 
239Cape Times, 22 October 1975. 
240Argus, 21 October 1975. 
241Argus, 
November 1975 
Labour Party, 
21 October 1975. See also Daily Dispatch, 8 
in which Norman Middleton, deputy-chairman of the 
repeated this threat. 
242Cape Times, 22 October 1975. 
243Zulu Voice, 22 November 1975. 
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government tried a new tactic. The Minister of Coloured 
Relations, Schalk van der Merwe, announced that, under the 
powers granted to him by the CRC Amendment Act, he had decided 
to appoint Sonny Leon to "appropriate funds" to continue the 
services of the CRC. This made Leon responsible for passing 
the CRC's R158 million budget. By doing so, the minister 
placed Leon in an invidious position. If the budget was not 
passed by 7 November 1975, the CRC would have no funds to pay 
its 25 000 employees which included 21 700 teachers in the 
employ of the coloured education department, 1 000 clerical 
workers, and 148 000 coloured pensioners and grantees. 244 
Willie Bergins of the Federal Party painted a picture of 
frustration, chaos and suffering which would result from the 
Labour Party's refusal to pass the budget. He warned that the 
coloured people would lay the blame squarely at the door of 
the Labour Party, as the welfare of thousands depended on the 
outcome. 245 While this was probably political posturing by 
the leader of the Federal Party, Alathea Jansen indicates that 
pensioners did in fact suffer in October and November 1975. 
Shopkeepers refused to provide pensioners with goods "op die 
boekie," because they had read in the newspapers that 
pensioners might not receive pensions after November. 246 
This was therefore a shrewd move by the government because if 
the budget was not approved and funds actually ran out, the 
Labour Party would in all likelihood face a backlash by those 
adversely affected. Yet, if Leon decided to pass the budget, 
another section would certainly heap opprobrium on the Labour 
Party. Thus, whereas the Labour Party had gambled on 
embarrassing the government and strengthening its image, it 
now appeared as if the gamble had backfired and the government 
had succeeded in creating a situation in which the Labour 
244Argus, 23 and 24 October 1975; Survey of Race Relations 
(1975), 20. 
R5Ibid, 24 October 1975. 
246Alathea Jansen, interview, 6 January 1994. Because 
pensions were guaranteed, shopkeepers, especially in the rural 
areas, allowed pensioners to purchase goods on credit. 
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Party would draw fire from both sides. 
On 24 October, the day following Van der Merwe's announcement, 
the CRC executive held an emergency meeting and decided 
unanimously that Leon should not implement the budget and 
rather refer it back to the minister. 247 On 29 October, they 
met again and confirmed their decision and conveyed it to the 
minister on the afternoon of 31 October, seven days before the 
deadline for passing the budget. The decision triggered a 
wave of response from many quarters. Telegrams of support, 
especially from teachers whose salaries were in jeopardy, 
began arriving at Leon's home. Well-wishers applauded his 
decision and urged him to stand firm. 248 Messages varied 
from: "You are prepared to sacrifice so are we," and, "reject, 
reject, reject," to, "call their bluff . ,,249 Telegrams from 
Labour Party branches gave Leon and the executive a "unanimous 
vote of confidence, ,,250 while others proclaimed, "We are proud 
of our leader. ,,251 Messages such as, "Leon and Exec Bravo for 
your stand the oppressed are one with you 'carry on God be with 
you, ,,252 were typical of most telegrams. 
Sugport also came from other quarters. The Cape Professional 
Teachers' Association (CTPA) ,253 the largest "coloured" 
247Argus, 24 October 1975; Burger, 31 October 1975. 
24BSunday Express, 9 November 1975. 
249The Sonny Leon Papers, C. 2 .4.6.2., has a large selection 
of telegrams dated from about 28 October 1975 onwards and the 
overwhelming majority express support for the party's stand. 
250For example, Sonny Leon Papers, Keimoes Branch to Leon, 
15 November 1975. 
251Ibid, Carnarvon Branch to Leon, 12 November 1975. 
252Ibid, Orange Free State region to Leon, 12 November 1975. 
253The CTPA was formed in 1967 when two small conservative 
teacher organisations, the Cape Teachers' Association and the 
Teachers' Educational and Professional Association combined. See 
Lewis, Between the Wire and the Wall, 273. 
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teacher organisation 
in which it approved 
in South Africa, issued a press statement 
of the Labour 
brought the grievances of coloured 
Party's stand, because it 
teachers to the attention 
of the government. If that was the case, the statement read, 
then the initiative had not been in vain. The CTPA expressed 
support for Leon and hoped that the situation would spur the 
government to phase out the inequality between white and 
coloured teachers . 254 Pensioners who stood to suffer most if 
the CRC ran out of money, also expressed support. A pensioner 
from Carnarvon summed up the sentiments of many in this 
message: "Ons was bereid om te offer want ons weet dat u vir 
almal se regte gestaan het. ,, 255 However, others were aware 
that they might suffer. Typical of such telegrams was this 
unsigned admonition: "Pass the Budget under protest. Think of 
our poor people who will go hungry. ,,256 
Letters to editors by and large supported the Labour Party. 
Most English-language newspapers applauded the party's stand 
on the budget and felt that the party was fully justified in 
refusing to pass a grossly inadequate budget. Comments were 
accompanied by articles outlining the history of injustices 
inflicted upon coloured people by the policy of separate 
development. 257 Nevertheless, most newspapers were unanimous 
in their opinion that the government would not allow teachers, 
employees and pensioners to go without their salaries and 
pensions. They felt that the government was only playing a 
political game by letting the Labour Party "stew" in the 
belief that it would suffer in the eyes of the coloured 
electorate, coloured public servants and pensioners in 
254Burger, 8 November 1975; Rapport, 9 November 1975. 
U5Sonny Leon Papers, C.2.4.6.2 . , (n.d.) 
256Ibid, C. 2 . 4 .6.3. , (n. d. ) 
257See for example, Argus, 1 November 1975; Eastern Province 
Herald, 1 November 1975. 
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particular, and coloured people in general. 258 At the 
appointed time, they reasoned, the minister would pass the 
budget himself or appoint someone else to do so. 259 
These assurances did not seem to have any effect on the Labour 
Party because the intense pressure which it had been subjected 
to by the government and supporting press, and the host of its 
own critics, gave it the impression that it was in the midst 
of a grave crisis. The government played up the crisis by 
indulging in a war of words, warning Leon that it would be 
"most regrettable" if he did not pass the budget. 26o The 
Minister of Coloured Relations issued grave warnings and made 
official statements which heightened tensions and made it 
appear that the Labour Party and Sonny Leon were on the brink 
of committing serious offences against the government and the 
country. Por example: 
As the Council, because of its early adjournment on 
September 12 was denied the opportunity to pass the 
budget, I decided to empower Mr Leon in his capacity as 
chairman of the Council's executive to do so on my 
behalf. until such a time as I revoke the authority 
conferred upon Mr Leon, he is in fact responsible for 
exercising those powers and is the only person that could 
legally do so. I have no intention of exercising these 
powers myself as it would be tantamount to usurping 
functions of the CRC and its chairman. 261 
That of course was not true as the government had, in 1972, 
revoked the CRC's final say in the approval of the budget and 
vested that power in the Minister of Coloured Relations. The 
CRC Amendment Act of 1975 also gave the minister the power to 
258Por example, Jakes Gerwel, lecturer at the University of 
the Western Cape, in an interview with Rapport, 9 November 1975. 
259See Eastern Province Herald, 1 November 1975; Sunday 
Express, 9 November 1975; Trust, January 1976, 10-11. 
260cape Times, 3 November 1975. 
261Ibid. 
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carry out the duties of the CRC, or its executive or its 
chairman. What the minister was therefore doing was to 
extract as much mileage out of a crisis it had initiated, to 
embarrass the Labour Party. The Labour Party, on the other 
hand, hoped to use the crisis to restore its credibility in 
the eyes of "its people" and other critics. It therefore 
responded in similar "crisis language" to the minister, 
calling his statement political blackmail "and an attempt to 
discredit Mr Leon in the eyes of his people. ,, 262 In a 
statement issued by the CRC executive, the party pledged its 
full support for Leon, adding that it was the government's 
responsibility to ensure that teachers, pensioners and CRC 
employees were paid because "die uitvoerende Bestuur en die 
VKR regeer nie die land nie. ,,263 In fighting language, the 
statement accused the minister of trying to dictate to the 
Labour Party on how it should act . This, said the statement, 
was an exposure of the government's policy of naked 
"baasskap." The statement closed in a note of defiance: "Ons 
weet dat ons die steun van ons mense het. Goedkeuring van die 
begroting beteken aanvaarding van diskriminasie en is 'n 
belediging vir die waardigheid van die mense wat ons verkies 
het.. ,, 264 
The Minister of Coloured Relations retaliated by signalling 
his intention of using the 173 000 people dependent on the CRC 
budget as his final weapon to force Leon to pass the 
budget. 265 The Labour Party appeared by then to have found 
the measure of the government and resisted the pressure. 266 
262Burger, 5 November 1975. 
263Ibid. 
264Ibid. 
265Star, 6 Nov ember 1975. 
266Much of this pressure came from white officials assigned 
to work for the Labour Party in the CRC. They actively sought 
to undermine the Labour Party and passed on secret information, 
(continued • • • ) 
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Norman Middleton reiterated that the CRC executive was not 
prepared to do the government's "dirty work" by passing a 
"discriminatory budget. ,,267 As the November 7 deadline 
approached, the government, Afrikaans newspapers and pro-
government parties in the CRC became more strident in their 
criticism. The Federal Party seemed to succumb to the 
orchestrated hysteria by requesting the government, as a 
matter of urgency, to remove Leon from office and appoint a 
more competent person so as to ensure that "bruinmense nie 
ellende en ontbering ly nie. ,, 268 The call to remove Leon from 
the chairmanship of the CRC executive was significant. Unlike 
other members of the executive who were chosen by the CRC, the 
chairman was appointed by the Minister of Coloured Relations. 
The CRC Act of 1964 made provision for the removal from office 
of the chairman at any time by order of the State President. 
Failing to carry out an instruction from the minister gave him 
the right to dismiss the chairman. Thus, the refusal by Leon 
to pass the budget, after an explicit instruction by the 
Minister to do so, rendered him liable to °dismissa1. 269 This 
was an action which the Labour Party appeared to have 
anticipated but it did not feel that the government would go 
that far. 
By 7 November, neither side had yielded. On that day, the CRC 
was technically bankrupt. The Labour Party waited for some 
reaction from the government but none carne. The next day, the 
party's NEC met in Kimberley, Leon's horne town, amidst a 
stream of support for Leon and his executive from 
representatives and their branches. Local newspapers assured 
266 ( •• • continued) 
decisions and impending actions to the government and the CRC 
opposition parties. John Nash, interview, 31 August 1993, 
ruefully states: "We were the governing party but we could not 
even trust our own officials." 
267Burger, 5 November 1975; Star, 6 November 1975. 
268Burger, 8 November 1975. 
269Argus , 24 October 1975; Sunday Express, 26 October 1975. 
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the party that it had the solid support of coloured people. 270 
Prominent coloured leaders and organisations such as N.S. 
Kearns, founder member of the party; Jakes Gerwel, later to 
become rector of the University of Western Cape, and the CTPA, 
sent messages of support. Allan Hendrickse warned the 
government not to attempt to dismiss Leon, adding 
dramatically: "Touch Sonny Leon and you touch the whole 
Coloured community in South Africa. ,,271 Bolstered by the show 
of solidarity, Leon stated defiantly that he would call an 
election before he signed the budget. 272 
After the NEC meeting ended on Sunday, 9 November, Leon 
embarked on a tour of selected cities to get support for his 
party's stand. He addressed a hastily-arranged, but well-
attended meeting in Uitenhage near Port Elizabeth on the 
Monday,273 followed by another the next day at Tiervlei in 
Cape Town, where he was "given a standing ovation by nearly 
1 000 people. ,,274 The air of crisis and confrontation was 
heightened by calls to people not .relianton government 
salaries or pensions to assist and feed those who would find 
themselves in difficulty because of the delay in authorising 
the. new budget. 275 
The government's long-awaited response came on 11 November 
1975 with an announcement by Schalk van der Merwe: 
270For example, Diamond Fields Advertiser, 8 November 1975; 
The Friend, 8 November 1975. 
271Eastern Province Herald, 11 November 1975. 
272Daily Dispatch, 8 November 1975; Rand Daily Mail, 11 
November 1975. However, in terms of the CRC Act, Leon had no 
power to call an election. 
273Eastern Province Herald, 11 November 1975. 
274Argus, 12 November 1975. 
275The Friend, 8 November 1975; Eastern Province Herald, 11 
November 1975. 
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I .•. wish to announce that the State President has 
deemed it fit (a) to remove Mr L S Leon from his post of 
chairman of the executive of the Coloured Representative 
Council as from November 11, 1975 in terms of Section 
17(2)(A) of the Coloured Persons Representative Council 
Act No.49 of 1964; (b) To appoint Mrs A A Jansen as from 
November 12, 1975 as chairman of the council's executive 
in terms of section 17(1)(A) of the abovementioned act. 
I have furthermore decided to authorise Mrs Jansen in 
terms of section 22A of the Act to make the necessary 
funds available for the continued services of the Council 
••• and to revoke Mr Leon's appointment in this regard as 
from November 11. 276 
The Labour Party responded immediately to this move by 
announcing that the rest of the members of the CRC executive 
would resign with immediate effect. 277 Leon responded to his 
dismissal by issuing a press statement: 
I have no regrets. What I have done, I have done 
honourably which is much more than can be said by people 
in other quarters. I want to say that the respect of my 
people means to me much more than the position of 
Chairman of the Executive. This exercising of power by 
the Minister of Coloured Relations, Dr Van der Merwe, 
makes a sham of the whole detente of the Prime Minister, 
for on the South African scene it becomes obvious that 
detente demands acceptance, without question, of the 
policy of Separate Development. 278 
The Labour Party tried to capitalise on the groundswell of 
support following Leon's dismissal by embarking on a nation-
wide campaign of meetings. 279 30 000 people attended meetings 
in the first ten days following Leon's dismissal. 28o Over a 
period of thirty days, thirty-six meetings were held 
, 
276Argus, 12 November 1975. 
277Survey of Race Relations (1975), 21. 
278Sonny Leon Papers, D .1.1.1., Press Statement, 11 November 
1975. 
279Diamond Fields Advertiser, 15 November 1975. 
280Sunday Times, 23 November 1975. 
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throughout the country with a total attendance of 62 500. 281 
Far from discrediting Leon in the eyes of the coloured people, 
it appears as if his dismissal had actually strengthened the 
party and given it much wider popular support among coloureds. 
Numerous newspaper articles,282 letters to editors, statements 
and remarks by prominent coloured leaders, 283 the reaction of 
the government/84 and the buoyant and confident attitude of 
the party leaders/8s attest to the fact that the Labour Party 
was indeed "riding high on the support of their followers and 
others,,286 and enjoyed support not previously evidenced in 
such a prolonged, sustained and public manner. 
Thus it appears that if the government had hoped that by 
creating a crisis and then dismissing Leon, it would discredit 
the Labour Party, then its plan had backfired. The Labour 
Party, in turn, had hoped to embarrass the government and 
increase its support and thus appeared to have succeeded. 
David Welsh, senior lecturer in African government at the 
University of Cape Town, agreed that the Labour Party had 
profited from the exercise, adding that "far from being 
discredited by his dismissal, Mr Leon's political standing has 
281Sonny Leon Papers, C. 1.4., Secretary's Report to National 
Conference, 3-6 January 1976. These meetings were reported in 
a variety of newspapers such as the Sunday Times, 23 November and 
7 December 1975; Post, 15 November 1975; Diamond Fields 
Advertiser, 15 November 1975; Eastern Province Herald, 17 
November 1975; Daily Dispatch, 18 November 1975; Argus, 2 
December 1975. 
282The budget crisis and the response of coloureds to Labour 
Party-held protest meetings was reported extensively in 
newspapers for more than a month following Leon's dismissal. 
283As reported in a variety of newspapers. The Sonny Leon 
Papers contains a number of letters and telegrams of support. 
284See for example, Cape Herald, 22 November 1975; Star, 19 
November 1975; Weekend Post, 15 November 1975. 
285For example, Daily News, 12 November 1975; Rand Daily 
Mail, 14 November 1975; Diamond Fields Advertiser, 15 November 
1975; The Friend, 20 November 1975. 
286Sunday Times, 10 November 1975. 
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risen surprisingly. The Coloured people's only political 
weapon has been to try and embarrass the Government. They 
have done so pretty effectively. ,, 287 
Clearly, Leon's refusal to pass a discriminatory budget, and 
his adjournment of the CRC struck a responsive chord among 
many coloureds. Disillusioned voters who had seen the Labour 
Party renege on an election promise to boycott and destroy the 
CRC looked to the budget crisis with renewed hope. Many who 
had abstained from voting in 1975 felt that the Labour Party 
was going to do what it had promised in 1969, viz. destroy 
institutions of separate representation by refusing to allow 
them to work. Anti-government activists saw in the crisis an 
opportunity to confront the government and force it to come 
forward with an acceptable political solution to the problem 
of coloured political rights. However, there were those who 
saw it another way . They questioned the party's motives 
regarding the adjournment and the budget crisis. Hassan Howa, 
chairman of the South African Cricket Board of Control, 
suggested that the Labour Party had for a long time stumbled 
from crisis to crisis, seeking confrontation to justify its 
ex*stence and its presence in the CRC and the budget crisis 
was just another such ploy: 
Most of the confrontations the Labour Party has had with 
the government were, in fact, really confrontations with 
the party's own stated principles. The fact that they 
are in the CRC had placed them in the position of having 
to have confrontations, to take stands to cover their 
deviations from their part~ principles as well as those 
of the rest of the people. 88 
Trust magazine suggested that the Labour Party had lost its 
287Rand Daily Mail, 14 November 1975. 
2MSunday Times, 10 November 1975. During the 1970s, when 
the government sought to restore sporting links with the rest of 
the world, Hassan Howa urged other sporting nations to continue 
to resist such overtures, gaining prominence with the slogan, "No 
normal sport in an abnormal society". 
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impetus and the potency it had shown earlier. The party was 
going downhill and needed a diversion to give it time to 
regroup, replan and regain its position in the coloured 
community: 
Many political observers suspect that the real reason for 
the adjournment was that the Labour Party found 
themselves with their backs to the wall and the only line 
of action open to them was to adjourn the Council and so 
gain time to replan their line of action . ,,289 
This accusation had some credence but others may consider this 
sound strategy and political astuteness on the part of the 
Labour Party. If the party was indeed in a corner, the budget 
crisis gave it an opportunity to redeem itself and renew and 
increase its support. Yet, while, the crisis appeared to be 
in line with the Labour Party's earlier policy of 
confrontation, the party did not, at any time beJore or during 
the crisis, repeat its promise to cripple the council by 
boycotting it. In fact, the Labour Party's action had not 
been intended to destroy the CRC as an institution of separate 
representation, because when the CRC convened again in March 
1976, the Labour Party was present. Furthermore, even though 
the chairmanship of the CRC executive had been taken away from 
it and executive members had resigned their seats, the Labour 
Party later reclaimed the seats on the executive. 290 
If the Labour Party was serious in its opposition to the CRe 
and the government's policy of separate political 
representation, the budget crisis presented the party with the 
best opportunity to cripple the eRC, mobilise opposition and 
289Trust (January 1976), 11; See also Cape Herald, 15 
November 1975. 
290Prior to Leon's dismissal, the eRC executive consisted of 
Sonny Leon, chairman, and four senior party members, viz. Allan 
Hendrickse, David Curry, Norman Middleton and George Fortuin. 
After Leon was dismissed, Alathea Jansen, a government-nominated 
independent member in the CRC, took the chair. The Labour Party 
then dropped Fortuin and allocated his seat to Leon. Fortuin 
took exception and resigned from the party. Survey of Race 
Relations (1975), 21. 
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show the government the extent of coloured rejection of "dummy 
insti tutions. ,,291 According to Jakes Gerwel, the budget 
crisis offered the Labour Party an "unprecedented chance of 
'going to the nation' with a tangible case of mobilising anti-
apartheid energy in the Coloured people and of laying its 
foundation as a mass movement which in any event could be the 
only justifiable raison d' etre for the Labour Party. ,,292 
Thus, a statement to the effect that it would not return to 
the CRC would have rallied the vast majority of coloured 
people to its side. That the party did not do so calls into 
question its actions regarding the budget and the adjournment 
of the CRC: The Labour Party did not take this action as part 
of its promise to cripple the CRC, it did so to deflect 
criticism of its decisions after the election to strengthen 
the CRC and its participation therein. 
Undoubtedly, the budget crisis provided the Labour Party with 
the opportunity to build a broad-based popular movement. 
However, it let the opportunity slip and its popularity soon 
began to dissipate. For example, the party's national 
conference in Upington in January 1976 was characterised by 
dissatisfaction and a potentially divisive split. The 
conference was torn between the adoption of a "moderate" line 
leading towards negotiation with the government, and a more 
"militant" stance proposing greater confrontation and 
polarisation. 293 By the end of the three-day conference, it 
transpired that the Labour Party had been captured by a 
"radical" wing bent on intensifying the party's policy of 
confrontation . The leaders of this wing were identified as 
Allan Hendrickse and Norman Middleton, chairman and deputy-
chairman respectively.294 Some CRC members claimed that these 
291Cape Times, 10 November 1969 . 
292Star, 20 November 1975. 
293Sunday Times, 18 January 1976. 
294rbid. 
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leaders were deliberately making matters difficult for 
moderate CRC members so that they would leave the party. This 
would then wipe out the party's majority, forcing it to go 
into opposition . 295 This allegation was repeated four months 
later when Hendrickse and deputy-leader, David Curry, were 
accused of forcing conservative CRC members to resign so that 
the Labour Party could lose its majority and become the 
opposition in the council. 296 The Labour Party leadership 
appeared to be uncomfortable in the role of the "ruling" 
party. Its weaknesses, lack of policy and absence of 
organisation were cruelly exposed. The inability of the party 
to initiate action and plot a definite course for itself and 
coloured people was clearly evident. The party therefore 
preferred to return to the role of a "reaction" party. It 
felt safer attacking the government, the CRC, apartheid and 
the Federal Party, and reacting to government policies as it 
had done for the first five years of the CRC. This stance 
came in for scathing condemnation by the Cape Herald: 
They showed yet again that the Government initiative is 
the only thing that keeps them going. When the 
Government kicks them, they have something definite to do 
- howl in chorus. But when the Government ignores them 
they can only squawk around in circles, ~etting nowhere, 
like a gramophone record that is stuck. 29 
Nevertheless, the events of 1975 appeared to signal a marked 
shift in Labour Party policy. While it embarked on a highly-
publicised campaign of confrontation with the government over 
the budget, the party had already shifted from a policy of 
confrontation to one of cooperation. The budget crisis merely 
disguised the traumatic transition from one policy stance to 
another. 
295Ibid, 25 January 1976. 
296 I bid, 2 May 1976. 
297Cape Herald, 11 January 1977. 
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Chapter 4 
THE STRUGGLE OVER COLOURED POLICY, 1975-1980 
The Labour Party's election success and the budget crisis in 
1975 boosted the popularity of the party considerably but at 
the cost of bringing divisions into the open. Between 1969 
and 1975, the two factions, the initially small and 
insignificant "moderate" grouping which later grew in numbers 
and influence, and the powerful and influential "militant" 
element which later began to be overshadowed, took shape. 
However, these two factions were not clearly defined in the 
early years of the Labour Party and many members often 
supported both positions as the Labour Party struggled to come 
to terms with its role in the CRC and in coloured politics.! 
At the time of the 1975 CRC election, these two factions had 
settled into specific ideological positions: the "militant" 
position based on conflict and confrontation and a "hard-line" 
attitude to the government; and the "moderate" position of 
working within the system and utilising all institutions of 
separate development with the aim of improving the position of 
coloured people; hoping eventually to gain equality with 
whites. 2 The "militants" were mostly from the Cape urban 
'. 
areas and were better educated. By 1975, this faction was in 
the minority but it comprised elements in the party leadership 
and caucus and its influence was considerable. Among the 
"militants" were founder-members of the party and those who 
had campaigned and fought the first election in the heady 
atmosphere of anti-apartheid and anti-government rhetoric. 
They had been able to influence the party to adopt the policy 
of boycott and confrontation which the Labour Party displayed 
during the first CRC. The "moderates" were mainly 
conservative, unsophisticated and less-educated members who 
!For example, David Curry was initially considered a 
"moderate" but later came to be identified with the "militants". 
Sonny Leon shifted between the two positions often during his 
first five years as leader. 
2Whisson, "Coloured People", 55. 
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were more "collaborationist" in their approach. They were 
mostly from the rural areas of South Africa and the urban 
areas of the Orange Free State and Transvaal. 3 This group 
increasingly felt that dialogue was preferable to 
confrontation and that the party should drop its opposition to 
the council and participate fully in all bodies created by the 
government. 4 This accounts for the increasing tendency in the 
party, especially after 1972 to soften its attitude to 
participation in the CRC and promote dialogue with the 
government. However, because they were better-educated and 
well-spoken, the "militants" were often able to hold sway at 
conferences, resulting 
the media. 
in their position most 
Thus the public image 
often being 
of the Labour reported in 
Party which often 
one. "Moderates" 
emerged 
did not 
was a 
often 
hard-line, confrontationist 
publicly oppose the 
"militants" for fear of appearing ignorant and 
unsophisticated, but when it carne to voting, their numerical 
superiority often counted. In public, therefore, the Labour 
Party was confrontationist but in .private; increasingly 
collaborationist. 
The "moderates" had won their first major victory in 1972 when 
'. 
they were able to defeat attempts by the "militants" to 
withdraw from the CRC. s After the party's election victory in 
1975, the party's role in the CRC had once again become the 
subject of heated debate when the caucus met in April of that 
year. The "moderates" again won when the party accepted the 
chairmanship and seats on the CRC executive as well as the 
offer of nominated seats in the council. The budget crisis in 
3In areas where they were a minority in a largely African-
dominated city or province, coloured voters in 1969 and 1975 
tended to support the Federal Party and other parties which 
promised them protection from racial integration. This factor 
is discussed more fully below. 
4Simons, "Organised Coloured Political Movements", 231. 
SP.A.29, Minutes of Labour Party National Conference, East 
London, 6-8 April 1972. 
( 
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the latter part of 1975 papered over the cracks and allowed a 
temporary unity. However, this unity was shattered in 1976 
when the idea of the liaison committee was resurrected, and a 
struggle for the heart of the Labour Party ensued. The 
"militants " had no intention of reconstituting the liaison 
committee, refused to accept the system whereby the eRe 
executive merely made recommendations to the government, and 
claimed that the restoration of full political rights for all 
South Africans was a prerequisite for cooperation with the 
government. 6 "Moderates" on the other hand felt that the eRe, 
the liaison committee and other bodies should be utilised in 
the struggle for the freedom of coloured people. They were 
prepared, for the time being, to settle for less than what the 
party demanded. 7 This group was therefore prepared to abandon 
boycott and confrontation and meet with the prime minister. 8 
The Labour Party's reaction to the liaison committee 
accurately mirrored the divisions in the Labour Party and the 
struggle between the two opposing -elements . When the idea of 
liaison was first suggested in 1971, the Labour Party rejected 
it outright. The "militants" appeared to have succeeded in 
their objections when the government acknowledged in 1974 that 
this committee was an unsatisfactory solution. The government 
had increasingly come to believe that if the eRe commanded 
executive powers and shouldered more responsibility for 
enforcing its legislation by means of its own administration, 
this might dampen hostility to that body and perhaps win over 
the Labour Party to the principle of separate institutions. 
Vorster therefore made another effort to find a suitable 
instrument which would salvage the eRe as a credible and 
viable coloured parliament. In a speech at the opening of the 
eRe in November 1974, Vorster announced: 
6Argus, 27 March 1976. 
7Sunday Times, 28 March 1976. 
8post, 4 April 1976 . 
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That there should be a liaison at the highest level ... 
is already accepted policy . What requires further 
thought is how this liaison can, in practice, take place 
to mutual satisfaction •..• As r see it, the current 
machinery for liaison should be further developed to a 
more satisfactory and more significant instrument. r 
therefore think that the time has come to transform the 
Liaison Committee into a consultative Cabinet Council. 9 
Vorster suggested that members of the CRC executive be 
elevated to cabinet status and, with an equal number of white 
cabinet ministers, function as a cabinet council under the 
chairmanship of the prime minister. This body would attend to 
all matters of interest common to whites and coloureds. 
Furthermore, the Administration of Coloured Affairs would also 
be organised into various departments or directorates. Each 
directorate would fall under the authority of a CRC executive 
member as in the case of cabinet ministers in the white 
parliament. 10 The concept of a cabinet council was taken a 
step further in January 1975 when the Prime Minister met a 
delegation from the CRC. The delegation,which was comprised 
of non-Labour Party members, submitted a memorandum which 
stated that their interests would best be served by direct 
representation in the central parliament . ll The mainly 
Federal Party delegation, by indicating its preference for 
direct representation, was taking a dramatic step by 
intimating its disenchantment with the concept of separate 
representation as represented by the CRC. This concept 
constituted the cornerstone of Federal Party policy and the 
reason for its existence. Vorster rejected their submission 
on the grounds that it would lead to political chaos. 
90pening speech by the Prime Minister, B.J. Vorster at the 
seventh session of the CRC, 8 November 1974 in Hugo, Quislings 
or Realists, 96-97 . See also Debates of the House of Assembly 
(12 May 1975), col. 578. 
IOSurvey of Race Relations (1974), 11; Hugo, Quislings or 
Realists, 95,97. 
ll"Memorandum submitted by the Liaison Committee of the 
C. P.R.C. to the Prime Minister", January 1975, in Hugo, Quislings 
or Realists, 353-61. 
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However, 
shift in 
he appeared 
the Federal 
to have taken cognisance of this dramatic 
powers and 
portfolios 
functions 
Party's 
of the 
instead of five. 
stance by agreeing to extend the 
CRC, It would control thirteen 
Each executive member would 
become a cabinet minister, responsible for his own department, 
and have the power to initiate legislation without the prior 
approval of the Minister of Coloured Relations. 12 Vorster saw 
the cabinet council as the solution to the problem of sharing 
executive power without having to share the same legislative 
body. In a speech in Ceres in March 1975, he expressed his 
satisfaction with the cabinet council concept: 
I can report here tonight that where we struggled for 
years with the problems that you cannot have two or three 
sovereign parliaments in one country, I believe we have 
found the unique solution. Each group should have 
exclusive say in its own affairs, but spheres of common 
interest could be discussed in the inter-cabinet council 
and each group's own legislative body.13 
The cabinet council thus contained the germ of the tricameral 
system and established the concept of "own affairs" and 
"general affairs" which were to be at the heart of the new 
constitutional dispensation inaugurated eight years later. 14 
The Labour Party's reaction to the cabinet council was 
ambivalent. The party at first declined Vorster's invitation 
to attend the January meeting because it was not interested in 
"window-dressing talks, ,,15 The party expressed its opposition 
to the cabinet council because it would be able to block the 
wishes of coloured people by means of the casting vote of the 
12Prime Minister's response to "Memorandum submitted by the 
Liaison Committee of the C.P.R.C." in Hugo, Quislings or 
Realists, 361-64; Survey of Race Relations (1975), 12, 
l3Rand Daily Mail, 17 March 1975. 
14Debates of the House of Assembly (24 June 1976), cols. 
10473-74. 
15survey of Race Relations (1975), 11. 
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prime minister. Sonny Leon viewed this council as being "no 
more than advisory machinery in the formulation of the Prime 
Minister's policy decisions. ,,16 He proposed instead that an 
interim body be established to deal with matters of mutual 
white-coloured concerns until his party's aim of direct 
representation in parliament was achieved. Both the white and 
coloured legislative bodies would voluntarily delegate 
sovereignty to this body on matters which were of mutual 
concern. 17 
Having forthrightly rejected the cabinet council idea, the 
Labour Party then did an about-face in July 1975 and 
tentatively accepted the cabinet council as a replacement for 
the liaison committee. The party felt that the cabinet 
council offered a more effective opportunity than the eRe to 
put pressure on the government. This council would be able to 
enlarge the coloured budget and enable coloured ministers to 
apply pressure to prevent legislation adversely affecting 
coloureds going through parliament, or at the very least, have 
it watered down. A month later, the Labour Party returned to 
its earlier criticism of the cabinet council with Leon stating 
th~t it was doomed unless it became a decision-making body. 
The party not only expressed its rejection of the cabinet 
council but also rejected representation on the Road 
Transportation Board, Prisons Board, Hospitals Board and other 
statutory bodies. 18 Leon later cited the .. apparent double 
standards" of the Prime Minister as justification for their 
rejection - that while Vorster advocated discussions between 
black and white in South West Africa and Rhodesia, he was 
16 Ibid, 18 . 
17Star, 26 March 1975; Survey of Race Relations (1975), 18 . 
18Star, 22 and 24 August 1975; Debates of the eRe, vol. 31 
(10 September 1975), 203. 
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reluctant to do the same in South Africa. 19 
In September 1975, the party's NEC reaffirmed its opposition 
to the cabinet council and all government policies affecting 
coloureds. 2o In his address to the party's national 
conference in January 1976, Leon stated that all racial groups 
should meet together to work out a common destiny for all. 
The cabinet council was a "separate package deal" and a 
"subtle means of getting us tied up to a system that denies 
what is given to others. ,,21 He warned delegates that the 
cabinet council and other political concessions were mere 
"sops" and were designed to detour the coloured people in 
their demands for full citizenship rights. 22 Thus, even 
before the proposed council had reached the drawing board, the 
Labour Party had already rejected, then accepted, then 
rejected it again. The reason for this vacillation can be 
attributed to the struggle between the "militants" and 
"moderates" in the party. 
It was not only in the Labour Party that an ideological 
struggle was taking place. While Vorster insisted that 
co~oureds would not return to parliament and that the cabinet 
council was the answer to their demands,23 a confidential 
19Sonny Leon Papers, C.1.4., Speech by Sonny Leon 
Party National Conference, Upington, 6 January 1976; 
News, 7 January 1976; Star, 7 January 1976. 
to Labour 
Daily 
20Sonny Leon Papers, Minutes of Labour Party NEC Meeting, 4-
7 September 1975. 
21Sonny Leon Papers, C.1.4., Sonny Leon, Address to Labour 
Party National Conference, Upington, 6 January 1976. 
22Ibid. 
23Hugo, Ouislings or Realists, 93-96, opening speech by the 
Prime Minister, B.J. Vorster at the seventh session of the CRC, 
8 November 1974; Labour Party Accession, Fred Peters, Address to 
Labour Party National Conference, Upington, 6 January 1976; 
"Colouredism: The Last Grovellings; The End of a Political 
Obscenity", Educational Journal (January-February 1977), 6-8; 
Debates of the House of Assembly (28 January, 1977), col. 376. 
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study group of the Cape National Party advocated full 
citizenship rights for coloured people. However, the study 
group conceded that coloureds would have to pass through a 
transitional stage in which it would be linked to the white 
parliament through the cabinet council. Such a transitional 
period would prepare the white electorate for the 
inevitability of full coloured citizenship.24 Thus, the 
cabinet council began to assume a position of great 
significance in the evolutionary development of the 
government's coloured policy. 25 
Almost a year passed after the cabinet council was first 
mooted but no concrete steps were taken to implement the 
proposal. The government seemed hesitant to proceed with yet 
another body which appeared to be doomed before it was even 
formed. It appeared to be waiting for some evidence of 
acceptance by the Labour Party. As this party controlled the 
CRC and its executive after March 1975, its cooperation was 
vital to the success of this council. When Sonny Leon refused 
to pass the CRC budget in September 1975 and adjourned the CRC 
to March 1976, the government's coloured policy was in danger 
of _, collapsing and the proposed cabinet council seemed the only 
way out to salvage a rapidly deteriorating situation. Vorster 
thereupon called for a meeting with the leaders of the Labour 
Party. On the eve of the meeting which was to be held in 
Pretoria on 20 October 1975, the two sides became involved in 
a war of words. Buoyed by the encouraging response to his 
recent action regarding the budget, Sonny Leon warned that a 
total breakdown in communication between the government and 
coloureds was close and could follow an "unsatisfactory 
meeting" with Vorster. He added: "On this issue our position 
is clear. If the Government's offer included real concessions 
the CRC would accept it, but only provided the Coloured people 
24Sunday Times, 19 October 1975. 
25Debates of the House of , Assembly (22 June 1976), col. 
10136. 
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accepted it too . ,,26 The Minister of Defence, P . W. Botha, 
entered the fray, stating that he saw no advantage in 
coloureds hav ing direct representa tion in parliament . He 
warned Nationalists to stick to party policy, pending the 
report of the Theron Commission. 27 
The meeting on which Vorster had s taked so much ended in a 
complete impasse. The Labour Par ty delegation asked Vorster 
to show them where the political road for coloured people 
would lead to, by spelling out the details of his plans for 
the cabinet council. Vorster replied that he could not do so 
because he had not formulated any plans. He was hoping that 
these could be worked out mutually. Vorster tried in vain to 
get the coloured leaders to participate in a plan where the 
final answers could only be reached by negotiation . However, 
he made it difficult for them to accede to his request by 
conceding that the area of negotiation was limited. Leon made 
it clear that the delegates would not accept the government's 
proposals because of the latter's refusal ' to depart from its 
policy of separate development. The Labour Party thereupon 
decided that it would report to its members and ask for a 
ma~date on the government's proposals . 28 Leon called, at the 
same time, on the government to also test white opinion by 
calling a referendum on full citizenship for coloured 
people . 29 
The rejection of the cabinet council exacerbated the struggle 
in the party. The "moderates" felt that the cabinet council 
should have been accepted as an interim measure . Some members 
26Star, 20 October 1975. 
27r bid. 
28Argus, 21 October 1975. 
29Cape Times, 22 October 1975. 
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of the CRC executive also supported this view. 30 A split in 
the party appeared imminent. The position of the "moderates" 
was made even more uncomfortable by the announcement that a 
deputation of Federal Party members had met the Prime Minister 
soon after his meeting with the Labour Party leaders and 
informed him that they were prepared to cooperate with the 
government to start a new dispensation for coloured people. 
This included full acceptance of the proposed cabinet 
council. 31 A significant percentage in the Labour Party 
appeared to be speaking the language of the Federal Party and 
a convergence of interests appeared likely at some stage. 
Even though the Federal Party and "moderates" in the Labour 
Party were convinced that the cabinet council was a major step 
forward on the road to political rights for coloured people, 
the proposed cabinet council had a fatal flaw which seemed to 
condemn it in the eyes of those who might have been prepared 
to accept the government's bona fides. The council was 
designed to function on the basis of consensus. 32 White and 
coloured representatives would discuss matters of mutual 
concern and try to reach consensus without a vote being taken. 
If _, they could not reach consensus a final decision would be 
taken by the chairman. In terms of Vorster's plan, the 
chairman would be the prime minister. The final decision 
would thus always be the prerogative of whites because a 
coloured could never become chairman of the cabinet council. 
The "militants" in the Labour Party therefore saw the cabinet 
council as nothing else than a new tactic to perpetuate and 
preserve white domination and that this body would be as 
30Sunday Times, 26 October 1975. Middleton points out that 
after the 1975 election, Sonny Leon was more inclined to support 
a "moderate" stance, and the other members of the executive had 
a battle trying to keep him "in line". Norman Middleton, 
interview, 10 October 1994. 
31Cape Times, 30 October 1975; Argus, 31 October 1975; 
Sunday Times, 2 November 1975; Diamond Fields Advertiser, 17 June 
1976. 
32Debates of the House of Assembly (12 May 1975), col. 5817. 
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powerless as the CRC to effect meaningful change on behalf of 
coloured people. 33 
Eventually, it was not this aspect that doomed the cabinet 
council but Sonny Leon's dismissal in November 1975 for 
refusing to pass the budget. This action generated such 
bitterness and hostility that the Labour Party summarily 
rejected the cabinet council, considering it an issue never 
more to be entertained. 34 As far as the party was concerned, 
the CRC had been destroyed and with it the concept of the 
cabinet council. 35 Vorster tried one last ploy. He declared 
his willingness to continue talks with any CRC members, 
irrespective of party affiliation, who were prepared to 
discuss his offer of coloured representation on the cabinet 
council. He even went so far as to offer to provide 
credibility for the proposed council by passing on to it 
responsibility for implementing the recommendations of the 
Theron Commission when it issued its report the following 
year. 36 However the government's action in dismissing Leon 
brought the "moderates" back into line as the party was swept 
along on a wave of popular support. The budget crisis unified 
th~ party for the first time in years. 
The appointment of Alathea Jansen by the Minister of Coloured 
Relations to replace Leon as chairman of the CRC executive 
only served to further exacerbate the already strained 
relations between the government and the Labour Party, and 
33Cape Herald, 8 November 1975. This aspect of consensus 
was later to become a core feature of the President's Council and 
the basis of the "general affairs" concept in the new tricameral 
system. 
34Evening Post, 10 November 1975; Sonny Leon Papers, 
J.l.10., Minutes of Labour Party NEC Meeting, 16 November 1975. 
35Weekend Post, 15 November 1975. 
36Sunday Express, 16 November 1975. 
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appeared to harden the resolve of the party's leaders. 37 
Jansen was a schoolteacher by profession but at the time of 
her nomination to the CRC, she was employed by the 
Administration of Coloured Affairs in a department dealing 
with family and women's issues. She came to prominence after 
establishing social work in coloured communities in the Cape 
in the 1960s. She had also founded the South African Union of 
Homemakers' Clubs in 1961, an association which still 
functions today in coloured communities throughout South 
Africa. 38 Jansen also served as principal of the Eoan Group, 
a cultural organisation established in the coloured community 
in 1934 and widely known for its renditions of Italian operas 
in the 1960s and 1970s. 39 Her prominence and standing in the 
coloured community attracted the attention of the government 
and she was nominated to the CRC after the 1975 election and 
sat as an independent. 40 
Jansen's appointment as Leon's replacement as chairman of the 
CRC executive was not without intrigue. After a meeting 
between the government and the Labour Party on 20 October 1975 
to discuss the premature adjournment of the CRC and the 
deadlock over the budget, Schalk van der Merwe decided to take 
the precautionary step of finding a replacement, should Leon 
have to be dismissed. He subsequently called on Jansen and 
informed her that Leon had until 9 November to pass the 
budget, whereupon he would be dismissed. He asked her if she 
would accept the appointment if that should happen. Jansen 
37The CRC Act referred to the head of the CRC executive 
committee as "chairman" and made no provision if that person 
should be a woman. Jansen was appointed as "chairman" in terms 
of the proclamation by Schalk van der Merwe and this was a title 
she bore throughout her term as head of the executive. See 
Argus, 12 November 1975. 
38A.A. Jansen, The Storv of the South African Union of 
Homemakers' Clubs (Cape Town: SAUHC, 1986), 3. 
39Alathea Jansen, interview, 3 November 1993; Venter, 
Coloured, 350-52. 
40Al a thea Jansen, interview, 6 January 1994. 
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agreed on condition she remained an independent in the 
council. To this day, Jansen does not know why she, and not 
an experienced member of one of the parties in the CRe, was 
approached. The government probably decided that it was not 
worth courting the same type of reaction when it had appointed 
the defeated Federal Party leader, Tom Swartz, to the 
chairmanship of the CRC executive in 1969. 41 Alathea Jansen 
was "neutral, an independent, and a woman with no political 
baggage ... 42 By midnight 9 November 1975, the final deadline 
for Leon to respond to the ministerial instruction to sign the 
budget passed without reaction from the Labour Party. On the 
morning of the 10th, Van der Merwe phoned Jansen to ascertain 
whether she was still willing to accept the appointment, and 
immediately prepared a press statement to be released that day 
at midnight. When the news broke on the morning of the 11th, 
the press converged on Jansen's house and waited until she 
returned from a women's meeting in Ceres. The sudden media 
attention was something Jansen and her family were totally 
unprepared for: "I did not know what the reaction to my 
appointment would be. Nevertheless, I went into the post 
knowing what the Labour Party and others wanted to do, but I 
cou,ldn't be pickled about it.,,43 Jansen did not suffer any 
personal condemnation at the beginning. David Welsh, senior 
lecturer in African government at the University of Cape Town, 
summed up the general feeling when Jansen's appointment became 
known: "For all I know she is a worthy person, but she is 
politically unknown. ,,44 
Alathea Jansen had very strong views about the CRC and its 
role in the political life of coloured people. She fully 
supported the view that coloured people should accept the CRC 
41See chapter 2. 
42Alathea Jansen, interview, 6 January 1994. 
43Ibid. 
44Rand Daily Mail, 14 November 1975. 
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and similar bodies because "you must take the little you can 
get to eventually get what you want. ,,45 She took a kinder 
view of the government's motives in creating the eRe than 
other opponents had, seeing the eRe as the government's plan 
to train and educate coloured people to a higher level and 
prepare them for equal citizenship some time in the future. 
The eRe would also serve as a training ground for coloured 
politicians against the day when they would serve their people 
in "higher councils." She therefore accepted nomination to 
the eRe because she saw it as an opportunity "to get what I 
could for the coloured people." Regarding her decision to 
accept the appointment as chairman of the executive, Jansen 
says that she decided to accept it in order "to be there to 
see what is going on and to educate our people into the realm 
of politic s • ,,46 
After Jansen was appointed chairman, she immediately signed 
the budget which the Labour Party had rejected, an action 
which prompted Sonny Leon to respond in strong language: "The 
Government's cynical dishonesty has been exposed once and for 
all. The fact that the Minister has all the powers he needs 
to -, override and perform all the functions of the council is 
evidence enough that this unholy experiment must be brought to 
an abrupt end." He added: "We want to bring this farce to an 
end ••• " because the eRe had never been anything else but a 
"puppet body. ,,47 This marked the beginning of a testy and 
ill-tempered relationship between Jansen and the members of 
the Labour Party who filled the rest of the seats on the eRe 
executive. At the outset, the Labour Party barely concealed 
their dislike of her. In his reaction to his replacement by 
Jansen and her action of signing the budget, Leon indicated 
that if the minister called the council into session the 
Labour Party would fill the benches of the governing party, 
45Alathea Jansen, interview, 6 January 1994 . 
46Ibid. 
47Rand Daily Mail, 14 November 1975 . 
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but, he queried caustically: "Where will Mrs Jansen sit? She 
is neither a member of the governing party nor of the 
opposi tion Federal Party. ,, 48 On her part, Jansen had no 
sympathy for Leon and the manner of his dismissal: "If Leon 
was willing to accept the chairmanship of the executive, he 
had to accept the responsibility, and passing the budget was 
his administrative duty . It was an administrative matter and 
had nothing to do with politics. ,,49 
The four Labour Party members who served on the executive with 
Jansen did not conceal their resentment of her. They tried 
her patience by turning up late for the weekly executive 
meetings. She in turn would reprimand them in the manner of a 
school teacher. This infuriated them and Jansen admits: "I 
was cheeky and stubborn. They probably also resented serving 
under a woman and I was not going to let them push me 
around . ,,50 The members would show their frustration and 
resentment by banging doors when they left committee meetings. 
Saks agrees that Jansen was good-natured and well-intentioned, 
and "was also, as her exasperated opponents discovered, thick-
skinned and extremely stubborn. ,, 51 Middleton confesses that 
th~ Labour Party made life miserable for Jansen,52 and Nash 
admits that party councillors "gave a her a rough ride" in the 
eRe, but even then, they privately condemned the government 
for taking "this nice lady and throwing her to the wolves . ,, 53 
However, despite the criticism and the Labour Party's attitude 
towards her, Alathea Jansen's competence as an administrator 
was never called into question. 
48Ibid. 
49Alathea Jansen, interview, 6 January 1994. 
50Ibid. 
51Saks, "The Failure of the eRe", 143-44. 
52Norman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. 
53John Nash, interview, 30 August 1993. 
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In March 1976 Jansen called a meeting of CRC members to 
discuss resumption of liaison between the CRC and the 
government. 54 The purpose of the meeting was to elect a 
committee which would provide a link with the government. 55 
This attempt to resurrect the aborted CRC liaison committee 
was vehemently opposed by the Labour Party and it issued a 
directive to its members to boycott the meeting. Sonny Leon 
stated that the only liaison the party would recognise would 
be "direct representation in Parliament. ,,56 However, this 
"hard-line" stance forced the hand of some "moderates." 
Disgruntled members met with certain Federal Party and CRC 
Independents to consider the formation of a new party to 
challenge both the Federal and Labour Parties. When a 
deputation of CRC members led by Jansen met Hennie Smit the 
new Minister of Coloured Relations in May 1976, three Labour 
Party councillors defied the party's directive and joined the 
delegation. 57 Under pressure from the "militants," these 
councillors resigned from the party.58 When David Curry, the 
party's deputy-leader also had talks with Smit and Jansen, the 
"militants" tried to have him suspended from the party. 59 
However, the "militants" soon came to realise that their 
pos,i tion was threatening to split the party. They 
subsequently softened their stance by accepting "confrontation 
through dialogue. ,,60 The threat by "moderates" to break from 
the party and form a new party abated for the time being. 
54Sunday Times, 28 March 1976. 
55post, 4 April 1976. 
56Sunday Times, 28 March 1976; Diamond Fields Advertiser, 30 
March 1976. 
57Sunday Times, 18 April 1976. 
58Sunday Times, 9 May 1976; Sonny Leon Papers, D.3., Labour 
Party information circular, (n.d.); Sonny Leon, Address to Labour 
Party National Conference, Cape Town, 3 January 1977. 
59Sunday Times, 16 May 1976. 
60 I bid. 
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Despite the dissension within the majority party in the CRC, 
the government was clearly aware that its coloured policy lay 
in tatters. In the space of a few months, all its attempts to 
dampen coloured political aspirations by providing alternative 
but separate political outlets had failed. The CRC had been 
adjourned; the budget rejected; the chairman of the CRC 
executive had been dismissed; the entire CRC executive had 
resigned in protest; the government had had to resort to 
appointing a nominated member of the CRC as chairman and had 
instructed her to pass the budget; and the Minister of 
Coloured Affairs had effectively taken over the powers of the 
CRC and was running that body through an appointee. Thus, at 
the beginning of 1976, the government was virtually back where 
it had started in 1969. The CRC and the cabinet council, as a 
final arrangement for coloureds, had come to a dead-end. The 
government now looked hopefully to the Theron Commission to 
salvage its coloured policy and provide the impetus for the 
next phase in the policy of separate representation. 
In January 1973, Vorster appointed an 18-member commission 
chaired by Professor Erica Theron, a retired University of 
Ste.llenbosch academic. 61 The commission' s brief was to 
investigate the progress of coloured people in a number of 
spheres, to identify points of contention in those spheres and 
make suitable recommendations to the government. 62 This was 
the first commission to survey this field since the Wilcocks 
Commission of 1934. The appointment of the commission once 
again highlighted the problems which the government had long 
been wrestling with in its attempts to implement its coloured 
policy. The formation of the CRC in 1969 had been heralded by 
the government as a breakthrough and the final solution to the 
61Commission of Inquiry into matters relating to the 
Coloured Population Group (Theron Commission). 
62Theron and Du Toit, Kortbegrip van die Theron-verslag, 1; 
Wilkins and Strydom, Super-Afrikaners, 163; Debates of the House 
of Assembly (2 February 1978), col. 8. 
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coloured question. Then came the liaison committee and 
cabinet council. Yet the government was aware that these 
steps were unacceptable to the majority of coloured people, 
but because of its long and implacable opposition to coloured 
representation in a central parliament, the government was 
left with no option but to keep coming up with new formulae 
until it found one which suited both the National Party and 
which would be acceptable to the majority of coloured people. 
The single-minded determination to "fit the Coloureds into the 
neat logic of separate development" caused divisions in 
Nationalist ranks as well. 63 A faction within the National 
Party considered coloured people to be a "nation in the 
making" who therefore needed their own country, a coloured 
homeland, in order to develop to the status of a nation. 
Apartheid and the belief that coloureds were a separate 
"nasie-in-wording" decreed that this group be separated from 
whites. 64 But coloureds had no territory where they could 
reach sovereign independence. Because they had no homeland, 
the moral base of separate development did not exist . 65 The 
government then offered parallel development as a 
co~promise.66 However, many Nationalists came to regard this 
as morally indefensible. 67 They saw the various institutions 
63Sunday Times, 20 June 1976. 
64Pretoria News, 7 December 1970; Survey of Race Relations 
(1971), 6. 
65Burger, 26 October 1963; Star, 6 August 1971. The creation 
of a coloured homeland was n,ever seriously considered, although 
the idea was kept alive In the Transvaal for many years, 
especially by Andries Treurnicht, editor of Hoofstad. See also 
M.G. Whisson and H.W. Van der Merwe, (eds), Coloured Citizenship 
in South Africa (Cape Town: Abe Bailey Institute of Interracial 
Studies, University of Cape Town, 1972), 1-2; Venter, Coloured, 
524-25; B. Pottinger, The Imperial Presidency - P.W. Botha, the 
First Ten Years (Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers, 1988), 
151; Vosloa, "The Coloured Policy of the National Party", 379. 
66Cape Times, 1 July 1971. 
67Burger, 1 July 1971. 
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of separate representation such as the UCCA and CRC struggle 
ineffectually through lack of real powers. Moreover, 
coloureds were increasingly driven away by the Group Areas Act 
and other apartheid laws which were perceived as rejection by 
whites. 68 This led those Nationalists to plead for the 
political integration of coloured people with whites and their 
acceptance as "Brown Afrikaners. ,,69 This argument was 
strongly supported in 1971 by academics from the Universities 
of South Africa, Pretoria, witwatersrand, stellenbosch and 
Cape Town as well as writers, professional men and prominent 
farmers in the Boland who pleaded for full equal citizenship 
for coloured people. 7o Opposition to integration was just as 
vehement. The proponents of continued separation argued that 
integration would erode the very foundation of the philosophy 
of separate development. 71 
At the height of the debate the CRC was in a state of near-
collapse, barely two years after it had been established. 72 
This factor induced a mild panic in Nationalist circles. 73 
68Goldin, Making Race, 135. 
69 Sunday Times, 20 June 1976. Cape Nationalists had 
already argued in 1961 that the future of coloureds and whites 
were intertwined and that a separate homeland for coloureds was 
not feasible. Verwoerd, however, had insisted that coloured 
people were a separate "nation-state". See Goldin, Making Race, 
133; Cape Times, 23 November 1964. 
70Transvaler, 31 July 1971; Hoofstad, 31 July 1971; Argus, 
5 August 1971; Star, 6 August 1971; Burger, 26 August 1971. 
71Transvaler, 31 July 1971; Hoofstad, 31 July 1971; Burger, 
2 and 5 August 1971; Star, 6 August 1971; Argus, 6 August 1971. 
Despite chiding the academics for precipitating a division in 
Afrikaner circles, Burger did not repudiate the 
"integrationists". 
72Rapport, 26 March 1972. 
73See, for example, Survey of Race Relations (1971), 8-9; 
S.P. Cilliers, Appeal to Reason (Stellenbosch: University Press, 
1971), i-vii; p.s. Coertze, Die Afrikaner Volk en die Kleurlinge 
(Pretoria: HAUM, 1983), 138-39; Argus, 9 July 1971; Hoofstad, 31 
July 1971; Burger, 2 and 26 August 1971. 
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N. Rhoodie of the University of Pretoria suggested that an 
umbrella constitutional body in which whites, Indians and 
coloureds would be represented, would have to be established 
eventually to solve the present problems. 74 A.B. du Toit in a 
doctoral thesis, advocated that coloureds be represented in 
parliament by their own people. 75 W.A. de Klerk, editor of 
Die Transvaler, argued that coloureds and Indians should 
participate jointly in a council which handled communal 
affairs. 76 D. Worrall, National Party Member of Parliament, 
suggested that white South Africa would have to consider 
transferring power "on the basis of adult suffrage with 
representation in different parliaments corresponding to 
different parts of the country. ,,77 
A number of books and articles by well-known Afrikaner 
academics, such as S.P. Cilliers, J.H. Coetzee and D.P. Botha, 
also appeared at the time, urging Afrikaners to re-think their 
political attitudes in respect of coloured people. 78 The 
Afrikaanse Calvinistiese Beweging's Woord en Daad of April 
1971 urged in an article, entitled "volk? Sonder Land?", that 
coloureds be treated as citizens with political rights equal 
to that of whites. 79 Andries Treurnicht placed the importance 
of the coloured question in perspective: "Whether we 
74Sunday Times, 1 August 1971. 
75A. B • Du Toit, "Politics and Ethics in South Africa: A 
Study in the identification and evaluation of political 
alternatives", (D. Phil thesis, university of Stellenbosch, 1974). 
76J. Kane-Berman, South Africa: The Method and the Madness 
(London: Pluto Press, 1979), 172 
77D.Worrall (ed), South Africa: Government and Politics 
(Pretoria: Van Schaik, 1971), 351. Worrall's suggestion came very 
close to the concept of the tricameral system which Worrall 
himself had a hand in developing when he chaired the President's 
Council constitutional committee in 1981-82. 
78For example, Cilliers, Appeal to Reason; Coetzee, The 
Coloured Challenge; Botha, Die Kleurling en ons Kleurlingbele~ 
See also Educational Journal (January-February 1977). 
79Survey of Race Relations (1971), 8. 
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acknowledge it or not, the National Party's policy of separate 
development will succeed or fail with the implementation of 
its coloured policy. ,,80 It was becoming obvious that the 
position of coloured people had become a source of 
embarrassment to the government which was now coming under 
heavy pressure from within its own ranks to act on the issue. 
This ideological battle within Afrikanerdom and the National 
Party, the expressed frustration of coloured people and the 
Labour Party, and the perceived failure of the CRC as a 
political instrument to appease the coloured clamour for 
political rights, led to Vorster appointing the Theron 
Commission. 8! The appointment of this commission removed a 
thorny issue from the party's agenda for the time being and 
contained a growing revolt in party ranks. 82 
When the appointment of the commission was first announced, it 
elicited negative reaction from a broad spectrum of South 
Africans. The Labour Party argued that the needs and wishes 
of coloured people were well-known and had been stated on many 
occasions by community leaders. The appointment of a 
commission was therefore merely a device for postponing yet 
again the removal of discrimination based on colour and a 
solution to meet the political aspirations of coloured 
people. 83 Others viewed the commission with scepticism. The 
previous "Coloured" commission had resulted in the formation 
of the CAC, the first instrument of separate representation. 
Yet, the lot of the coloured people had not improved. The 
findings of other commissions of inquiry in the past into 
other matters had been rejected by the government which itself 
had appointed those commissions. It was thus an inescapable 
fact that when the government wanted to sideline an issue and 
80Hoofstad, 23 April 1971. 
8!Sunday Times, 20 July 1976. 
82Goldin, Making Race, 137. 
83Wollheim, Theron Commission: Comment, 32. 
J 
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remove it from public scrutiny, debate and criticism, it 
appointed a commission of inquiry. However, despite the 
initial criticism, the work of the commission grew in 
importance as it set about preparing its report. Frequent 
reference was made to it by members of parliament and the 
cabinet, as well as by the news media. Great expectations 
were aroused throughout the period of the three years that it 
took to compile the report, and the public awaited the 
pUblication with keen interest and growing anticipation. 
Coloured people held high hopes that the commission's findings 
would restore them to their rightful place alongside whites, 
politically and socially . The importance of the commission in 
the eyes of all concerned can be gauged from the fact that 
every piece of legislation or conjecture regarding the future 
of coloured people was met with the reaction: "Wait for the 
Theron Report. ,,84 
Apart from investigating the economic and social problems 
affecting coloured people, the commission also looked closely 
at their political status and future. It invited all parties 
to comment and make submissions in respect of the role of the 
CRG in coloured politics. 8s The Labour Party was the only 
party to refuse to cooperate with the commission. 86 It could 
not accept that coloured people were a separate "population 
group" from whom full citizenship rights had to be withheld 
and it was therefore pointless to examine them as a separate 
84Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 363; Theron and Du Toit, 
Kortbegrip van die Theron-verslag, 3; Weekend Post, 15 November 
1975; Rand Daily Mail, 15 November 1975; S.A. Financial Gazette, 
5 March 1976; Qggendblad, 4 June 1976. 
8sN.P. Arends Accession, Acc . 136, Letter from J.B. du Toit, 
Secretary of the Theron Commission, 30 November 1973. (Arends 
was one of the coloured members of the Theron Commission). 
86Sonny Leon Papers, Minutes of Labour Party NEe meeting, 9-
11 February 1973; Theron and Du Toit, Kortbegrip van die Theron-
verslag, 3; Sunday Times, 25 January 1976. 
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population and political group.87 Sonny Leon explained in an 
address to the party's national conference: "My submission to 
you is that unless subpoenaed, we refer them to the debates of 
the CRC which has all the evidence required to convince them 
of the desires of the people. ,,88 Yet , despite the Labour 
Party's conviction that the appointment of the commission was 
not motivated by a desire to improve the lot of coloured 
people, on the surface, it did appear to be a genuine attempt 
to try to find answers to the dilemma of their political 
future. For the first time, a significant number, six in all, 
of representatives from the people who were the subject of a 
commission's examination were actually appointed to serve on 
that commission,89 although none of them were considered 
opponents of the government and its policy of political 
separation as applied to coloured people, except perhaps for 
Van der Ross. 90 The white membership looked independent too 
in the sense that the government had steered clear of the 
temptation of appointing National Party politicians. Although 
eleven were Nationalists and one was from the united Party, 
only two were members of parliament. 91 The commission's brief 
87Hirson, Year of Fire, Year of Ash, 225. 
88Sonny Leon Papers, Sonny Leon, Address to Labour Party 
National Conference, Durban, 20 April 1973. 
89Abdullah Abdurahman had been the sole coloured member to 
serve on the wilcocks Commission. 
90The coloured members were R. E. van der Ross, J. Rabie, 
A.J. Arendse, S.l. Arendse, H.M. Beets and J.S. Feldman. Van der 
Ross, Rise and Decline, 341; Sunday Tribune, 20 June 1976; 
Wollheim, Theron Commission: Comment, 1. Despite a record of 
being anti-government and anti-separate development, Van der Ross 
nevertheless accepted the CRC and similar institutions as 
opportunities for coloured people to advance toward the goal of 
equality with whites. 
91These were N.G. Treurnicht and W. Kingwill of the National 
and United Parties respectively. The other white members were 
F.H. Badenhorst, G. Cronje, J.E. de V. Loubser, A.S. Meyer, J.H. 
Pretorius, C.D. Roode, S.J. Terreblanche, C. van den B. Uys, G.J. 
van Zyl and W.B. Vosloo. The 13th white member, Erica Theron 
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was also wider than that of any previous commission and it was 
expected that a major portion of its report would deal with 
socio-economic issues. 92 
The real interest in the commission centred on its 
investigations into, and recommendations on coloured 
It was this aspect that disturbed the Labour Party. 
politics. 
The 
commission was part of South Africa's separate development 
framework. If its findings did not accord with the stated 
intentions of the Labour Party regarding full citizenship and 
direct representation in parliament, the party would have 
justified its refusal to cooperate on the grounds that the 
commission was just another government attempt to dupe 
coloured people. On the other hand, if the commission's 
recommendations did not fit into the framework of separate 
development, the government would be faced with the dilemma of 
rejecting the recommendations of a commission it had itself 
appointed. Accepting the recommendation would mean going 
against its own policies. The government had repeatedly 
stated that it would not allow coloureds in parliament. It 
was therefore apparent that whatever the commission 
rec?mmended, Vorster and the government were not going to 
accede to the demands of the Labour Party.93 Because 
government policy was clear on this point, the commission 
could not recommend with any hope of success that coloured 
people be represented directly in the central parliament or in 
any other political body which might exercise sovereignty over 
whites. If it did, the government would reject it out of 
hand. In fact, three months before the commission reported, 
Vorster indicated that the government would not be bound by 
the findings of the commission. He informed parliament in 
91 ( ..• continued) 
served as chairman. 
Apartheid, 342. 
See Van der Ross, Rise and Decline of 
92Burger, 19 June 1976. 
93Rand Daily Mail, 15 November 1975; Star, 17 November 1975. 
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April 1976 that the Theron Commission had not been appointed 
to devise a coloured policy because the government already had 
a policy. The commission·s job was to identify points of 
friction and bring these to the attention of the government in 
order that it may be dealt with in terms of that policy .94 
The findings of the Theron Commission thus began to assume a 
position of irrelevance. To provide a formula that would 
satisfy whites on the one hand, but which would give coloured 
people sufficient hope to once again cooperate with the 
government, seemed beyond the capabilities of the Theron 
Commission. The commission therefore seemed to provide only 
one reasonable justification for its existence: it was an 
attempt by the government to extricate itself from a problem 
of its own making. The appointment of the commission would 
give the government time to review its coloured policy and 
provide it with an excuse for any possible changes to that 
policy. If some changes were inevitable, the appointment of 
the commission would serve an important function in the 
government's strategy of re-educating the white electorate 
towards the acceptance of the need for flexibility in respect 
of .the political position of coloured people. However, 
Vorster had already prepared the people for a possible 
rejection of the report if it made recommendations contrary to 
Nationalist policy.95 When the Theron Commission finally 
presented its report on 18 June 1976,96 the government 
94Debates of the House of Assembly (21 April 1976), col. 
5133-34; Ibid (23 April 1976), cols. 5275-76. See also 
"Colouredism: The Last Grovellings", Educational Journal 
(January-February 1977), 7. 
95Labour Party Accession, Fred Peters, Address to Labour 
Party National Conference, Upington, 6 January 1976; Debates of 
the House of Assembly (21 April 1976), col. 5133-34; Ibid (23 
April 1976), cols. 5275-76. 
96The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into matters 
relating to the Coloured Population Group (R P 38 - 1976), was 
written in Afrikaans and had five parts, divided into twenty-two 
chapters giving factual information and argument. A sixth part 
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responded by issuing a White Paper which rejected virtually 
every recommendation that held any meaningful political 
consequence for coloured people. 97 An examination of the 
findings and the 178 recommendations clearly shows why, as the 
majority of these were too far ahead of the government for it 
to consider implementing them. 98 Many of these were aimed at 
the very foundation of the policy of apartheid. 99 For 
example, the report called into question the argument that 
coloured people comprised a separate ethnic group. As this 
premise constituted part of the foundation of the policy of 
apartheid, the commission instead urged that the Population 
Registration Act be amended to make both acceptance and 
descent criteria for purposes of population classification. 
This would make it easier for those classified "Coloured" to 
apply for reclassification into the "white population group" 
and would remove a source of aggravation for the coloured 
"petty-bourgeoisie" who had long considered themselves part of 
white society. 100 Other recommendations were not only aimed 
at benefiting coloured people but other population groups as 
96 ( ... continued) 
contained 178 recommendations and two further parts contained 
tables and annexures such as provisos to recommendations. 
97Wilkins and Strydom, Super-Afrikaners, 164; Pretoria News, 
18 June 1976; Sunday Express, 20 June 1976; Sunday Tribune, 20 
June 1976. The White Paper was entitled, Provisional Comments by 
the Government on the Recommendations of the Commission of 
Inquiry into matters relating to the Coloured Population Group 
(W.P. S - '76). 
98Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 69-70; E.S. Munger, ed. 
The Afrikaners (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1979), 126-27. 
99Freedberg, "Changing Political Identity", 193. 
lOOGoldin, Making Race, 151. The term "petty-bourgeois" is 
used by Goldin to describe the coloured middle class who agitated 
throughout the twentieth century for equal rights. By 
introducing and tinkering with laws which eased restrictions and 
discrimination experienced by this group, the government hoped 
to defuse hostility and dampen the clamour emanating from 
coloured people. 
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well. The commission called for the Immorality Act and 
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act to be changed or repealed, 
the Separate Amenities Act to be implemented in such a way as 
to reduce separate amenities or allow the mixed use thereof, 
and for all forms of statutory job reservation to be 
abolished. Furthermore, in order to provide greater business 
opportunities for entrepreneurs of all "population groups," 
the commission recommended that the Group Areas Act be 
adjusted to allow members of any "population group" to own and 
occupy business premises in industrial areas and in specific 
areas of business concentration. lol The most telling 
recommendation was that the "coloured population" should not 
be viewed as a community culturally different or 
distinguishable from the "white population," and that 
satisfactory forms of direct coloured representation and a 
direct say for coloureds at various levels of government and 
on various decision-making bodies must be created. I02 
Given its previous position on these points, these 
recommendations had very little hope of being accepted by the 
government. The White Paper outlined the government's 
position and declared that "recommendations that would amount 
" 
to the recognition and development of the identity of the 
various population groups in the Republic being broken down 
are not conducive to the orderly and evolutionary advancement 
of the various population groups in the Republic as a 
whole. ,,103 For this reason, stated the white Paper, the 
10IThe most significant recommendations were summarised by 
Oscar Wollheim in Theron Commission: Comment, and the United 
Party in a booklet, Die Theron-Kommissie en die Verenigde Party: 
'n Samevatting (September 1976), 1-21. See also van der Ross, 
Rise and Decline, 374-79; Survey of Race Relations (1976), 11-12; 
Joyce, The Rise and Fall of Apartheid, 91; Hirson, Year of Fire, 
Year of Ash, 225. 
102Diamond Fields Advertiser, 19 June 1976; Sunday Tribune, 
20 June 1976; Sunday Times, 20 June 1976; Survey of Race 
Relations (1976), 11-12; Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 
70-71. 
103Provisionai Comments, (W.P. S - '76), 2. 
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government was not prepared to change its standpoint in regard 
to the Immorality and Mixed Marriages Act. Similarly, 
coloureds would not be allowed direct representation in 
parliament; a coloured homeland was rejected on the grounds 
that it was not "practical politics"; the government was not 
prepared to change its policy of separate development. 
Vorster bluntly stated that any recommendations that direct 
representation be granted to coloureds was not acceptable to 
the government. The government indicated, however, that it 
accepted the recommendation that the westminster system of 
government on which South Africa's parliamentary system was 
based, be altered to meet the particular requirements of South 
Africa's plural society, and that a committee of experts be 
appointed to investigate the adjustments which would be 
necessary to achieve this .104 
If the appointment of the Theron Commission was designed to 
sweep the "Coloured Problem" under the carpet or relegate it 
to a committee which would spend years discussing it until the 
problem hopefully disappeared, then the idea backfired. The 
government had "loaded the dice" in its favour by appointing 
eleven Nationalists of whom seven were known supporters of a 
"hard-line" Nationalist policy.lOS Similarly, the appointment 
of Erika Theron as chairman was a step in its favour. She was 
a fervent "Afrikaner Nationalist" who had lectured at the 
University of Stellenbosch's Department of Sociology under 
H.F. Verwoerd, the architect of "Grand Apartheid." She 
greatly admired him and authored a book on his life in 
1970. 106 Yet, despite their impeccable credentials within the 
I04Provisional Comments (W.P. S - 1976), 2; Wollheim, Theron 
Commission: Comment, 30; Wilkins and Strydom, Super-Afrikaners, 
164; Vosloo, "The Coloured Policy of the National Party", 381; 
Diamond Fields Advertiser, 18 June 1976; Sunday Tribune, 20 June 
1976. 
10SWollheim, Theron Commission: Comment, 1, 29. 
106Sunday Tribune, 20 June 1976, article by J. Basson, 
Progressive Federal Party MP. 
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Nationalist establishment, these commissioners, along with the 
others, made recommendations abandoning or undoing twenty-
eight years of laborious and complicated legislative attempts 
by the National Party to keep white and coloured South 
Africans apart. 
If one takes into consideration the c omposition of the 
commission and the fact that it had to, at all times, bear in 
mind that it was expected to recommend within the general 
framework of the policy of separate development, then under 
the circumstances, the commissioners appeared to show courage 
in going as far as they did. Of the 178 recommendations, no 
one voted against 141 recommendations of which 125 were 
unanimous and 16 with abstentions. Of the 37 remaining 
recommendations on which there were opposing votes, minority 
recommendations were only made on 18. 107 However, those 
consisted of recommendations which struck at the very core of 
the government's race policies. It was therefore easy for the 
commission to achieve unanimity on relatively neutral issues . 
The majority of the Afrikaner commissioners, mindful that the 
commission was appointed within the framework of the 
gov.ernment's separate development policy and, placing their 
personal ideological views above the facts at their disposal, 
baulked at recommending unanimously the repeal of odious race 
legislation . Thus, the minority recommendations from 
commissioners influenced the government in its attitude to the 
Theron Report. 
The Labour Party, which had at the outset refused to accept 
the Theron Commission and had declined to cooperate with it, 
immediately issued a statement to the effect that the party 
had been vindicated in its stand in refusing to give evidence 
to the commission. Because of its previously stated rejection 
107Wollheim, Theron Commission: Comment, 3. 
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of the commission,108 the party did not consider it necessary 
to offer any further comment on the report or the government's 
response to it. Sonny Leon, however, described the commission 
. as "an expensive exercise in futility" as the government had 
consigned the report to the "waste-paper basket." 109 He 
predicted that coloured/white relations would become more 
strained than before as many coloured people had been looking 
to the commission to create a new political dispensation for 
coloureds. llo His statements were given the hard edge of 
reality because two days before the commission presented its 
report, Soweto had erupted in violence. The long-held fears 
of coloured alienation and a coloured-African alliance were 
realised when coloured youth came out in support of their 
African counterparts. lll This was a startling development as 
coloureds had always occupied a social and economic position 
above that of the African and appeared to be sufficiently 
insulated for such a phenomenon to be unthinkable. ll2 Even 
coloured people themselves were taken aback by the ferocity of 
coloured support. This was reflected in the Cape Herald which 
reported the Cape uprising in banner headlines: "They said it 
could never happen . " The headline elaborated further: 
"Bonteheuwel, Wednesday, August 25, 1976 - a day to remember. 
A day people said would never happen. Soweto, yes. Guguletu, 
Langa, Nyanga, yes. But never a Coloured township. But then 
it happened." 113 
108Sonny Leon Papers, Minutes of Labour Party NEC meeting, 
9-11 February 1973 . 
109Diamond Fields Advertiser, 18 June 1976; Sunday Tribune, 
20 June 1976. 
l10Sunday Express, 20 June 1976. 
111M• Attwell, South Africa: Backoround to the Crisis 
(London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1986), 113. 
112R.W. Johnson, How Long will South Africa Survive? 
(Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1977), 194. 
113Cape Herald, 31 August, 1976. 
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The chairman of the Theron Commission, Erika Theron, also gave 
an indication of the great expectations coloured people had of 
the commission and the devastating effect it had on them when 
the main recommendations were rejected. During the riots in 
coloured areas in support of the Soweto uprising, Theron 
reports that a prominent coloured leader cited the rejection 
of the Theron Report as the reason for coloured unrest: 
Ja, sien u, drie jaar het ons op hierdie verslag gewag; 
drie jaar het ons veral aan die jonger groep wat begin 
kriewelrig word en net nie meer die dinge wil vat nie, 
gese: "Wag nou, wees tog geduldig, dalk stel die Theron-
Kommissie ons saak reg." En toe kom die verslag en ons 
se: "Die manne het reg gepraat." Maar toe kom daar mos 
ook daardie memorandum (the White Paper) en dit slaan ons 
voete onder ons uit. 114 
The government's rejection of the Theron Report was again 
cited as a factor in the unrest in the Cape in 1976 when a 
deputation representing all parties in the CRC handed a 
memorandum to the Prime Minister on 21 September 1976: 115 
Dit was geen enkele insident wat die situasie plofbaar 
gemaak het nie, dit het ontwikkel in 'n oplaaiende gevoel 
van magteloosheid; 'n verset teen die sosiale struktuur 
wat menswaardigheid aantas, en 'n reeks spanningvolle 
insidente waarvan die negering van die Erika Theron-
verslag as deurslaggewend kan beskou word. 116 
The Labour Party accused the government of making it 
impossible for coloured people to achieve anything by means of 
dialogue and discussion. Young people were rejecting their 
leaders because of the failure of dialogue with the 
government. III However, although the Theron Report aimed at 
improving conditions for coloureds vis-a-vis Africans, the 
majority of its recommendations were also aimed at removing 
114Theron en Du Toit, Kortbegrip van die Theron-verslag, 5. 
115Argus, 23 September 1976. 
116Theron and Du Toit, Kortbegrip van die Theron-verslag, 5. 
117Star, 23 September 1976; Argus, 23 September 1976. 
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restrictions applied to other population groups. 
would therefore have broken 
Acceptance 
up the of the Theron Report 
political logjam and given an indication of a move towards an 
equitable political dispensation . Yet, while many of the 
older generation of coloure d people might have been 
disappointed that the rejection of the Theron Report would 
delay the removal of "pin-prick" and humiliating apartheid 
laws,118 as well as their assimilation into white society, 
coloured youth saw the rejection in a wider sense. The Cillie 
commission which inquired into the riots found that a large 
section of the coloured community rejected "not only the word 
' Coloured' but also the notion of a separate Coloured 
identity" and that they had "joined up with the Black 
community so as to remove (their) grievances and obtain their 
rights through concerted action." The commission argued that 
the attitudes of coloureds "had changed to the extent that 
they were prepared to regard the Black man as their comrade in 
distress and to continue the struggle for improvement with 
them. ,,119 
The government was clearly caught off-guard by the 
controversial nature of what was essentially a conservative 
document. It acted instinctively in rejecting the significant 
recommendations without regard to the repercussions or the 
feelings and reactions of the people who were the subject and 
supposed beneficiaries of the investigation. In an attempt to 
dampen the criticism and soften the rejection, the government 
announced that it would table a comprehensive response to the 
commission's report at a later date. In April 1977, ten 
months after the Theron Commission reported, the government 
eventually tabled its detailed White Paper . 120 The reason 
118See De Klerk, The Puritans in Africa , 274-76, for 
reference to, and discussion of these "pin-pricks". 
119Goldin, Making Race, 207. 
120Witskrif oor die Verslag van die Kommissie van Ondersoek 
na Aangeleenthede rakende die Kleurlingbevolkingsgroep (W . P. D -
1977) • 
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given for the time lapse was that the various state 
departments needed to make a thorough study of the 
commission's report .121 However, it was -not so much the 
departments which needed the time but the Broederbond. 
Throughout the process of tabling the report in 1976, the 
Broederbond had been intimately involved in the formulation of 
the government's provisional comments and in the drawing up of 
the White Paper in 1977 . In a circular to all members,122 it 
was indicated that the government's objections to, and 
rejection of, the main recommendations of the Theron Report, 
were formulated by the Executive Council of the Broederbond: 
Branches are aware of the first reactions to the release 
of the report of the Erika Theron Commission on Coloured 
matters. The Executive Council had a special consultation 
with the relevant responsible friend (Mr Hennie Smit, 
Minister of Coloured, Rehoboth and Nama Relations) before 
the report was released. The provisional comments •.. of 
the Government on the report represent the considerations 
discussed in this consultation. t23 
The Broederbond executive further advised its members to study 
the Theron Report and the comments of its committee for 
coloured matters. Thus, between June 1976 when the Theron 
Report was tabled and the government's detailed response in 
April 1977, the Broederbond was actively engaged in 
formulating coloured policy and providing comments which the 
government could use in response to the report. This allowed 
the government the space to pursue further attempts to salvage 
its coloured policy in the wake of the criticism over its 
rejection of the Theron Report. The government used this time 
to try to revive the proposed cabinet council. In an attempt 
to give it some credibility and facilitate acceptance, the 
government announced that it would include Indian leaders in 
121Provisional Comments, (W. P. S '76); Survey of Race 
Relations (1976), 13. 
122Circular letter No. 5/76/77 of 1 July 1976. 
123Wilkins and Strydom, Super-Afrikaners, 164. 
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the proposed council. 124 Vorster then called a meeting for 9 
August 1976 and unilaterally decided that the cabinet council 
would function, announcing that the first meeting would be 
held on 24 September 1976. 125 
It appears inexplicable that, at this juncture, Vorster would 
suddenly decide that the cabinet council would be implemented, 
with or without the Labour Party. The council was originally 
conceived to dampen coloured demands for direct 
representation, but when the Labour Party rejected it at the 
outset, Vorster abandoned the idea. 
Council indicated its willingness to 
suddenly felt emboldened to proceed. 
Now, after the Indian 
support the idea, Vorster 
He hoped that by 
broadening the base it would facilitate acceptance. The 
Labour Party, however, reiterated 
and still refused to participate. 
its rejection of the council 
Sonny Leon explained: 
The Cabinet Council will be nothing more than a powerless 
discussion group and the Labour Party will have nothing 
to do with it •••. The Cabinet Council will be a purely 
consultative body with no power and no chance of moving 
towards power sharing between South Africa's race groups 
• • •• The Labour Party will not participate until the 
government includes Africans in the discussions and there 
is progress towards genuine power sharing .126 
The Minister of Indian Affairs dismissed Leon's remarks 
concerning Africans and explained that the cabinet council was 
not intended for "blacks" because "they have a different 
destination in terms of the NP' s thinking. ,,127 Nevertheless, 
the government decided to ignore the Labour Party and convened 
a meeting which was attended by cabinet ministers, chairman of 
124Rand Daily Mail, 28 June 1976; Race Relations Survey 
(1977), 22. (From 1977 the Survey of Race Relations was called 
Race Relations Survey). 
125Star , 10 August 1976. 
126Rand Daily Mail, 28 June 1976. 
127Debates of the House of Assembly (24 June 1976), col. 
10501. 
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the eRe executive, Alathea Jansen, and fifteen Federal Party 
and independent members of the eRe. However, the original 
plan of operation for the cabinet council was that it would 
consist of an equal number of cabinet ministers and eRe 
executive members. As the Labour Party controlled the eRe 
executive, Vorster would have to alter the composition of the 
council and choose ordinary members for the cabinet posts. 128 
This would then create a ludicrous situation whereby Labour 
Party members would occupy the executive posts in the eRe (in 
effect, the coloured cabinet), and ordinary opposition members 
would occupy the cabinet posts in the cabinet council. The 
government would then be liaising with persons who had no 
authority, position or standing in the eRe or the coloured 
community. It was difficult to see how the cabinet council, 
under these circumstances, would fill the role of satisfying 
the political demands of coloured people. Sonny Leon warned 
that such a course of action "will reduce the council to a 
total farce." 129 
What then were Vorster's motives in pressing ahead in the face 
of Labour Party opposition, with a combination of coloured 
minority groups to set up the council? It must be 
.. 
interpreted as an attempt to outflank the Labour Party and at 
the same time create a divisive wedge by exploiting the 
struggle between "moderates" and "militants" in the party, 
thereby breaking the party's control of the eRe. Vorster 
appeared to be taking a calculated gamble that he would 
eventually win majority support in the eRe for the cabinet 
council. However, if he failed to break the party or persuade 
it to cooperate, the Labour Party would be able to block the 
implementation of any decisions taken by the council that 
required legislation to be passed by the eRe. If this 
happened, the government would in turn be forced to pass 
amending legislation bypassing the eRe. Such an action would 
128Sunday Times, 12 August 1976. 
129Rand Daily Mail, 28 June 1976. 
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then defeat the purpose of having a eRe at all. The 
government would then be using one instrument of its coloured 
policy to destroy another. 13o 
Vorster was astute enough to realise that he needed the Labour 
Party's cooperation and made another attempt to win it over, 
this time hoping to change the attitude of a sufficiently 
large number of Labour councillors to enlist their support for 
his plans. 
eRe, which 
At the opening ceremony of the 1976 session of the 
the Labour Party boycotted because of the detention 
of its chairman Allan Hendrickse,l3l the President of the 
Senate, Marais viljoen, announced a number of "important 
concessions" aimed at removing obsolete discriminatory 
practices which caused dissatisfaction among coloured 
people. 132 These concessions were designed to please, and so 
win the support of the more affluent sections of the coloured 
people. Among the concessions were those which made allowance 
for the right to open industries in any area; the right to 
trade outside coloured group areas; prominent coloured people 
serving on committees to help handle the squatter problem in 
coloured residential areas; the provision of proper waiting-
room facilities at health institutions serving coloured 
people; better seating at arts and science conferences and in 
courts of law; laying down guidelines for the solution of 
problems caused by separate entrances in public buildings; the 
removal of some points of friction on the motorways by 
providing more (but still separate) eating and rest 
facilities; and allowing private patients to be treated by a 
doctor of his or her own choice in any hospi tal. 133 
130Star, 13 July 1976. 
131The detention of Allan Hendrickse is discussed in greater 
detail below. 
132Hirson, Year of Fire, Year of Ash, 225. 
133Survey of Race Relations (1976), 16-17; Hirson, Year of 
Fire, Year of Ash, 226; star, 10 September 1976; Argus, 11 
September 1976; Beeld, 11 September 1976; Rand Daily Mail, 11 
September 1976 . 
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However, these "special concessions" were so feeble and 
inconsequential that it is hard to understand why the 
government even considered that they would impress coloured 
people, dampen the anger of coloured youth who had joined the 
Soweto protesters, or bring the Labour Party around to 
accepting the cabinet council. None of the concessions in any 
way addressed the root of the problems experienced by coloured 
people, viz. the harsh and insensitive application of the 
policy of apartheid. Hirson contends that more appropriate 
concessions might have helped to "cool down the situation in 
the Cape which had reached boiling point," but that the 
government had no real intention of "cooling" the coloured 
people. These concessions were really intended to subdue or 
repress opposition. 134 It was therefore not surprising that 
the Labour Party summarily dismissed these so-called 
concessions. Leon pointed out that coloured people were not 
the only ones affected by apartheid and that urban Africans 
were "part and parcel of those who suffer under the laws of 
discrimination."J3S Moreover, argued Leon, the concessions 
would benefit only the more affluent sections of the 
community. He added that the party was not concerned with 
"special concessions for special people . "J36 
Whereas the government had hoped that its offer of special 
concessions would influence or divide the Labour Party, it had 
the opposite effect: it succeeded in uniting the parties in 
the CRC. The CRC unanimously accepted a motion to adjourn and 
appoint a deputation to meet with the Prime Minister. Among 
the aims of the deputation was to discuss the unrest in South 
Africa and the release of Allan Hendrickse who had been 
134Hirson, Year of Fire, Year of Ash, 226. 
13SArgus, 11 September 1976. 
136Ibid. 
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detained on 26 August 1976 in Grahamstown. 137 The Labour 
Party hinted that it would consider serving on the cabinet 
council if the government guaranteed that Hendrickse would be 
allowed to attend; if it gave an assurance that the council 
would have meaningful powers; if it indicated what powers 
coloured cabinet ministers would have if and when they were 
appointed; and, finally, if the government considered the 
inclusion of urban blacks. 138 However, the Labour Party's 
hint of participation was not seriously intended, given its 
"hard-line" attitude to this council, and must be seen as an 
attempt to gauge the government's attitude to Hendrickse's 
detention and the party's request for his release. Indeed, 
the Labour Party informed the Secretary for Coloured Relations 
the next day that the party's attitude to the cabinet council 
remained unchanged. 139 
The detention of Allan Hendrickse became a bargaining chip as 
the government and the Labour Party took opposing positions 
regarding the cabinet council. Neither the government nor 
Allan Hendrickse ever gave any indication why the latter had 
been detained. Hendrickse's biographer suggests that it had 
to do with his association with the black consciousness 
movement (BCM) .140 The nationwide unrest in 1976 was linked 
137Daily Dispatch, 27 August 1976; Cape Times,S September 
1976; Rand Daily Mail, 15 September 1976; Star, 21 September 
1976; Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 94. Coetzer maintains that only 
five minutes of discussion was directed to Hendrickse's 
detention. 
138 Cape Times, 30 August 1976; Debates of the CRC, vol. 32, 
(13 September 1976), 113. 
139Survey of Race Relations (1976), 19; Star, 22 September 
1976; Rand Daily Mail, 22 September 1976; Argus, 23 September 
1976. 
140Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 93-95; S. Gastrow, Who's Who in 
SA Politics, No.3 (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1990), 105. Middleton 
however refutes this suggestion and denies that Hendrickse was 
ever associated with the black consciousness movement. Norman 
Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. The Labour Party's links 
with the black consciousness movement will be examined more fully 
below. 
197 
to the BCM and Hendrickse was suspected of being involved. 
This was hinted at by the Minister of Justice, Jimmy Kruger, 
in an interview with Hendrickse's wife .141 Sonny Leon however 
declared that Hendrickse was detained as part of a government 
plan to render the coloured people leaderless and that the 
detention was a ploy to obtain a pro- government majority in 
the CRC .142 At that stage, the Labour Party held a one-seat 
majority in the CRC. This would then enable the government to 
proceed with the cabinet council. However no official reasons 
for Hendrickse's detention have ever been given but it was 
clearly linked to the Labour Party's confrontationist stance 
and the debilitating effect its opposition to the CRC and the 
cabinet council was having on the government and its coloured 
policy. An indication of this was given by the Prime Minister 
himself. Vorster told the delegation that while he did not 
know why Hendrickse was held, if the Labour Party was prepared 
to cooperate with the cabinet council to investigate the 
constitutional position of coloureds, he would see what could 
be done about Hendrickse's detention .143 According to 
Coetzer, the threat of blackmail was obvious: "Cooperate and 
Allan Hendrickse will be a free man. ,,144 John Nash states 
that the most important consequence of Hendrickse's detention 
" 
was that "it put the fear of God into the Labour Party. ,,145 
141Coetzer , Awaiting Trial, 93, 127 . 
142Daily Dispatch, 27 August 1976; Weekend Post, 28 August 
1976. 
143Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 94-95. 
144I bid, 95. Allan Hendrickse was detained on 26 August 
1976. On 7 September 1976, his seventeen-year old son, Peter, 
was detained in the Walmer jail in Port Elizabeth. His mother, 
Terry, was not told that he had been detained, nor was she 
allowed to see him. Security police later told her that if she 
"calmed Labour Party supporters and opponents of the government" 
her son would be released. Terry Hendrickse concluded that this 
step had been taken to put pressure on her husband in order to 
break his spirit and dampen his opposition to the government. 
Terry Hendrickse, interview with author, Uitenhage, 17 September 
1994. 
145John Nash, interview, 31 August 1993. 
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Members were so scared of the Security Police that not one of 
the Labour Party leaders wanted to hold meetings in Port 
Elizabeth. Nash conjectures that this may have been behind 
the thinking of the government because the Eastern Cape was a 
cauldron of political activity and protest at the time. The 
germ of the idea which led to the formation of the South 
African Students' Organisation (SASO) originated in the 
Eastern Cape, 146 and the BCM was strongest in this area. 
Steve Biko, who was behind the rise and development of both 
movements, had his roots in the Eastern Cape .147 Moreover, 
SASO appeared to be the driving force behind the protest 
sweeping the country after 16 June 1976. Thus it appears that 
the government considered it necessary to keep agitators out 
of the area in order to bring unrest under control. This view 
was given some credence when 
released on 24 October 1976. 
Hendrickse was eventually 
A condition of his release was 
that he made no political speeches until the end of November 
1976 and that he did not enter the Port Elizabeth magisterial 
district until 31 December 1976. 148 If one of the reasons for 
Hendrickse's detention was to banish the Labour Party from the 
Eastern Cape, it certainly succeeded. 
Nevertheless, despite all efforts, veiled threats and hints of 
blackmail, the government's desperate attempt to get the 
cabinet council off the ground did not meet with much success. 
Yet, with the obstinacy born of ideological single-mindedness, 
Vorster doggedly forged ahead and invited five members from 
CRC opposition groups to become cabinet council members. The 
five consisted of three nominated CRC members, one elected 
146M. Motlhabi, The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance 
to Apartheid: A Social-Ethical Analysis (Skotaville: 
Johannesburg, 1987), 108-9. 
147Readers' Digest, Illustrated History of South Africa: The 
Real Story (Readers' Digest Association: Cape Town, 1988), 443. 
148Ga strow, W=h...,o,,--,' s"--,,--'W,,,h,-=o 
interview, 6 December, 1993. 
(1986), 107; Mohammed Dangor, 
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independent and one elected Federal Party member. This move 
posed several immediate questions about the CRC and its 
participating parties. Since 1969 the CRC executive had been 
the control mechanism of the government's coloured policy and 
the highest statutory executive body in terms of the 
government's coloured policy. Yet the government now planned 
to introduce another committee which would have a say at 
government level, something which the CRC executive had never 
had. Because the Labour Party, which controlled the CRC 
executive, refused to serve on the cabinet council, a council 
consisting largely of un elected members would have powers 
greater than the elected members on the executive and be able 
to override and ignore the CRC executive. Cabinet council 
decisions would automatically be imposed on the CRC. This 
raised the question that if the coloured members of the 
cabinet council had the final say in what laws would be made 
and what laws would be done away with, what was the purpose of 
debating them in the CRC? The CRC had therefore become 
irrelevant. with three government-nominated members in a 
position to dictate to the CRC, the government would 
effectively be bypassing the election process. 1" Thus, in 
on~ inexplicable stroke, the government sabotaged its own 
creation and relegated coloured people to the position they 
had occupied in 1956 - a disfranchised, politically powerless 
group, ruled by government 
though the cabinet council 
decree and whim. However, even 
was to meet 
occasions, the government had to admit 
again on two further 
that the current 
composition of the coloured component in the cabinet council 
was unrepresentative and their presence had to be seen as a 
temporary arrangement until the duly elected CRC executive was 
prepared to participate. 150 
While the Labour Party and the government wrangled over the 
149Sunday Times, 26 September 1976. 
150Sonny Leon Papers, government memorandum to the CRC 
Executive on the "Functions and Objects of the Cabinet Council", 
(1976). 
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implementation of coloured policy, the detailed response to 
the Theron Report was being drawn up. Unfortunately for the 
government, it had not been able to use .the time successfully 
to establish its cabinet council. When the detailed White 
Paper on the Theron Report was eventually tabled in April 
1977, it confirmed the fears of those who had hoped for 
significant change. Seven members of the Theron Commission, 
including Erika Theron herself, publicly condemned the White 
Paper .151 Even newspapers sympathetic to the National Party 
joined with opposition newspapers in condemnation, while the 
Labour Party dismissed it as an "apartheid document. ,,152 In a 
bitter attack, the Sunday Times declared: 
The White Paper on the Theron Report has signalled to the 
Coloured People that they will be deprived of the rights 
and dignity of citizenship for as long as our present 
rulers can see into the future. The government's response 
to the report - itself a cautious document - is a 
disgraceful rejection of any notion that this hapless 
group has a right to full social, economic and political 
acceptance by Whites. In the first place, it did not 
require a commission to establish that coloured people 
are bitterly aggrieved. How close they are to the end of 
their tether was chillingly demonstrated in last year's 
upheaval. And what are we left with at the end of the 
long, costly exercise? The Government has evaded the 
central issue of political rights by shunting it into a 
Cabinet committee .... The Coloureds, therefore, are on a 
single track to - nowhere?153 
The newspaper concluded that the White Paper was really "a 
whitewash job •••• Beneath the whitewash the structure is 
still ugly." 154 Four years of research had been callously 
swept away. Thirty-one recommendations by the Theron 
Commission that crucially affected the political, social and 
l5lWilkins and Strydom, Super-Afrikaners, 165; Rapport, 17 
April 1977 . 
152Rand Daily Mail, 22 April 1977. 
153sunday Times, 17 April 1977. 
154Ibid. 
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economic life of the coloured people were rejected outright in 
the White Paper. The rest of the recommendations which met 
some grievances were accepted by the government. However, the 
newspaper pointed out, these could have been implemented 
administratively long before they were highlighted by the 
Theron Commission. The Sunday Times referred to the 
acceptance, often unenthusiastic and qualified, of this vast 
majority of the commission's recommendations as "the 
whitewash. ,,155 The White Paper did not address the grievances 
of the coloured people. The apartheid edifice remained solid. 
The government made no attempt to offer comment on the main 
recommendations of the commission - those dealing with the 
political future of, and race laws affecting, coloured people, 
neither did it offer a blueprint or definite guidelines on the 
future of coloured people or their position vis-a-vis other 
population groups in South Africa. 156 The fragmentary, 
purposeless nature of the White Paper led Rapport to plead: 
Ons wil dit ten sterkste beklemtoon dat dit in die 
huidige binne-en-buitelandse omstandighede dringend 
noodsaaklik is dat daar so gou moontlik bevredigende 
vorme van regstreekse kleurlingverteenwoordiging en 
kleurlingseggenskap op die sentrale sowel as die 
plaaslike owerheidsvlak ingeruim sal word .157 
What the newspaper was pleading for was something that the 
Labour Party had been calling for since 1965. This call had 
formed the basis of the Labour Party's opposition to the CRC 
and the reason for its policy of occasional boycott and 
confrontation. The CRC, liaison committee and cabinet 
council, in fact the entire coloured policy of the government 
had shipwrecked on this very issue. The Theron Report had 
been rejected because it had dared to suggest the same. The 
government's insistence that coloured people would never be 
directly represented in parliament was the root cause of the 
155rbid. 
15Gwilkins and Strydom, Super-Afrikaners, 167. 
157Rapport, 17 April 1977. 
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impasse in coloured politics in the 1970s. The long-held 
fears of many whites that coloureds would become completely 
estranged from them was again echoed during the no-confidence 
debate in parliament in January 1977: 
The Government did not accept the recommendations of the 
Erika Theron Commission and since then agonising things 
have happened to the Coloured community. I say that we 
should stop beating about the bush and we should give the 
Coloured people full citizenship with representation in 
this House. This is the least we can do to try to remove 
the conflict situation between us and them. 158 
To which the Prime Minister replied: 
The hon. member for Sea Point asked me whether I was 
going to bring the Coloured people back to this 
parliament, and I told him that I had no such 
intention. 159 
It was therefore obvious that the government's inflexible 
stance on coloured representation would render impossible any 
further hope of cooperation by the Labour Party. The White 
Paper appeared to ·signal a permanent impasse in coloured 
politics. However, the Theron Commission had given the 
government an outlet. While pointing out that coloured people 
had no direct say in the decisive legislative institutions and 
that the vast majority rejected alternative measures of 
coloured representation, the commission suggested in 
recommendation 178 that the Westminster system of government 
in South Africa be changed. It recommended that a committee 
of experts be appointed to consider proposals for satisfactory 
forms of direct coloured representation at the various levels 
158Colin Eglin, Leader of the Opposition, no-confidence 
motion, Debates of the House of Assembly (24 January 1977), col. 
88. 
159B. J. Vorster, Debates of the House of Assembly (28 January 
1977), col. 376. 
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of government and on decision-making bodies .160 The 
commission made no recommendation as to how this particular 
proposal should be implemented. 
stated that this proposal could 
without the majority support of 
However, it had already 
hardly come to fruition 
the CRC. As the CRC was 
controlled by the Labour Party, and its opposition to the 
commission and its findings was already 
arising out of 
well-known, it 
the acceptance 
was 
of clear that any 
recommendation 
proposals 
178 could only be implemented if it suited the 
Labour Party. Because the government had consistently refused 
to consider full citizenship for coloureds, any proposals 
providing for an alternative to the westminster system would 
merely be an extension of the present policy of separate 
development. It therefore had no chance of acceptance by the 
Labour Party. Thus, this much-vaunted recommendation offered 
no additional relief to coloured people in their quest for 
political equality. 
The government nevertheless accepted both the majority and 
minority views in this recommendation and announced that it 
would investigate the present parliamentary system to 
de~ermine the adaptations necessary to suit South African 
circumstances .161 This investigation was entrusted to a 
special cabinet committee under the chairmanship of P.W. 
Botha, the Minister of Defence. 162 During August 1977, the 
committee put constitutional proposals to a National Party 
caucus meeting, then to the party's provincial congresses. 
The proposals made provision for a constitutional dispensation 
consisting of three parliaments for each of whites, Indians 
160Theron Report (R P 38 - 1976), 519; Van der Horst, The 
Theron commission, 118-20; Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 70-
72 • 
161Debates of the House of Assembly (20 May 1977), col. 
133-4. 
162Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 71; Hugo, Quislings or 
Realists, 741. 
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and coloureds .163 Before full details of the scheme were 
available to the public, it became an issue in the white 
general election of 1977. 164 However, just as the hand of the 
Broederbond was clearly evident in the drafting of the 
provisional comments to the Theron Report in June 1976 and the 
detailed White Paper in April 1977, so the government's new 
constitutional 
Broederbond. 165 
plans again bore the unmistakable stamp of the 
Circular 7/77/78 dated 1 September 1977 told 
members: "The Executive Council is pleased to say that friends 
in responsible circles took part in our brain-storming and 
that there was a healthy exchange of ideas. ,,166 The circular 
also informed members that the executive council was party to 
the discussions that preceded the formulation of new 
constitutional proposals and that the Broederbond's view was 
presented to "responsible friends long before the plan was 
announced. ,,167 That the Broederbond' s proposals were 
submitted and approved by the organisation before they came to 
parliament is striking evidence of the strength of its 
influence over government policy. The fact that influential 
policy-makers in respect of coloured policy, such as the Prime 
Minister John Vorster (membership No. 3737), Schalk van der 
Merwe (membership No. 6571), Hennie Smit and P.W. Botha, were 
members of the Broederbond, explains in some ways the strong 
influence this organisation had in the formulation of the 
163The proposals of the Botha committee are discussed more 
fully in Chapter 5. 
164F. van Zyl Slabbert and D. Welsh, South Africa's Options: 
Strategies for Sharing Power (Cape Town: David Philip, 1979), 
105. 
165Wilkins and Strydom, Super-Afrikaners, 164-65 i Sunday 
Times, 22 January 1978. 
166Wilkins and Strydom, Super-Afrikaners, 173. 
167rbid. 
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government's coloured policy. 168 
The initial reaction of the Labour Party to the proposals was 
enthusiastic. Sonny Leon felt that it contained "encouraging 
flexibility" and that it would be a breakthrough if it was 
accepted by National Party congresses. Norman Middleton, 
deputy-chairman, and one of the "militants" in the party, 
agreed that the proposals offered more than the Labour Party 
and coloured people had expected. He stated however that it 
was 
but 
not a question 
whether whites 
of whether coloured people would accept it 
would. 169 
reaction turned to criticism. 
However, the initial favourable 
At a specially called meeting 
of the party's NEe on 10 September 1977, the proposals were 
discussed in detail and then rejected. The NEe saw the formal 
ethnic divisions in the proposals as entrenching racism in the 
constitution. Furthermore, the plan sought to create an 
alliance of whites, coloureds and Indians, and even if this 
alliance were to comprise equal partners, which it clearly did 
not, it was still unacceptable since it excluded blacks. This 
exclusion would intensify, and not eliminate, racial 
conflict. l7O These objections led the party to reject the 
constitutional proposals .171 Labour Party chairman, Allan 
Hendrickse, elaborated on the reasons why the party rejected 
the proposals. He indicated that the party considered the 
plan for supposed "power-sharing" a facade and that "the new 
system has the essence and germ of further oppression and 
168Ibid, 22, 173, A211, A254, A290. This book contains a 
comprehensive list of members of the Broederbond and, in many 
cases, indicates the membership numbers as well as the date when 
members joined the organisation. See also Serfontein, 
Brotherhood of Power, 257-75. 
169Hugo , Quislings or Realists, 739-40. 
170Sonny Leon Papers, Minutes of Labour Party NEe meeting, 
Stellenbosch, 10 September 1977. 
l7lSonny Leon Papers, Minutes of Labour Party NEe meeting, 
Stellenbosch, 10 September 1977; Race Relations Survey (1977), 
9; Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 739-40. See also Debates of the 
House of Assembly (20 May 1977), cols. 133-34. 
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therefore white domination. ,,172 Hendrickse explained that the 
westminster system had come into being to curb the despotism 
of the English kings. This system presupposed the 
indivisibility of power and enshrined the fact that parliament 
could not be constrained. Now this system had been taken away 
and given to the state president "which makes him a dictator." 
Acceptance of the proposals would mean buying time for white 
nationalism. Furthermore, said Hendrickse, the Labour Party 
could not accept the proposals because it did not include 
Africans: "The White man needs us just as we need him. 
Together we need the Africans. ,,173 
Despite expressing concern for the rights of Africans in the 
early 1970s, the Labour Party had mainly been a "coloured" 
party concerned with "coloured" rights. Thus, the party's 
sudden concern for Africans in 1977 was out of character, 
arising primarily out of concern at the party's rejection by 
coloured youth during the Soweto uprising in 1976. 174 
Hendrickse, as one of the party "militants," had always been 
sympathetic to the African struggle, 175 but his views were not 
those of the majority of members in his party. However, having 
carefully studied the proposals, the party concluded that, by 
'. 
removing coloureds and Indians from their intermediate 
position in South African society, and taking them into the 
white fold, the government was attempting to negate any chance 
there might be of a "black alliance." This would have had the 
added advantage of allowing it to pursue its policy for 
Africans without hindrance. If that was the underlying motive 
behind the new constitutional proposals, then the government's 
plan failed. In December 1977, the Labour Party announced 
that it had turned its back on the government and white people 
172Cape Times, 17 September 1977. 
173Ibid. 
174See for example, Star, 23 September 1976; Argus, 23 
September 1976. 
175See chapter 3. 
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and was seeking an alliance with other "non-white" groups in a 
"joint freedom effort. ,,176 Gatsha Buthelezi of Inkatha 
praised the Labour Party for its stand and for its intention 
of throwing in its lot with Africans. 177 Leon tried to allay 
white fears by insisting that the proposed alliance did not 
mean that they were "ganging up on whites. ,,178 
Since its inception, the Labour Party had mainly concerned 
itself with coloured rights and grievances. After a brief 
flirtation with the idea of closer cooperation with Africans 
at its East London conference in 1972, and an invitation in 
1973 to Gatsha Buthelezi to address the party's national 
conference in Durban,179 the Labour Party, after winning the 
election in 1975, had begun to look once again after coloured 
interests. Nevertheless its leaders, who were mainly from the 
"militant" faction in the party, continued to seek closer ties 
with Africans. The budget crisis of 1975 afforded the 
"militants" the opportunity to strengthen their position, and 
at the height of the crisis party leaders felt confident 
enough to publicly intimate that they wished to see the 
formation of a black bloc. During the 1976 uprising, coloured 
students identified themselves with Africans and actively 
" 
involved themselves in the protests, boycotts and riots. 180 
The alienation of the coloured youth and the feeling of 
176StarT 29 December 1977. See also Eastern Province Herald, 
18 November 1975; Rand Daily Mail, 18 November 1975; Cape Times, 
9 December 1975. 
177Rand Daily Mail, 31 December 1977. 
178Star, 30 December 1977. 
179Minutes of Labour Party National Conference, Durban, 20-22 
April 1973. See also below. 
180See Report of the Commission of Inquiry into riots at 
Soweto and elsewhere from 16th of June 1976 to the 28th of 
February 1977, 260-79, for the role of coloured youth in the 
Soweto uprising. Also S. Ntebe, L . Levetan, G. Kraak and N. 
Rousseau, "Soweto and After: A Diary of Urban Unrest in 1976", 
South African Outlook (February 1977), 21-29 . 
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rejection suffered by the Labour Party led leaders to push, 
once again, for closer identification with the African 
struggle. Thus, even though coloured adults and the bulk of 
the party membership were generally not in favour of 
assimilation with Africans, Labour Party leaders and the 
coloured youth appeared to have no such qualms. 
The movement which had the greatest influence on coloured 
youth in the 1970s was the black consciousness movement (BCM) 
which took root in South Africa in the early 1970s. 181 Black 
consciousness sought, in Biko's words, "to challenge the pent-
up forces of the angry black masses to meaningful and 
directional opposition. ,,182 Black anger was present and the 
function of this ideology was to give it coherence and 
direction. According to Allan Boesak, black consciousness 
could be described as "the awareness of black people that 
their humanity is constituted by their blackness. It means 
that people are no longer ashamed that they are black .... It 
means that blacks are determined to be judged no longer by, 
and to adhere no longer to white values. ,,183 Black 
consciousness sought to "instil a sense of pride and dignity 
in _black people and to free them psychologically and 
physically from the inferior position to which apartheid had 
relegated them. ,,184 
Black consciousness emerged at a time when coloured people in 
general had become increasingly disillusioned. The promises 
made by whites and their governments over the years had proven 
to be empty. The CRC and similar bodies had turned out to be 
181D. M• Balia, Christian Resistance to Apartheid (Braamfontein: Skotavil~l~e~,~1~9~8~9~)~,~6~5~-~6~7~.~~~--~~--~~~~~ 
182SASO Newsletter, September 1970. 
183J.W. de Gruchy, The Church Struggle in South Africa (Cape 
Town: David Philip, 1986), 153. 
184Saks, "The Failure of the CRC", 113. See also Venter, 
Coloured, 540. 
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toothless. Urban, middle-class coloureds, especially in the 
Cape, and particularly the youth, had become dispirited by 
their inability to organise effectively and to effect 
meaningful change. For them black consciousness "provided a 
new focus for their identity and action." 185 Moreover, if 
Africans were identified negatively, coloureds were even more 
so. They occupied a vague middle ground between white and 
African; they had been negatively constituted and defined in 
1950; 186 they carried the negative definition of "non-white"; 
they had no distinct national or cultural heritage upon which 
they could fall back, except for their historical ties with 
whites who had, in any case, rejected them. The earlier 
conservative coloured movements which drew their strength from 
the racial concept of "coloured" had done so in response to 
the African threat. Black consciousness broke through these 
boundaries and many coloureds, especially the youth, 
increasingly began to reject the idea of "coloured" being a 
racial category and found common cause with Africans. The 
affirmation of this commonality was reflected in coloured 
support, particularly among those in the Cape, and more so, 
the youth, for the Soweto uprising of 1976. 187 
The BCM and the Soweto uprising of 1976 politicised many 
coloured people, but the Labour Party did not keep pace with 
trends in the broader coloured community and black society in 
general. While some of its leaders seemed to understand the 
impact of black consciousness on the coloured community, the 
party increasingly shied away from greater contact with 
185Freedberg, "Changing Coloured Identity", 20l. 
186The Population Registration Act of 1950 declared that all 
persons who were not European and not Native were classified 
Coloured. See chapter 1. 
187Freedberg, "Changing Political Identity", 200; Saks, "The 
Failure of the eRC", 196. 
210 
Africans and African political organisations. 1M Yet, the BCM 
politicised a generation of coloured youth who increasingly 
viewed with hostility attempts by coloured moderates to reach 
accommodation with the government. This was particularly 
noticeable in the Labour Party Youth Organisation which 
experienced a surge of support in 1973 when it decided to 
become a non-racial organisation and accept African and Indian 
members,189 but which virtually disappeared after 1975 when 
the Labour Party came increasingly to be viewed as a supporter 
of the system of separate development. 190 In fact the Labour 
Party's vacillation regarding involvement in the African 
political struggle contributed in no small measure to the 
party's problems. It was attacked by conservatives on the one 
hand for its attempts to forge closer ties with Africans, and 
by radicals on the other for adopting a narrow "colouredist" 
approach which played into the government's plan of driving a 
wedge between members of the oppressed .191 By trying to 
appease both camps, the Labour Party increasingly relegated 
itself to a position of irrelevance in coloured and South 
African politics. 
Certain party leaders like David Curry, Allan Hendrickse and 
Norman Middleton, whose maternal family was descended from the 
Zulu, were disposed to involving the party in the African 
political struggle and embraced the principles of black 
consciousness. Hendrickse's support of the BCM was reportedly 
188The increasingly conservative trend in the Labour Party 
continued to strengthen so that by the time of the 1984 election, 
the Labour Party occupied the same conservative platform that the 
Federal Party had in 1969, which led W.J. Bergins, former Federal 
Party leader, to remark that the Labour Party of 1983 was walking 
the same road as the Federal Party did in 1969. See Saks, "The 
Failure of the eRC", 240. 
189Eastern Province Herald, 3 May 1973. 
190Norman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. 
1915imons, "Organised Coloured Political Movements", 217. 
See chapter 2 for a discussion on "colouredism". 
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the cause of his detention in 1976. 192 The Labour Party was 
even able to influence the CRC to support the 1973 protest by 
coloured students at the University of the Western Cape. The 
protest followed the refusal of university authorities to 
allow a BCM speaker representing the South African Students 
Organisation (SASO) to deliver a lecture there .193 The unrest 
led to the temporary closure of the university as students 
extended their protest against the concept of separate 
universities .194 However, even though some Labour Party 
leaders aligned themselves with the black consciousness 
movement by pressing for the omission of the term "coloured'· 
from the party's constitution;195 accepting invitations to 
share political platforms with representatives of the BCM; 196 
and urging supporters to show solidarity with other oppressed 
groups,197 there was no tangible support for Africans in the 
Labour Party until the South African Black Alliance was formed 
in 1978. 198 This meant that the party became increasingly 
isolated as urban coloureds joined the mainstream of 
resistance politics. 
192Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 93-95; Gastrow, Who's Who (1990), 
105. 
193Venter, Coloured, 540. 
194K.G. Moodley, "South Africa's Indians", in Change in 
Contemporary South Africa, eds., L. Thompson and J. Butler 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles : University of California Press, 1975), 
267. 
1955onny Leon Papers, C. 1.1.3., Labour Party Constitution, 
as amended, April 1972, 4. 
196A. Todes, V. Watson and P. Wilkinson, "Local government 
restructuring in Greater Cape Town", in The Angry Divide: Social 
and Economic History of the Western Cape, eds. G.W. James and M. 
Simons (Cape Town: David Phillip, 1989), 198. 
197Rand Daily Mail, 17 June 1972. 
198Labour Party of South Africa, Steadfast, (Cape Town: 
Labour Party, n.d.), 1. (Most probably published in 1985 or 
shortly thereafter). 
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The idea of a black alliance had been bandied about in the 
Labour Party for a number of years already. In 1973, Gatsha 
Buthelezi was invited to address the Labour Party's national 
conference, and his call for solidarity between coloureds and 
Africans was embraced by party leaders .199 This heralded the 
beginning of a flirtation with Buthelezi and the idea of a 
united front of the oppressed which was to blossom into a 
formal alliance in later years. In November 1975, at the 
height of the budget crisis, Labour Party leader, Sonny Leon 
announced that plans were under way to organise a ' black summit 
and that he had already met with African, coloured and Indian 
leaders to discuss a formal black alliance. 2oo On 6 December 
1975, Leon conferred with African and Indian leaders, as well 
as leaders of the white Progressive Reform Party, in 
Johannesburg to discuss "a wide range of issues facing our 
country. ,,201 In a joint statement after the meeting, the 
leaders called on the government to convene a national 
convention "in order to achieve peaceful co-existence by an 
honest exchange of views. ,,202 The call for a national 
convention was repeated at the Labour Party's National 
Conference in January 1976. 203 However, nothing further came 
of .,the Labour Party's call for a black alliance and although 
passing reference was made to it in 1976 and 1977, the idea 
only came to fruition in 1978 when a formal alliance was 
concluded. The reason for the delay in forming such an 
alliance lay in the fact that while certain leaders were 
199Mina, "The CRC", 101; Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 199. 
200Eastern Province Herald, 18 November 1975; Rand Daily 
Mail, 18 November 1975; Daily Dispatch, 21 November 1975. 
201Cape Times, 9 December 1975. 
202Sunday Times, 7 December 1975; Cape Times, 9 December 
1975. Present at the meeting were Buthelezi of KwaZulu, Hudson 
Ntsanwisi of Gazankulu, Kenneth Mopeli of Qwa Qwa, Colin Eglin 
and Harry Schwarz from the Progressive Reform Party, Sonny Leon 
from the Labour Party and J. N. Reddy from the South African 
Indian Council. 
203Die Burger, 7 January 1976; Star, 9 January 1976. 
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prepared for such a move, the rank-and-file in the Labour 
Party were not. This confirmed the Labour Party's image as a 
"coloured" party. Despite sporadic references to solidarity 
with Africans and their political struggle, the party 
continued to pursue its policies as a mainly coloured party in 
a coloured political environment. 
Rumblings of conservative discontent were heard at the 1976 
conference concerning Leon's call for an alliance. Fred 
Peters, the party's secretary, was forced to issue a statement 
to dispel "unfounded statements" that since coloured people 
had been rejected by the white man, he now sought an alliance 
or unity with black groups. 204 It appears that Leon's "black 
alliance" call was made without ascertaining the feelings of 
supporters on the issue. This call came after Sonny Leon had 
been dismissed as chairman of the executive committee of the 
CRC in November 1975, and followed the emotional response of 
supporters and well-wishers to this action. Leon therefore 
issued his call in the heat of the moment. The reaction at 
the 1976 conference showed that members of the Labour Party 
were generally not in favour of seeking unity with Africans. 
The-' attitude of Labour Party members to Africans appeared to 
reflect the attitude of a large group of coloureds. In an 
investigation of coloured attitudes to Africans and other 
population groups by the Theron Commission, the commission 
found that the majority of coloured people were Afrikaans-
speaking and came from a middle to lower socio-economic and 
rural background. Most persons who voted in CRC elections 
came from this group and they mainly supported the Federal 
Party but also the Labour Party. They generally had a strong 
sense of identity as coloureds. Because they lived in areas 
where they constituted a minority group in their immediate 
environment, they tended to fear being swamped by Africans. 
204Labour Party Accession, Fred Peters, Address to Labour 
Party National Conference, Upington, 6 January 1976; Sunday 
Times, 11 January 1976; Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 235. 
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These coloureds were not in favour of assimilation with 
Africans. They tended towards closer association with whites 
because they believed culturally and historically that they 
had a common destiny. English-speaking coloureds were a small 
group, generally better-educated 
They did not identify positively 
and from an urban background. 
with coloureds as a 
Because they were mainly from the Western Cape where 
group.205 
they 
constituted a majority vis-a-vis Africans, they had less fear 
of the latter. This group were more likely to accept black 
consciousness or oppose 
prejudice".206 Because 
any form of "ethnocentrism or racial 
the Labour Party increasingly drew 
the bulk of its support from rural coloureds, it appears that 
the majority of Labour Party supporters were generally not in 
favour of an alliance with Africans. 
These findings were not surprising as coloureds had in the 
past not generally identified with Africans. The African 
People's Organisation(APO), an exclusively coloured 
organisation founded in 1903, never developed formal ties with 
the African National Congress, as the "Coloured community 
remained hopeful of full and prior acceptance by 
Eur.opeans ... 207 Except for the involvement of the Anti-CAD 
movement in the NEUM in the 1940s, and the Coloured People's 
Congress in 1953 which joined with the ANC and Indian Congress 
to plan the Kliptown Congress in 1955, coloureds generally 
remained aloof from the African struggle against segregation 
and racial discrimination. 208 In other studies conducted in 
205Lewis, Between the Wire and the Wall, 13. 
206Summary of Chapters of the Report of the Commission of 
Inguiry Into Matters Relating to the Coloured Population Group, 
136-37. 
207p • Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in South 
~A~f~r~i~c~a~.~T~h~e~~A~f~r~i~c~a~n~N~a~t~i~o~n~a~l~C~o~n~g~r~e~s~s~,~~1~9~1~2~-~1~9~5~2 (London: C. 
Hurst, 1970) 247. 
208Lewis, Between the Wire and the Wall, 270; Reader's 
Digest, Illustrated History of South Africa, 387. 
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the 1960s, Randall and Burrow found that coloured people in 
Johannesburg "saw a real danger of 'racial degeneration' if 
Africans were admitted to their ranks. ,,209 On the strength of 
her findings in a survey conducted in Riverlea, Johannesburg, 
Unterhalter carne to the following conclusions: 
While Coloured leaders might say "we have no alternative 
but to go to those people whose arms are open to us - the 
Black people of South Africa" - and Black leaders might 
invite a Coloured alliance under a Black Power or Black 
Consciousness banner, the average Coloured is 
unconcerned. Attitudes to the African remain 
unfavourable and Coloureds want to maintain social 
distance. 2lO 
In 1969 and 1975, the Labour Party had fared badly in the Free 
State and Transvaal where coloured communities were heavily 
outnumbered by nearby African townships and homelands. As had 
happened in the past,211 "swartgevaar" tactics were used to 
scare people into voting for pro-government parties. 212 
Voters were told that the policies of the Labour Party would 
lead to assimilation and social mixing with Africans. The 
status quo was preferable to closer association with Africans. 
Th~s, coloured voters in these areas preferred to support 
parties which advocated accepting separate development as a 
means of securing the advancement of their community towards 
eventual equality with whites. 213 As the Labour Party began 
209p • Randall and P. C. Burrow, Johannesburg's Coloured 
Community, with special reference to Riverlea (Braamfontein: 
SAIRR, 1968), 41. 
2IOB. Unterhalter, "Changing Attitudes to 'Passing for White' 
in an urban Coloured Community", Social Dynamics, 61-62 quoted 
in Theron Report (R P 38 - 1976), 449. 
211See for example Lubbe, "Vergeet die Arbeiders", 15-28. 
212venter, Coloured, 540. 
213Lemon, Apartheid: a Geography of Separation, 141; Arthur 
Stanley, interview, 10 September 1992. 
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to win in the former Federal Party-held constituencies after 
the first by-election victory in 1973, the party inherited 
these conservative coloured voters with . their particular 
attitudes towards Africans. Thus while the "black alliance" 
issue showed the Labour Party's leaders to be progressive in 
their racial attitudes, their conservative followers resisted 
attempts to forge closer links with Africans. Because of the 
attitude of members, party leaders had to retreat from their 
pro-black consciousness stance and in 1974, had already begun 
to direct themselves towards the internal affairs of the 
coloured community . This was probably done with the 1975 
election in mind - the party leadership not wanting to 
alienate supporters. 214 This was also borne out by the 
party's response to the Soweto uprising. Even though coloured 
students carne out in support of the Soweto protestors in 1976, 
the Labour Party kept aloof from the struggle. Richards 
explains that "the Labour Party was a conservative party 
because its main support was conservative. ,, 215 
After years of hinting at closer political cooperation and an 
alliance with Africans, the Labour Party finally made a public 
commitment and on 10 January 1978, representatives from the 
Labour Party, Indian Reform Party, Inkatha Yakazulu, homeland 
leaders from Gazankulu, Basotho Qwa Qwa and KaNgwane, and 
white liberal groups, met at Ulundi in KwaZulu to form the 
South African Black Alliance (SABA) , described as "the 
broadest-based 'political alliance' South Africa has yet 
seen . ,,216 It was the intention of the meeting to strive for 
unity of purpose among all unenfranchised people, a unity of 
214Goldin, Making Race, 158. 
21SMiley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992. 
216K .A . Moodley, "Structural inequality and Minority Anxiety: 
Responses of Middle Groups in South Africa", in The Apartheid 
Regime: Political Power and Domination, eds. R.M. Price and C.G. 
Rosberg, (Cape Town: David Philip, 1980), 221; Star, 11 January 
1978; Steadfast, (n.d.) 1; A. Venter, ed., South African 
Government and Politics (Johannesburg: Southern, 1989), 135. 
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the oppressed that had been unknown since the days of the 
Congress of the People in 1955. 217 Gatsha Buthelezi of 
Inkatha was elected chairman of SABA. 21B The government press 
reacted with alarm to this new grouping, seeing it as a threat 
to the new constitutional proposals which depended on the 
participation of coloureds and Indians. Beeld suggested that 
the Labour Party had abdicated and was blindly following after 
Buthelezi, while the Transvaler warned Leon that he was 
walking a dangerous road by joining SABA. 219 Vaderland played 
on coloured fears of racial domination and called SABA the 
first step towards a "Zulu-dominated unitary state. ,,220 Allan 
Hendrickse retorted that coloureds and Africans had found each 
other and that no amount of attempts to buy off the Labour 
Party would succeed . 221 
The Labour Party at its national conference later that year 
responded to criticism of its role in SABA by stating that 
they saw themselves as "blacks" and no longer wished to be 
called "Coloured" or "Brown. ,,222 David Curry warned that 
coloured people would only be free when the black man was free 
and that whites should understand that coloured people would 
no _longer side with them. Allan Hendrickse indicated that the 
Labour Party would consult with the ANC, PAC and SWAPO whose 
objectives they supported. Party leaders urged members to 
beware of schemes such as the constitutional proposals which 
217L. Schlemmer, "The Stirring Giant: Observations on the 
Inkatha and other Black Political Movements in South Africa", in 
The Apartheid Regime, 121. 
21BR . Stanbridge, "Contemporary African Political 
Organisations and Movements", in The Apartheid Regime, 95. 
219Beeld, 11 January 1978; Transvaler, 30 December and 13 
January 1978. 
22oVaderland, 13 January 1978. 
221Na tal Mercury, 9 June 1980. 
222p .A. 29, Minutes of Labour Party National Conference, 
Bloemfontein, December 1978. 
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did not afford full, unqualified and real equality for all 
people. The conference thereupon reaffirmed its rejection of 
the government's constitutional proposals and called for a 
national convention to work out a new constitution. 223 
This conference gave indication of a return to the pro-African 
stance which the Labour Party had flirted with in the early 
1970s. Those in attendance at the conference now considered 
that as part of the oppressed, their destiny lay with 
Africans. For them, cooperation with Africans was a good 
tactical weapon against whites. This meant that if the 
circumstances ever required it, the government should not 
count on the loyalty of coloured people. Already, during a 
visit to Britain in March 1976, Sonny Leon had told the 
British that most blacks would not rally to South Africa's 
defence in a war on its borders, until apartheid was 
removed. 224 Later, Leon warned that blac k South Africans 
"would not lift a finger to support whites in the event of war 
in the Republic - in fact they would support forces fighting 
to topple the present system ... 225 David Curry stated 
defiantly: "We shall not assist in building a South Africa for 
' Whites only'. ,,226 However, while the Labour Party now 
appeared to have changed its attitude to Africans, this did 
not mean that conservative members had suddenly found a new 
affinity with Africans, but it appeared to be more of a 
reaction or anger at the way they were being treated by the 
government. The rejection of the Theron Report and the 
handling of recommendation 178 appeared to harden attitudes. 
Van der Ross summed up the feelings of many coloured people: 
223Race Relations Survey (1980), 18-19. 
224Argus, 20 March 1976 . 
225Sunday Tribune, 19 November 1976. 
226Rashid Seria Accession, Acc 154, speech by David Curry, 
4 January 1977. Of course, Curry and the Labour Party could not 
claim to be speaking for all coloured people because, at the 
time, the Labour Party only represented some 15% of the potential 
coloured electorate . 
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Successive South African governments have done a near-
fatal thing; by reducing the Coloured people to a 
situation where we have no political rights, they have 
put us in a position where we can only improve. 
At the same time, they invested us, for the first time in 
many years, with a type of power - the power to say No. 
We have been so long outside the decision-making process, 
that many believe we can stay a while longer. Time is on 
our side. 227 
The protracted debate in the Labour Party over closer ties 
with Africans and the acceptance or not of the government's 
proposals masked another struggle in the Labour Party: a 
battle for the leadership of the party. 228 Ongoing friction 
in the leadership had sapped the party's energy throughout the 
1970s. This was mainly caused by the ideological struggle in 
the party over the issue of dialogue with the government as 
against a policy of confrontation and non-cooperation. These 
tensions affected the leadership of the party as some leaders 
advocated a collaborationist approach while others opted for 
confrontation with, and opposition to the government. In 
1970, Martin Arendse was ousted amidst accusations that he was 
meeting in secret with the prime minister. He refused to 
accept his defeat with grace, and although he withdrew his 
threat to contest Sonny Leon's election in court on the 
grounds that the voting was irregular, tensions ran high 
between the two and threatened to split the party on a number 
of occasions. 229 The "militants", Allan Hendrickse and David 
Curry were the frontrunners to replace Arendse but because 
they both had strong followings, the election of one over the 
other might have caused a split in the party. Sonny Leon was 
elected as a compromise candidate and immediately took up a 
227Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 110. 
228This issue is discussed more fully in chapter 6. 
229Allan Hendrickse, interview, 23 May 1989. 
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"militant" stance. 230 
Tensions soon burst into the open after .the party's election 
victory in 1975, over the issue of the acceptance of nominated 
seats and the chairmanship of the CRC executive. Leon took an 
openly "moderate" line, advocating full cooperation with the 
CRC and the government and acceptance of the cabinet council; 
a stance which led to the resignation of Curry and 
Hendrickse. 231 Although they later withdrew their 
resignations, this rift marked the beginning of friction 
between these leaders. At the party's annual conference in 
January 1976, Leon indicated his wish to stand down as party 
leader,232 and at the next conference asked to be relieved of 
all positions, stating his wish to resign from the party. In 
a strongly-worded statement, which indicated strained 
relations within the executive, he said that he was not 
prepared to be a figure-head and to rubber-stamp policy and 
did not see why he had to justify himself to everyone, because 
as leader he was able to act on his own discretion as he saw 
fi t. 233 Delegates however refused to accept Leon's 
resignation 
leadership. 
and passed a unanimous vote of confidence 
Lockey suggests that the reason Leon's 
in his 
resignation was not accepted was because he was very popular 
with the party's rank-and-file. He was a charismatic 
personality and at national conferences indulged in stirring 
speeches, used fiery rhetoric and spoke in the "language" of 
the people, "sommer 'n paar skelwoorde en vloekwoorde ook, ,,234 
230Hendrickse contends that Leon was not a good leader. He 
had been a compromise candidate but had not been expected to 
serve for very long. Allan Hendrickse, interview, 17 September 
1994. 
231Norman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. 
232p .A. 29, Minutes of Labour Party National Conference, 
Upington, 6-8 January 1976. 
233p .A. 29, Minutes of Labour Party National Conference, Cape 
Town, 3-6 January 1977. 
234Desmond Lockey, interview, 17 September 1994. 
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Leon thereafter continued to advocate a "moderate" position 
and began to draw closer to the Federals. In July 1977, 
without consulting his fellow-leaders, he met with Jac Rabie 
and Willie Bergins of the Federal Party to discuss unity 
between the various CRC parties. 235 Leon's action hastened 
the deterioration in relations between himself and the rest of 
the executive. When the NEC later met, members rejected the 
decisions taken at that meeting. Leon took this to be a vote 
of no confidence and tendered his resignation as leader, but 
was prevailed upon to withdraw it in the interests of party 
unity.236 
The strained relations between Leon and his colleagues split 
the party into two camps, referred to by the Federal Party as 
the Leon-Group and the Curry-Group.237 The Leon-Group, who 
were of course the "moderates" in the party, privately 
expressed their unhappiness with the boycott of the proposed 
cabinet council and stated their intention of accepting the 
government's constitutional proposals which were being 
discussed at the time. The "Curry-Group" were the "militants" 
but as Leon increasingly identified himself with the 
"moderates," Curry, the deputy-leader, came to the fore as the 
.. 
most vocal opponent of the "moderate" position. At a SABA 
meeting in August 1978, Leon publicly expressed support for 
the new constitutional dispensation and indicated that he 
would participate if it was implemented. Although he was 
rebuked by Buthelezi, the SABA chairman, and by some of the 
"militant" Labour Party leaders who would do exactly in 1983 
what Leon was suggesting ,238 Leon continued to alienate his 
colleagues. He defied the party by attending the inauguration 
235Sonny Leon Papers, Minutes of Labour Party NEC Meeting, 
23-24 July 1977. 
236Sonny Leon Papers, Minutes of Labour Party NEC Meeting, 
23-24, July 1977. 
237Saks, "The Failure of the CRC", 198. 
n8Ibid, 204. See also chapter 5. 
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of State President Diedrichs; visited Walvis Bay to inspect 
the South African Navy fleet; and appeared at the Nico Malan 
theatre in Cape Town which for years had been closed to 
coloureds. In August 1978, he attended the funeral of the 
late State President, Nico Diedrichs and accepted an 
invitation by the South African Defence Force to visit the 
operational area with Alathea Jansen. Upon his return, the 
NEC demanded that he account for his actions whereupon Leon 
resigned as leader. This time, no-one asked him to 
reconsider. 239 Middleton indicates that by this time, Leon 
could no longer be "controlled" by the executive. He had 
become too "moderate" and too "pro-government. ,,240 In fact, 
before his final resignation in September 1978, Leon had 
already resigned or threatened to resign in January 1976,241 
September 1976,242 December 1977,243 July 1978,244 and 
August 1978. 245 
The tension between the leaders from the outset was an 
accurate reflection of the turmoil in the Labour Party. When 
the leaders were united in their cause, the Labour Party 
flourished and was able to pursue its aims. When leaders 
pulled in different directions, the Labour Party was in danger 
of 'splitting. As early as 1970, energies had to be directed 
towards keeping the party together instead of building up its 
power base and improving its organisation. Divisions in the 
party and within the leadership also corresponded with drastic 
fluctuations in the size of the Labour Party's CRe membership. 
239Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 124. 
24oNorman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. 
241Sunday Times, 18 January 1976. 
242Ibid, 12 September 1976. 
243Star, 28 December 1977. 
244Transvaler, 7 July 1978. 
245Sunday Times, 10 September 1978. 
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In fact, the attitude of the "militants" was so inflexible 
between 1969 and 1973, that expulsions and resignations 
resulted in the party's numbers in the CRC declining from the 
original 26 to 21. 246 The party only began to recover late in 
1973 when it decided to moderate its attitude towards serving 
on all committees of the CRC. 
After the surge of support for the Labour Party in 1975, the 
Labour Party then lost five CRC members to the independent 
benches in 1977 because of dissatisfaction over the party's 
attitude to the cabinet council. Had it not been for the 
votes of its four nominated members, the party would have lost 
its overall majority. After Leon's resignation in September 
1978 and Curry's election as acting leader, the Labour Party 
was in a state of disarray . When the CRC session began a few 
days after the change in the party leadership, the Labour 
Party lost its majority and was in danger of losing the no-
confidence motion. Its four nominated members joined the re-
named Freedom Party (formerly Federal) and the Labour Party 
was down to 28 seats in the council, two short of the required 
majority. The twelve independents, many of them Labour Party 
defectors, held the balance of power. The Labour Party 
suffered a further blow in the Labour Party heartland, the 
Cape Peninsula, when it lost the Tafelberg by-election to the 
Freedom Party, bringing the latter's total to 20. This 
encouraged the Freedom Party to attempt to wrest control of 
the CRC. The Labour Party soon came under attack from the 
Federal Party on a number of issues, such as its inability to 
assist in the development of the coloured community; its 
destructive confrontationist policy; its failure to bring 
about a new constitutional dispensation for coloured people; 
for being a tool of Buthelezi through SABA; and for concluding 
an alliance with a terrorist organisation (SWAPO) .247 When 
246Saks, "The Failure of the CRC", 90. 
247Debates of the CRC, vol. 40 (9 September 1978),48-49,60-
61. 
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the no-confidence motion was eventually passed, six 
independents voted with the Freedom Party, three abstained and 
three voted with the Labour Party. The Labour Party survived 
by just one vote. The Labour Party seemingly recovered after 
Allan Hendrickse was elected party leader in December 1978. 
However, the acting leader, David Curry had also had designs 
on the leadership but was defeated by a stronger candidate. 
His defeat again caused strains in the party. 248 
Reconciliation between "moderates" and "militants" was also 
but a fragile one and Hendrickse struggled to hold the party 
together. 
Changes in white politics at the same time put further strains 
on a fragile unity. Vorster was succeeded as Prime Minister 
by P.W. Botha in September 1978. Botha decided to make 
another effort to reconcile the government and the Labour 
Party and get support from the largest coloured party for the 
government's constitutional plans. He called for a meeting 
with the Labour Party to discuss the latter's attitude to the 
Schlebusch commission which had been appointed to investigate 
the future of the CRC and the constitutional proposals which 
had., arisen out of the Botha committee of 1977. Given the 
atmosphere which prevailed at the previous meeting between 
Botha and the Labour Party leaders in October 1977, this 
meeting was bound to be an acrimonious one. Botha faced 
tougher opposition this time as the "moderate" 
Although David Curry 
Sonny Leon had 
had stood in as resigned in the interim. 
acting leader for a short period, the power within the 
executive had shifted to the "militant" Allan Hendrickse who 
was elected leader in December 1978 . At the meeting, which 
was held on 9 November 1979, Labour Party executive members 
repeated their refusal to give evidence to the Schlebusch 
commission and also flatly refused to submit the findings of 
248Al ready in 1970, Curry and Hendrickse had vied for the 
leadership, but because they both had strong followings, Leon was 
elected so as not to cause a split in the party. See also 
chapter 6 . 
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their own investigation into alternative proposals. 249 The 
reason given for not doing so was that merely submitting 
evidence was not the same as negotiating from an equal 
posi tion of strength. 250 However the Labour Party's fragile 
unity, and the apparent facade of united opposition to the new 
constitutional proposals, was shattered when Les du Preez 
resigned in protest at the decision not to submit his 
committee's report to the Schlebusch commission. 251 He 
thereupon presented the report to the Schlebusch commission in 
his personal capacity. This action caused a rumpus in the 
Labour Party, and threats to take him to court were made. 252 
The party's Chief Whip, ex-Federal Party member Lofty Adams, 
was also expelled for going on a one-man peace mission, 
preaching reconciliation between whites and coloureds. 253 
Sonny Leon then tendered his resignation from the party, 
citing the refusal to give evidence before the Schlebusch 
commission as his main reason for leaving. 254 All three 
members subsequently accepted nomination to the President's 
Council. 255 
with the resignation of what appeared to be the most 
249Burger, 3 April 1979; Race Relations Survey (1980), 22. 
The Report of the Committee on Alternative Constitutional 
Proposals (Du Preez committee) is discussed more fully in chapter 
5. 
250Sonny Leon Papers, transcript of 
Prime Minister and the CRC Executive, 
Times, 13 November 1979. 
discussions between the 
9 November 1979; Cape 
25lArgus, 29 December 1979; Sunday Times, 30 December 1979; 
Race Relations Survey (1980), 25; Miley Richards, interview, 29 
June 1979. 
252Argus, 29 December 1979; Sunday Times, 30 December 1979. 
253Saks, "The Failure of the eRC", 207. 
254Sonny Leon Papers, Letter from Sonny Leon to F. E. Peters, 
Secretary of the Labour Party, 19 January 1980. 
255The President's Council is discussed more fully in chapter 
5. 
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influential of the "moderate" leaders, control of the party 
was established more firmly in the hands of the "militant" 
Hendrickse and his followers. The Labour Party was therefore 
able to approach the CRC session in September 1979 with a 
greater degree of unity than in previous years. This session 
proved to be one of the most momentous in the history of the 
CRC up to then, and one of great significance for the Labour 
Party. The third election for the CRC was due to take place 
in 1980. However, at the earlier meeting with P.W. Botha the 
constitutional proposals had been summarily rejected by the 
Labour Party. The new Minister of Coloured Relations, Marais 
Steyn, was upset by the Labour Party's attitude. He came to 
the conclusion that a strengthened Labour Party might win the 
1980 election with increased support and would finally close 
down the CRC. Because such a move would embarrass the 
government, Steyn decided to preempt that possibility. During 
his speech at the CRC's opening session, he suddenly announced 
that the CRC would be abolished. This was a snap decision 
taken without consultation with anyone. 256 Steyn advanced the 
reason that the CRC had proved to be an inadequate instrument 
of the policy of shared responsibility.257 
The official announcement of the dissolution of the CRC was 
made in Parliament on 3 March 1980 by Steyn, and a bill to 
replace the CRC with an interim body, the Coloured Persons' 
Council (CPC), was ratified by the Senate later that month. 258 
The Coloured Persons' Council Act (No. 24) of 1980 made 
provision for a nominated body which would preserve continuity 
between the demise of the CRC and the inauguration of the 
256Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992. 
257Saks, The Failure of the CRC, 208-9; Race Relations Survey 
(1980),27. 
258Debates of the Senate (12 March 1980), col. 372; R.B . 
Davies, D.O' Meara and S. Dlamini. The Struggle for South 
Africa: A reference guide to movements, organisers and 
institutions (London: Zed, 1984), 398; Argus, 22 February 1980; 
Cape Times, 23 February, 1980; Rapport, 24 February 1980. 
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tricameral parliament. 259 The CPC would consist of 30 members 
and would have virtually the same functions as the CRC. The 
Minister admitted that this body was not a satisfactory form 
of political representation but that it was nevertheless 
better than trying to work out a new constitution while having 
to contend with the CRC resembling an "overheated oven." 
Steyn expressed his regret that it had come to this and made 
the Labour Party wholly responsible for this unsatisfactory 
state of affairs. He launched a bitter attack on members for 
their refusal in making the government's initiatives work. He 
added that the behaviour of some of its members had not been a 
"credit to the coloured community" or a "reflection" of their 
"standards of civilisation and development. ,,260 The Labour 
Party dismissed the criticism, announced its dissatisfaction 
with the CPC and resolved to disassociate itself from this 
"ill-conceived and undemocratic body. ,,261 Hendrickse accused 
the government of using the National Intelligence Service(NIS) 
to encourage members to resign from the party and to forward 
their names to the government as persons who would be willing 
to serve on the council. Several party members alleged that 
they had been approached by NIS agents. The head of the NIS 
conceded that it was possible that the NIS was involved in 
soliciting the opinions of members of the coloured 
community. 262 After a meeting between the Prime Minister and 
Labour Party representatives in August 1980, plans to 
implement the CPC were dropped. 
On 1 April 1980, the CRC was officially dissolved by 
proclamation. The Labour Party subsequently took credit for 
closing down it down. Hendrickse stated: "We have no regrets. 
259Government Gazette, 31 March 1980. 
260Debates of the House of Assembly (3 March 1980), col. 
1877-9; Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992. 
261Cape Times, 23 February 1980; Rapport, 24 February 1980; 
P.A.29, Minutes of Labour Party NEC Meeting, 5-6 April 1980. 
262Eastern Province Herald, 2 and 8 April 1980. 
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Today is a day of celebration, it is history. We have 
achieved that which we have set out to achieve ... 263 If that 
was indeed the case, then the Labour Party was doing what it 
had promised to do in 1969 but which should at least have been 
done in 1975. However, the party had not previously wanted to 
destroy its power base. Yet, it now agreed to the demise of 
an institution to which it owed its very birth and existence. 
The Labour Party argued that this was the fulfilment of its 
promise to close down the CRC. However, this claim cannot be 
taken seriously because, at its national conference in 1978, 
the party had in fact made detailed plans to contest elections 
due to be held in 1980. Members were urged to assist with . 
voter registration, plans were laid to collect more funds to 
fight the election and the party's cooperation with the 
delimitation commission was discussed. The party also 
considered how best it could win more seats in the proposed 
fully-elected body. 264 Hendrickse's claim must therefore be 
seen as an attempt to claim credit for the demise of the CRC 
at a time when his party's credibility was at a low point. 
The Labour Party's popularity had declined to a point where it 
would most probably have been humiliated if an election had 
taken place in 1980. Critics countered that it was rejection 
" 
by the community that finally 
and that members decided that 
led to the closure of the CRC 
forfeiting perks and privileges 
was preferable to humiliation in another election. 
Registration figures for 1979 appear to bear out observations 
that the Labour Party could have been severely embarrassed if 
an election were held in 1980. A general registration of 
coloureds undertaken in 1979 shows that the decline in the 
percentage of registration continued unabated (see table 5). 
263p . A. 29, Minutes of Labour Party NEC Meeting, 5-6 April 
1980. 
264Labour Party Accession, Secretary's Report to Labour Party 
National Conference, Bloemfontein, 27 December 1978. 
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Table 5 - General Registration for 1969, 1974 and 1979. 265 
No. of eligible voters 843 973 994 191 1 227 000 
No. of registered voters 637 587 521 557 587 615 
% of registered to 
eligible voters 75,0% 52,4% 47,8% 
No. of actual voters 300 918 251 631 
% of actual voters to 
eligible voters 35,7% 25,3% 
These figures appear to indicate mounting dissatisfaction 
and/or disinterest in the functioning and future of the CRC in 
the political life of coloured people. Whereas the number of 
eligible voters increased by some 24%, the number of 
registered voters increased by only 12.5%. Not even half of 
all eligible voters bothered to register. This trend appeared 
to be one of the factors which led the Labour Party to accept 
the dissolution of the CRC. If the trend were to continue, 
there was no indication that the Labour Party would increase 
its support if an election were to be held in 1980, but every 
indication that it could be embarrassed by the results. The 
two previous elections showed the party to be incapable of 
attracting more that 16,2% of the eligible vote. 266 As the 
tide of coloured opinion turned against it in the latter part 
of the 1970s, there was every indication that the party would 
do even worse if another 'election were to take place. 
The 1980 student boycotts in some ways provided credibility 
for this viewpoint because Curry conceded at the time that the 
boycotts prevented the birth of the nominated CPC. The 
inference was that if the CRC had been in place at the time, 
that body would have borne the brunt of student opposition. 267 
265Sonny Leon Papers, C.LL3.2., 26 September 1980; L. 
Thompson and A. Prior, ' South African Politics (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1982), 95. 
266See Table 2, chapter 2 and Table 4, chapter 3. 
2670 .,F. Molteno, "The Schooling of Black South Africans and 
the 1980 Cape Town Student's boycott: A sociological 
(continued ••• ) 
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Carter Ebrahim, chairman of the Labour Party's Cape region, 
admitted that the Labour Party did not intervene in the 1980 
student unrest in any substantial way because of the party's 
"total rejection by the students. ,,268 The 1980 student 
boycotts also illustrated the extent to which the Labour Party 
had become irrelevant in coloured politics. In 1976, the 
Labour Party had not supported the students because, according 
to Miley Richards, the Labour Party was a conservative 
party. 269 In 1980, the Labour Party did not support the 
students because the students did not want their support. 
Although Carter Ebrahim declared that the party identified 
with the students and recognised that 
Molteno states that "apart 
their grievances were 
from calls for students justified, 
to go back to school, and apart from negotiating with 
authorities for the release of the students in detention, the 
LPSA did not intervene in the boycott in any substantial way 
because of the LP' s total rejection by the students. ,,270 The 
1980 boycotts, the actions of the students, and the 
preoccupation of the government and its attempts to address 
problems arising out of the boycotts, led the Labour Party 
finally to realise that it had been relegated to a position of 
insignificance in the lives of coloured people in general. In 
summarising the Labour Party's response to the boycott, 
Molteno comments: 
Of all the liberal organisations operating in Cape Town 
at the time, the LPSA seems to have experienced the least 
internal pressure to do "something" in relation to the 
boycott and 'the most external pressure from the community 
to do nothing. But then the Labour Party can claim 
267 ( .• • continued) 
interpretation." (M.Soc.Sc dissertation, University of 
Cape Town, 1983), 358. 
268Molteno, "The Schooling of Black South Africans", 357. 
269Mi,ley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992. 
270Mol teno, "The Schooling of Black South Africans", 357. 
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considerable experience in gauging when it is not 
wanted . 271 
It was therefore clear to the Labour Party, by 1980, that it 
had lost the support and sympathy of the majority of the 
coloured people and that it had come to realise that it was 
"not wanted . ,,272 The dissolution of the eRC appeared to 
extricate the Labour Party from an embarrassing situation. 
However, while it immediately tried to fill the void by 
announcing wide-ranging plans to strengthen the party by 
establishing new branches and increasing membership; 
establishing a black convention; identifying with the goals of 
the ANC, PAC, BPC and SWAPOi and embarking on a campaign to 
secure the release of students detained in the 1980 student 
boycotts ,273 it soon became clear that the loss of the CRC had 
severely affected the morale of the Labour Party. While party 
"militants" gamely presented a public facade of continued 
opposition, it was not long before thoughts turned to the 
question of negotiations with the government on the new 
constitutional proposals . 
272Iqid . 
273Race Relat i ons Survey (1980), 31-32. 
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Chapter 5 
NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS AND THE 
TRICAMERAL SYSTEM, 1977-1984 
The dissolution of the CRC in 1980 had far-reaching 
consequences both for the Labour Party and for the government. 
For the former, it meant that the forum in which it had been 
able to articulate its opposition to government policies no 
longer existed; for the latter, it signalled the collapse of 
yet another attempt to fob coloured people off with a 
substitute for full political rights. Even the proposed 
replacement, the nominated Coloured Persons' Council, was 
abandoned by the government when it became apparent that it 
would not receive support in the coloured community.l After 
1980, the government based its hopes on the constitutional 
proposals before the Schlebusch commission to salvage its 
problematic coloured policy . For the Labour Party, however, 
the loss of a political platform and the accompanying 
prestige, influence and financial security which membership of 
that body provided, left members facing a dismal political, 
economic and social future. In an effort to remain relevant 
and sustain its support base, the moribund party turned its 
attention to the proposals for a new constitutional 
dispensation. The period 1980-83 was dominated by the debate 
within the party over the government's plan to introduce a new 
dispensation. 
However, of far greater long-term consequence for the Labour 
Party was the effect the dissolution of the CRC had on the 
Freedom (formerly Federal) Party. Since the 1969 CRC 
election, Federal Party members had defected on a regular 
basis to the Labour Party. At that stage already, Labour 
Party leaders such as deputy- chairman Norman Middleton and 
party secretary Fred Peters saw the dangers inherent in this 
lThompson and Prior, South African Politics, 96. 
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"insidious infiltration. ,,2 From 1974, the Federal Party had 
begun to move away from its overtly pro-separate development 
stance, and after the Labour Party took control of the eRe in 
1975, the Federal Party began to support motions criticising 
government policy. In the last two years of the eRe's 
existence, the Federal (now Freedom) and Labour Parties co-
operated more closely than at any other time in the history of 
the eRe. This close working relationship can be ascribed to 
the influence of the large number of former Federal Party 
members who were by then members of the Labour Party, and the 
fact that the earlier, overtly 
had long since left the scene. 
Freedom Party disintegrated and 
joined the Labour Party . Thus, 
become the home of the majority 
pro-government Federal leaders 
When the eRe was closed, the 
the majority of its members 
by 1980, the Labour Party had 
of former Federal 
members and between 1980 and 1983, former Federal 
Party 
Party 
members came to constitute the majority in the Labour Party, 
as well as the executive and in leadership positions. 3 
Because the Federal Party had always supported dialogue with 
the government and fully accepted instruments of separate 
political representation, this had profound implications for 
the party in its debate over the new constitutional proposals. 
The idea of a new constitutional dispensation first surfaced 
in 1977 when the government accepted both the majority and 
minority views of recommendation 178 of the Theron Report, and 
announced that it would investigate the present parliamentary 
system to determine the adaptations necessary to suit South 
2Norman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. Sylvia 
Landers, interview with author, uitenhage, 17 September 1994, 
states that Fred Peters warned throughout the eRe period against 
the dangers of accepting Federal Party defectors into the party. 
His warnings became more strident in the period after 1980 when 
he saw the danger of the Labour Party actually being "taken over" 
by forme~ Federal members. 
3Norman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. 
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African circumstances. 4 This investigation was entrusted to a 
special cabinet committee under the chairmanship of P.W. 
Botha, the Minister of Defence. s During August 1977, the new 
constitutional plans were put to a National Party caucus 
meeting and then to the party's provincial congresses. Before 
full details of the scheme were available to the public, it 
became an issue in the white general election of 1977. 6 The 
white electorate overwhelmingly accepted the new 
constitutional proposals. These proposals provided for a 
separate parliament for each of three "population groups": 
white, coloured and Indian. Representation would correspond to 
the relative population strength of the three groups. The 
white parliament would have 165 elected and 20 nominated 
members; the coloured parliament, 82 elected and 10 nominated 
members; the Indian parliament, 41 elected and 5 nominated 
members. 7 The respective cabinets would consist of a prime 
minister and 17 members in the white cabinet; a prime minister 
and 5 members in the coloured cabinet and a prime minister and 
3 members in the Indian cabinet. Each parliament would make 
laws affecting its own population group exclusively, while 
legislation affecting all three groups would be initiated by a 
council of cabinets consisting of the three prime ministers 
and other members of the three cabinets. The chairman of the 
council of cabinets would be the state president who would be 
elected by an electoral college. Another body, the 
president's council, consisting of white, coloured and Indian 
experts would act in an advisory capacity to the council of 
4Debates of the House of Assembly (20 May 1977), col. 
133-34. 
SVan der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 71; Hugo, Quislings or 
Realists, 741. 
6F.van Zyl Slabbert and D.Welsh, South Africa's Options: 
Strategies for Sharing Power (Cape Town: David Philip, 1979), 
105. 
7Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 739, pamphlet prepared by the 
Departmel,lt of Information, South Africa's New Constitutional Plan 
(1977), for mass circulation among coloureds. See also Race 
Relations Survey (1977), 7-10. 
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cabinets and the state president. B 
An important feature of the Botha proposals was the provision 
for an electoral college composed of 50 whites, 25 coloureds 
and 13 Indians which would choose the state president, who 
would head the council of cabinets. 9 The majority party in 
each population group's parliament would elect all of that 
group's delegates to the electoral college. Thus, in the 
present circumstances, all of the fifty white representatives 
would be members of the National Party. This arrangement 
ensured that the Nationalists, by virtue of their superior 
numbers, would choose the state president. As the council of 
cabinets was expected to deal with national issues by trying 
to reach consensus, the failure to do so would leave the 
president to decide policy. Thus a white Nationalist 
president would have the final say in the new dispensation. 
The negative reaction of the Labour Party to the Botha 
constitutional proposals led P.W. Botha and Hennie Smit to 
call for a meeting with the CRC on 21 October 1977 to explain 
the proposals and elicit reactions. The title for the 
meeting's agenda read: "Discussion in connection with the new 
Constitutional proposals; An Alternative to the present and 
for the future." The Labour Party-dominated CRC replied by 
laying down two basic premises for acceptance of the 
proposals: (1) All South African citizens must be represented 
and take part in constructive dialogue where important 
decisions are made; (2) All South African citizens must be 
represented on statutory bodies, local, provincial and 
central. 10 The independents in the CRC presented their own 
memorandum which analysed the proposals one by one, detailing 
BMoodley, "Structural Inequality", 218. 
9Hugo, Quislip~. or Realists, 742. 
IORashid Seria Accession, Acc 154, 21 October 1977. 
I" 
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thei r reactions, objections and fears in respect of each 
proposal. 11 The meeting turned nasty when Hennie Smit, 
Minister of Coloured Relations, called the coloured people 
"slow thinkers , " to which CRC members responded by nicknaming 
him "Flinkdink. ,,12 Members angrily rounded on Botha and 
rudely rebuffed his attempts to sell the new constitution. 
Botha was taken aback at the ferocity of their attitude and 
retorted: "Ek gaan hier vandaan om te rapporteer aan die 
Eerste Minister en julIe sal die wronge vrugte van julIe dade 
proe . ,,13 with that, he grabbed his hat and stormed out of the 
meeting .14 
The attitude of Botha and Smit was not an isolated one in the 
government's relationship with coloured people. Its whole 
approach to the coloured question was one of arrogance and 
disdain . This was apparent in the way the government went 
about formulating the proposals . It had unilaterally formed a 
cabinet committee consisting only of members of the National 
Party . The plans were drawn up in isolation by this committee 
which consisted largely of Nationalist-supporting political 
scientists. No one else was consulted or invited to provide 
input , least of all coloureds and Indians who were to be 
included in the new proposals and 1rTho were expected to accept 
it . 1s The proposals were then considered by the National 
Party caucus and presented to closed sessions of the 
provincial congresses. It was finally presented to the CRC as 
a fait accompli, for members to accept or reject . The 
ll "Memo in reaction to the New Constitutional Proposals" , 
presented to the government by the Independent Group in the CRC, 
October 1977, in Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 711-19 . 
12Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992 . See also Debates 
of the Senate (13 June 1980) , col. 2558. 
13John Nash, interview, 31 August 1993. 
14See also Sonny Leon Papers, Minutes of Labour Party NEC 
Meeting , 19-20 November 1977 • 
• 
1SMina, "The CRC", 138 . 
237 
possibility of rejection did not even bother the government as 
the following quotation from the September 1977 edition of 
Pro-Nat, a National Party magazine illustrates: 
Q: What would the position be if the Coloureds and 
Indians were to withhold their co"-operation in the 
implementation of the plan? 
A: Then they will be in eX'actly the same position as the 
homelands which are rejecting independence. They then 
remain where they are . We lay the table and those 
refusing to sit down shall do without. Because the old 
dispensation is something of the past, we will simply 
continue with the new dispensation . 16 
One of the major problems which the Labour Party and the other 
CRC and independent members had with the Botha proposals was 
the provision in Clause 26(I)(a) which stated that "the 
legislative power of the Republic shall be vested in the 
Assembly . ,,17 This meant that sovereign legislative power lay 
with the white parliament while the other two would always 
remain subordinate. Clause 26(111) determined that the white 
parliament alone could change the constitution and could thus 
abolish the coloured and Indian parliaments at will. 1s It 
began to dawn on the Labour Party that the proposed coloured 
parliament would simply be an upgraded CRC. At the same time, 
it was increasingly being recognised in Nationalist circles 
that representative bodies without real authority were 
ineffectual and that a new dispensation had to be worked out . 
Consequently, the draft bill based on the Botha proposals was 
not passed and the legislation was referred to a select 
committee which would 
input 
joint 
on the matter. 
open up the issue and allow for more 
The select committee took the form of a 
select committee of both houses of parliament . Its 
terms of reference were that it consider the introduction of a 
16"Questions and Replies on Constitutional Plan " , Pro-Nat, 
September 1977 . 
17 "The Republic of 
Government Gazette (April 
Isrbid. 
South Africa Constituti onal 
1979), no. 6386. 
Bill " , 
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new constitution for the Republic of South Africa. It would 
have powers to take evidence and call for papers and submit 
draft legislation. All races would be able to give 
evidence. 19 This initiative gave evidence that the government 
had taken some cognisance of a general movement of opinion 
among whites that the existing political system had to be 
altered, a "movement stimulated by the constitutional debate 
in Rhodesia and South-West Africa, by external pressure and 
••• by more realistic thinking within South Africa about the 
future. 2o At long last, the government appeared to be heeding 
the debate which had been taking place in Nationalist circles 
for a number of years already on the political future of the 
coloured people. 
It was expected that the select committee, later converted 
into a 24-man commission under the chairmanship of Alwyn 
Schlebusch, the Minister of Interior, would only report in 
1981 at the earliest. However, the government intimated that 
if coloureds and Indians did not accept the new constitution, 
they could carryon according to existing legislation. The 
bill on the new constitutional proposals had contained clauses 
in sections dealing with the electoral college, the council of 
cabinets and the president · s council to ensure that it would 
be possible for them to come into operation even if the 
coloured and Indian groups did not participate. 21 This 
revelation confirmed suspicions and accusations that the new 
constitution was not a "new" one after all; that this was not 
a "radical" departure from existing coloured 
simply apartheid in a new form . Since 1956, 
19Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 72; 
South Africa: A Modern History (Johannesburg: 
466 . 
policy. This was 
the government 
T.R.H.Davenport, 
Macmillan, 1987), 
20M. Forsyth, "Constitutional Proposals: The Middle Ground", 
in South Africa in Crisis, ed. J. Blumenfeld (London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1987), 127. 
21Race Relations Survey (1980), 4-5. 
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had held out against the possibility of coloureds gaining 
parliamentary representation and one plan after another had 
been adopted to ensure their exclusion. Yet, the acceptance 
of recommendation 178 appeared to be a sign that coloureds 
would at last be accommodated in a political arrangement that 
would satisfy their clamour for political rights. However, by 
making provision for a system to operate with only one 
chamber, the government showed its cynical disregard for the 
sentiments behind the recommendations of the Theron 
Commission. In retrospect, the Theron Commission was naive to 
ever expect the government to dismantle twenty-eight years of 
methodical construction of the apartheid edifice. 
In response to the Botha constitutional proposals, the Labour 
Party-controlled CRC executive appointed a five-man committee 
chaired by Les du Preez,22 chairman of the CRC, to formulate 
the CRC's views on constitutional matters which could serve as 
a basis for future negotiations with the government . 23 The 
Labour Party made it clear that it was not going to accept the 
government's proposals in its present form. It spelt out the 
points of difference with the government's proposals by 
advocating the retention of the westminster system, formation 
of political parties on ideological and not group lines, and 
the inclusion of all races on a common roll. 24 The Labour 
Party's reservations regarding a plan which appeared to give 
coloured people the opportunity to legislate for the first 
time on their own affairs and which, moreover, gave them 
access to the upper councils of the nation, fairly reflected 
coloured scepticism of the government's proposals. Van der 
Ross offered the following explanation for this attitude: 
Coloured people have come to view the attitude of Whites 
22Members were: L.V. du Preez (chairman), C.H. Ebrahim, J.A. 
Rabie, M.B. Savahl, P.M. Sonn. 
23Committee on Alternative Constitutional Proposals (Du 
Preez co~ittee). 
24Race Relations Survey (1980), 22. 
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towards them, as less than sincere. So now, when White 
people come forward with a new plan, any new plan, it is 
likely to meet the same suspicion, scepticism and even 
distrust. 
Why are the Whites now offering to give us a share in 
running the country, Coloured people ask. Are they 
really giving us a share? Isn't it just another way of 
hoodwinking us into the acceptance of something which 
will turn out to be a hoax?2, 
Van der Ross pointed out that every governmental offer made to 
the coloured people had turned out to be a hoax - the Coloured 
Advisory Council (CAC) of 1943, the Union Council for Coloured 
Affairs (UCCA) of 1959, Coloured Management Committees of 1966 
and the Coloured Persons' Representative Council (CRC) of 
1969. In each case, the body specially created for coloured 
people ran itself into a state where operations could not 
continue as originally envisaged. The CAC resigned in 1950 
and the UCCA was replaced by the CRC, "which now continues to 
produce little else besides a continuous cry of its own 
ineffectiveness. ,,26 The government, continued Van der Ross, 
had often insisted that these bodies failed because of the 
uncooperative attitude of the coloured people themselves. 
This was not entirely true because in each case, coloured 
people were found to man the posts. The system did not so 
much fail because coloured people did not cooperate "but more 
so because those who did co-operate found they had no real 
power. ,,27 According to Van der Ross, if coloureds had been 
given the right political incentive, the response would have 
been more enthusiastic, but thus far, they had been held at a 
distance and fobbed off with substitute institutions. With 
such a record, any new proposal from the government was likely 
to be met with scepticism. Thus, the answer to the reasons 
for the rejection - of the government's coloured policy to date 
25Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 97. 
26.IQiQ. 
27Ibid. 
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was to be found in that policy itself. 28 Now, in 1977, the 
government was making another offer which upon closer 
examination, retained power for whites and entrenched the 
subordinate position of the coloured people. It is therefore 
not surprising that coloured people not only re j ected this new 
offer but proceeded to ignore it. They had seen it all happen 
before. 
Eventually, it was not Labour Party recalcitrance but the 
upheaval within the National Party caused by revelations of 
fraud and corruption within the Department of Information, 
which prevented the Botha proposals from becoming law. 29 P.W. 
Botha subsequently replaced B.J. Vorster as Prime Minister in 
September 1978 but the problems in the National Party had 
succeeded in pushing the constitutional proposals into the 
background. However, in 1979, a set of proposals almost 
identical to those of the Botha committee was published in the 
form of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill . This 
bill was not tabled in parliament and was referred to the 
Schlebusch Commission for further deliberation. 30 After 
several rounds of discussions at government and National Party 
level, the bill was eventually passed as the Republic of South 
Africa Constitution Fifth Amendment Act (No . l01) of 1980 . 31 
This Act made provision for the abol ition of the Senate and 
its replacement with a multi-racial president ' s council as 
28Ibid . 
29The Information scandal led to the fall of Vorster, the 
rise to the prime ministers hip of P.W . Botha, and the expulsion 
from the party of Connie Mulder, Minister of Information and 
heir-apparent to Vorster. See Davenport , South Africa, 435-37. 
E. Rhoodie, Die Ware Inligtingskandaal (Pretoria: Orbis, 1984) 
discusses the entire scandal. 
30Commission of Inqui ry on the Constitution (known as the 
Schlebus9h Commis sion) . 
31Thompson and Prior, South Afri can Politics , 96 . 
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recommended by the Schlebusch Commission. 32 On 3 February 
1981, the State President, Marais Viljoen, formally 
inaugurated this body.33 The President's Council was given 
the task of drawing up a new constitution which would make 
provision for coloured and Indian representation. 34 The 
council was to consist of 60 members nominated by the 
government, including "recognised" leaders of the coloured, 
Indian and Chinese communities, with the majority being made 
up of white members. 35 Initially, 14 coloured and Asian 
members were appointed with most of the coloured members 
coming from the Freedom Party. The majority of the 
councillors had previously worked in state-created structures 
and were, according to Van Zyl Slabbert, "political has-beens 
rewarded for loyal service, or ••• others waiting for 
vacancies to occur elsewhere. ,,36 
The Labour Party no longer had an official forum in which to 
present its views, but opposition members in parliament took 
up the task of articulating the concerns of opponents and 
critics regarding the Act and the President's Council . During 
the marathon debate on the constitutional bill in the Senate, 
Senator Winchester insisted that "the President's Council, if 
it is set up in the way proposed here, is bound to fail 
because it will be seen as merely another attempt to bolster 
the Government's policies." He pointed out that "all (the 
various consultative bodies) have failed because they have 
been seen as merely another instrument of the Government's 
32Interim Report of 
Constitution, R.P.68/1980. 
Commission of Inquiry 
33Thompson and Prior, South African Politics, 96. 
on the 
34G . Leach, South Africa (London: Methuen-Mandarin, 1989), 
48; Race Relations Survey (1980), 4-7; Thompson and Prior, South 
African Politics, 96. 
35These members were recognised as leaders by the government 
and not necessarily by the community concerned. 
36F. · van 
(Johannesburg: 
Z Y I S I abbert , =T'""h"e'-:::-!'L"a'-'s""'t"------'W'-'h±~"_· t"_e"'-~P"-"!a"'r-=l-=i,,!;am~e~n~t"_ 
Jonathan Ball, 1985), 107. 
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attempt to bolster its own policy of separate development. ,,37 
Criticism of the President's Council, inside and outside of 
parliament, had no effect, however, on the government. 
Frustrated at the futility of their cause, coloureds and 
Indians who were opposed to the council rounded on those who 
did accept nomination, accusing them of being "sellouts . " An 
Anti-President's Council campaign was launched to drum up 
support from coloured and Indian quarters. 
Despite the nation-wide campaign to discredit it, the 
President's Council set about its deliberations. After months 
of listening to testimony, the council's constitutional 
committee, chaired by Dennis Worrall, tabled its first report 
in May 1982. The report proposed a system of "consociational 
democracy" for whites, coloureds and Indians but recommended 
the perpetuation of the existing system for Africans, whereby 
they would continue to be part of the political dispensation 
in their respective homelands . 38 The second and final report 
in November 1982 spelt out the tricameral structures and gave 
details of the "Own Affairs" and "General Affairs" concepts. 39 
A bill was presented to parliament in May 1983; passed as the 
Republic of South Africa Constitution Act (No. 110) of 1983, 
and put to the white electorate in a referendum in November of 
that year. 40 
The new constitution provided for a three-chamber system which 
envisaged the establishment of three racially-based 
parliaments. Each parliament would consist of elected members 
from a particular race group, and would also have its own 
cabinet (ministers' council) with its own "prime minister" as 
37Debates of the Senate (13 June 1980), col. 2552. 
38Behrens, "The Other Two 
"Constitutional Proposals", 131. 
Houses", 74; Forsyth, 
39Report of the Van der Merwe Commi~tee(November 1982). 
40Government Gazette, 28 September 1983; Van Zyl Slabbert, 
The System and the Struggle, 61 . 
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chairman. 41 Although the government proudly proclaimed that 
this system afforded other race groups a say in the political 
affairs of the country, the system had been carefully 
constructed to ensure that no power was "shared." Each 
parliament would only deal with affairs concerning its own 
race group (the "Own Affairs" concept). Matters that affected 
all race groups in general were debated separately and then 
consensus would be attempted (the "General Affairs" concept). 
If this could not be achieved, the matter would be referred to 
the President's Council and its ruling would be final. 
Because the President's Council was dominated by whites, they 
would always have the final say. 
The Labour Party's response to the constitutional proposals 
manifested itself on two levels: a public facade of opposition 
and non-cooperation, and a struggle behind closed doors on the 
merits of participation. The subject of participation in a 
new constitutional dispensation had become the central feature 
of Labour Party debate after the new constitutional 
dispensation was first proposed by the Botha committee in 
1977 . The public response of the Labour Party to proposals 
presented between 1977 and 19B2 was consistently critical and 
one of unanimous rejection. When proposals were first 
presented in 1977, the initial reaction of Labour Party 
leaders was one of enthusiasm. Party leader, Sonny Leon, felt 
that the proposals contained "encouraging flexibility," and 
Norman Middleton, deputy-chairman, agreed that the proposals 
offered more than the party and coloured people had 
expected. 42 However, the favourable reaction turned to 
criticism. At a specially called meeting of the party's NEC 
on 10 September 1977, the proposals were discussed in detail. 
The NEC saw the formal ethnic divisions in the proposals as 
41"Republic of 
Government Gazette, 
Decline, , 350. 
South Africa Act (No. 110 of 19B3)", 
2B September 19B3; Van der Ross, Ris~ and 
42Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 739-40. 
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entrenching racism in the constitution. 43 A resolution was 
thereupon adopted to the effect that an alliance of whites, 
coloureds and Indians "is totally unacceptable to the Labour 
Party because it will completely alienate the overwhelming 
majority of South Africans. ,,44 The resolution pointed out 
that the exclusion of Africans would intensify, and not 
eliminate, racial conflict. Allan Hendrickse, party chairman, 
was especially scathing in his criticism and described the 
proposals as indicative of "decadence, immorality and a sick 
society and an attempt to entrench racism in the 
constitution. ,,45 The party thereupon voted to reject the 
constitutional proposals and refused to entertain further 
discussion on the subject. 46 
The Labour Party's rejection of the proposals was to be 
expected in view of its consistent opposition to institutions 
of separate representation. 47 Even though it served in, and 
used the CRC as a political forum, the party had never 
accepted that body as meeting its demands for full and equal 
political rights and it was therefore not going to accept any 
other body which continued to perpetuate political separation. 
43See also A. Lemon, "The Indian and Coloured Elections: Co-
optation rejected?", South African International, vol. 15, No. 
2, (October 1984), 86 . Lemon points out that in the tricameral 
constitution, the Population Registration Act enjoyed 
constitutional entrenchment for the first time; that the "Own 
Affairs" concept rested on the Group Areas Act, and that 
therefore, the tricameral system reinforced, not diluted, 
apartheid. 
44Sonny Leon Papers, Minutes of Special Labour Party NEC 
meeting, Stellenbosch, 10 September 1977. 
45T. Abrahams, "'Coloured Politics' 
Quislings' trek into the Abyss," Ufahamu 
in South Africa: 
(1983), 255. 
The 
46Sonny Leon Papers, Minutes of Labour Party NEC meeting, 
Stellenbosch, 10 September 1977; Race Relations Survey (1977), 
9. 
47See for instance, P.A.29, Minutes of Labour Party National 
Conferenge, East London, 6-8 April 1972; Diamond Fields 
Advertiser, 14 March 1972; Sunday Tribune, 9 April 1972; Hugo, 
Quislings or Realists, 120. 
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Thus, it was not surprising that the Labour Party summarily 
rejected the Botha and Schlebusch proposals. It also refused 
to give evidence before the Schlebusch Commission on the 
grounds that to do so would to give the government an 
opportunity to claim "legitimacy" for its plans. 48 The party 
then formed its own commission, headed by CRC chairman, Les du 
Preez, to draw up its own constitutional proposals. 49 The Du 
Preez committee presented its report in April 1979. The 
report rejected pluralism and insisted that South Africa was 
one nation. 50 It criticised the proposed council of cabinets 
and the president's council concept and rejected the idea of 
three separate parliaments, suggesting instead a federal 
system of government. 51 The committee pointed out that a 
unitary system of government, as well as partition had failed 
in South Africa and only a federation could equitably take 
into account the heterogeneous and multicultural character of 
the country. The report suggested that, in the search for an 
ideal democratic system of government, there would be an 
initial phase in which all provinces, homelands and national 
states consolidate geographically and develop their own 
constitutions. Thereupon, the country would embark on a 
constitutional phase to "organise and formulate the 
institutions of the federal umbrella government. ,,52 The 
committee recommended a Federal Senate, Federal House of 
Assembly and a president and a cabinet as the main structures 
of central government and advocated an enforceable Bill of 
Rights. It insisted on the principle of one citizenship and 
48p .A. 29, Minutes of Labour Party NEC meeting, 8-9 September 
1979. 
49Race Relations Survey (1979), 22. 
50Report of the Committee on Alternative Constitutional 
Proposals, 9. 
51Ibid, 1, 17-19. 
52Report on Alternative Constitutional Proposals, 17-19; 
P.A.29, pamphlet issued by F.E. Peters, The Labour Party of South 
Africa and its Constitutional Options for South Africa (Cape 
Town: Labour Party, n.d.), 4-5. 
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universal suffrage for all South Africans on a "one-man-one-
vote" basis. 53 The committee then expressed its rejection of 
the 1977 proposals on the grounds that these would entrench 
inequality, and insisted that no group should dominate any of 
the others politically. 54 Therefore, negotiations based on 
these proposals were out of the question. The report 
concluded that the "government's constitutional proposals are 
so defective in essence that the product (viz. the draft 
constitution) cannot give concrete expression to the 
Minister's well-intentioned optimistic willingness and obvious 
enthusiasms for negotiations. ,,55 The committee's report was 
accepted unanimously by the Labour Party. 
When the idea of a president's council was first suggested by 
the Schlebusch Commission in 1979, the Labour Party refused to 
cooperate with the commission; rejected the proposed council 
out of hand, and threatened its members with expulsion if they 
accepted nominations to the council. 56 The vehement Labour 
Party reaction was accompanied by the accusation that the 
president's council was simply another ploy to keep whites in 
power. The party insisted that, as citizens of this country, 
coloureds were entitled to full political rights and an equal 
say in the running of the country; that the president's 
council would not enhance the role of coloureds in the 
political sphere because of the preponderance of whites on the 
council; and that the council was just an attempt to sidestep 
53p.A.29, The Labour Partv of South Africa and its 
Constitutional Options, 4; Report on Alternative Constitutional 
Proposals, 1 
54P.A.29, The Labour Party of South Africa and its 
Constitutional Options, · 4. 
55Report on Alternative Constitutional Proposals, 21. 
56Goldin, "The Coloured Labour Preference Policy", The 
Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th ··centuries, vol. 
13, collected Seminar Papers, No. 33 (University of London: 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1984), 116. 
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coloured demands for full political rights. 57 Allan 
Hendrickse later outlined the basis of the Labour Party's 
rejection of the council and its initial proposals: 
We would certainly reject such an arrangement. We would 
not accept any parliamentary system which excludes 
blacks. We want full and equal citizenship and nothing 
less will satisfy us . ~ 
Attempts by the government to get the Labour Party to change 
its attitude was of no avail. P.W. Botha called a meeting to 
discuss the latter's attitude to the Schlebusch Commission, as 
well as the future of the CRC and the constitutional 
proposals. At the meeting, held on 9 September 1979, Labour 
Party executive members repeated their refusal to give 
evidence to the Schlebusch Commission and also flatly refused 
to submit the findings of the Du Preez committee. 59 The 
reason given for not doing so was that merely sUbmitting 
evidence was not the same as negotiating from an equal 
position of strength. 6o At a further meeting in June 1981, 
party leaders met with government ministers to discuss 
constitutional issues. 61 Immediately thereafter, the party 
chairman, David Curry, repeated the party's hard-line 
position, stating that it would only support a new 
constitution if it provided for universal franchise within a 
single political system and if Africans were allowed to 
participate at all levels. 62 The party reiterated its 
rejection of the President's Council and the three-chamber 
57L . p.O.Wagenaar, interview with author, Oudtshoorn, 19 
December 1992. 
58Argus, 22 September 1980. 
59Burger, 3 April 1979; Race Relations Survey (1980), 22. 
60Sonny Leon Papers, transcript of 
Prime Minister and the CRC Executive, 
Times, 13 November 1979. 
61Cape Times, 12 June 1981. 
62Race Relations Survey, (1981), 13. 
discussions between the 
9 November 1979; Cape 
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parliament because they were simply an "extension of the 
policies of apartheid," and because separate parliaments for 
Indians and coloureds, and the exclusion of Africans, would 
increase polarisation. Furthermore, three parliaments could 
not function effectively because the white parliament would 
continue to have a political monopoly.63 
Although the party was beginning to show signs of dormancy 
following the dissolution of the CRC in 1980, leaders 
continued to publicly air hostility to the President's Council 
and rejection of a three-chamber parliament. At the Labour 
Party's national conference in December 1981, Allan Hendrickse 
spelt out the party's position on participation: "Nothing but 
direct representation in parliament for all South Africans is 
going to satisfy the majority of South Africans and 
particularly the Labour Party. ,,64 
1982, the party's NEC reiterated 
And at a meeting in April 
its support for the principle 
of a unitary state based on "one- man-one-vote," and confirmed 
that it would not accept a dispensation which did not include 
all South Africans. 65 When the President's Council's final 
report on the proposals were released in August 1982, Norman 
Middleton condemned the exclusion of Africans and confirmed 
the party's rejection because of that. Middleton stated that 
the plan was not an advance on the 1977 proposals and that it 
could not succeed without the inclusion of the majority of the 
people of South Africa. Allan Hendrickse confirmed that there 
was no possibility that the Labour Party would approve the 
proposals and that the forthcoming party congress would 
examine it to see how it c .ould provide a basis for the 
attainment of the Labour Party's ideals. 66 
63Ibid. 
64p .A. 29, Allan Hendrickse, Address to Labour Party National 
Conference, Cape Town, 27 December 1981. 
65Cape Times, 30 April 1982. 
66Natal Witness, 4 August 1982; Norman Middleton, interview, 
10 October 1994. 
250 
Before the final draft of the constitutional proposals was 
South African presented in December 1982, a 
Black Alliance(SABA) was held 
meeting of the 
in November to establish the 
position of the members of the alliance regarding the 
proposals. 67 The Labour Party was at pains to assure its 
alliance partners that it would hold to its position and would 
not participate in the proposed tricameral system. David 
Curry convinced alliance members of the strength of the Labour 
Party's stand by slating the proposals as "a clever and 
sophisticated scheme for entrenching white baasskap (which 
would not be acceptable to the coloured community and which) 
seemed to be a new version of the old recipe for conflict that 
we had in the old Coloured Representative Council. ,,68 
Immediately thereafter, the party's NEC met to discuss matters 
pertaining to the forthcoming Labour Party conference. The 
NEC again confirmed that the party would not consider 
participation. 69 Thus, by the time the Labour Party prepared 
for its national conference in Eshowe, Natal, in January 1983, 
it had over a period of six years publicly assured its 
members, its alliance partners, the government and the South 
African public that it would not participate in the tricameral 
system. It had also convinced the majority of coloured people 
that the Labour Party would reject participation . 70 
However, while it presented a united public face of opposition 
to the constitutional proposals, all was not well in the 
Labour Party . Although the public image of the party between 
1977 and 1982 was one of implacable and resolute opposition to 
the proposals, in private, the question of participation 
67Van der Ross, Rise and Decline, 353. 
68"Labour Party A constitutional Decision?" Work in 
Progress No. 25 (1983), 9 . 
69Miley Richards I interview, 29 June 1992. 
70Van der Ross, Rise and Decline, 353; 
(1977), ' 9; Sonny Leon Papers, Minutes 
Meeting, 10 September 1977. 
Race Relations Survey 
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threatened to tear the Labour Party apart . The struggle 
between the "moderates" and the "militants" again came to the 
fore when the Botha proposals were first raised at a party 
meeting in 1977 . Although the Labour Party voted to reject 
the proposals, the decision was only carried by the casting 
vote of the chairman. 71 The "militants" then pushed the party 
to form a commission to draw up its own constitutional 
proposals,72 but appeared to soften their hard-line attitude 
when, in August 1978, Leon hinted that the party might 
consider participation . He cited Buthelezi's use of the 
homeland system as a means of fighting apartheid and felt that 
the Labour Party could do the same with the tricameral 
system. 73 The indications were that the "moderates" were 
exerting pressure on the party to reconsider its position on 
participation. 
In 1979, cracks began to appear in the seemingly implacable 
facade of the Labour Party, when Les du Preez resigned because 
of the party's refusal to cooperate with the Schlebuschy 
Commission. 74 Du Preez's resignation was followed by that of 
the party's former leader, Sonny Leon, who cited the party's 
refusal to cooperate with the Schlebusch Commission, as one of 
his reasons. 75 In p r evious years, leading members such as 
Leon, Du Preez, Arendse and Adams had come under attack from 
the "militants" in the Labour Party for adopting an 
increasingly moderate tone towards the government. All of 
them later lost their positions in the Labour Party and, 
except for Arendse, became members of the President's 
7lRace Relations Survey (1977), 9 . 
72Ibid (1979), 22 • . 
73Saks , "The Failure of the CRC", 204. 
74Sunday TiI1les, 30 December 1979. The threat was never 
carried put . 
75Sonny Leon Papers, Letter to F . E . Peters, 19 January 1980 . 
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Council. 76 The resignations of Du Preez and Leon brought into 
the open the turmoil within the Labour Party on the issue of 
participation, even though the party publicly continued to 
condemn the proposals. 
At the same time, the Labour Party also found itself at the 
crossroads regarding its future. The massive drop in voter 
numbers between 1969 and 1975 did not augur well for the 1980 
CRC election . The rising tide of discontent and criticism 
from all quarters in the coloured community led the Labour 
Party to believe that it would not survive this election. 77 
It therefore agreed that the government not proceed with the 
election and that it dissolve the CRC. 78 However, the demise 
of the CRC soon presented a crisis for the Labour Party. The 
party owed its existence to the CRC . It had specifically been 
formed to contest elections for that body and to work within 
the "system." Deprived of a political environment, the Labour 
Party began to show signs of dormancy. The "moderates" in the 
party who supported dialogue on the constitutional proposals 
stepped up their campaign against the "militants" who 
continued to espouse opposition. 79 It became clear that a 
split was looming in the Labour Party and that its 
constituency was falling apart. 80 Thus, at the urging of the 
"moderates" in the party, thoughts increasingly turned to the 
question of participation in the constitutional system with 
which the government, in the meantime, had been doggedly 
forging ahead . 
The turmoil in the Labour Party was a reflection of the 
76Cape Times, 6 February 1982. 
))Molteno, "The Schooling of Black South Africans", 357-58. 
78Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 127; Debates of the House of 
Assembly, (3 March 1980), col. 1877 . 
79Sunday Tribune, 4 January 198!. , 
8~enter, South African Government and Politics, 136. 
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ambivalence in the coloured community itself. For example, 
Roothman and Schutte's investigation into coloured attitudes 
towards the President's Council found that 37,9% felt that the 
introduction of the council was a good thing, 15,5% disagreed, 
39,7% were uncertain and 6,9% did not respond. 81 The 
uncertainty and opposing views were similarly represented in 
the Labour Party. While the Labour Party continued to vilify 
the President's Council and its proposal of a three-chamber 
parliament, the party leaders, most of whom were in the 
"militant" camp, sensed that a spirit of revolt was brewing in 
the party. They therefore agreed to discussions with 
government ministers in June 1981 on constitutional issues, 
although the meeting was ostensibly held to discuss unrest in 
coloured schools. After the meeting, both parties decided to 
hold further talks. 82 This meeting represented a victory for 
party "moderates." However, talks did not take place and at 
the Labour Party's national conference in December of that 
year, "moderates" expressed alarm that only the government 
appeared to be involved in the formulation of the new 
constitution. Fearing that the interests of coloured people 
were not being represented, they forced through a resolution 
that party leaders "initiate a process of negotiation with the 
government of the day in order to achieve our political goals 
and to end the existing stalemate with regard to a new 
acceptable constitution for South Africa. ,,83 Hendrickse tried 
to quell the mounting disaffection, but insisted that the 
party would only be satisfied with direct representation in 
parliament for ail South Africans. 84 Although he railed 
against the new proposals, many in the party were not all that 
81S. Roothman and D.W. Schutte, 
Aanvaarbaarheid van die Presidentsraad onder 
in die RSA (Pretoria: HSRC, 1983), 15. 
82Argus, 12 June 1981. 
Ondersoek na die 
'n groep Kleurlinge 
83 . t P.A.29, Mlnu es 
Town, 27-28, December 
of Labour Party National Conference, Cape 
1981; Cape Times, 6 February 1982. 
84p.A.29, Allan Hendrickse, Address to Labour Party National 
Conference, Cape Town, 27 December 1981. 
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certain that non-participation was a good idea. 
Acting on the "negotiation" resolution, several leading 
members of the Labour Party requested a meeting with the Prime 
Minister in February 1982. David Curry indicated that the 
Labour Party was tired of being merely a "post office" for 
government decisions and that it wanted to start serious 
negotiations. 85 In July 1982, after the interim report on the 
constitutional proposals had been presented by the President's 
Council, the NEC invited the Minister of Constitutional 
Affairs, Chris Heunis, to a meeting in order to gain 
clarification on the constitutional guidelines. The 
guidelines were then sent to branches throughout the country 
for study and comment. Branches were instructed to "examine 
them for any aspects which could be used to achieve the 
Party's objectives. ,,86 However, despite mounting pressure 
within the party to negotiate with the government, the party 
leadership continued to present a defiant public face, but it 
was becoming apparent that they were out of step with the 
direction which the rank-and-file wanted the party to take. 
However, the "moderates" did not appear to be influential 
enough at that stage to force a change in the party's 
position. 
As the participation of Indians and coloureds was needed for 
the successful implementation of the new dispensation, it was 
essential for the government to win the support of those 
parties or groupings which appeared to exert the greatest 
influence in, or represent the greatest number of, people from 
their respective communities. As the Labour Party had 
overshadowed all other parties in the CRC, that party became 
the target for the government's agents. Chris Heunis was 
entrusted with the task of selling the new constitutional 
85Cape Times;., 6 February 1982. 
86Coetzer , Awaitina Trial, 
interview, 31 August 1 992. 
1984, 158-59; John Nash, 
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dispensation to the Indian and coloured parties, and it was 
therefore his job to woo the Labour Party.87 Heunis recruited 
the "Young Turks" in the National Party, a younger and more 
liberal breed of National Party MP who had entered parliament 
after the 1977 and 1981 general elections, to assist in this 
task.~ A public relations firm, Communitel, also entered the 
fray and worked undercover for the National Party to promote 
the new constitution. 89 Directors of the firm, Piet Coetzer, 
Kobus du Plessis and W.A.(Wimpie) de Klerk approached the 
Labour Party with an offer to help raise funds and act as 
consultants to run workshops.90 It would not cost the party 
anything and Communitel's fundraising fee would be covered by 
a percentage from funds raised. Communitel's offer was 
especially attractive to the Labour Party because the party 
had always "battled financially," and it was therefore not 
surprising that they succumbed to Communitel's "smooth talk," 
which included assurances such as "money is no object" and "no 
strings attached. ,,91 The party accepted Communitel's 
assurances that they were neutral and that no conditions were 
attached to their offer of assistance. Although some leaders 
were sceptical of the offer, Allan Hendrickse assured them 
that he would "take money from the devil, if it would benefit 
us. ,,92 
Communi tel was productive in the promotion of the 'tricameral 
87Saks, "The Failure of the CRC", 230. 
~Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992. 
89willie Meyer, interview with author, Stellenbosch, 21 
January 1994. Norman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994, 
maintains that Communitel was a government and Broederbond front . 
90Peter Hendrickse, interview, 18 
Middleton, interview, 1'0 October 1994. 
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system and with seemingly unlimited funds, conducted seminars, 
held parties, and "wined and dined " members of the Labour 
Party . 93 The Labour Party appears not to have been aware 
initially of Communitel's motives,94 but if that is indeed the 
case, then it showed astonishing naivete for a party with 
eighteen years of experience in politics, and which had 
already witnessed at first hand the Machiavellian machinations 
of the National Party during that period . If indeed, the 
Labou r Party had no idea of what Communitel was up to, then 
the penny dropped two years later when Piet Coetzer was 
appointed by the National Party to the President's Council as 
a renowned "Hotnotkenner" - the basis for his appointment was 
his "inside knowledge" of the Labour Party and coloured 
people . 95 As far as the promise of raising vast amounts of 
money for the Labour Party, the party hardly got anything out 
of the arrangement and, in fact, ended up paying money to 
Communi tel when it went beyond its budget. 96 
While Communi tel was working in the open to influence members 
of the Labour Party, Heunis and his assistants were working 
behind the scenes . Private meetings between the "Young Turks" 
and members of the Labour Party had taken place in 1981 
already, but Heunis' s first offici.al contaC't; with the Labour 
Party came in July 1982, ·after the interi.m report on the 
constitutional proposals had been presented to the government. 
The NEC invited Heunis to a meeting in Lansdowne, Cape in 
order to gain clarification on the constitutional 
guidelines . 97 This meeting with Heunis, coupled with the 
conciliatory tone of some Labour Party leaders, the 
93John Nash, interview, 31 August 1993 ; Willie Meyer, 
interview, 21 January 1994. 
94peter Hendrickse ; interview, 18 September 1994; Norman 
Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994 . 
95peter Hendrickse, interview, 18 September 1994. 
96IbJ.-d . 
97John Nash, interview, 31 August 1993 . 
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contradictions of others, and reports of dissension among 
party members caused disquiet in the ranks of the party's 
allies. The president of SABA, Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi 
of Inkatha, was concerned that the Labour Party might be 
wavering and convened the meeting in November 1982 to 
establish the position of the members of the alliance. 98 The 
Labour Party delegation included Jac Rabie, a former Federal 
Party leader noted for his pro-participation and pro-
government stance. Rabie tried to convince SABA members that 
it would be good for all concerned if the Labour Party 
participated because, by going in, the party would be able to 
look after the interests of blacks. 99 However, his argument 
elicited such vehement reaction that Allan Hendrickse had to 
allay fears and assure alliance members that the party had not 
changed its position on the proposed tricameral system. The 
assurances appeared to dampen disquiet and ease fears. 100 
Immediately after the SABA meeting, the NEC of the Labour 
Party met on 9 and 10 December to discuss matters pertaining 
to the Labour Party national conference due to be held at 
Eshowe on I January 1983. At this meeting the NEC closed 
ranks and confirmed, without dissent, that the party was not 
considering participation in the tricameral system. 101 This 
decision disturbed Heunis whose behind-the-scenes work to sway 
the Labour Party appeared to be hanging in a delicate balance. 
He immediately arranged for an urgent meeting with some of the 
NEC members, among them, Allan Hendrickse, David Curry and Jac 
Rabie. The party's deputy-leader, Norman Middleton, was 
deliberately not informed of the meeting. Buthelezi, as SABA 
president, had for a long time been concerned that the Labour 
Party might be wavering and eventually throw in its lot with 
9SVan der Ross, Ris"e and Decline, 353. 
99Norman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. 
100"Labour Party - A constitutional Decision?" in Work in 
Progress.No. 25 (1983), 9. 
101Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992. 
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Botha and the new dispensation. Middleton, a consistent 
opponent of the tricameral proposals and an ardent admirer and 
staunch supporter of Buthelezi, had regularly kept the latter 
appraised of Labour Party decisions regarding this matter. 
After the NEe meeting, he had assured Buthelezi that the 
Labour Party would publicly declare at the Eshowe conference 
its irrevocable refusal to participate. Heunis was wary of 
Middleton, not only because of the latter's vehement 
opposition to participation, but because he feared Middleton 
would tell Buthelezi who would promptly try to undermine 
Heunis's influence. Heunis wanted the discussions, and 
whatever decision came out of it, to remain secret. Middleton 
was therefore deliberately left out of the discussions .102 
It was not for nothing that Heunis had been selected to court 
the Labour Party. He was noted for his endless patience and 
his ability to find answers to the fears of a group which had 
every reason to be "suspicious of a government which thirty-
odd years before had spared few scruples to remove coloured 
voters from the common roll. ,,103 Heunis clearly possessed 
"formidable powers of persuasion. ,,104 Nash, who attended many 
of the meetings at which Heunis was present, describes him as 
"a real diplomat, very smooth, and very persuasive, ,,105 At 
this meeting Heunis drew on all his skills and made out a 
convincing case for the acceptance of the constitution; that 
it was only a beginning, and that further reforms would 
follow. What was important was that the country was making a 
fresh start and other improvements were likely to follow. 
However, Heunis refrained from making any binding 
102Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992; Norman Middleton, 
interview, 10 October 1994. 
103H. Kenney, Power, Pride and Prejudice (Johannesburg: 
Jonathan Ball, 1991), 334. 
104Ibid. See also Saks, "The Failure of the eRe", 230. 
-
105John Nash, interview, 31 August 1993. 
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commi tments. 106 According to Van Zyl Slabbert, Heunis used 
the meeting to "plead, beg and cajole." He "hinted, suggested 
and implied, but not once was a definite public promise 
extracted or a definite shift in Nationalist policy 
offered. ,,107 Lockey states that Heunis, while not making any 
specific promises, continually assured the Labour Party that 
the government was acting in good faith; that important 
reforms were just over the horizon if the Labour Party 
participated; yet hinted darkly that the government would find 
and appoint its own coloured leaders if the Labour Party 
declined the offer to participate. 108 This veiled threat 
should not of course have carried any weight with the Labour 
Party. The creation and failure of the UCCA in 1959 was a 
stark indication of what could happen if the government 
attempted to foist "coloured leaders" on an unwilling 
community. Packing the CRC with defeated Federal Party 
candidates in 1969 had all but destroyed the CRC as a credible 
attempt at providing an instrument of separate political 
representation which would be acceptable to the majority of 
coloured people. The attempt to create a nominated CPC in 
1980 after the demise of the CRC failed when the government 
itself acknowledged that it would not be a viable substitute . 
Furthermore, the only party which could have provided 
candidates for such a move, the Freedom Party, had all but 
disintegrated in 1980 and virtually the entire membership 
defected to the Labour Party. Thus, a threat to find its own 
"leaders" and appoint them to the House of Representatives, 
was a threat of iittle substance. Yet, it appeared to have 
been sufficient for Labour Party leaders to consider changing 
their , position. It appeared as if some of them had been 
planning to participate all along and needed a telling reason 
to consider a chance in stance. 
106Kenney I Power, Pride and Prejudice, 334. 
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By the time the meeting was over, Labour Party leaders had 
resolved upon an amazing volte face and decided to change 
their position. Unfortunately, minutes were not kept of this 
secret meeting and none of the members present were inclined 
to give an indication of what was discllsl;>ed,109 but after the 
party leaders had decided to change their position, they went 
to extraordinary lengths to ensure that the conference would 
support their about-face. They refused to tell Norman 
Middleton that they had met with Heunis. As deputy-leader and 
NEC member, he was entitled to know. This was done to keep 
the decision secret until it was discussed at the conference 
and so forestall the mobilisation of opposition to the 
decision. They also did not want Buthelezi to hear about it 
because he would have released the news to the media. An 
angry Buthelezi was more than they could handle at the 
time. 110 However, shortly before the conference, Middleton 
realised that something was amiss and contacted Hendrickse 
about rumours of a secret meeting and a switch in policy. 
Hendrickse assured him that the meeting had not been an actual 
meeting but a "chance meetirig for tea." Regarding rumours of 
a switch in policy, Hendrickse was evasive and advised 
Middleton not to listen to idle talk. 111 
As the party's national conference was to be held in Natal, 
the Labour Party paid Buthelezi, as Chief Minister of KwaZulu· 
and leader of the Zulu cultural organisation, Inkatha, the 
courtesy of inviting him to address the conference as the key-
note speaker. Unaware of the Heunis meeting and the switch in 
policy, and armed with Middleton's assurance that the Labour 
Party had unequivocally put to rest any possibility of 
participation, Buthelezi addressed the delegates with 
109Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1993, and Allan 
Hendrickse, interview, 23 May 1989, were both present at the 
meeting but neither gave an indication of what was actually 
discussed . 
110M~ley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992. 
111Norman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. 
261 
confidence, lauded the party for its wisdom in rejecting 
participation, and lambasted the government and the new 
constitutional proposals.1I2 It therefore came as a shock to 
him when, soon after his address, Labour Party leaders 
entertained discussion on the new dispensation and urged the 
delegates to accept Heunis's invitation to participate. After 
a lengthy and heated debate, the conference voted to 
participate in the tricameral system. ll3 Buthelezi's reaction 
was immediate and explosive. He felt that he had been 
insulted. Buthelezi had the kind of personality which did not 
accept insults, rebuffs and refusals. 1I4 He angrily rounded 
on the Labour Party for making a fool of him, and there and 
then expelled the party from SABA. Middleton too was furious 
that he had been betrayed and summarily resigned from the 
Labour Party, taking with him all the members of the Natal 
branch. 115 Thus, even before parliament voted to accept the 
tricameral system, and even before the white electorate had 
accepted it in a referendum, the Labour Party declared its 
acceptance of the new dispensation and indicated its decision 
to participate. P.W. Botha was so pleased with this decision 
that he immediately invited a delegation of party leaders to 
meet with him so that he could congratulate them and explain 
how matters would work from then onwards. An indication of 
the concern at the potential of Middleton's disruptive 
influence on the participation question was given when Botha 
enquired as to Middleton's absence in the delegation. When 
1I2Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 159. 
113Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992; Arthur Stanley, 
interview, 10 September 1992 . 
1I4Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 159; Miley Richards, interview, 
29 June 1992. 
1I5Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992; Arthur Stanley, 
interview, 10 September 1992. Sylvia Landers, interview, 17 
September 1994, states that she pleaded with Middleton not to 
resign, but according to Luwellyn Landers, interview, 17 
September 1994, Middleton was adamant because he had personally 
assured Buthelezi that the party would not participate, and he 
now felt that the latter had been slighted. 
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told that he had resigned from the Labour Party, Botha's 
reaction was: "Thank God! ,,116 
The question which immediately came to the fore after this 
somersault was why the Labour Party, which had always been 
vehemently anti-apartheid; which had vociferously opposed 
institutions of separate representation; and which had 
consistently and publicly disavowed the new dispensation, did 
such an abrupt about-turn and become partners of the very 
government which it had opposed for almost twenty years. 
Nothing in the Labour Party's official attitude and public 
utterings had ever given an inkling that it would want to 
participate in what Justice Mlnister Jimmy Kruger had long ago 
admitted, were only going to be "talking shops."ll7 Although 
the Labour Party had become increasingly vulnerable in the 
years following the dissolution of the CRC, and the promises 
held out by participation became increasingly tempting to 
those who considered the Labour Party to be on the brink of 
disintegration, it still came as a shock to many when the 
party suddenly, and without public warning, accepted the 
constitutional proposals and decided to participate in the 
proposed tricameral system. 
As the party's volte face came under scrutiny, the role of 
certain leaders began to loom large. It became apparent that 
many of those who had been at the forefront of public 
opposition to the constitutional proposals, were, in fact, the 
driving force behind the party's decision to change its 
116Norman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. Miley 
Richards, interview, 29 ~une 1922, and Sylvia Landers, interview, 
17 September 1994, confirm that Middleton was the most vehement 
and aggressive opponent of participation and the only leader 
whose attitude to the question of participation never changed 
throughout the six years of debate within the party. 
117P :A.29 , Minutes of 
Oudtshoorn, 27-28 December 
Labour 
1977 . 
Party National Conference, 
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position. 118 This suggested three possibilities: either, the 
leaders had undergone a dramatic change of heart; or, they had 
not been projecting an honest image in the years of opposition 
to the proposals; or, Heunis possessed extraordinary powers of 
persuasion. 119 Further examination tends to indicate that the 
second possibility was the more likely one. For example, 
Hendrickse's somersault was the most astounding of all. He 
had been the most vociferous and consistent opponent of 
apartheid, political separation and separate institutions of 
representation since entering the CRC in 1969. 120 Prior to, 
and for years after his election to the party leadership in 
1978, Hendrickse was at the forefront of opposition to the 
constitutional proposals .121 Moreover, he had long been 
regarded as the leader of the "militants" in the Labour Party 
and had forged close links with the ANC, even publicly 
declaring his support for that organisation in 1978. 122 
118Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992; John Nash, 
interview, 31 August 1993; Mohammed Dangor, interview, 6 December 
1993; Willie Meyer, interview, 21 January 1994; Norman Middleton, 
interview, 10 October 1994. 
119Rumours have done the rounds in coloured political circles 
for a number of years that Heunis, on behalf of the National 
Party, made Labour Party leaders "an offer which they could not 
refuse"; that this was in the form of "perks" which were too good 
to turn down, or blackmail and some threats, or perhaps a 
combination of all three. Despite conjecture and discussion and 
suspicions voiced by Labour Party members themselves over the 
years, no one has ventured any concrete evidence. 
120Evidence of Hendrickse's stance in the ten years of the 
existence of the CRC can be studied in greater detail in Du 
Preez, "Role and Policies of the Labour Party"; Mina, "The CRC"; 
Saks, "The failure of the CRC". 
121Kenney, Power, Pride and Prejudice, 334. 
122p .A. 29, Allan Hendrickse, Labour Party National 
Conference, Bloemfontein, 27 December 1978. In 1977, Hendrickse, 
who at the time was the minister of the Congregational Church in 
uitenhage, received a letter from Nelson Mandela in which he 
asked Hendrickse to calIon coloureds and Indians tO ,reject the 
Botha constitutional proposals. Fear of Security Police 
interfer~nce led Hendrickse to read the letter from the safety 
of his pUlpit during a church service. Immediately afterwards, 
(continued • • • ) 
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Hendrickse had also been a supporter of the black 
consciousness movement and this factor, together with his 
anti-government stance in the CRC, reportedly led to his 
arrest and detention in August 1976. 123 He had had a hand in 
the dismissal of two former Labour Party leaders because they 
had talked with the government, and claimed the credit for 
scrapping the CRC in 1980. 124 Furthermore, Hendrickse had 
also been offered a lucrative appointment to the President's 
Council in 1980 but had turned it down because he was "not 
prepared to sellout his people." 125 As late as August 1982, 
five months before the Eshowe meeting, Hendrickse had still 
assured the public that he was not in favour of accepting the 
proposals,126 and in November that year, he was the leader of 
a delegation which assured SABA delegates that the party would 
not participate. Three weeks before the Eshowe conference, he 
attended an NEC meeting which confirmed the party's rejection 
of the proposals and its refusal to participate. 
However, it appears that while Hendrickse was presenting a 
public face which advocated rejection, in private, he was 
reconsidering his position.127 According to Lockey, 
122 ( ... continued) 
the letter was destroyed. Mohammed Dangor, interview, 6 December 
1993. 
123Coetzer, Awaiting Trial,13, 93-95; Gastrow, Who's Who 
(1990), 105. The Labour Party leadership have always tried to 
claim affinity with the liberation movement because their leader 
had also been a 'detainee. However, questions have been raised 
over Hendrickse's detention and subsequent release. He was 
released before the majority of other detainees, after he had 
given a written undertaking to disassociate himself from extra-
constitutional agitation and denounce the "violence" unleashed 
during the Soweto riots. It has even been suggested that the 
seeds of participation were planted when Hendrickse was in 
detention. See SASPU National (March, 1983). 
124Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 125, 127. 
125Ibid, 146. 
126Natal witness, 4 August 1982. 
127Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 140, 151. 
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Hendrickse was personally opposed to the constitutional 
proposals at the outset and this was borne out by his public 
and consistent statements opposing acceptance. However, as 
leader, he had to be sympathetic and responsive to the views 
of his members, as well as take into account what was best for 
the party. Because of the groundswell of opposition within 
the party to the public stance of the leaders, Hendrickse 
began to consult knowledgeable and influential persons inside 
and outside of the party regarding the way to go. 128 One of 
those he consulted with was Franklin Sonn, rector of the 
Peninsula Technikon and chairman of the influential Cape 
Teachers' Professional Association(CTPA), the largest coloured 
organisation of its kind in South Africa. Sonn and others 
urged Hendrickse to participate .129 However, says Lockey, 
when Hendrickse subsequently pushed for participation based on 
the advice and promises of support by these "outside 
supporters," they "dropped him" and refused to stand by the 
party's decision .130 Many of them later became strident 
critics of the party and Hendrickse during the tricameral 
years. 
Norman Middleton, however, insists that Hendrickse was the 
"prime mover" in the Labour Party to get it to join the 
tricameral system. He suggests that the turning point in 
Hendrickse's stance carne when the "carrot was dangled in front 
of him that he would be the first 'coloured' prime minister." 
From that moment, contends Middleton, Hendrickse began to work 
behind the scenes to get the Labour Party to accept 
participation. l3l John Nash, Mohammed Dangor and Willie Meyer, 
are also unequivocal in their view that Hendrickse was the 
128Desmond Lockey, interview, 17 September 1994; Coetzer, 
Awaiting Trial, 161. 
129James Swigelaar, interview with author, Oudtshoorn, 17 
October 1994. 
130Il?id. 
131Norman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. 
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driving force behind the conference's decision to participate 
and that he relentlessly set out to ensure that such a 
decision would be favourable. Events during the participation 
debate also lends credence to such a view. At moments of 
deadlock during the debate, Hendrickse and Jac Rabie would 
leave the conference hall and "rush over" to Empangeni to 
confer with Heunis, who was staying at a hotel for the 
duration of the conference. Bolstered by advice and armed 
with strategies from Heunis, they would return to the 
conference and attempt to break the deadlock. 132 
David Curry was another of the leaders who had been even more 
strident in expressing public opposition to the constitutional 
proposals than Hendrickse had been. He had long been regarded 
as one of the "militants," and, as party chairman after 1978, 
Curry had often articulated the party's hard-line approach to 
the new constitution. However , his public stance often 
appeared to be contradictory. For instance, in June 1981 
Curry told government ministers that the party would only 
support a new constitution if it provided for a universal 
franchise within a single political system, and if Africans 
were allowed to participate at all levels .133 Then in 
February 1982, he turned around and informed the Prime 
Minister that the Labour Party wanted to start serious 
negotiations .134 Yet, at a SABA meeting in November 1982, 
barely a month before the party's volte face at Eshowe, Curry 
castigated the constitutional proposals, calling it a "a 
clever and sophisticated scheme for entrenching white 
baasskap," and slating it as a "new version of the old recipe 
for conflict that we had in the old Coloured Representative 
Council . ,,135 However a study of the Labour Party' s private 
132r bid. 
133Argus, 12 June 1981; Race Relations Survey (1981), 13. 
134Cape Times, 6 February 1982. 
135"Labour Party A constitutional Decision?" Work in 
Progress No. 25 (1983), 9 . 
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and public response to the constitutional proposals between 
1977 and 1982 gives evidence that Curry had his feet in both 
camps. While he made some of the most telling attacks on the 
President's Council and the constitutional proposals, he was 
not consistent and often made strong calls at the same time to 
consider participation. At Eshowe, he appeared to be the most 
eager of the leaders to ensure that the conference voted to 
participate. 
The leader who appeared to work hardest at ensuring 
participation, was Jac Rabie. Rabie was a leading member of 
the Federal Party until a leadership clash in the party led to 
his resignation in 1977. After taking his place as an 
independent, he joined the Labour Party in 1978. He 
immediately gathered around him defectors from the Federal 
Party and "moderates" who advocated acceptance of the CRC and 
instruments of separate representation. When the Federal 
(Freedom) Party fell apart after the demise of the CRC in 
1980, former members flocked to the Labour Party. This 
immeasurably strengthened Rabie's power base. 136 Between 1981 
and 1983, Rabie tried unsuccessfully to wrest the leadership 
of the Labour Party from Hendrickse. 137 However, he continued 
to work as a shadowy figure in the background, influencing and 
urging members to support a decision for participation .138 In 
preparation for a successful decision on participation at 
Eshowe, Rabie and his supporters had "done their homework," 
ensuring that pro-participation regions made plans to send 
136Norman Middleton is of the opinion that Rabie canvassed 
members of the Freedom Party in 1980 and encouraged them to join 
the Labour Party en masse with the intention of taking control 
of the party. 
137Desmond Lockey, interview, 17 September 1994. 
138Norman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994, suggests 
that Rabie made a deal with the National Party to influence the 
Labour Party from the inside. Middleton points to the fact that 
Rabie and all the former Federal Party members who assisted him 
in this tOask, were later rewarded in the House of Representatives 
for "services rendered to the National Party" . 
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delegates; that pro-participation members were elected as 
delegates to the conference; that transport and accommodation 
was arranged to ensure their presence. 139 Thus, while the 
Labour Party publicly voiced rejection of the constitutional 
proposals between 1977 and 1982, Rabie and his supporters 
worked in private to ensure support for participation. 
It therefore becomes apparent that elements in the leadership 
were certainly more eager to push for participation than they 
had admitted in public, and were prepared to go to any lengths 
to ensure a positive vote by delegates at the Eshowe 
conference. Accusations were also levelled that a "power 
clique" consisting of party leader, Allan Hendrickse; party 
chairman, David Curry; Transvaal leader, Jac Rabie; and 
Western Cape leader, Carter Ebrahim, "rigged" the conference 
to ensure a "yes" vote .140 Firstly, it transpired that the 
congress was "loaded" with delegates from rural branches who 
were more acquiescent and amenable to a vote for 
participation. In former years rural branches had been unable 
to afford the costs of sending delegates to annual 
conferences .141 NOw, suddenly, a poverty-stricken Labour 
Party found the money to bus in delegates from remote rural 
areas, and in numbers not seen at previous conferences . 142 In 
139Miley Richards, 29 June 1992; Sylvia Landers, 17 September 
1994; Norman Middleton, 10 October 1994. 
140Freedberg, "Changing Political Identity", 235. 
141Statistics of the CRC elections of 1969 and 1975 showed 
that rural coloureds were more in favour of parties which 
advocated collaboration, than their urban counterparts. See, 
also Freedberg, "Changing political Identity", 236. 
14'James Swigelaar, interview with author, Oudtshoorn, 22 
April 1994, states that funds from the South African Defence 
Force were channelled " to the Labour Party throughout the 
tricameral period as the government attempted to create as 
favourable an opportunity as possible for the Labour Party to 
influence coloured voters to support the tricameral system. 
Financial support was especially forthcoming at election time. 
Funds for the Eshowe Conference might also have come from the 
National"Party or Broederbond, but channelled through Communitel 
(continued • • • ) 
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delegates 
65-70% of 
at the conference were from 
the coloured the Cape which 
This later led to accusations that the decision 
population . 
did not 
adequately represent the feelings of the whole Labour 
Party. 143 Landers states that many in the Labour Party were 
not happy about participation and it never even entered their 
minds that the party would make a decision at Eshowe to 
participate. The pro-participation group, on the other hand 
did their homework . They bused in s upporters and ensured that 
they had majority support.144 Secondly, the resolution on 
participation was put to the conference in such a way that 
many delegates did not understand what they were voting for . 
Thirdly, a vote was called for without the chairman, David 
Curry, first calling for amendments or objections .145 The 
full resolution, the phrasing of which critics felt was 
deliberately ambiguous, reads as follows: 
The Labour Party of South Africa believes in the 
effective participation of all South Africans, 
irrespective of race, colour or creed in the councils of 
the nation at all levels. The party does not see the 
proposals of the National Party as being the answer to 
the constitutional demands of the people. Because of the 
exclusion of the greatest number of people, the Africans, 
it is not the answer to the constitutional demands of our 
time. It entrenches ethnicity. We reiterate our demands 
for, and belief in one man, one vote in a unitary system, 
the latter being negotiable. 
However, the Labour Party believes that its participation 
in the tricameral parliament and subsequent standing 
142 ( ••• continued) 
to avoid accusations of contravention of the Prohibition of 
Political Interference Act of 1968. 
143Behrens, "The Other Two Houses", 9 6 i Freedberg, "Changing 
Political Identity", 236. 
144Sylvia Landers, interview, 17 September 1994 i Norman 
Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. 
145Abrahams , " ' Coloured' Politics", 255. Freedberg maintains 
that the, resolution was pushed through the conference by the 
"power clique" of Hendrickse, Curry, Rabie and Ebrahim. 
Freedberg, "Changing Political Identity", 235 . 
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councils can assist us in the achievement of our goals 
and constitutional objectives, and further instructs its 
leaders to continue on the road of negotiation with the 
government of the day. 106 
Accusations were made that the resolution was deliberately 
worded in a way that delegates could not understand what they 
were voting for. While they were rejecting the principles of 
the proposals, because they did not go far enough, they were 
also voting in favour of participation in the elections for 
the coloured House of Representatives. 147 Dissenters urged 
the party not to take a decision on participation before the 
implications of such a decision had been examined, and 
certainly not before the constitution had been finalised and 
passed by parliament. lOS Many members conceded that 
participation "had to happen but the timing was wrong. ,,149 
However, the proponents of participation stymied them by 
quoting the Labour Party's constitution which stated that the 
party should negotiate with the government of the day. 150 The 
debate swayed back and forth; each side appearing to gain the 
upper hand over the other. Speakers made impassioned and 
emotional pleas for the party to consider either one or the 
other decision. Whenever the meeting deadlocked, one or more 
146"Labour Party A 
Progress No. 25 (February 
Party National Conference, 
Constitutional Decision?" 
1983), 9; P.A.29, Minutes 
Eshowe, 1-3 January, 1983. 
Work in 
of Labour 
147Freedberg, "Changing Political Identity", 235-36; Race 
Relations Survey ' (1983), 29. 
14SMiley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992. Richards states 
that there were eleven dissenters to the Eshowe decision, among 
them, members of the Executive and others who were provincial 
leaders and long-serving CRC members such as Mohammed Dangor, 
Luwellyn Landers, Norman Middleton, Charles Redcliffe, Miley 
Richards and Sam Solomon. Other sources put the figure at nine. 
See Behrens, "The Other Two Houses", 97; Kenney, Power, Pride and 
Prejudice, 334; Rand Daily Mail, 6 January 1983. 
149Sy I via Landers, interview, 17 September 1994. 
150Sonny Leon Papers, C. 1. 1.3, "Constitution of the Labour 
Party of 'South Africa", as amended, 8 April 1972, preamble to the 
Constitution (ii), 1. 
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of the leaders would drive the short distance to Empangeni to 
confer secretly with Chris Heunis. Armed with new ideas, they 
would return with suggestions to break the deadlock. 151 At 
the end of the day-long debate, David Curry made the final 
speech which he used effectively to sway doubting and 
uncommitted delegates. Curry's speech appeared to be the 
decisive one. 152 Immediately thereafter, the resolution was 
put to the vote. The proponents carried the day and the 
resolution was passed. Thus, if one bears in mind the 
clandestine nature of the Heunis meeting three weeks earlier, 
the exclusion of Middleton from that meeting, the secrecy 
surrounding the discussions and decisions taken, and the 
stratagems employed at the conference to ensure a positive 
decision, it becomes apparent that elements in the party 
leadership were particularly keen to deliver their 
constituents into the hands of Heunis and the National Party. 
The Eshowe decision elicited a wave of condemnation by a 
variety of coloured organisations and leaders. 
chaplain at the University of the Western Cape, 
Allan Boesak, 
immediately 
embarked on a series of interviews and lectures in which he 
stridently and eloquently condemned the Labour Party for 
electing to participate .153 He stated that the Labour Party's 
decision would mean that "apartheid would cease to have a 
white face" and that coloured people would become "junior 
partners" of the government and share responsibility for the 
implementation of apartheid such as, for example, the creation 
of the homelands · and the resettlement of people .154 In a 
speech which typified his attitude to the constitutional 
151Norman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. 
152Peter Hendrickse; interview, 17 September 1994. 
153E .G. Pedro, "Dr Allan Aubrey Boesak: 'n Bree 
Agtergrondskets en Sy Aandeel in die Stigting van die united 
Democratic Front" (M.A. Dissertation, University of the Western 
Cape, Noyember 1989), 69. 
154Cape Times, 24 January 1983. 
272 
proposals, he accused the government of opportunism by 
attempting to use coloured people to bail it out of its 
present difficulties: 
The P.C. proposals are trying to co-opt Coloureds and 
Indians to make the Apartheid machine run more smoothly, 
and were a move by the government to meet the economic, 
military and political crisis it faces .... And now, all 
of a sudden, the government's problems have become our 
(the coloureds') problems. Apartheid's crisis has become 
our crisis. All of a sudden, we are told that we are no 
longer "lepers", that we too are people with dignity that 
we "belong" with "the whites" .155 
Boesak was supported in his opposition and condemnation by the 
Cape Housing Action Committee(CAHAC), representing 22 civic 
organisations in the Western Cape, church groups and a number 
of trade unions such as the South African Allied Workers' 
Union(SAAWU), the Federation of South African Trade 
Unions(FOSATU), the Food and Canning Workers' Union(FCWU), and 
the General Workers' Union (GWU) .156 CAHAC stated that the 
Labour Party's decision represented the views of only a "tiny 
fraction" of the "so-called coloured community. ,,157 Out of 
this groundswell of criticism emerged the idea of a united 
front to oppose the new dispensation, cUlminating in the 
formation of the united Democratic Front (UDF) in August 1983 
in Mitchell's Plain, Cape Town, to oppose the tricameral 
elections .158 Many trade union members and others who 
previously supported the Labour Party terminated their 
relationship with the party. 159 A number of coloured leaders 
who, in earlier years had been well-disposed to the Labour 
155New York Times, 23 February 1983 . 
156Rand Daily Mail, 7 February 1983 . 
157Survey of Race Relations (1983), 31. 
158Pedro, "Dr Allan Aubrey Boesak", 69; Nazeem 
interview with author, Cape Town, 20 July 1994; Van der 
Rise and Decline, 354; Gastrow, Who's Who (1990), 105. 
159venter, South African Government and Politics, 136. 
Howa, 
Ross, 
273 
Party turned their backs on it. Allan Boesak, who had been 
the keynote speaker at the Labour Party's National Conference 
in 1977,160 refused to appear on the same platform as David 
Curry at a symposium at the University of Cape Town in 
1983. 161 Adam Small, a lecturer at the University of the 
Western Cape and a noted coloured poet who had applauded the 
Labour Party leaders' acceptance of the BCM in the mid-1970s, 
condemned the Labour Party for its decision : "How, at this 
point in time, can any black group join a dispensation in 
which the only base from which negotiation is possible remains 
the philosophy of apartheid. ,,162 In an article in Work in 
Progress, the Labour Party was accused of betraying the black 
cause and the liberation effort by legitimising the 
constitutional proposals. It was called the "junior partners 
of apartheid, (which) from now on will share the 
responsibility for apartheid, for the creation of yet more 
homelands, for the resettlement of black people, for the rape 
of our human dignity. ,,163 
After the decision to participate had been taken, Hendrickse 
became the party's chief apologist with much of the 
justification for his and his party's decision to participate 
contained in his biography which was published the year after 
the Eshowe decision . 164 Soon after the Eshowe decision, 
160Rashid Seria Accession, Acc 154, Allan Boesak, Address to 
Labour Party National Conference, Cape Town, 3 January 1977. 
161Preedberg, "Changing Political Identity", 237. 
162Star, 15 January 1983. 
163"Labour Party 
Progress ( 1983), 11. 
A constitutional Decision", Work in 
164Awaiting Trial: Allan Hendrickse. what is significant is 
that this book was written by Piet Coetzer, head of Communitel. 
In the l i ght of Hendrickse's role in the Eshowe volte face , 
Coetzer ' ~ new role in "selling" Allan Hendrickse and the Labour 
Party's Eshowe decision to the South African public and the 
coloured people, comes into sharp focus. 
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Hendrickse set out to clarify his position, and the Labour 
Party's decision to participate: 
The decision taken by the Labour Party at its National 
Conference in January 1983 was an act of faith. I don't 
care who says what, but in the six months prior to taking 
that decision I was on my knees every night praying for 
guidance. 165 
Even though the decision led to the resignation of a number of 
Labour Party national and regional leaders such as Norman 
Middleton, deputy-leader of the Labour Party and Natal leader; 
A. Solomon, national treasurer; George du Plessis, NEC member; 
E. Lucas, Natal deputy-leader; Sam Solomon, former Transvaal 
leader; Mohammed Dangor, Transvaal deputy-leader; Louise 
Boesak, chairwoman of the Carnarvon branch; M. Isaacs, 
secretary of the Cape Peninsula region, as well as the 
resignation of the entire Natal and Worcester branches of the 
party, and precipitated a split with Buthelezi and SABA,166 
Hendrickse persisted that the decision to participate was the 
correct one: 
I have no doubt about the rightness of the decision we 
took at Eshowe . .•. We seriously want the new 
dispensation to succeed, we will do our best to ensure 
that it does. But whether the Government likes it or 
not, I say in all seriousness that I'll give the new 
dispensation five years to see if it delivers the goods 
.• .. If there are no positive results, the government can 
forget about further Labour Party co-operation. 167 
In a further address to the party ' s national conference in 
1984, Hendrickse again defended his and the party's decision 
to participate: 
165Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 156. 
166Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992; Coetzer, Awaiting 
Trial, 159; Race Relations Survey (1983), 30; Rand Daily Mail, 
6 January and 8 January 1983. 
1 67C~etzer, Awaiting Trial, 
19 84; Rand Daily Mail, 17 April 
162. 
1984. 
See also Star, 13 April 
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The new constitution did not meet the demands of the 
party and of our time because of the exclusion of the 
largest section of the South African community. The 
party also declared its belief in the effective 
participation of all South Africans in all processes of 
lawmaking but decided to participate in the new system 
not as an end in itself but as a means towards an end . 
We have clearly stated that the new constitution had to 
be seen as a point of departure and not as a place of 
arrival. 168 
In trying to explain what he meant by "a means towards an 
end," and "point of departure," Hendrickse quoted William 
Cobbett: "Tactically speaking, some reform is better than no 
reform." He then explained the Labour Party's stance based on 
Cobbett: 
Dat 'n gematigde mate van hervorming aanvaar moes word, 
want dit sou dan makliker wees om verder tree op die pad 
van hervorming te neem. Cobbett's approach was 
historically correct for later governments were to amend 
the constitution until they have in Britain today a real 
representative government. So, I believe history will 
prove our decision a correct one . 169 
Hendrickse thus believed that the tricameral system, although 
not any near meeting the requirements of the unfranchised, was 
nevertheless a start on the road to a non-racial democracy. 
Throughout the tenure of the tricameral system, Hendrickse 
continued to insist that the Labour Party was right to 
participate. 170 
that he would 
Even after he announced in September 1993 
retire 
of the Labour Party, 
from active politics and the 
Hendrickse still maintained: 
leadership 
"I am 
certain we made the right decision to 'go in'. Our approach 
was one of 'oortuigingspolitiek'. We saw our role as one of 
convincing the NP to grant political rights and to scrap 
168p.A.29, Allan Hendrickse, Address to Labour Party National 
Conference, Kimberley, December 1984. 
169I~id . 
l70Allan Hendrickse, intervi ew, 23 May 1989 . 
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apartheid. ,,171 David Curry supported such an argument: "It is 
within the system that we must take the initiative because our 
people are not strong enough to change the system alone from 
outside. ,,172 
However the Labour Party had other motives for participating 
and the philosophical arguments were developed later and 
tailored to suit their decision. The Labour Party had no 
historical basis for trusting the National Party and believing 
that the government was truly committed to reform and 
democracy. The experience of coloured people with the CAC in 
1943, the UCCA in 1959 and the CRC in 1969 did not provide any 
basis for believing that the government could be sincere when 
it spoke of reform. The National Party had also dealt 
horrendously and treacherously with coloured people since 1948 
and had immorally removed them from the voters' roll in 
1956. 173 Even while the National Party was promoting the CRC 
as the solution to coloured political aspirations, more petty 
apartheid laws affecting coloured people were passed between 
1969 and 1975 than at any other time during the National 
Party's term of office. 174 Despite this, the Labour Party 
still decided to trust the National Party and accept its bona 
fides. 
It was always on the cards that the Labour Party would go 
along with the tricameral system. Its involvement in the CRC 
between 1969 and 1979 had shown a marked shift from its 
original policy of confrontation. Although it was openly 
confrontational after its formation in 1966 and during the 
first few years in the CRC, the Labour Party had gradually 
171Allan Hendrickse, interview with Lester Venter, Agenda, 
TV1, 20 September 1993. " 
172Adam and Moodley, South Africa without Apartheid, 79. 
173The National Party' s treatment of coloured people is dealt 
with at !ength in Du Pre, Separate but Unequal, chs. 4-13 . 
174See Joyce, The Rise and Fall of Apartheid, 69-84. 
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allowed itself to be coopted. Its election victory in 1975 
and the decision to accept the chairmanship, seats on the 
executive and nominated seats in the council, despite an 
earlier undertaking never to do so,175 was a decisive shift 
from opposition to cooperation with the concept of separate 
representation. Although it kept up a facade of confrontation 
by indulging In anti-government and anti-CRC rhetoric, the 
Labour Party's continued support of a discredited and 
ineffectual institution, despite threats since 1969 to walk 
out and cripple the CRC, had laid it open to charges of 
collaboration. 176 Even its acceptance of the government's 
offer in 1979 to scrap the CRC was not above suspicion. The 
Labour Party realised that the electorate was disenchanted 
with its presence in the CRC, the ineffectiveness of that 
body, and the party's deviation from its principles. Thus, an 
election in 1980 would have proved embarrassing for the Labour 
Party. III 
Furthermore, it had become evident that the attractive 
salaries, lavish perks and accompanying prestige and status, 
had ensnared CRC members and caused them to waver in their 
opposition to that body. 178 Many had given up their jobs to 
stand as councillors. A number \vere close to 
government pensions 
that members had to 
for life. The closure of 
receiving full 
the CRC meant 
forfeit their annual incomes of R15 
000. 179 Longer-serving members were able to claim a 
175Cape Times, 10 November 1969; Mina, "The CRC", 108. 
176Sunday Times, 16 November 1975; Saks, "The Failure of the 
CRC", 56. 
IllBehrens, "The Other Two Houses", 2 7 • 
178Sonny Leon Papers, Sonny Leon, Address to Labour Party 
National Conference, Umtata, 1 January 1975; Hugo, Quislings or 
Realists, 479. 
179A' considerable sum then, 
starting salary of a teacher was 
when one considers 
half that. 
that the 
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government pension of half their annual salary. 180 Members 
were also deprived of the prestige, status and power to give 
patronage which membership of the eRe had afforded. Others 
found themselves unemployed after the closure of the eRe, 
while some were even unemployable. 181 Thus, the scrapping of 
the eRe in 1980 caused a devastating imbalance in their lives. 
Membership of the eRe ' s proposed replacement, the House of 
Representatives, would restore them to their former positions 
with even greater advantages. The ordinary member of 
parliament would receive R43 000 per annum, a generous housing 
and car allowance, 36 free air tickets per annum, a 
substantial pension and "golden handshake" after serving for 7 
1/2 years or two parliaments, and numerous other perks .182 
For those who had participated and remained in the eRe because 
of prestige, status and 
very difficult for them 
financial self-interest, it was not 
to 
1983 to participate in the 
make a "principled" decision 
tricameral system. 183 
in 
An examination of the party's attitude to the final 
constitutional proposals also reveals glaring inconsistencies. 
When the new constitutional proposals were first presented in 
1977, the Labour Party had rejected them out of hand. 184 At 
the t ime, the NEe issued the following statement : 
The proposals are designed to entrench Apartheid in the 
constitution by preserving the so-called ethnic divisions 
180Behrens, "The Other Two Houses", 27. 
181 I bid, 136-37. 
182p .A. 29, circular from W. F. Rousouw to members of the House 
of Representatives, (n.d.); Behrens, "The Other Two Houses", 137; 
Die Nasionalis, March 1986. 
183B . Pottinger, The Imperial Presidency: P.W.Botha, the 
First Ten Years (Johannesburg, 1988), 158. Middleton, interview, 
10 October 1994, states that after 1975 the government started 
"throwing money at the Labour Party" and made membership of the 
counc il par ticularly lucrative. 
184S~nny Leon Papers, Minutes of Labour Party NEe meeting, 
10 September 1977. 
> 
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of "coloureds, Indians and whites." We see the plans as 
a subterfuge for using "coloureds" and "Indians" as tools 
to entrench exclusive National Party rule .... The plans 
are solely and exclusively those of the government and as 
such do not in any respect accord to the democratic 
principle that all the people of Scuth Africa could, 
through their authentic representatives, have an 
effective say in designing a new constitution ••.• The 
only solution acceptable to us would be the holding of a 
National Convention representative of all South 
Africans .185 
Yet, the 1982 constitutional proposals, which were essentially 
the same as those of 1977, were accepted by the party. 186 And 
when these proposals were released, David Curry described them 
as a "clever and sophisticated scheme for entrenching 
baasskap ... 187 Yet, six weeks later, this same Curry rose at 
Eshowe and urged delegates to accept the proposals, which were 
essentially the same as those of 1977. Although there were 
some minor differences, these were not significant enough to 
warrant such an about-face. 188 Thus further reasons have to 
be sought for the participatory somersault. It was not the 
changes in the 1982 proposals which caused the Labour Party to 
change but the altered political climate and the Labour 
Party·s position after the demise of the CRC. Firstly, the 
Labour Party had begun to show signs of disintegration and 
dormancy after the closure of the CRC in 1980. Apart from 
financial considerations, the Labour Party, as a political 
party, began to realise that the lack of an institutional 
platform would lead to its demise. The party had been formed 
to operate within the "system." That was the reason for its 
existence. Like a fish out of water, the Labour Party could 
not function or survive outside of the "system." Deprived of 
185 .. Labour 
Progress No. 25 
Party: A Constitutional 
(February 1983), 6-7. 
Decision?" Work in 
l86Kenney, Power, Pride and Prejudice, 334. 
l87Abrahams, "Coloured Politics", 255. 
l88F;eedberg, "Changing political Identity", 222; 
"The Failure of the CRC," 229. 
Saks, 
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its platform, the Labour Party stagnated and showed signs of 
disintegrating. Participation was therefore essential for its 
continued survival. In fact, participation in institutions 
for political representation was its only reason for 
existence . 
Secondly, Prime Minister Botha's decision to entertain the 
notion of the tricameral system had led to a breakaway by the 
National Party right wing and the formation of the 
Conservative Party. The Labour Party leadership perceived 
Botha's willingness to risk the breakaway as "proof" of his 
political sincerity and commitment to reform. 189 The split in 
the National Party provided the legitimacy and the excuse for 
the Labour Party to rejoin the "system" because it proved the 
"sincerity" of the reforms .190 Already in 1980, Hendrickse 
had shown admiration for Botha as a reformist. At a meeting 
between the Prime Minister and the Labour Party in August 
1980, Hendrickse saw Botha as being genuine in his efforts to 
initiate reform. He agreed that non-violent change would only 
come about through "communication, consultation and 
negotiation. ,,191 
However, more importantly, the Labour Party's apparent about-
face was merely a continuation of the tradition of 
collaboration which had come to characterise coloured politics 
since the beginning of this century. 192 The government's 
offer of a "New Deal" in the 1920s,193 the CAC in 1943, the 
separate voters' °roll in 1958 and the UCCA in 1959, found 
support amongst a significant percentage of coloured people. 
189Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 157. 
190Adam and MoodleYi South Africa without Apartheid:, 77. 
191Gastrow, Who's Who (1990),105. 
192Alexander, "Non-Collaboration in the Western Cape", 181-
82. 
1935ee Lubbe, "Vergeet die Arbeiders", 15-28. 
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In 1969, five of the six parties contesting the CRC election 
supported the policy of separate development .194 Even the 
anti-apartheid Labour Party had gradually allowed itself to be 
coopted and make the CRC work. All of the parties, 
individuals or organisations which participated in government 
structures over the years advanced the same arguments which 
the Labour Party eventually used to justify its participation 
in 1983 . 195 Thus, the strong trend towards collaboration in 
the coloured community eventually caught up with the Labour 
Party in 1983,196 and it became clear that its volte face at 
Eshowe was not really so surprising after all. 
It may appear inconceivable that such a publicly vociferous 
anti-government party could become collaborationist in such a 
short time. However, this can more easily be understood when 
one realises that the Labour Party which decided in 1983 to 
participate in the tricameral system was no longer the Labour 
Party of the 1960s. By 1983, most of its members were former 
supporters of the old Federal Party. Over the years 
defections from the Federal Party and other pro-apartheid 
parties in the CRC had continued at a steady pace. After the 
dissolution of the CRC in 1980, virtually the entire Federal 
(Freedom) Party defected and joined the Labour Party . By 
then, most of the founders and early leaders of the Labour 
Party, who had promoted and fostered the militant anti-
apartheid stance, had resigned, retired or withdrawn from 
194Hugo , Quislings or 
documents highlighting these 
Realists, 
issues. 
contains a number of 
195These arguments are dealt with at length by Rowan Elliot, 
"The Politics of Collaboration," Bandwagon, No.5 (April, 1975), 
4-5. 
196The reasons for this phenomenon are too detailed to be 
dealt with here but are discussed in greater detail by, among 
others, Du Pre, separate but Unequal; Van der Ross, Myths and 
Attitudes; H.F. Dickie-Clark, The Marginal Situation: A 
Sociological study of a Coloured Group (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1966). 
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acti ve involvement in the party. 197 Therein lies one of the 
major reasons behind the gradual but systematic shift in the 
Labour Party, from vigorous confrontation in 1969 to 
acquiescent collaboration in 1983: the Labour Party had been 
systematically infiltrated, and eventually taken over, by pro-
government collaborationists. 
The collaborationist tendencies of coloured people, but more 
particularly, the Labour Party in this instance, carne in for 
some harsh criticism from Allan Boesak, the Islamic Council of 
South Africa, the Cape Areas Housing Association and a number 
of other community organisations. 198 Trevor Abrahams summed 
up the criticism thus: 
It should corne as no surprise that at this very 
moment when confronted with the demise of the 
terrain which in the past had constituted their 
stomping grounds, that the L.P. has now shed its 
radical veneer and exposed their anachronistic 
opportunism and racial political leanings. Personal 
ambition and opportunism have long been a part of 
the tradition of collaborationist politics and no 
doubt this stigma is as strong as ever in the L.P.'s 
decision .199 
The Labour Party undoubtedly found itself in a dilemma in 
1983. It wanted to give the appearance of opposition, yet was 
drawn into a situation which it had no ideological basis for 
resisting. Dr Mohammed, chairman of the Ad-Hoc Anti-P.C. 
Committee summed up the Labour Party's dilemma: 
197W. J . Bergins, former leader of the Federal Party stated 
that the Labour Party of 1983 was walking the same road as the 
Federal Party did in 1969. See Saks, "The Failure of the CRC", 
240. Norman Middleton even suggested at Eshowe that the Labour 
Party change its name as it no longer subscribed to the aims and 
objects of the party as stated in its constitution. Middleton, 
interview, 10 October 1994. 
1985ee for instance, Argus, 25 February 1983; Cape Herald, 
15 Janua~y 1983; Cape Times, 1 February 1983. 
199Abrahams, "Coloured Politics", 251. 
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I think that the Labour Party was faced with a problem at 
Eshowe. It was not sufficient just to reject the 
proposals. To gain credibility within the country it 
would have to throw in its lot with the whole democratic 
struggle. And I think it has not got the stomach for 
that difficult struggle ahead. The easiest way out was 
to go in, to delude people and to say we are going in, in 
an attempt to produce changes from within. 2oo 
One of the puzzling aspects of the Labour Party's approach to 
the new dispensation was the accept a nce of the government's 
offer of participation without any pre-conditions . Such an 
action appears inexplicable in view of the fact that the 
Labour Party appeared to have the upper hand in 1983. The 
National Party desperately needed the tricameral system to 
work and it had been obvious to its strategists at the outset 
that coloured participation was critical to the success or 
failure of the new dispensation. Thus, it had to have the 
Labour Party's cooperation . 201 The importance of coloured 
support for the constitutional proposals had already been 
highlighted in 1978 when the Transvaler commented: "A wide 
measure of agreement among different peoples and groups will 
be necessary to introduce a new structure to make it 
endure. ,,202 Thus, the Labour Party already had prior 
knowledge of the importance of c oloured support for the new 
dispensation . Given that, if the Labour Party was determined 
to participate, it could at least have attempted to exact 
government agreement on a number of issues, e.g . the creation, 
or promise of, a "black" chamber; a timetable for the 
abolition of apartheid and introduction of universal suffrage; 
unbanning of the liberation organisations, etc. as pre-
conditions for participat i ng in the tricameral parliament . 
Hendrickse had in fact stated in 1980 that the Labour Party 
would not participate "unless certain conditions are met. 
200Speak, March 1983 . 
201Freedberg, ."Changing Political Identity", 225; Kenney, 
Power Pride and Prejudice, 333. 
202Transvaler, 18 February 1978. 
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Among these were that blacks be included and that laws such as 
the Group Areas Act and Mixed Marriages Act be scrapped. ,,203 
David Curry even added: "I have no hesitation in saying that 
we will keep our word on this. ,, 204 Yet, the Labour Party 
reneged on its promises and decided to participate 
unconditionally, even though it knew that the new dispensation 
could not function without its support. 205 Moreover, at the 
time of the Eshowe decision, the constitution had not yet been 
presented to parliament as a bill, neither had the government 
given any intention that it would dismantle apartheid. The 
opportunity was there for the Labour Party to put pressure on 
the government to 
final acceptance. 
Party ignored its 
make major additions or adjustments prior to 
In its eagerness to participate, the Labour 
obvious indispensability to the new 
dispensation, not even bothering to push for any terms and 
conditions under which it would entertain participation. 
A deeper investigation of the Labour Party's volte face, the 
quiet abandonment of its pre-conditions for participation, and 
its timid reaction to the long wait before the election, 
unearthed some disturbing facts. According to Van Zyl 
Slabbert, the Labour Party leadership were so eager to become 
a part of the government's "gravy-train" that they did not 
even know what the structures of the tricameral system were 
when they decided to participate . 206 
the fact that they did not even wait 
Even more puzzling was 
for the results of the 
white referendum, nor, for that matter, parliament's 
acceptance of the tricameral bill, before indicating their 
willingness to participate; neither did the Labour Party 
203Argus, 22 September 1980. 
204Ibid. 
205Africans were never included in the tricameral system. 
The Mixed Marriages Act was only abolished in 1988 and the Group 
Areas Act in 1991. 
206F : van Zyl Slabbert, interview on Agenda, South African 
Broadcasting Corporation, 26 May 1991. 
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express any objection to the decision of the government not to 
hold a referendum for coloureds. Z07 Allan Hendrickse later 
confessed that the Labour Party made a mistake in taking the 
decision so early. They had evidently expected the tricameral 
elections to take place in 1983. 208 Miley Richards confided 
that a number of Labour Party leaders, while agreeing in 
principle to participate, vigorously opposed making a decision 
before the referendum and before parliament had accepted the 
proposals, but that they were "overrun" in the party's eager 
rush to participate. 209 Nash, who missed the Eshowe meeting 
because of illness, considered that the Labour Party took a 
needless risk by not considering the possibility, and the 
embarrassing consequences of the "white" electorate and 
parliament rejecting a dispensation which the "coloured" 
Labour Party had already accepted. ZIO Ismail Omar, a member 
of the House of Delegates observes that "in its eagerness to 
set the machinery into motion, the government acted with undue 
haste, insufficient co-ordination and not much strategy."Zl1 
It appears that the Labour Party was as hasty and as 
insufficiently prepared as the government. In its eagerness 
to accept the tricameral system, the party compounded the 
government's error by itself acting with undue haste and very 
little str'ategy. 
The Labour Party also made no attempt to examine the 
implications and consequences of its decision, nor did it even 
try to find experts to analyse the new constitution . This 
207Leach, South Africa, 65. 
208Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 161. Luwellyn Landers, 
interview, 17 September 1994, indicates that the Labour Party 
expected the election to be held within three months of the 
Eshowe decision. 
Z09Mi ley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992. 
zloJohn Nash, interview, 31 August 1992. 
211I : Omar , Refor m in Cri sis: Why the Tricameral Parliamentary 
System has failed (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1988), 22. 
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constitution was obviously flawed, a fact which the Labour 
Party itself had pointed out often enough in its criticism of 
the proposals since it was first introduced in 1977, and up 
till November 1982. The tricameral system was not designed to 
share power because each chamber only had jurisdiction over 
its own affairs. General affairs would be subject to the 
final approval of a President's Council which was controlled 
by whites. The state president, who, according to the new 
proposals would be an executive president in the place of the 
present prime minister, was to be elected by an electoral 
college consisting of 50 whites, 25 coloureds and 13 
Indians. 212 Thus the state president would always be the 
nominee of the white ruling party. No matter which way they 
looked at the new constitutional proposals, it still spelt 
"white domination. ,,213 In fact, in a 1991 Report on 
Constitutional Models, the SA Law Commission condemned the 
1983 tricameral constitution as lacking "substantive 
principle, constitutionalism, and even a regard for the 
law. ,,214 Furthermore: 
It also failed to protect individual human rights, showed 
a fundamental lack of democracy, lacked an independent 
judiciary in the broad sense of the word, did not have 
adequate checks and balances, had no minority protection 
and gave excessive power to the president. 215 
At the time that it made its decision to participate, the 
Labour Party had access to the opinions of a number of 
academics whose views were later published in a book, Bridge 
or Barricade. This book was rushed into print by the 
publishers so that it would be available before the 1983 
referendum. The arguments exposed serious flaws in the 
constitution and by and large militated against its 
212Moodley, "Structural inequality", 218; 
213Van Zyl Slabbert, The System and the Struggle, 63. 
214Sunday Times, 23 February 1992. 
215 I bid. 
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acceptance. A selection of some of the arguments gives an 
idea of the tone of warnings: Lawrence Schlemmer argued that 
because too great an emphasis was placed on race identity 
"this constitution before Parliament is basically a document 
for whites, drawing in a few but not all , of the others . ,,216 
Marinus Wiechers contended that the new constitution was 
designed by the National Party "to consolidate its own 
political strength for the purposes of limiting power sharing 
with Coloureds and Indians," and that the concepts "own 
affairs" and general affairs" were simply alternative 
phraseology for the "largely discredited ideology of separate 
development. ,,217 Andre Thomashausen warned that the 
tricameral system did not allow for powersharing: "Building a 
system of government on the naive hope that antagonistic 
groups will peacefully 'share' power of government, resembles 
those Utopian dreams that a society could exist without 
criminal law merely by appealing to the conscience of 
potential criminals. ,, 218 
A number of academics and other opponents of the tricameral 
constitution also warned the Labour Party of the perception 
amongst other "non-white'; groups that participation would be 
construed as support for and the strengthening of apartheid 
structures . Africans would see the decision as betrayal of 
the cause of the oppressed. Oscar Dhlomo of Inkatha bluntly 
stated that "Indians and Coloureds who accept participation in 
the proposed tricameral Parliament will accept the status of 
partners in propping up white supremacy and they will be 
216L. Schlemmer, "Bridges that have to be built", in Bridge 
or Barricade? The Constitution, a first appraisal, ed., F . de 
Villiers (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball with the Sunday Times, 
1983),62. . 
217M. Wiechers, "The New Constitution: Can it be Salvaged", 
in Bridge or Barricade?, 56. 
216 .. A. Thomashausen, "Power-sharing is it a Utopian Dream", 
in Bridge or Barricade?, 106. 
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rightly regarded as co-oppressors. ,,219 Herman Giliomee warned 
that the new constitution "introduces coloured and Indian 
representatives into Parliament in such a manner that they 
will be unable to change the apartheid structures built into 
the constitution itself but will be held responsible for 
whatever Parliament decides. ,,220 Bhadra Ranchod added: "What 
worries moderates is that the Group Areas Act and race 
classification are to form the cornerstones of the new 
dispensation. A positive response could be interpreted as 
acceptance and support for racial discrimination. ,,221 
Van Zyl Slabbert slated the tricameral proposals in words 
which were to prove prophetic: 
The tragedy for South Africa is that at a time when the 
voters have come to acknowledge the need for such reform, 
the National Party has come forward with a plan that is 
so defective and ill-conceived that if implemented will 
set back the process of reform for at least a decade. 222 
Even Van der Ross, the founder of the Labour Party and a 
supporter of the principle of participation in government 
structures, stated at the time: "The great value of the 
constitutional proposals now before the country is that they 
cannot work. ,,223 He implied that when the tricameral system 
failed, as it inevitably would, only then would an acceptable 
constitutional dispensation emerge. Thus, if the Labour Party 
2190. Dhlomo,. "Inkatha and the Reform Proposals", in Bridge 
or Barricade?, 126. 
220H. Giliomee, "The Road to a Dictatorship is Paved with 
Good Intentions", in Bridge or Barricade?, 112. 
221B . Ranchod, "Reform or Change", in Bridge or Barricade?, 
73. 
222Leach, South Africa, 54. 
223R.E. van der Ross, "In this failure lies our Hope", in 
Bridge or Barricade?, 117. In an interview with the author, 
Belhar, Sape Town, 9 September 1992, van der Ross supported this 
statement but agreed that the Labour Party, in spite of 
shortcomings in the constitution, was right to participate. 
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had done even some rudimentary homework in 1983; if it had 
taken time to examine the fears and disquiet expressed by the 
many experts, it would have been able to make a much more 
informed decision. It would have had a greater understanding 
of the flaws in the tricameral system and the implications and 
consequences if this dispensation was implemented. However, 
it apparently did not want to know this because it wanted to 
join the tricameral system, corne what may. By doing so, the 
Labour Party continued a tradition of collaboration which had 
corne to characterise coloured politics since the beginning of 
this century. 224 
After making its decision in January 1983, the Labour Party 
had to wait until August 1984 for the elections for the House 
of Representatives to take place. This long delay enabled the 
opponents of the new dispensation to rally their forces. 
Thus, having obtained a commitment of support, the government 
threw the Labour Party "to the wolves. ,, 225 Hendrickse 
expressed his bitterness at having to endure the escalating 
opposition and criticism which carne his way during the long 
wait before the election. 226 This in itself should have been 
a warning to the Labour Party that perhaps the government was 
not being honest with them and that it merely wanted their 
support to make the tricameral system work. This is not 
surprising when one considers that the National Party had a 
long history of using the coloured people for its own ends and 
then abandoning them when they had served their purpose. 227 
The Labour Party tried to hold meetings but these ended in 
disarray. A meeting hosted by Allan Hendrickse and David 
Curry in Stellenbosch, the latter ' s horne town, ended in a 
224Alexander, "Non-Collaboration in the Western Cape," 181-
82. 
225Arthur Stanley, interview, 10 September 1992. 
226Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 162. 
227See, for example, R.H. du Pre , "Beware of the Fox in the 
Coloured Chicken Coop", South, 2 May, 1992. 
290 
brawl . 228 In Vredenburg, members of the FCWU took over a 
meeting c alled by the Labour Party , stating that workers had 
never given the party a mandate to negotiate with the 
government on its behalf. 229 At a meeting in East London, 
hec klers accused the Labour Party of "selling out". 230 When it 
could no longer hold meetings in the Cape, the Labour Party 
shifted its focus to the more historically-collaborationist 
Transvaal but even there it had to abandon its plans when it 
had to receive police protection at some meetings. 231 
Meetings in Johannesburg c ould only be held with the aid of a 
strong police presence. 232 At Reiger Park, police armed with 
machine guns arrested opponents and in Eldorado Park, teargas 
had to be used to break up fighting. The party even 
considered forming a military wing, which Jac Rabie explained 
would deal with "opponents who disrupted meetings" ,233 and 
although the idea received full government sanction, it never 
materialised . 234 
Eventually, the Labour Party stopped holding meetings in the 
main urban centres because it feared a similar negative 
response . Hendrickse expressed his bitterness at having to 
228Freedberg, "Changing Political Identity", 236 . 
229Race Relations Survey (198 3 ),31. 
230I bid . 
231 Debates of· the House of Assembly (11 February 1983), cols. 
816-17; House of Assembly: Questions and Replies, vol 110 (4 
March 1983), 517. Edelstein' s What do the Coloureds think 
provides insight into the Transvaal coloureds tendency to 
collaboration. Election statistics in 1969 and 1975 showed 
consistent support for pro-apartheid parties in CRC and HoR 
elections in the Transvaal . 
232Debates of the House of Assembly (11 February 1983), cols . 
816-17; House of Assembly: Questions and Replies, vol 110 (4 
March 1983), 517. 
233Rac e Relations Survey (1983), 3l. 
234House of As s e mbly: Questio ns and Replies, Vol 110, 25 
February 1983, 315. 
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endure the escalating opposition and criticism which came his 
way during the long wait before the election: 
It is a pity the government did not show a greater 
appreciation of our position. We got the short end of 
the stick through this delay .... The time lost allowed 
those opposing our decision to marshal their support. It 
seemed as though once our support was assured~ less 
attention was given to our needs and wishes. 23 
Once the Labour Party and the Indian parties decided that they 
would participate, the forces opposing participation began to 
mobilise. The ANC-aligned united Democratic Front(UDF) and 
the black consciousness-orientated National Forum(NF) were 
formed in 1983 for the specific purpose of opposing the 
establishment of the tricameral system and the elections for 
the coloured and Indian Houses. 236 These two organisations, 
along with the New Unity Movement(NUM), adopted a non-
collaborationist approach and called for a total boycott of 
the August 1984 elections . These organisations used a variety 
of arguments to urge people to boycott the forthcoming 
tricameral elections, while the NUM aggressively appealed for 
non-collaboration using the language that the Educational 
Journal adopted in the 1940s in its opposition to the CAC. 237 
The Labour Party, which had throughout the existence of the 
CRC, staunchly defended the use of the boycott, now had the 
painful and unenviable task of explaining why people should 
235Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 162. 
236Van der Ross, Rise and Decline, 359-60; Readers' Digest, 
Illustrated History of South Africa, 472. 
237Lewis, Between the Wire and the Wall, 281-83. The Labour 
Party P.A.29 also contains a selection of pamphlets by the New 
Unity Movement and the UDF ( e . g . the UDF News, 1984 ) and 
associat~d organisations such as the Muslim Students Association 
and Cape Action League, which called for a total boycott of the 
elections . 
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not heed the call to boycott the elections. 238 David Curry 
put it succinctly: "You either boycott yourself out of 
existence or the government boycotts you out of existence. ,,239 
Thus, the debate for or against an election boycott became the 
real election campaign for the 1984 election and overshadowed 
the actual campaign for supremacy at the polls. 240 Because 
the coloured electorate had been denied the opportunity of 
accepting or rejecting the tricameral system by means of a 
referendum, the elections became, in effect, the coloured 
referendum. Participation in the elections was equated with a 
"yes" vote and a boycott that of a "no" vote. 241 
As the election drew near, the government realised that the 
boycott campaign was gaining in strength and might seriously 
jeopardise the credibility of the election. It belatedly 
recognised the problems which the Labour Party had to contend 
with and tried to assist where it could. The Labour Party 
subsequently had to contend with accusations that it was 
getting assistance from the National Party . The marketing 
company, Communitel, handled the Labour Party's campaign and 
allegedly helped to raise one million Rand from white 
businessmen. 242 The South African Broadcasting Corporation 
(SABC) also crone out in support of the Labour Party, which led 
to complaints by other coloured parties that they were 
allocated a limited number of minute-long advertising spots on 
television while Allan Hendrickse had been allowed two half-
238 P .A. 29, "Labour Party of South Africa, Election 
Manifesto"; election pamphlet, "Hervorming versus Rewolusie", 
1984; Steadfast, (n.d. probably March 1984). 
239Race Relations Survey (1982), 16. 
240See for example, "Labour Party: 
Decision?" in Work in Progress, No 25 (1983), 
March 1983; Sunday Times, 27 May 1984. 
241Behrens, "The Other Two Houses", 108. 
A Constitutional 
11; Cape Times, 23 
242Grassroots, August 1984. Peter Hendrickse, interview, 18 
September 1994, conf i rms that Communitel conducted workshops on 
how to organise an election and conduct a campaign. 
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hour appearances. 243 
Whereas the government had decided on a referendum to enable 
whites to decide on the new constitution, no such opportunity 
was afforded coloureds and Indians, despite considerable 
demand therefore. 244 The government was keenly aware of the 
possibility that it could suffer a defeat if such a referendum 
was held. This would then 
to press ahead with reform 
to help had rejected it. 
present the ticklish problem of how 
if the very people it was designed 
The Labour Party, which had endured 
months of hostility and vigorous opposition orchestrated by 
the UOF, NF and NUM, agreed that a referendum should be 
dispensed with and that the government should proceed directly 
wi th elections. 245 This move by the Labour Party to avoid a 
referendum indicated that it could not hope to win a "yes" 
vote. 246 The denial of this opportunity unleashed hidden 
elements of bitterness and anger on such a scale that the 
government was forced to detain opponents of the elections. 
On the eve of the elections, the government detained 18 UOF 
and Indian Congress leaders and prohibited the pUblication of 
any statements by detained persons. 247 The Solidarity Party 
contesting the Indian elections threatened to withdraw from 
the election if the detainees were not released. 248 The 
Labour Party's Natal leader, Albie Stowman, however, fully 
supported the detentions, adding that the "UOF backroom boys 
should have been picked up long ago." He also accused the UOF 
243Behrens, "The Other Two Houses", 107. 
2440avenport, South Africa, 471. 
245p .A. 29, Minutes of Labour Party National Conference, Port 
Elizabeth, 3 January 1984; Race Relations Survey {1984), 26; 
Leach, South Africa, 6S. 
246Arqus, S January 1984. 
2470"!Venport, South Africa, 47l. 
248Behrens, "The Other Two Houses", lOS . 
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of "subverting the democratic process. ,,249 Such was the 
vehemence of the opposition that coloured and Indian parties 
had to abandon the holding of public meetings when a number of 
earlier meetings were disrupted by violence. 250 
A total of 207 candidates stood for election to the House of 
Representatives. 251 The Labour Party put up candidates in all 
80 constituencies and won 76. It immediately interpreted this 
as an overwhelming vote in favour of participation. However, 
when the full results were analysed, the boycott lobby claimed 
a resounding victory252 (See table 6). From a total of 881 
984 registered voters (approximately two-thirds of the 
coloured electorate), only 272 854 actually voted. 253 This 
represented a 30.9% poll . However, if the percentage poll is 
Table No. 6. 254 
Region Potential Voters Registered Voters No. who 
Number % Poll Number % Poll voted 
Transvaal 141 408 24,9 81 523 43,2 35 197 
Natal 54 647 15,7 33 649 25,5 8 595 
OFS 32 999 18,8 11 139 55,6 6 193 
Cape Province 1 317 554 16,9 755 673 29,5 222 869 
- Peninsula 504 950 4,9 226 706 11,1 25 154 
- (excl.Peninsula) 812 602 24,3 528 967 37,4 197 715 
Total 1 546 607 17,6 881 984 30,9 272 854 
calculated on the basis of the number of persons eligible to 
249Rand Daily Mail, 6 September 1984. 
2~Race Relations Survey (1983), 31. 
251Star, 30 July 1984. 
252Leach, South Africa, 66. 
253See Van der Ross, Rise and Decline, 357. 
254E . Patel, "Legitimacy and Statistics: A critical analysis 
of the first tri-c ameral parliamentary elections, August 1984", 
Saldru Working Paper No . 61 (Cape Town: SALDRU, 1985), 13. 
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vote (1 546 607), then it drops to 17,6%. 05 The boycotters 
interpreted this as a massive rejection of the tricameral 
system. 256 Although the Labour Party won 73,2% of the total 
poll, its share of a meagre turn-out could not be interpreted 
as overwhelming support for the party' s decision to 
participate in the tricameral parliament. 257 Furthermore, as 
in preceding elections, the Labour Party only increased its 
support at the expense of other parties. It never managed to 
rally the majority of the coloured people to its banner. The 
results in all CRC and House of Representative elections 
confirmed the Labour Party's inability to attract more than 
20% of the support of coloured people. 258 Its share of the 
eligible vote started out at 16,2% in 1969 and steadily 
declined to 15,2% in 1975 and 14,2% in 1984. The statistics 
therefore appear to belie the Labour Party's claim that it was 
the representative of the coloured people and that its victory 
in 1984 was an endorsement by coloured people of the 
tricameral system. In fact, the percentage poll as well as 
the actual number of votes cast in 1984 was lower than in the 
1969 CRC election. In 1969, 300 918 votes were cast in a 
49,1% poll of registered voters and a 35,7% poll of potential 
voters. Thus, with every successive election, even though the 
size of the coloured electorate i nc r eased, fewer and fewer 
people were inclined to support institutions of separate 
representation and those parties whi ch cooperated with them. 
Table 7 - Comparative Results for the three election years. 259 
Year Eligible Registered Ac tual Votes Votes cast for 
Voters Voters Cast Labour Party 
255Van der Ross, Rise and Decline, 356; Behrens, "The Other 
Two Houses", 108, 111; 
256Davenport , South ' Africa, 471. 
257Behrens, "The Other Two Houses", 112 . 
258Freedberg, "Changing Political Identi ty", 238. 
259Van der Ross, Rise and Decl i ne, 357; Sonny Leon Papers, 
C.1.1 . 3 . 2 ., 26 Se ptember 1980 . 
1969 
1975 
1984 
843 973 
994 191 
1 546 607 
637 587 
521 557 
881 984 
296 
300 918 
251 631 
272 854 
136 845 
151 410 
219 397260 
Having decided to take part in the elections, the Labour Party 
was now irrevocably bound to the new dispensation. Although 
Hendrickse had provided for an escape route when he promised 
earlier that he would give the new dispensation "five years to 
deliver the goods," this was a not a serious threat as the 
mood within the Labour Party caucus would have militated 
against any decision to withdraw. 261 
The significance of the Labour Party's decision to participate 
in the tricameral system must be seen against the background 
of its attitude to the CRC. The Labour Party had always 
expressed its opposition to this body which it saw as an 
unacceptable substitute for direct parliamentary 
representation. It had consistently voiced its intention of 
destroying the CRC and when this body was dissolved in 1980, 
the party claimed that it had achieved its goal. Yet, in 
1983, the Labour Party settled for the House of 
Representatives which was little more than an extension of the 
system it had so vociferously opposed; the House of 
260Behrens uses N. J . J . Olivier's calculations which includes 
the uncontested seats. The actual votes cast would then increase 
to 292 039. The votes received by the Labour Party would also 
include those in uncontested seats. See Behrens, "The Other Two 
Houses", 108. 
261Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 162. Nash states that the Labour 
Party never ever considered the possibility that it would 
withdraw at some stage in the future. This would have entailed 
too great a sacrifice. He explains that one of the reasons why 
Hendrickse had to apologise after he swam at a whites-only beach 
in 1987 in defiance of t·he Separate Amenities Act, was that P.W. 
Botha threatened to call an election if Hendrickse refused to 
apologise. Labour Party members pressured Hendrickse because 
they were "hocked to the teeth" for their cars, houses and other 
items. If there was an election and members lost their seats, 
many wou~d have been ruined for life. John Nash, interview, 31 
August 1993. 
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Representatives was merely an upgraded version of the eRe. 262 
Therefore, the party's reasons for participation in the two 
bodies can be justifiably compared. In 1969 The Labour Party 
defended participation on the grounds that if it did not, the 
government would use the pro-apartheid coloured parties to 
implement its policies. The Labour Party also argued that it 
was only participating in order to destroy the eRe and after 
the collapse of the eRe in 1980 it claimed, with some 
justification, the credit for the dissolution of the eRe. 
However, the same arguments could not be advanced in 1983 for 
participating in a system which was merely a refined version 
of the eRe. There were no pro-apartheid coloured parties of 
substance left by that time. 263 Even the Federal Party, its 
main opposition, had changed its name to the Freedom Party in 
1978 to get away from the pro-apartheid stigma. Its pro-
government leadership had long since been ousted and most of 
the old Federal Party members had joined the Labour Party. 264 
The fact that the Labour Party subsequently won 76 of the 80 
elected seats in the 1984 election bears testimony to its 
dominance and the negligible influence of its opponents. In 
comparison therefore to the 1969 argument of participating in 
order to destroy the eRe, the decision of the Labour Party to 
participate in the House of Representatives actually ensured 
that the tricameral system came into existence. 
No matter how much Hendrickse insisted that the Labour Party's 
participation was a starting, not an end point, it could not 
disguise the fact that the government's coloured policy had 
reached its highest level of success to date and that the 
policy of establishing separate, but powerless, instruments of 
political representation for coloured people had attained its 
262Saks, "The Failure of the eRe", 237. 
263.J;QM, 234. 
264Behrens, "The Other Two Houses", 39 . 
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most sophisticated form yet. 265 
265Saks, "The Failure of the CRC", 238. 
299 
Chapter 6 
THE ROLE OF THE LABOUR PARTY IN 
COLOURED POLITICS, 1965-1984 
The role of the Labour Party in coloured politics in the 1960s 
and 1970s must be seen against the background of the political 
and social position of coloured people at the time. By the 
time of the formation of the Labour Party in 1965, coloured 
people had been subjected to a host of discriminatory 
legislation such as the Mixed Marriages Act (1949), Population 
Registration Act (1950), Group Areas Act (1951) and Separate 
Amenities Act (1953). Furthermore, they had been removed from 
the common voters roll (1956), the provincial roll (1956) and 
were about to lose the municipal franchise as well (1972). 
Moves to prohibit coloureds from belonging to the same 
political party as whites were also afoot (1966, and 
accomplished in 1968). At about the same time, Group Areas 
removals in the Cape had begun in earnest (from 1965), 
especially the removals from District Six in the Cape which 
later became a rallying point for opponents of apartheid. 
From 1948 onwards, coloured people had been steadily denied 
the opportunity to express their opposition to government 
policy. Legislation ensured that there was no protest and 
voices of dissent were silenced by the threat of detention and 
imprisonment. l Because coloureds had been removed from the 
voters' roll in 1956, the vote could not be used to express 
their feelings. Although they were provided with the UCCA in 
1959, it was an irrelevant and despised "Uncle Tom's" body 
consisting of government appointees. 2 The CRC which they were 
lBunting, Rise of the South African Reich, 194-243, gives a 
detailed account of the steps taken by the government between 
1948 and 1967 to eliminate all opposition to its rule and 
policies. 
2Articles and letters in The Torch in 1959 give some 
indication of the attitude of coloureds to this body. Some of 
these ar'ticles and letters are found in Hugo, Ouislings or 
Realists, 673-78. 
, 
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now being offered was not what they wanted. Thus in 1965, a 
group of coloureds decided to establish the Labour Party and 
use this government-created apartheid platform to express the 
bitterness and frustration of coloured people. The Labour 
Party in this period was the tangible manifestation of that 
section of the coloured people who were not happy with their 
second-class status but who were also not sure how to bring 
about the desired change in that status. 3 The formation of 
the Labour Party in 1965 was an attempt to fill a gap. It was 
the aim of the founders to establish an organisation which 
would look after the interests of coloured people in the Cape 
who had been deprived of the franchise in 1956, and those in 
the other provinces who had never had the vote. By 
establishing a broad-based mass movement, the Labour Party 
hoped to attract as many coloured people as possible, 
intending for them to serve as a strong pressure group to 
force the government to take heed of the grievances of the 
coloured community and to restore them to political equality 
with whites. 
At its inaugural meeting in July 1966, the Labour Party 
realised the need for strong grassroots support and made 
provision in its constitution for the establishment of a 
broad-based party organisation. 4 That the Labour Party failed 
to do so can be attributed to a variety of reasons. Firstly, 
coloured people did not have much experience in or,ganised 
electoral politics. The first coloured political 
organisation, the APO, had not been a political organisation 
in the sense that it was formed to contest elections. It was 
an organisation of intellectuals mainly concerned with 
attempts to protect the existing coloured franchise in the 
3Adhikari, "Protest and Accommodation", 106; Karis and 
Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 162. 
4p .A. 29, "Constitution of the Labour Party of South Africa", 
as amended, July 1966; P.L. Berger and B. Godsell, A Future South 
Africa: Visions, Strategies and Realities (Cape 'I'own: Human and 
Rousseau; 1988), 182. 
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Cape and to extend the franchise to coloureds in the northern 
provinces. s In the late 1930s and 1940s, a number of coloured 
organisations such as the New Era Fellowship(NEF), National 
Liberation League (NLL), Anti-CAD movement and Train Apartheid 
Resistance Committee (TARC) were formed, 6 but these were mainly 
aimed at preventing the erosion of coloured political rights. 
Up to 1968, coloureds were members of existing white political 
parties, 7 but as they were not allowed to select candidates 
for parliament, they were merely "voting fodder" for white 
political parties. s Even when they were placed on a separate 
roll in 1956, they had to elect white candidates to fill 
"coloured" seats in parliament. 9 Furthermore, the various 
political bodies provided by the government prior to 1969 were 
nominated and not elected. The CAC in 1943 was a fully 
nominated body. The UCCA in 1959 was intended to be partly 
elected, partly nominated, but due to opposition from a small 
but vociferous group of coloured people, mainly in the Western 
Cape, it became a fully nominated body.10 Thus, by the time 
the CRC Act was introduced in 1964, no coloured party had ever 
been formed to contest an election. The leaders of the Labour 
Party therefore did not have experience in organised party 
SM. Adhikari, "Protest and Accommodation", 94; R.E. van der 
Ross, The Founding of the African People's Organisation in Cape 
Town in 1903 and the Role of Dr Abdurahman (Pasadena: Munger 
Africana Library Notes 28, 1975), 11. 
6Alexander, "Non-Collaboration in the Western Cape", 182-83; 
Mina, "The CRC" ·, 31; Saks, "The Failure of the CRC", 24; 
Freedberg, "Changing Political Identity", 88; Lewis, Between the 
Wire and the Wall, 208; I. Goldin, "The Reconstitution of 
Coloured identity in the Western Cape", in The Politics of Race, 
Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa, eds. S. 
Marks and S. Trapido (London: Longman, 1987), 169; Hugo, 
Quislings or Realists, 44 . 
7Allan Hendrickse, ·interview, 23 May 1989; Mohammed Dangor, 
interview, 6 December 1993. 
SSouth, 2 May 1992 . 
9Ba~linger, Union to Apartheid, 468; Mu l ler, 500 Years, 476. 
IOHugo, Quislings or Realists, 45. 
302 
politics. In addition, almost all political activity up to 
1965 had been confined to the Cape. Because coloured people 
in the rest of South Africa did not have the franchise, there 
had been no need to belong to political parties, nor take part 
in organised electoral politics. 
Secondly, a year after the Labour Party was officially 
established in 1966, the founder and driving force behind its 
formation, Richard van der Ross, resigned to accept a post in 
the Department of Coloured Affairs. Van der Ross was the most 
experienced and capable coloured leader at the time and "one 
of the more prominent and articulate representatives of the 
moderate faction of the coloured elite. ,,11 Van der Ross was a 
highly-educated academic with degrees in education, which 
included a Ph.D from the University of Cape Town. 12 He became 
involved in politics through his father's role in the CAC,13 
and continued his involvement in the 1950s and 1960s through 
SACPO and the Convention Movement. 14 Thus, the resignation of 
such an astute leader was a loss for the fledgling party. To 
compound their problems, four of the five founder members had 
resigned by 1968. That the Labour Party had not yet recovered 
from these losses at the time the first CRC election was due 
in 1969 is evident from the fact that the party had no 
election and organisational machinery, nor finances, which it 
could utilise to organise its election campaign. It was left 
to the new leader, Martin Arendse, who with Sonny Leon and 
Arthur Stanley embarked on a nation-wide recruiting campaign. 
Virtually all the candidates were personally recruited in this 
11M. Adhikari, "Responses to Marginality: Twentieth-Century 
Coloured Politics", S.A~ Historical Journal, 20 (1988), 116. 
12Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, cover. See also 
Appendix II. 
13Lewis Between the Wire and the Wall, 212. 
. ' 
14Richard van der Ross, interview, 9 December 1992. 
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way.1S In contrast to Van der Ross, the later leaders of the 
Labour Party, although willing and enthusiastic, were poorly-
educated and lacking the skills needed to deal with the kind 
of politician found in the National Party in the 1960s and 
1970s .16 
However, one of the main reasons why the Labour Party 
subsequently failed to build a broad-based mass movement with 
strong grassroots support was because it considered that its 
anti-apartheid platform, which set it apart from the other 
pro-separate development coloured parties, was sufficient to 
attract support. It therefore relied on its anti-apartheid 
rhetoric and confrontationist posturing to keep it in the 
public eye, and on the support of the press to rally the 
electorate to its side. By the time of the 1975 election, the 
Labour Party had still not broadened its support base nor 
strengthened its organisational machinery. The Theron 
Commission reported in 1976 that one of the reasons for the 
low registration of eligible voters was the lack of effort and 
success on the part of political parties in registration 
drives. 17 Barely a month before the election, very few 
election candidates had held public meetings to air their 
views .1B Candidates left most of the electioneering and 
speeches to party leaders. 19 Fred Peters, the party's 
secretary, also blamed the regions for the low percentage 
poll. He suggested that had all regions done their work 
methodically, the party would have won thirty-five seats, 
1SSunday Times, 16 November 1975; Sonny Leon, interview, 25 
September 1985; Arthur Stanley, interview, 10 September 1992. 
16Allan Hendrickse, interview, 
Ross, interview, 9 September 1992. 
of the CRC", 208. 
23 May 1989; Richard van der 
See also Saks, "The Failure 
17Theron Report, (R P 38 -1976), 361. 
1BSunday Times, 2 February 1975. 
19So~ny Leon Papers, Minutes of Labour Party NEC meeting, 4-
7 September 1975. 
• 
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instead of thi rty-one , and achieved far more impressive 
polling figures. He added: "Elections are not won on 
personality or sentiment alone. It is won on good organisation 
- organisation that is prepared long before the day of the 
elections. ,, 20 
Because of the lack of a grassroots organisation, the Labour 
Party was not able to sustain its popularity and hold on to 
supporters for any length of time. For example, in March 
1975, it basked in its election victory but the euphoria was 
short-lived. Shortly after, leaders were battling to keep the 
party together as dissension and division threatened to tear 
it apart at a caucus meeting held in April 1975. 21 The NEC 
meet i ng in July 1975, barely four months after the party's 
electoral success, was marked by a high degree of absenteeism 
on the part of caucus members. 22 The budget crisis of 
September 1975 and Sonny Leon's dismissal in November that 
year rescued the party and it enjoyed a surge in popUlarity. 
Clearly, Leon's refusal to pass a discriminatory budget, and 
his adjournment of the CRC struck a responsive chord. 23 
Disillusioned voters who had seen the Labour Party renege on 
an election promise to boycott and cripple the CRC, looked to 
the budget crisis with renewed hope . Many who had abstained 
from voting felt that the Labour Party was going to do what it 
had promised to do in 1969, viz. destroy institutions of 
separate representation by refusing to allow them to work . 
Radicals saw in the budget crisis an opportunity to confront 
the government and force it to come forward with an acceptable 
political solution to the problem of coloured political 
20Sonny Leon Papers, C. 1 . 4 . , Secretary's Report to Labour 
Party National Conference, Upington, 6 January 1976. 
21Sonny Leon 
Meeting, 2 April 
22Sonny Leon 
19-20 July 1975. 
Papers~ C.l.5., Minutes of Labour Party Caucus 
1975. 
Papers, Minutes of Labour Party NEC meeting, 
Sees also Minutes , 4-7 September 1975. 
23Se~ chapter 3 for the response of coloured people to 
Leon ' s dismissal. 
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rights. Yet, while the budget crisis gave the Labour Party an 
opportunity to recapture the spotlight and keep itself in the 
public eye,24 it did not capitalise on this groundswell of 
support and the party's popularity soon dissipated. Deputy 
leader David Curry had been paid a monthlY salary of R200 to 
organise branches but was accused by party members of not 
doing so. Party secretary, Fred Peters was castigated by the 
Cape region for "doing nothing to build up the party in the 
area where the majority of the Coloured people live," despite 
being paid a salary of R300 per month to look after the 
party's interests. 25 Charles Domingo, secretary of the . 
region, alleged that "ambitious men in high positions" were 
running the party as if it were their property, and accused 
the party leaders of relying on the number of seats the party 
had in the CRC "to keep it alive, when in fact we should be a · 
grassroots party spread across the country and actively 
engaged in the life of the community at every level. ,,26 
Thus, ten years after its formation, the Labour Party had 
still not developed a solid electoral base, relying instead on 
its anti-apartheid image, the feelings of the coloured people 
in general towards separate development and separate 
representation, and the support of the press to sustain it. 
This approach appeared to continue until the dissolution of 
the CRC in 1980. When it lost its political platform, the 
Labour Party soon began to stagnate. When the CRC 
disappeared, the Labour Party also disappeared from public 
view. The confrontationist posturing and the anti-government 
rhetoric no longer had a public forum and the Labour Party 
lost the regular press coverage which had kept it in the 
public eye. The grassroots support which could have sustained 
the Labour Party at this time was non-existent. It is 
therefore not surprising that the issue of participation in 
24Star, 20 November 1975. 
25Sunday Times, 18 July 1976. 
26Ibid, 1 August 1976. 
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the proposed tricameral system became such an enticing 
prospect for the Labour Party. 
Because of the lack of grassroots support throughout the 
1970s, the Labour Party stumbled from crisis to crisis, often 
seeking confrontation to justify its existence and its 
presence in the CRC. 27 The party had often been accused of 
having no policy and no grassroots organisation. 28 This 
resulted in major policy decisions being taken which had 
little chance of success due to lack of grassroots support. 
As a result, the party veered "from pillar to post," 
initiating and then abandoning actions, 
acceptance or rejection by supporters. 29 
member stated: 
depending on their 
A dissident 
Instead of looking at the whole party structure, its 
double standards, its failure to establish a mass 
grassroots organisational machine and its increasingly 
obvious inability to come to grips with the political 
situation and the trends in the country, the leadership 
are again looking for scapegoats .... The simple and 
honest truth is that the Labour Party has relied too long 
on newspaper publicity and emotive issues to project an 
image of militance and anti-apartheid. 3o 
The lack of popular support was the crucial weakness of the 
Labour Party, which therefore had to resort to other measures 
to gain and retain some sort of power base and maintain 
credibility in the CRC. Because of its tenuous support base, 
the party was very sensitive to criticism. Its leaders openly 
attacked sections of the press which criticised the party's 
policies and exposed its internal affairs. For example, at a 
meeting of the Labour Party NEC in September 1975, it was 
27Sunday Times, 10 November 1975. 
28Sunday Times, 1 January, 16 January and 28 March 1976; 
Argus, 27 March 1976. 
29ArSills, 27 March 1976. 
30Sunday Times, 28 March 1976. 
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resolved that "reporters who were not well-disposed to the 
Party should be ignored out of existence." 31 This resolution 
was mainly directed at the party's severest critic, Howard 
Lawrence of the Sunday Times who during the 1970s had 
dedicated himself to exposing every policy and action of the 
Labour Party.32 Eventually, the Labour Party could bear his 
probing no longer and had him barred from the sessions of the 
CRC. 33 
The question arises that if the Labour Party had no grassroots 
organisation, had no policy, was ambivalent and indecisive and 
increasingly allowed itself to be coopted into the system, why 
then did so many coloured people support the party? Molteno 
explains that, to the extent that the party retained any 
credibility among people, "has to be understood partly in 
terms of the apparent lack of effective alternative political 
organisation and leadership; partly also in terms of the 
political backwardness of those who still have not learnt the 
historical lesson of the barrenness of collaborationist 
strategy. ,, 34 He accused the Labour Party of being 
opportunists and of exploiting coloured people: 
The Labour Party capitalised on the apparent leadership 
void that had been left by the ruthless repression of the 
people's organisations in the period after Sharpeville. 
Under these conditions, the Labour Party, protected by 
their collaboration in the CRC, presented itself as the 
only vehicle for organising the Coloured section of the 
oppressed in the people's political struggle. 35 
31Sonny Leon Papers, Minutes of Labour Party NEC Meeting, 4-
7 September 1975. 
32P.A.29, Sonny Leon, Address 
Conference, Umtata, 1 January 1975. 
to Labour Party National 
See also chapter 3. 
33See Debates of the CRC, vol. 36 (22 October 1976), 1360. 
34MoJ-teno, "The Coloured Representative Council" I 16. 
35r bid. 
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with the banning of the ANC, PAC and other organisations after 
the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and the suppression of black 
political activity throughout the 1960s, the Labour Party 
presented itself as an alternative and genuine representative 
of the oppressed peoples. This encouraged many coloureds to 
lend their support to the party. For those who resented 
apartheid and wished to regain political equality with whites, 
the Labour Party appeared to be the vehicle which could be 
utilised to fulfil those aims. 36 For those who hankered after 
a closer association with whites, the Labour Party's 
participation in the CRC gave them the hope that, by taking 
the little favours which came their way, they could improve 
the position of coloured people as a whole and restore them to 
the position they once held vis-a-vis the whites. In fact, 
this appeared to be one of the underlying factors influencing 
coloured support for the Labour Party in the 1970s. Van der 
Ross referred to this penchant by coloured people to seize 
upon any opportunity to move closer to whites. He spoke of 
the "childish optimism which had led the Coloured people 
to believe that their political destiny lay with that of 
Whites. ,,37 
The Labour Party's efforts to rally the majority support of 
coloured people in the 1970s was complicated by the fact that 
the statutory coloured population group was not a homogeneous 
group.38 Thus the party could not appeal to their national 
spirit or on the basis of a common culture. The only way the 
Labour Party couid unite coloured people behind its banner was 
to appeal to a common factor which bound them together. This 
36Adhikari, "Responses to Marginality", 116. 
37Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 78. At a special 
meeting held to discuss the dissolution of the Labour Party, 
Lockey castigated those members who supported the National Party, 
despite what it had done to them in the past: "Die kleurling se 
liefde vir die witman is altyd groter as hulle liefde vir 
hulself." Desmond Lockey, Labour Party Special Conference, 
uitenhag~, 17 September 1994. 
3Bvan der Ross, Myths and Attitudes,S. 
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the Labour Party identified as rejection of apartheid, 
political inequality and separation between white and 
coloured. However, the CRC and tricameral system were only 
able to rally support from a small section of the coloured 
population - that section which, as far back as 1919, 
traditionally provided a reservoir of support for white 
governments, white political parties and institutions of 
separate representation. This group had been variously 
referred to on the one hand as "realists, pragmatis,ts and 
gradualists" and on the other as "quislings, sell-outs and 
collaborationists. ,,39 The challenge facing the Labour Party 
was to break the mould and appeal to coloured people outside 
of the traditional collaborationists. The extent to which it 
failed or succeeded also determined the extent to which the 
Labour Party was to succeed or fail as a relevant force in 
coloured and South African politics. That the Labour Party 
never succeeded in drawing more than 16,2% of the potential 
coloured vote throughout the history of its involvement in 
institutions of separate 
failed in this respect.~ 
representation indicates that it 
By claiming that it was supported 
by more coloureds than any other party, the Labour Party 
simply ignored the fact that the majority of coloured people 
consistently refused to participate in institutions of 
separate representation and had begun to channel their 
political activity into organisations outside of the 
government's program of separate development. 41 
Yet within that narrow range, many coloured people voted in 
CRC elections and, for the same reasons, accepted the 
tricameral system in 1983. The fear of being swamped by 
Africans motivated many, especially those in the rural areas 
39See for example, Hugo, Quislings or Realists, 44; Whisson, 
"Coloured People", 56, Torch, 27 October and 10 November 1959. 
40Star, 15 January 1983. 
41Freedberg, "Changing political Identity", 238; Adhikari, 
"Between Black and White", 107. 
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and the northern provinces, to support the CRC and vote for 
the Federal Party.42 By the 1980s, the influx of Africans 
into the Western Cape meant that the coloured numerical and 
economic dominance in that region came under threat. Prior to 
the 1984 election, coloureds in the Cape were numerous enough 
not to fear being swamped by Africans. They had also long 
been protected by legislation which declared the Cape a 
coloured labour preference area, by which only coloured people 
could be employed. 43 This made it easier for many to embrace 
black consciousness and oppose government policy. As the 
coloured labour preference policy fell into disarray, more 
coloureds were encouraged, by 1984, to accept the status of 
"coloured" and their current second-class citizenship, rather 
than risk losing their advantages over Africans. 44 Because 
the Federal Party had all but disappeared, these coloureds 
supported the Labour Party in 1984. Whereas they had looked 
to the CRC and the Federal Party in 1969 to protect what they 
already had and try to gain equality with whites, these same 
people now looked to the tricameral system and the Labour 
Party to protect their position and prevent Africans gaining 
equality with them. 
ThEe main problem confronting the Labour Par"ty in the 1960s was 
the powerlessness felt by many coloured people. They had been 
marginalised to such an extent that many felt that opposing 
the government was an exercise in futility. Others felt that 
any policy or institution which improved their lot was better 
than nothing. 45 Apathy, despair and frustration characterised 
42Lily Slinger, interview, 13 December 1993. 
43Goldin, "The Reconstitution of Coloured Identity", 171-72; 
Goldin, Making Race, 151-52; Hirson, Year of Fire, Year of Ash, 
217. 
44Cohen, Muthien and Zegeye, Repression and Resistance, 8; 
Lemon, Apartheid: A Geography of Separation, 142. 
45Adhikari, "Between Black and White", 106-7. 
311 
coloured politics in the 1960s. 46 Because the government had 
no particular concern for coloured interests, decision after 
decision was made on the political future of the coloured 
people without allowing coloureds themselves to take part in 
this decision-making process. This fact was highlighted in 
parliament by Harry Schwarz after the introduction of the CRC 
Amendment Act in March 1975 which allowed the government to 
take over the powers of the CRC in the event of a Labour Party 
boycott of the council. Schwarz observed: 
I think that the most significant part of this debate 
today is ... that we, here as Whites, elected by Whites 
to a White Parliament, are debating the future of the 
Coloured people, while not a single representative of the 
Coloured people sits here with us in order to participate 
in this debate. This is what will strike the Coloured 
people; this is what will strike all people of colour in 
South Africa; this is what will strike the people in 
Africa as a whole; this is what will be discussed in the 
world - that we here, as Whites, take it upon ourselves 
solely to debate the future of the Coloured people of 
South Africa while they have no part in the decision-
making process which, in fact, is taking place here. 47 
This observation perhaps encapsulates the attitude of the 
National Party and government policy to coloured people since 
1948: the government had no particular concern for the 
problems of coloured people and they were only a factor when 
they had an impact on white and Afrikaner concerns. For 
instance, the ideological feud which raged in the National 
Party in the 1960s over the future of the coloured people was 
not concerned with their welfare or political destiny but how 
best to prevent them from acquiring political power. 48 At 
stake was the survival of the Afrikaner. 49 Because of its 
46Highway, 5 December 1975. 
47Debates of the House of Assembly (25 March 1975), col. 
3340. 
48venter, Coloured, 535. 
49F.A. van Jaarsveld, conversation with author, Pretoria, 8 
December 1994. 
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fixation with keeping coloureds out of parliament , the 
government was not particularly concerned with finding a 
solution to the political future of coloured people. For 
example, when the government's coloured policy was in danger 
of crumbling after the adj ournment of the CRC, the budget 
crisis and Sonny Leon's dismissal in the latter part of 1975, 
Vorster refused to consider solutions to the coloured problem 
and instead, invite d future generations to solve this 
problem. 50 However, as long as white Afrikaners kept the 
Nationalist government in power, there was no pressing reason 
nor obligation to find a political niche for coloureds. This 
obsession with maintaining power by denying coloureds 
political rights led the Nationalist government to seek ways 
to find alternative methods of representation and political 
expression for coloured people . 51 These methods would always 
involve the suppression of the clamour for equal rights. It 
was only when members of the National Party began to realise 
that they were alienating coloureds to the extent that they 
might throw in their lot with Africans, that the government 
decided to look at ways to meet coloured political aspirations 
but still ensure that coloureds would pose no threat to 
Afrikaner hegemony and white supremacy.52 However, this 
obsession with depriving coloureds of direct representation in 
parliament became the rallying point for those who formed the 
Labour Party in 1965 and those who supported it throughout the 
1970s. 
The formation of the Labour Party also brought to the fore a 
recurring problem in coloured politics - whether to 
collaborate or not with the government in the implementation 
of coloured policy. Van der Ross speaks of this problem as: 
.. . the compromise . of a marginal, powerless population 
50Eastern Province Herald, 13 December 1975 . 
51Mu~ler, 500 Year s, 477. 
52Attwell, Background to the Crisis, 119 . 
, 
> 
313 
group, tormented on the one hand by its sense of 
powerlessness, encouraged on the other hand by the 
promise of better things to come. Trustingly, it put its 
faith in vague, undefined forces, and in its belief in 
the intrinsic justice of its cause. 53 
The divisive nature of this issue was evident in the struggle 
within the leadership of the Labour Party. Ongoing friction 
in the leadership had sapped the party's energy throughout the 
1970s. This was mainly caused by the ideological struggle in 
the party over the issue of dialogue with the government as 
against a policy of confrontation and non-cooperation. These 
tensions affected the leadership of the party as some leaders 
advocated a collaborationist approach while others opted for 
confrontation with, and opposition to the government. This 
could be seen to great effect in the number of leading members 
who joined the Labour Party and participated in the CRC as 
avowed opponents of the government and the concept of separate 
institutions, but in later years became vocal proponents of 
dialogue with the government and supporters of cooperation 
with institutions of separate representation. From the early 
leaders in the CRC, to those who participated in the HoR, 
virtually every leading member of the Labour Party succumbed 
and eventually collaborated with the government in the 
implementation of its coloured policy. For example, Martin 
Arendse joined the Labour Party and stridently opposed the 
government in the run-up to the 1969 election. However, soon 
after the election, he held secret talks with Vorster on the 
implementation of the NPs coloured policy.54 After he was 
ousted, Arendse alternatively sat as a backbencher or 
independent and supported the approach of the "moderates" to 
participation. Sonny Leon, a founder-member of the party was 
53R . H. du Pre, Strangers in their Own Country: A Political 
History of the "Coloured" People of South Africa (Johannesburg: 
Southern History Association, 1992), 124. See also Adhikari, 
"Responses to Marginality", 115. 
54 John Nash, interview with author, 31 August 1993; Whisson, 
"Coloured People", 55. 
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elected as a fiery and outspoken opponent of the government 
and the CRC but by 1975 had drawn closer to the Federal 
Party's position on participation. After 1975, he was the 
leading proponent of participation in the CRC and the cabinet 
council, and supported the constitutional proposals from the 
outset. 55 Between 1975 and 1978, his overtly pro-government 
attitude led to his resignation as leader. Because of his 
unhappiness with the party's rejection of the constitutional 
proposals and the President's Council, Leon resigned from the 
party in 1980 and took up an appointment as a member of the 
PC. 56 Les du Preez had been infiltrated into the party by the 
BCM in 1969 and was considered one of the "militants." In 
1975, he was appointed chairman of the CRC and in 1977 chaired 
the CRC Committee on Alternative Constitutional Proposals 
which condemned the government's proposals, including the PC. 
By 1979, he had completely turned around and was a leading 
"moderate." He resigned from the party in 1979 because it 
refused to cooperate with the Schlebusch Commission and 
subsequently accepted an appointment to the PC which his own 
committee had condemned. 57 Don Mateman was infiltrated into 
the Labour Party by the ANC in 1969, but by the early 1980s 
the ANC-aligned Progressive Teachers' Union in the Transvaal 
was campaigning against him because of his pro-government role 
in the HoR. 58 By 1983, even hard-liners Curry and Hendrickse 
were advocating policies similar to those whom they had 
removed in earlier years for advocating such positions. 59 The 
shifts and changes in the position of leading Labour Party 
members between i965 and 1984 from one of confrontation and 
opposition to collaboration, can clearly be seen in the fact 
55Norman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. 
56Cape Times, 6 February 1982. 
57Sunday Times, 30 December 1979 i Cape Times, 6 February 
1982. 
58Ro!1 Swartz, interview, 9 December 1993. 
59See chapter 5. 
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that Martin Arendse was ousted as leader in 1970 because he 
advocated dialogue with the government and cooperation with 
the concept of separate institutions. Yet, in 1975, the 
Labour Party adopted the very same position over which they 
had deposed Arendse. Between 1975 and 1978, Sonny Leon 
advocated negotiation with the government and acceptance of 
the tricameral system. For that he was worked out of his post 
as leader . Yet, by 1984, the party adopted everything that he 
had advocated . 
The struggle in the Labour Party over the issue of whether to 
collaborate or not, or to what extent it should or not, was 
reflected in the party's attitude to the CRC. When the CRC 
was abolished in 1980, the party claimed the credit for its 
dissolution. 60 However, the Labour Party had always only paid 
lip service to the aim of destroying that body. In fact, its 
entire approach to the council was ambivalent. In spite of 
rejecting the CRC, it took part in elections and accepted 
posts in the council. At times it boycotted various council 
proceedings and then used the council as an arena for 
confrontation. The Labour Party also urged voters on occasion 
not to register, then encouraged them to vote for the Labour 
Party in order to demonstrate their rejection of apartheid. 
Party officials accepted posts on the CRC executive but were 
unwilling to fulfil the minimum obligations required of the 
position. However, the Labour Party's participation appeared 
to have some benefits. Its participation in the CRe certainly 
contributed to the ideological debate within the ruling party. 
By infiltrating the government's structures of separate 
representation, ultimately taking them over, the party made it 
impossible for the government to claim that its policies were 
supported by the majority of coloured people. The Labour 
Party's incessant clamour for equal rights for coloureds also 
60This claim was repeated as recently as 17 September 1994 
by the leader of the Labour Party, Miley Richards, in an address 
to the Labour Party Special Conference, Uitenhage, 17 September 
1994. 
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meant that the demands of coloured people for citizenship 
rights continued to receive media exposure. 61 Even though the 
government ignored these calls for equality and did not even 
bother to acknowledge the recommendations which came from the 
CRC, white opposition members often took these matters up in 
parliament, contributing to the eventual reappraisal of the 
government's coloured policy. The Labour Party also succeeded 
in thwarting the government's attempts to build up a strong 
conservative coloured body with a distinct ethnic orientation 
in order that it might become a focus and channel for coloured 
aspirations, without challenging white supremacy.62 The most 
notable attempt, the Federal Party, had failed dismally 
because the Labour Party had not only consistently beaten the 
Federal Party at the polls, but had managed to discredit and 
demoralise it during CRC sessions. Eventually, the Federal 
Party itself began to adopt a confrontationist stance and in 
1975 removed all references to separate development in its 
constitution. 63 Between 1976 and 1980, the government finally 
lost its hold over the Federal Party. 
The government could not ignore the Labour Party because the 
latter had built up a significant constituency, using the very 
structures which the government had hoped would win coloured 
people over to its side. In fact the government had always 
claimed that most coloured people supported separate 
development and that opposition was confined to a small group 
of radicals. The Labour Party's success at the polls 
discounted those ' assertions. The party successfully exploited 
this support, even though it was but a small percentage of the 
potential coloured electorate, and used the CRC as a vehicle 
to articulate coloured grievances, challenge discrimination 
61Berger and Godsell, A Future South Africa, 181. 
62Similar attempts had already been made in the 1920s with 
the formation of the ANB, the CAC in 1943, UCCA in 1959 and the 
support 9iven to the Federal Party from 1969 onwards. 
63Simons, "Organised Coloured Political Movements", 231. 
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and demand equal rights for coloured people, this at a time 
when other anti-apartheid opponents were silenced by draconian 
security legislation. Reality reflected that "the Labour 
Party has made the Council into a vigorous and outspoken body, 
where more truths have been spoken than have been heard •.. 
since the Liberal Party was made illegal. ,,64 Although the 
Labour Party could not force the government to pass 
legislation to meet its demands, it had considerable nuisance 
value by embarrassing the government. 'rhe policy of boycotts 
and walkouts frustrated what the government had hoped would be 
a subservient and passive body quietly representing the 
political aspirations of coloured people. The Labour Party's 
confrontational attitude not only sabotaged the smooth working 
of the CRC but ensured the non-implementation of other bodies 
intended to supplement or supersede it. Thus the liaison 
committee and cabinet council failed, the 1977 Botha proposals 
were never implemented, and the nominated CPC of 1980 never 
functioned. Although other factors also influenced the change 
in the National Party's coloured policy, it is fair to say 
that the Labour Party did play some role in the decline in the 
status of the CRC as an effective instrument of the 
government's coloured policy. 
Because the Labour Party was initially perceived by a large 
number of coloured voters as the most effective vehicle for 
securing certain rights, the party enjoyed a short honeymoon 
with the coloured electorate in its early years, but it 
increasingly came in for severe criticism and vilification by 
a wide spectrum of the coloured community. The reason for 
this attitude must be seen in the light of the party's claim 
to be the spokesman for coloured people. As such, the Labour 
Party promised to reflect the views and feelings of the people 
and to seek on their behalf full citizenship and equal 
political rights. To that end, the party sought a mandate to 
get elected to the CRC with the object of boycotting the 
~Reality, Vol.3, No.1 (March 1971), 2. 
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council, thereby "destroying it. ,,65 This the Labour Party did 
not do. It took its seats in the council in 1969; remained 
there in 1975 even though it by then had the power to cripple 
it, and only withdrew from the CRC when the government itself 
decided to dissolve that body in 1980.66 . The Theron 
Commission uncovered wide-spread opposition to the CRC and 
revealed that most coloureds wanted direct representation in 
parliament. Thus, by remaining in the CRC, the Labour Party 
was acting contrary to the wishes of the majority of coloured 
people. This was also reflected in low registration figures 
and low percentage polls. The Labour Party also elected to 
serve in the House of Representatives(HoR), a body which was 
merely an "upgraded version" of the CRC, 67 but the coloured 
response to the t~icameral system indicates that the majority 
did not accept the HoR either as a response to their desire 
for equal political rights. By participating in "dummy 
institutions" , 68 the Labour Party estranged itself from 
coloured people. In 1975, Norman Daniels, a trade unionist 
and former Cape Town Councillor summed up the party's 
position: 
There can be no question about what the Labour Party must 
now do. They must get out of the CRC and end this era of 
puppet institutions . .... It was impossible for a 80-
called anti-apartheid organisation to take part in a pro-
apartheid institution. More people supported this view 
than those who voted in the CRC elections. The Labour 
Party ••. (does) not have a mandate from the majority of 
the Coloured people to participate in the CRC, because 
the opposition to the CRC is overwhelming ...• In spite 
of this opposition, the Labour Party still went into the 
CRC. They have done a lot more harm to the Coloured 
people's cause ... because they made the institution 
respectable ...• They, in fact breathed life into a 
65Sunday Times, 16 November 1975. 
66The Argus, 
1980; Rapport, 24 
22 February 1980; 
February 1980. 
Cape 
67Saks "The Failure of the CRC" 237. . , , 
68Cape Times, 10 November 1969. 
Times, 23 February, 
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still-born institution." 
Molteno uttered similar sentiments when he wrote that instead 
of the Labour Party being instrumental in the closure of the 
CRC, the party had in fact assisted in getting a still-born 
body off the around: "The CRC had the Labour Party's 
participation to thank for ever enjoying any credibility at 
all. Without the Labour Party, the CRC would never have been 
able to weigh anchor, let alone wait around to be wrecked. ,,70 
According to the Educational Journal, the CRC was killed at 
the first election in 1969 already: 
The plain and palpable fact about the recent dummy 
election is that it killed the Coloured Representative 
Council at the starting post. The owners, trainers, 
punters, Uncle Tom, •.. and all are pretending that an 
exciting and vital race is taking place and the so-called 
Coloured community is awaiting the result with bated 
breath. But they know and everybody knows that there is 
no race, there never was and never will be one: the only 
horse in the race is dead.71 
Thus, according to the journal, for ten years the Labour Party 
had been "riding a dead horse. ,,72 
Elliot suggested one way in which the Labour Party could have 
served its people. He argued that it should have abandoned 
the CRC and used the platforms of the people - organisations 
such as trade unions, ratepayer's associations, consumer 
organisations and teacher and student bodies, which fulfilled 
the needs of day-to-day living problems. He pointed out that 
Genuine protest is always directed at the people 
themselves and the government reacts to the force of the 
people and not to the empty talk of self-appointed 
69Sunday Times, 16 November 1975. 
70Molteno, "The Coloured Representative Council," 16. 
7l"Riding A Dead 
November . 1969), 1. 
72r bid. 
Horse" , Educational Journal (October-
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"leaders." Protest can be addres s ed from any platform of 
the people, and not only from the platform created by the 
government - in this case, the CRC. 73 
Hommel refers to the CRC as a "pophuis parliament," suggesting 
that while coloureds were "playing parliament," the government 
was going its own stubborn way, vigorously implementing its 
race policies. 74 The Educational Journal called the CRC a 
"political obscenity. ,, 75 However, the CRC was important to 
the Labour Party because it owed its birth in 1965 to the 
formation of that body. The party's existence and present 
pol i tical standing was closely tied up with the council. Yet, 
the attempt to participate as an anti-apartheid group within 
an apartheid body was its undoing. The party was criticised 
from the right and from the left - by the government and pro-
participation coloureds for its non-cooperativeness and by 
Africans and anti-government coloureds for being part of the 
white-controlled political system. 76 with the dissolution of 
the CRC in 1980, the Labour Party lost its political platform 
and its protection. For the first time since 1969, the Labour 
Party had to share the political wilderness with the rest of 
the oppressed. Stripped of the protection afforded by its 
participation in the CRC, it was not long before the Labour 
Party showed signs of dormancy and disintegration. 
Despite its claim to have "destroyed" the CRC, that body 
failed not because of the efforts of the Labour Party but 
because the government's coloured policy as manifested in the 
CRC contained the seeds of its own destruction. The coloured 
73R. Elliot, "The Politics of Collaboration", Bandwagon, no. 
5, (April 1975) . 
74M . W. Hommel, "The Organisation and Evolution of Coloured 
Political Movements in South Africa." (Ph.D thesis, York 
University, 1978), 300 . 
7s"Colouredism: The Last Grovellings", Educational Journal, 
(January;February 1977), 6. 
76Thompson and Prior, South African Politics, 11. 
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policy of the government was designed to ensure that coloured 
people would never enjoy political equality with whites, as 
this would lead to social equality and "biological 
assimilation" between white and coloured and ultimately with 
Africans. 77 According to Verwoerd, political equality 
threatened the existence of the Afrikaner nation. Thus, the 
eRe was never intended to improve the political and social 
standing of coloured people, and views which conflicted with 
that policy were never going to be entertained, nor allowances 
made to meet the wishes of opponents of that policy. The 
government was therefore only going to allow the eRe to 
operate within the narrow constraints imposed by the policy of 
separate development. This also meant that the eRe would 
never be given any power to effect change. Van der Ross 
likened the eRe to a "new vehicle" which coloured people 
"eagerly mounted" only to find that it was "stationary". 
Moreover, "you pedalled a great deal, but you got no 
further. ,, 78 Therefore, those looking for signs of a movement 
towards greater rights for coloured people were never going to 
be satisfied with the eRe. The eRe concept therefore suffered 
because the vast majority of coloured people would not accept 
it, a fact borne out by low registration and even lower 
percentage polls in both elections. In fact, the Labour Party 
prolonged the life of the eRe because its involvement in the 
elections ensured a higher percentage poll than would have 
been the case if only the pro-apartheid parties had been 
involved. The Labour Party's participation attracted a large 
number of coloured people who were opposed to the eRe and the 
government's coloured policy but who saw in the Labour Party a 
medium through which they could express their opposition. Had 
the Labour Party not participated, these persons would 
arguably have abstained and the resultant poll would have been 
so low as to have rendered the results ridiculous. It would 
then probably have caused the government to rethink its policy 
77Heprd, General Elections in South Africa, 123. 
78Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 98. 
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and strategy that much earlier. Such a precedent already 
existed in the formation of the UCCA in 1959 which met with 
such opposition that, by 1961, the government was already 
contemplating another body to replace it. 79 
The CRC also failed because of the ideological struggle within 
Nationalist circles. Many members lost faith in the CRC as a 
long-term solution. Others found it unacceptable that two 
parliaments co-existed in the same geographical area, one with 
superior powers to the other. Since parallel development, 
which meant that coloureds would always be in a position of 
inferiority,80 was morally and practically indefensible,81 
the ultimate solution had to be either the creation of an 
independent homeland or political reintegration with whites. 82 
By 1980, the latter view appeared to have found favour with 
the majority of Nationalists. The National Party, in which a 
more progressive wing appeared to have gained control, began 
to distance itself from the CRC as the solution to the problem 
of coloured political accommodation. They now saw the 
solution as coopting coloureds into the white power structure 
rather than "overseeing their development in completely 
separate institutions."~ In 1978, P.S. Marais, National 
Party member for Moorreesburg, explained his party's new 
policy approach as being "the granting of full and equal 
citizenship •.. within a single political dispensation to 
people of another colour in a way that would eliminate group 
domination .... ,,84 He therefore foresaw the end of an 
79Theron and Swart, Kleurlingbevolking, 206; Alpha, 6, No.6 
(June 1968), 9. 
80Debates of the Senate (20 May 1968), col. 3169. 
81Burger, 1 July 1971. 
82See for example, Argus, 9 July 1971; Debates of the House 
of Assembly (26 May 1978), col. 7923. 
83Sa)cS, "The Failure of the CRC", 173. 
84Debates of the House of Assembly (26 May 1978), col. 7923. 
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institution such as the CRC. 
The effect of this debate can also be seen in the announcement 
in November 1980 by Ben Schoeman, South Africa's longest-
serving cabinet minister and a former Leader of the House of 
Assembly, that he had remained silent long enough. Coloureds 
had to be restored to the common voters' roll, he declared, as 
part of the process needed to ensure white survival and a 
peaceful future for the country. Coloureds spoke the 
Afrikaner's language, practised their religion, and shared 
their culture. They were, in truth, a highly civilised and 
refined people. Schoeman made the following admission: 
Ek was self verantwoordelik daarvoor dat hulle op 'n 
aparte kieserslys gekom het, maar toestande het nou 
verander. Kleurlinge het destyds net vir die Sappe 
gestem, maar as ons hulle ordentelik behandel, sien ek 
geen rede waarom hulle nie vir ons sal stem nie . 85 
Schoeman's conciliatory (and paternalistic) tone can of course 
not be taken at face value. He was not expressing remorse for 
the way his party had treated coloured people since 1948, 
neither was he apologising for the way coloureds were 
immorally removed from the common roll in 1956. On the 
contrary, he was acknowledging that coloured people had been 
pawns in a white power struggle - the attempt by Afrikaners to 
secure supreme political power and domination in South Africa . 
In his statement, he was still arguing from the standpoint of 
a white Afrikaner Nationalist and continued to envisage 
coloured people in a subordinate role - expecting them to vote 
in such a way as to ensure white survival. Nevertheless, 
Schoeman's statement highlights the fact that whites were at 
least beginning to think about their actions in respect of 
coloured people. However, whites and the government still did 
not accept that coloureds should be their political equals. 
The sudden concern for coloureds mostly stemmed from the 
85Rapport, 
long silence", 
2 November 1980. See also B.J.Schoeman, 
in Cape Times, 3 and 4 November 1980. 
"The 
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potential they had to constitute a threat on the one hand (if 
they joined with Africans to "gang up" on whites) or allies on 
the other to offset the numerical advantage of the African. 
The fear of a "coloured-African" alliance had occupied the 
minds of the National Party since the 1920s already.86 After 
the NP carne to power in 1948, African resistance to government 
policies had a sobering effect on government thinking and it 
felt it necessary at that early stage already to adopt new 
strategies to counteract this threat. One of the strategies 
involved the cooptation of coloured people. In the 1960s, the 
government sought to recruit or conscript coloureds to assist 
in the military defense of apartheid. To this end, the 
government introduced legislation in 1968 to force coloured 
youth in the Western Cape to register for paramilitary 
training. Known as the Cadet system, it had three aims in 
mind - to prepare coloureds for military conscription, develop 
the preferential labour system in the Western Cape, and 
exercise political and social control over coloured youth. 87 
The reasons for the introduction of the Cadet system for 
coloureds was not altogether clear at the time. However, the 
eRC was introduced a year later and after its collapse was 
followed by the tricameral system. The Prime Minister, P.W. 
Botha had declared on a number of occasions that the time 
would corne when it would be necessary to include coloureds and 
Indians in the military as part of the strategy to avoid them 
"going behind the backs of our (white) sons to fight on the 
side of the (black) enemy."BS Thus, the Cadet system, the eRC 
and tricameral system were attempts by the government to 
utilise the hearts and minds of coloured people as junior 
86See for example, National Party pamphlet, The Segregation 
Problem, 10; Burger, 6 March and 17 May 1929. 
87G. Cawthra, Brutal Force - the Apartheid War Machine 
(London:.IDAF, 1986), 66-67. 
BSSun , 11 April 1982. 
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political and military partners. 89 
Prior to the implementation of the tricameral system, motives 
such as the following had already been clearly spelt out: "A 
close affinity between the Whites, Coloured and Indians can 
only strengthen the ranks of the Whites and can increase the 
confidence with which they can work for a peaceful solution of 
the 'Bantu problem' . ,,90 In this respect, the 1976 Soweto 
uprising played a significant role. The 1970s had witnessed 
the emergence of the black consciousness movement and a 
growing radicalisation of the youth. The rebellious mood 
among coloured youth and their support for their African 
counterparts in 1976 took the government by surprise. Even 
though it had dealt harshly with coloured people in the past 
twenty-eight years, it never conceived of the idea that the 
placid, politically apathetic coloureds would ever dream of 
rioting. The liberal Cape Nationalists saw the special 
relationship with, and closeness to coloured people wane. The 
old fear of a growing alignment between coloured and African 
once again began to surface. 91 The effect that coloured and 
Indian support for the Soweto protesters had on the government 
was clearly demonstrated when just days after the riots, P.W. 
Botha made an impassioned plea for adjustments to be made to 
official policy in order to forge ~tronger white links with 
coloureds and Indians. 92 The fear of coloured alienation and 
the possibility of this resulting in a "non-white front" drove 
the government and its supporters into various stages of 
panic. David Bond indicates the effect that the unrest had on 
Afrikaner thinking: 
The evidence of combined African, Coloured and Indian 
89Cawthra, Brutal Force, 66-67 . 
90Moodley, "Structural Inequality", 221-
91Go;!.din, Making Race, 174, 182 . 
92Cape Times, 25 June 1976; Burger, 26 June 1976. 
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protest posed a potentially strong threat to White 
dominance. The boycotts placed pressure on the 
government which led to a re-assessment within Afrikaner 
ranks. 93 
Thus, by removing coloureds and Indians from their 
intermediate position in South African society and taking them 
into the white fold, the government attempted to negate any 
chance there might be of a black alliance, which would have 
the added advantage of allowing it to pursue its "bantu" 
policy without hindrance. 94 
Despite the acceptance of the government's bona fides and the 
Labour Party's subsequent explanations regarding 
participation, the tricameral system was clearly just another 
facet of the National Party's coloured policy which was 
dominated by the concept of separate political institutions in 
a white-dominated society. The establishment of the 
tricameral system was not a spontaneous response to the Theron 
Commission's recommendation 178 nor was its birth a reflection 
of a political conversion in Nationalist ranks on the "race" 
question. Nationalist thinking had long been dominated by the 
intermediate position of coloured people in white society. 
Behind the discussion and debate had always been the fear of 
black domination, and the government's coloured policy over 
the years had always had in mind the larger view of winning 
the hearts and minds of coloureds in order to bind them as 
allies to offset-the numerical superiority of the African 
majority. This would also ensure that a coloured-African 
alliance which could challenge Afrikaner hegemony, would not 
be formed. 95 Thus the tricameral system fitted perfectly into 
the apartheid design. Whether the Theron Commission had made 
93D.F.D. Bond, "Coloured Education Struggles 
Africa: Education Boycotts in the Western Cape, 1976" 
dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1984), 160. 
94Mo9dley, "Structural Inequality", 221-
95Freedberg, "Changing political Identity", 228. 
in South 
(M.Soc.Sc 
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the relevant recommendation or not, a system would always have 
been devised to fit that framework. The trick was to ensnare 
coloureds into accepting the government's plans. By 
participating in the CRC, coloureds had almost been 
successfully coopted, had it not been for the spoiling tactics 
of the Labour Party. However, by accepting the tricameral 
system, the Labour Party played into the hands of the 
government. If the party honestly believed that the 
tricameral system was designed to give coloured people equal 
political rights then the government had succeeded admirably 
in concealing its true intentions. 
An advantage which the implementation of the tricameral system 
had for the government was that it could defuse and deflect 
domestic and international criticism regarding white 
domination. By replacing overt white domination with covert 
domination by using coloured and Indian surrogates to do its 
work,96 it gave the appearance that whites were ruling South 
Africa with their fellow-South Africans. Of course this was 
not so as David Welsh, Professor of African Studies at the 
University of Cape Town pointed out at the time: 
The new constitution is an exercise in co-optation. It 
seeks to incorporate the Coloured and Indian categories 
into the white-controlled structure so that their 
incorporation will strengthen that structure, but without 
jeopardising white power. 97 
The tricameral system had a veneer of democracy but below the 
surface, it was still Afrikaner domination, white supremacy 
and Herrenvolkism. 98 Prior to its implementation, Ken Andrews 
warned that "this dispensation provides for no powersharing. 
96Behrens, "The Other Two Houses", 151. 
97D. Welsh, "How can Coloureds be an Ethnic Affair?", in 
Bridge or Barricade, 85. 
98 See Van Zyl Slabbert, The System and the Struggle, 58-67. 
Slabbert . gives a detailed analysis of the constitution and 
indicates the extent to which it was designed to maintain white 
domination. 
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It is unfortunately not even a new beginning. It is a 
desperate last attempt to keep as much of the discredited 
apartheid master plan alive as possible. ,,99 Thus, if the 
Labour Party had not been so eager to accept the tricameral 
arrangement when it did, the tricameral system would not have 
been inaugurated and the government would have had to continue 
its search for a more acceptable plan to accommodate people of 
colour in parliament. lOO Multi-party negotiations and the 
momentous political events of 1990 and 1991 which saw the 
unbanning of black liberation movements, the release of Nelson 
Mandela and the abolition of apartheid, might, conceivably, 
have taken place earlier. Thus, the tricameral system 
probably delayed an early transition to a non-racial 
democratic society. Tragically, the implementation of the 
tricameral system precipitated a chain of events which had 
devastating consequences for the country. 101 In fact, the 
tricameral system was only introduced because it posed no 
threat to apartheid,102 and the Labour Party was coopted into 
the system to assist the government in the more efficient 
application of that policy. 
Nadine Gordimer heaped the ultimate insult on the tricameral 
system when she referred to the Houses of Representatives and 
99Debates of the House of Assembly (11 February 1983), Col. 
801. 
10~orman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994, is 
unequivocal in hi's view that had the Labour Party stayed out, the 
tricameral system would not have functioned. 
101Argus, 9 April 1994; Leach, South Africa, 54. Many 
historians and political commentators have pointed to events in 
South Africa after 1984 which began with the boycott campaign 
against the tricameral elections, and which led to various states 
of emergency, the "Rubicon" fiasco of 1985, the collapse of the 
JSE and the currency,' sanctions and disinvestment, school 
boycotts, the ANC's "armed struggle" and the collapse of the 
South Africa economy, as evidence of ,the destructive consequences 
of the implementation of the tricameral system. 
102S ~M. Davis, Apartheid's Rebels (Johannesburg: Ad Donker, 
1987), 163. 
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Delegates as the "outhouses of parliament. ,,103 To others, the 
tricameral system was a political fraud. It did not share 
power or grant coloureds and Indians equal political rights. 
It did, however, prolong white supremacy and enabled the 
National Party to hang onto power just a little while longer 
and delay the inevitable. Blacks had to endure life under 
apartheid for a few more years but that extra period of delay 
was crucial for South Africa . The SA Law Commission's Report 
on Constitutional Models stated in 1991: "It need hardly be 
argued that the problems being experienced by our country 
(today) are due at least in large measure to the shortcomings 
of the existing constitution. ,,104 
At the beginning of the tricameral dispensation, the Labour 
Party sought to justify its decision to participate. When it 
later came to appreciate the enormity of the opposition to the 
new constitutional dispensation, it began to adopt a public 
position of defiance and opposition to the government. 
However, in private, the Labour Party continued to remain 
close to the National Party. For example, at the high point 
of confrontation with the government in 1988,105 the party 
privately declared its intention of seeking and maintaining 
closer links with the National Party. 106 However, the Labour 
Party had expected that while it cosied up to the National 
Party in private, it would continue to criticise the National 
Party in public in order to show its supporters that it was 
not a submissive puppet. The Labour Party always felt it 
necessary to justify its participation in the House of 
Representatives and thus public criticism of the National 
103Behrens, "The Other Two Houses," 1. 
104Sunday Times, 23 February 1992. 
105See chapter 7. 
106p :A. 29, Minutes of Labour Party National Conference, 
Pretoria, 28-30 December 1987. 
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Party was necessary to support its position .107 
While critics of the Labour Party generally disparage the role 
played by the party in coloured politics and suggest that it 
wasted the opportunity to play a meaningful role in the 
political life of the coloured people, a number of key-note 
speakers at various Labour Party conferences over the years 
made references to a role which they believed the Labour Party 
should have played. In an address to the party's regional 
conference in the Transvaal in 1975, Gerald Braam, rector of 
the Rand College of Education in Johannesburg, called on the 
party to abandon its "obsessive confrontation politics stance" 
and adopt a policy of reconciling the masses, of bringing 
white and black together. lOB Braam saw that South African 
society had become polarised and, because coloureds occupied a 
unique position in South African society (having both African 
and European ancestry), they could span the gulf between black 
and white. Thus Braam saw, the Labour Party, a "Coloured" 
organisation, undertaking the task of reconciling black and 
white to create a united South Africa in which all peoples 
could live in peace. However, by participating in the CRC, 
the Labour Party was perceived to be allying itself with 
whites. The party had thus sacrificed its neutrality which 
made it difficult to accomplish the role of "reconciler. ,,109 
Kenneth Mopeli, Chief Minister of Qwa Qwa, in an address to 
the Labour Party's national conference in 1978, also likened 
the party to a bridge between black and white . He appealed to 
the Labour Party ' to take on the role of reconciling black and 
white .110 Enos Mabusa in an address to the Labour Party's 
1980 conference, covered the same ground : 
107Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992 . 
10Bpost, 7 December 1975. 
109Gerald Braam, interview with author, Johannesburg, 27 
October 1986 . 
1l0L~bour Party Collection, Kenneth Mopeli, Address to Labour 
Party National Conference, Bloemfontein, 27 December 1978 . 
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There is an important conciliatory role you (coloured 
people) can play in bridging the gap between the fears of 
Whites and the aspirations of Blacks. Yours is the 
significant role of bringing together the Whites and the 
Blacks to the realisation that they are one great 
nation .111 
However, by maintaining its ties with the CRC and other 
separate structures, it was impossible for the Labour Party to 
perform this role. On the other hand, David Curry in 1975 
spelt out the role that the Labour Party saw itself playing: 
"We are just a passing phase. We wish to transport the Black 
people along the road for we know that ultimately, when this 
land will be free from the shackles of greed and hate, the 
role of the party would have been played.,,112 In 1977, Allan 
Boesak posed the question: "And does the Labour Party have a 
future? That is not important and frankly, I don't really 
care. As long as the Labour Party has honestly worked for a 
genuine, free and just future for this country and all of its 
people. ,,113 Although members of the Labour Party will argue 
that they did exactly that, their critics will argue just as 
vehemently that the Labour Party actually delayed the 
transition to a "genuine, free and just" society. 
Throughout much of the Labour Party ' s existence, it was slated 
by critics as a party of ruthless, calculating opportunists 
who exploited the ignorance, political backwardness and 
gullibility of their people for power, prestige and the 
furthering of their own pecuniary interests. Yet, when one 
speaks to many of the founders of the Labour Party and others 
who knew them, one gains the overwhelming impression that 
those who started out with the Labour Party were generally 
well-intentioned people who were genuinely concerned about the 
111Enos Mabusa, Address to Labour Party National Conference, 
Johannesburg, 27 December 1980. 
112post, 7 December 1975. 
113Ra:shid Seria Accession, Acc 154, Allan Boesak, Address to 
Labour Party National Conference, Cape Town, 3 January 1977. 
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parlous position of coloured people . This of course is to be 
expected as respondents would not portray themselves or their 
friends in a bad light . However, one cannot ignore the fact 
that all of them had lived in pre- apartheid South Africa where 
discrimination was already a fact of South African life, but 
which was nevertheless free of the harsh and brutal nature 
which characterised the apartheid era from 1948 onwards. Most 
of the founders were from the Cape and they remembered with 
nostalgia the days when they voted on a common roll; when they 
could live the way they wanted to; where they enjoyed an 
unfettered relationship with neighbours of various colours, 
nationalities and creeds. They had been witness to, but also 
victims of, the changing political atmosphere in the 
country. 114 Whereas the united Party of Smuts had practised a 
benevolent form of race discrimination, that of the National 
Party was crass, crude and humiliati ng. After 1948 the 
government introduced harsh and draconian legislation to 
protect Afrikaner hegemony . Opponents were harshly dealt with 
and the police kept a watchful and vengeful eye on 
"agitators." Those who opposed the government and the policy 
of apart heid were considered traitors .115 Van der Ross 
describes the effect these changes and actions had on 
coloureds who would later emer ge as leaders in the 1960s: 
This has been a traumatic period in the history of the 
country and of the Coloured people . It would never be 
forgotten that those Coloured people who are now in 
leadership positions , men in thei r fifties and sixties 
a nd older ••• are men who have lived through this period 
of political emasculation . They have seen their rights 
whittled down from meaningful participation individually 
and considerable potential collectively, to nothing at 
all •••• Few who have lived through the past thirty years 
••• would wish to re-live the tensions and anxiety of the 
constitutional crisis of the 1950s •••• Not only was the 
tol l heavy in regard to schisms between English and 
Afrikaans-speaking Whites • • • but it had a severe effect 
on the Coloured people ••• • It brought about grave 
divisions within the ranks of the Coloured people • ••• 
114V~n der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 77-78. 
l1sBunting, South Africa Reich , 194. 
333 
The effects of those divisions still linger on in the 
political attitudes and actions of the Coloured people 
today. 116 
It would be unfair therefore to simply write off the founders 
of the Labour Party as cold, calculating, political 
mercenaries. In the 1960s they were part of a "down-trodden, 
humiliated, belittled, ignored and manipulated minority group 
squeezed between rival nationalisms and denied their role in 
the destiny of the country to which they have shown so much 
10yalty.,,1l7 In addition, the majority of coloured people 
were poorly-educated and lived in a state of poverty.118 In 
the midst of all this, the founders of the Labour Party tried 
to devise methods to keep coloured hopes alive. The formation 
of the Labour Party was one such attempt. 
Financial inducements, perks and prestige have often been 
cited in criticism of, and as reasons for, the party's 
participation in the CRC, but these were not an issue in 1969 
as evidenced by the fact that the Labour Party had great 
difficulty finding candidates to stand for the first election. 
Modest salaries and meagre perks in the first CRC were not 
enough of an inducement for one to assume that this was the 
reason for the sudden concern for the plight of the coloured 
people. Although salaries of R150 per month for councillors 
were higher than those of the average coloured wage-earner, 
most of it went on travelling and other expenses as 
councillors trie4 to maintain fragile contacts with their far-
flung constituencies. u9 It was only when CRC salaries were 
increased to R500 per month in 1975 that suddenly, a new breed 
of councillor came to the fore. Higher salaries, increased 
116yan der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 77-78. 
117Saks, "The Failure of the CRC", 240. 
11Byan der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 10. 
119Mj,ley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992; Arthur Stanley, 
interview 10 September 1992; John Nash, interview, 31 August 
1993. 
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perks, the opportunities for self-enrichment and the power to 
give patronage became the draw-card. 120 Middleton states that 
after 1975 the government "threw money at the members of the 
CRC. ,,121 However, the extravagant salaries and perks provided 
to induce coloureds to participate in the House of 
Representatives in 1984 saw the rise of the coloured political 
mercenary. The majority of Labour Party members who entered 
the HoR in 1984 were far removed from the calibre of men who 
formed the Labour Party in 1965 and who fought against 
overwhelming odds in the 1969 election. Thus, when 
this would 
Molteno 
probably accuses the Labour Party 
apply to many of the CRC 
of opportunism, 
councillors who entered the council 
in 1975, but more properly, to the majority of those who stood 
for election in 1984: 
The Labour Party of South Africa was the only party that 
claimed to be opposed to apartheid. From the outset, in 
fact, its prime dilemma was explaining just why it was in 
the running. The actual explanation was of course that 
it was a party of opportunists entirely lacking in any 
strategic sense .122 
Despite this condemnation of the Labour Party, a study of its 
role in the period 1965-1984 indicates a heightened awareness 
of the position of coloured people in South African 
society. 123 The vociferous condemnation of the government, 
instruments of separate representation and the policy of 
separate development by the Labour Party at the outset and 
later, to a lesser extent by the Federal Party, focused the 
attention of the white electorate on coloured people in their 
120Sonny Leon, Address to Labour Party National Conference, 
Umtata, 1 January 1975. 
158 . 
121Norman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. 
122Molteno, "The Coloured Representative Council", 16. 
123Thomas, "Coloured People and the Limits of Separation", 
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midst and contributed to a debate in white political circles 
and an increased awareness of the claims of the coloured 
people to full citizenship in the land of their birth. 
The question must nevertheless be asked whether the Labour 
Party had any relevance in coloured politics in the period 
under discussion? Yes, to the extent to which the party was 
able to verbalise the feelings and frustrations of a section 
of the coloured people. The Labour Party represented that 
section of the coloured community who resented their second-
class status, who were opposed to apartheid and institutions 
which were designed to entrench the principle of separate 
representation, who were frustrated at the lack of avenues for 
the free expression of their feelings, and uncertain about how 
to bring about the desired change in their status. 124 Even 
though its support came from a small percentage of the 
coloured electorate, the party's highly-publicised criticism 
of and confrontation with the government and its policies led 
the government to continue to look at alternative methods of 
satisfying the political aspirations of the coloured people. 
Herein lies the Labour Party's major contribution: It played a 
role in the government's re-evaluation of its coloured policy . 
Between 1969 and 1984, the government devised the CRC, a 
liaison committee, cabinet council, new constitution, 
President's Council and eventually, the tricameral system to 
provide for the political aspirations of coloured people. In 
addition, the government had appointed the Theron Commission 
which focused not only on the political, but also the social 
and economic position of coloured people. 
However, although the Labour Party appeared to prod the 
government, it did not succeed in influencing the government 
in the right direction. The declared aim of the Labour Party 
was to strive for equal citizenship and the restoration of 
full political rights for coloured people. In order to 
124Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, 162. 
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achieve this, it planned to oppose apartheid and all 
instruments of separate representation designed to keep whites 
and coloureds politically separate. As such, it planned to 
hamstring the CRC and oppose all other institutions of 
separate political representation. Yet, by participating in 
separate institutions such as the CRC, the Labour Party 
negated its lofty ideals. It lent credibility to a body which 
it supposedly rejected and had vowed to destroy. Instead of 
forcing the government to abandon separate development, the 
Labour Party assisted in its implementation. Although the 
Labour Party played a role in causing the government to look 
at alternative methods of satisfying coloured political 
aspirations, those alternatives were simply alternatives 
within the framework of the policy of separate development and 
not a departure therefrom. Furthermore, the Labour Party 
failed to secure full citizenship for coloureds, but on the 
other hand, by allowing coloureds to be coopted into 
government structures, it succeeded in earning for coloured 
people the enmity of their fellow-oppressed. 125 
Whereas the Labour Party was formed in 1965 to frustrate the 
government in the implementation of its policy of separate 
development, by 1984 it had consciously elected to fully 
collaborate with the government and assist in the 
implementation of that very policy. 126 From a position where 
it was considered an important component of the liberation 
struggle in the 1960s and early 70s, and a vociferous and 
credible opponent of the government and its policy of 
apartheid; by 1984 the Labour Party had turned full circle and 
became a junior partner of the same government - labelled by 
the liberation movements as a collaborator and fellow-
oppressor . 
1250 . Dhlomo, "Inkatha and the Reform Proposals" in Bridge 
or Barricade?, 126. 
126p .,A. 29, Statement by 
Chairman of the Ministers' 
Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 162 . 
the Honourable H.J.Hendrickse: 
Council, n . d . (probably 1994). 
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Chapter 7 
Epilogue 
THE LABOUR PARTY, 1984-1994 
The decision by the Labour Party to participate in the House 
of Representatives was the logical culmination of its decision 
to participate in the CRC in 1969. Having once decided to 
cooperate with the government in its plans for separate 
poli tical representation for coloureq I Jel)p I.e, the Labour Party 
had no moral basis for refusing partIcipation in the 
tricameral system. The decision to cooperate in 1969, albeit 
qualified, led inevitably to the decision to participate in 
1984. By the time it took part in elections for the House of 
Representatives in August 1984, the Labour Party had dispensed 
with any notions of "confrontation" or "confrontation through 
dialogue" which had been its policy throughout much of the 
1970s, and committed itself to fully collaborate with the same 
government it had purported to oppose for so long. 
In the 1984 election, the Labour Party was opposed by a number 
of parties, none of which constituted any major threat. The 
Freedom Party(FP) had suffered defections to the Labour Party 
after the demise of the CRC in 1980, and, in addition, 
experienced a leadership crisis shortly beLore the election 
when it replaced its leader, Charles' Julies with Arthur 
Booysen. The party contested all ten seats in the Transvaal 
and twelve in the rest of the country.! It failed to win a 
single seat, but ' tied with the Labour Party in Bosmont, 
Booysen's seat. After court action by the Freedom Party 
against the Labour Party for electoral fraud, the seat was 
allocated to Booysen. 2 Julies left the FP after he was 
!The Transvaal had always been the stronghold of the Freedom 
(formerly Federal) Party. See chapters 2 and 3. 
2Beverley Booysen, interview with author, Johannesburg, 24 
April 1989. The author was also a teacher in a school situated 
in this constituency in 1984, and followed the proceedings as 
part of preparation for an earlier research study on the Labour 
Party. 
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deposed and formed the Reformed Freedom Party(RFP) . The RFP 
fielded eleven candidates in the election and adopted an 
"unashamedly Coloured Nationalist" position, similar to that 
of the Federal Party in 1969. 3 The party failed to capture a 
single seat and all its candidates lost their deposits. 
The main opposition to the Labour Party in the 1984 election 
came from the People's Congress Party(PCP) , a party to the 
right of the Labour Party. The PCP started out as the 
Congress of the People, a body concerning itself with the 
social welfare of coloured people in the northern suburbs of 
the Cape Flats in the Cape Peninsula. 4 Its leader, Peter 
Marais was a former member of the Labour Party who had been 
suspended from the party in 1978. Although the party fielded 
59 candidates in the August 1984 election, and two former 
Labour Party leaders, Sonny Leon and Les du Preez actively 
supported and campaigned on its behalf, only one PCP 
candidate, Dennis de la Cruz of Ottery, was elected. A 
further candidate, Soheir Hoosen of the Tafelberg 
constituency, was declared the winner by the Supreme Court 
after it found that the Labour Party candidate, former leader 
Martin Arendse, had bribed four pensioners with money and 
christmas gifts . 5 Hoosen then joined the Freedom Party, 
bringing its representation in parliament to two. 6 When the 
Labour Party's 76 candidates took their places in the House of 
Representatives for the first session,7 they were faced with 
an opposition consisting of four members: two FP, one PCP and 
3Race Relations Survey (1984), 31 . 
4Behrens, "The Other TWo Houses", 42. 
5Citizen, 8 August 1985. 
6Beverley Booysen, interview, 24 April 1989; Trevor George, 
interview, 6 May 1994. 
7Because of the number of candidates elected to the HoR, the 
Labour P~rty was able to nominate its candidates to all five 
nominated seats, bringing its total complement in the House to 
81 out of 85 members . 
> 
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one independent. When the first session of the HoR met in 
January 1985, a new party, the Democratic Worker's Party(DWP) 
constituted the official opposition. This party was formed 
after a breakaway from the PCP and consisted of three members: 
the independent and the PCP member elected in August 1984, and 
a further PCP member elected in a by-election in December 
1984. 8 These all joined the DWP before the first HoR session. 
Within the Labour Party itself, a realignment also took place . 
The 1983 decision of the Labour Party to participate led to 
the resignation of those who were opponents of participation. 
After the party's victory in the 1984 election three groupings 
in the party caucus came to the fore. The groupings largely 
reflected similar divisions within the party rank-and-file. A 
loyalist grouping consisting of older MPs gathered around 
Allan Hendrickse, the party's leader. The majority of these 
members had served in the CRC. For them, participation was a 
success in itself. As far they were concerned, the Labour 
Party had fought long and hard for representation in "the 
councils of the nation," for "membership of Parliament" and 
"other instruments of central and local government ... 9 Even 
though all South Africans did not yet have this privilege, 
these members felt that this was at least a beginning. 
Although a minority in the party, the Hendrickse loyalists had 
greater influence and dominated the party's decision- making 
process. This can largely be ascribed to the fact that these 
members were more experienced in politics, having served in 
the CRC. 
A second grouping, dubbed the "coloureticians, .. 10 emerged 
8Cape Times, 15 January 1985. 
9P.A.29, "Objects of the Party" 2(c), "Constitution of the 
Labour Piirty of South Africa", as amended, 9 July 1966. 
IOBehrens, "The Other Two Houses", 36. 
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under the leadership of David Curry and Carter Ebrahim. 11 It 
was Ebrahim who, in 1972, had presented a paper at the party's 
East London conference which spelt out the Labour Party's 
attitude to participation in the CRC, and which had committed 
the party unequivocally to acceptance of the council as a body 
in which the party could realise its aims and objectives. 12 
Ebrahim was also one of the "power clique" which pushed the 
party towards the decision to participate at Eshowe in January 
1983. 13 When he was appointed Minister of Education and 
Culture in 1984, the "coloureticians" grouped around Ebrahim. 
This group consisted of the social worker-type MF who was 
generally older and from a rural background. Many of them had 
come into the HoR in 1984 from a background of long service to 
the community. Among them were teachers, community workers, 
members of Management Committees and public service employees. 
These members were content to busy themselves with the 
upliftment of the coloured community. To them, parliament was 
to be used to improve social, educational and economic 
conditions for coloured people. Thus, they saw it as their 
duty to content themselves with providing community facilities 
such as halls, creches and old age homes; improve pensions and 
other grants; build more schools; and improve conditions in 
coloured areas. 14 These MFs were more ethnically oriented and 
were less concerned with national or non-racial politics. IS 
This group constituted the majority within the Labour Party 
caucus but did not initially exert themselves . Their initial 
reticence can be ascribed to the lack of experience and the 
subsequent insecurity felt by those who had just been elected 
to the HoR in 1984. This group's main opposition within the 
llSee chapter 5 on Curry's role in the Eshowe vol te face and 
Appendix II for a biographical profile. 
12See chapter 3. 
13Freedberg, "Changing Political Identity", 235. 
14wi~lie Meyer, interview, 21 January 1994. 
ISBehrens, "The Other Two Houses", 36. 
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Labour Party was the "young turks," a grouping of younger, 
urban, more well-educated MFS.16 Although they shared with 
the supporters of the progressive movements operating inside 
and outside the country, a commitment to a non-racial 
democracy, they differed on the strategy of how best to 
achieve this goal. 17 This group was a very small, but brash 
minority consisting of less than a dozen MFs, and generally 
grouped around spokesmen like Desmond Lockey, son-in-law of 
Allan Hendrickse. 1S This group most often opposed the 
"coloureticians" and sought to keep them out of influential 
positions in the party and the HoR. 19 
As soon as the Labour Party took office in the House of 
Representatives, it had to deal with country-wide student 
boycott which arose out of the campaign against the tricameral 
elections in August 1984. 20 The government had to declare a 
state of emergency to deal with the unrest which accompanied 
the boycott. The boycotts were mainly confined to the 
Transvaal and the Eastern Cape in 1984 but moved to Cape Town 
in July 1985 after the government had declared a second state 
of emergency in other parts of the country.21 The focal point 
of the first wave of unrest in the Western Cape was provided 
when a march planned from Athlone Stadium and Hewat College of 
Education in Athlone to Pollsmoor prison to demand the release 
of Nelson 
patron of 
Mandela, was banned. 
the UDF was detained 
Allan Boesak, the founder and 
while attempting to lead the 
16Peter Hendrickse, 18 September 1994. 
17Behrens, "The Other Two Houses", 37. 
lSPeter Hendrickse, interview, 18 September 1994. 
19Desmond Lockey, interview, 17 September 1994. 
20yan der Ross, Rise and Decline, 355, 359-60; Du Pre, 
Separate but Unequal, 181-84; D. Reed, Beloved Country: South 
Africa's Silent Wars (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1994), 21. 
21Race Relations Survey (1985), 24. 
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march. 22 The banning of the march and the police reaction to 
the marchers unleashed a wave of violence. The actions of 
students in coloured schools in the Peninsula led the Labour 
Party to close all coloured schools and colleges in the Cape 
Peninsula. 23 Parents and teachers challenged the Labour 
Party's educational policies and accused the party of 
supporting government actions against its "own" people. 
Ebrahim's actions were challenged in the Supreme Court, and 
although some his regulations were declared invalid,24 he 
insisted that he would continue to take a hard line in order 
to re-establish law an order in coloured schools. 25 with the 
closure of schools, thousands of coloured pupils took to the 
streets. Coloured suburbs resembled war-zones as pupils 
taunted and battled the police. 26 When student unrest began 
to subside in 1986, the Labour Party was faced with a 
rebellion in colleges of education under its control. 
Students demanded the end of "apartheid education" and 
disparities in bursaries and the allocation of resources. 27 
At the same time, the party was accused of trying to increase 
party membership by only making posts available in HoR 
educational institutions to party members. This accusation 
first surfaced in the Cape Herald in December 1985 and was 
repeated throughout the tenure of the Labour Party as the 
22Du Pre, Strangers in their Own Country, 137. 
23Star 7 October 1985. 
--, 
24Argus , 28 October 1985. 
25Race Relations Survey (1985), 25. 
26C. Bundy, "'Action Comrades, action!': The Politics of 
Youth-Student Resistance in the Western Cape, 1985", in The Angry 
Divide, 210-1I. 
27At the time, the author was a lecturer at a college of 
educatiop. controlled by the HoR, and served between 1987 and 1990 
as the college's representative on a number of committees dealing 
with the crisis in "coloured" colleges. 
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governing party in the HoR. 28 Willie Meyer states that files 
were kept at the party's head office of every constituency. 
When an application was made from a teacher or lecturer, the 
MP for that constituency was asked to investigate and report 
whether the candidate was a member, supporter, critic or 
opponent of the Labour Party. Preference was then given to 
Labour Party members and supporters. Meyer states that 
Hendrickse called this "affirmative action" .29 At a conference 
of the Labour Party in September 1994, Allan Hendrickse also 
referred to the Labour Party's role in promoting "affirmative 
action" stating that the Labour Party during the HoR period 
looked after "its own people." He clarified this to mean 
that the party was looking first to promote coloured people. 3o 
However, teachers over the years openly accused the Labour 
Party of favouring Labour Party members when it came to making 
appointments. Ron Swartz, chairman of the Progressive 
Teachers' Union in Johannesburg between 1985 and 1992, reports 
that this was common knowledge and he and his organisation 
received countless complaints regarding this practice. 3! 
At the outset, the Labour Party came under attack for the 
calibre of its members in the HoR. Fred Peters, the party's 
long-serving secretary had warned the party since the early 
1970s against accepting every "Dick, Tom and Harry" as 
candidates in the various elections. After the demise of the 
CRC in 1980, he tried to screen prospective members, but was 
28Cape Herald, 14 December 1985; Argus, 28 March and 3 
October 1987. 
2~illie Meyer, interview, 21 January 1994. 
30Allan Hendrickse, Labour Party Special Conference, 
Uitenhage, 17 September 1994. 
3!For example, Ron Swartz, interview, 9 December 1993; 
Matilda 9airncross, interview with author, Oudtshoorn, 22 April 
1994. Du Pre, Separate but Unequal, 116, describes this practice 
in greater detail. 
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overruled by party leaders eager to increase membership.32 In 
1984, Peters became concerned about the type of candidate the 
Labour Party was putting up for election,33 but was stymied by 
a problem the Labour Party had not foreseen: it could not find 
suitable candidates to stand for the party. There was no 
shortage of persons eager to stand, but the Labour Party was 
seeking to encourage recognised community leaders, well-known 
educationists, businessmen and educated persons of standing to 
accept nomination to candidacy. In this way the party hoped 
to broaden its support and increase its acceptability among 
the coloured electorate. However, the vociferous criticism 
which the party faced after its Eshowe decision, the 
mobilisation of forces to protest the election, the stridency 
of the boycott lobby, and the growing prospect of a violent 
reaction to the implementation of the 
deterred many prospective candidates. 
struggled right up to the election to 
tricameral system 
In the end the party 
find suitable 
candidates. Having failed in this endeavour, the party had to 
"take whatever it could get. ,,34 
Soon after the August 1984 election results confirmed a Labour 
Party victory, Hendrickse was appointed as chairman of the 
Minister's Council of the HoR and cabinet minister without 
portfolio. 35 From 1984 until 1987, when Hendrickse left 
Botha's cabinet, the Labour Party followed a policy of 
acquiescence. It hardly opposed the National Party and 
concerned itself mainly with matters pertaining to the 
32Sylvia Landers, interview, 17 September 1994; Norman 
Middleton, 10 October 1994. 
33Lockey indicates that even though he was Allan 
Hendrickse's son-in-law, he was rigorously questioned by Peters 
regarding his background, his motives for wanting to stand as a 
candidate, and his suitability for the party. Desmond Lockey, 
interview, 17 September 1994. 
34Allan Hendrickse, interview with author, uitenhage, 17 
Septembef 1994. 
35Race Relations Survey (1986), 156. 
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administration of the HoR. Much of this political inertia had 
to do with the protest and school boycotts which arose out of 
the protest to the tricameral elections in August 1984, and 
which simmered for years after. Much of the action against 
the protests was borne by the government's security police, 
but the HoR and Labour Party had to bear the brunt of the 
schools boycott which reached a crescendo in coloured schools 
in the Cape in 1985. 36 The Labour Party tried to keep a low 
profile and preferred to wait for directives from the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet. When the Labour Party tried to get 
involved in the process of government, it most often succeeded 
in strengthening the hand of the government in the application 
of apartheid policies. Labour Party members constantly found 
themselves on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the 
tricameral system had given them positions of power; on the 
other, they were required to implement government policy and 
bear responsibility for it. For example, the party helped to 
place new apartheid legislation on the statute book, e.g. the 
Regional Services Councils Act. 37 While serving in the 
cabinet, Hendrickse found it difficult to oppose government 
policy. The only known case in which he distanced himself 
from a cabinet decision was over the question of independence 
for KwaNdebele. 38 
Hendrickse's departure from the cabinet in 1987 was 
precipitated when he and twenty-five supporters swam at 
Humewood, a whites-only beach in Port Elizabeth on 4 January, 
1987 in defiance "of the Separate Amenities Act. 39 However, 
the party had not reckoned on the consequences of what it had 
36Bundy, "Action comrades, action 1 ", 211. 
37Behrens, "The Other Two Houses", 213. 
38Ibid. 
3~incent Baartman, interview with author, uitenhage, 17 
Septembe. 1994; Peter Hendrickse, interview, 18 September 1994; 
Race Relations Survey (1987/88), 738; Kenney, Power Pride and 
Prejudice, 386; Star, 5 January 1987. 
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hoped would have been an opportunity to enhance its leader's 
standing as a defiant opponent of apartheid. While Hendrickse 
got support for his action from the so-called Eminent Person's 
Group, a delegation from the Commonwealth Conference which had 
recently visited the country to help negotiate a settlement 
within south Africa,4o his action stirred up conservatives, 
especially in Port Elizabeth. The Herstigte Nasionale Party 
threatened to send it members to Port Elizabeth to patrol 
white beaches and ensure that the Labour Party and coloureds 
never came to swim there again. 41 Of greater significance was 
the reaction of President Botha who accused Hendrickse on 
television and in the press of contravening his ministerial 
oath to uphold the laws and the constitution of the land. 4z 
Hendrickse was given three choices: that he and the Labour 
Party MFs involved in the swim publicly apologise for 
deliberately breaking the law by swimming on a white beach; 
that he resign from the cabinet and as chairman of the 
Minister's Council; face the dissolution of the House of 
Representatives followed by new elections in May that year. 43 
Hendrickse loyalists were not keen for him to resign as 
chairman lest he be replaced by one of his conservative 
rivals. MFs were also reluctant to lose their positions, 
privi.leges and perks, and face the electorate in a general 
election. Hendrickse responded by stating that what he had 
done had been in accordance with the dictates of his 
conscience and the policy of the Labour Party, and therefore, 
no apology was necessary. However, Nash states that Labour 
Party members "pressured" Hendrickse into apologising because 
they were "hocked to the teeth" for their cars, houses and 
other items. "If there was an election and members lost their 
40Kenney, Power, Pride and Prejudice, 364-65 . 
41Peter Hendrickse, interview, 18 October 1994. 
42Sunday Times, 2 June 1991; Kenney, Power, Pride and 
Prejudice, 386. 
43Race Relations Survey (1987/88), 738. 
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seats, many would have been ruined for life . ,,44 Hendrickse 
thereupon apologised for any "unintended" affront to the 
President or "any impression that might have been created to 
that effect. ,,45 The apology was aired on national prime time 
television. 
The repercussions of the "swimming incident" did not end 
there. In a series of Management Committee by-elections 
throughout the country, the Labour Party lost support. 46 
aendrickse's apology had further consequences for the party in 
a by- election held in the Bosmont constituency in March 1987. 
Trevor George, an independent,47 ensured his victory by making 
constant reference to Hendrickse's apology.48 In the same 
month, five Labour Party MPs in the HoR resigned from the 
party and crossed the floor to sit as independents. One of 
the defectors, Peter Mopp, explained that the Labour Party had 
"gone off the rails" and had become an "appendage" of the 
National Party. Furthermore, Hendrickse's apology had 
"crucified the image of the party because man does not 
apologise for what God has given you . " Moreover, the Labour 
Party had reached the stage where it was no longer "fighting 
apartheid but entrenching it. ,,49 The Labour Party however 
accused them of leaving because of unfulfilled personal 
ambitions . 50 In April 1987, the Labour Party suffered a major 
44John Nash, interview, 31 August 1993. 
45Star, 21 'January 1987; Cape Times, 22 January 1987; 
Citizen, 22 January 1987 . 
46Sunday Times, 3 May 1987 and 9 August 1987. 
47Trevor George campaigned for Federal Party candidates 
throughout the CRC period and had supported Arthur Booysen, the 
Freedom Party leader who defeated the Labour Party in the Bosmont 
constituency in 1984. Beverley Booysen, interview, 24 April 
1989. 
48Trevor George, interview, 6 May 1994. 
49Business Day, 25 March 1987. 
50Sunday Times, 3 May 1987. 
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blow with the resignation of the party's deputy-leader, and 
leader in the Transvaal, Jac Rabie in April 1987. 51 Rabie 
cited the lack of leadership and the "authoritarian actions" 
of Hendrickse as his reasons for leaving, but indicated that 
Hendrickse's timid apology to the State President was the main 
reason,52 Rabie's resignation created concern in the Labour 
Party because of his role as traditional leader of the former 
Federal Party faction in the Labour Party. However, Rabie's 
departure was more for personal reasons than for reasons of 
principle. He had tried to wrest the leadership of the party 
ever since he joined in 1978. 53 Even though he had the 
support of the "moderates" in the party who constituted a 
majority by the time of the Eshowe in decision in 1983,54 
Rabie was not able to translate that support into votes for a 
bid to gain election as leader. This was largely because 
Allan Hendrickse had shifted his position by that time and his 
stance on participation in the tricameral system was in line 
with that of the "moderates." In addition, Hendrickse was the 
more experienced of the two in political leadership. Moreover, 
he had a much higher political profile after the Eshowe 
decision and was feted by President Botha, Chris Heunis, the 
National Party and its supporting press. His biography by 
Piet Coetzer had also reached "bestseller status . ,,55 
"Moderates" saw Hendrickse as competent enough to achieve 
their political aims and were thus content to rally behind 
him. There was therefore no reason to want to replace him 
with Rabie when the differences between the two leaders had in 
51Natal Mercury, 28 April 1987. 
52Behrens, "The Other Two Houses", 48; Natal Mercury, 28 
April 1987. 
53Desmond Lockey, interview, 17 September 1994. 
54Norman Middleton, interview, 10 October 1994. 
55Peter Hendrickse, interview, 18 September 1994. As this 
information was supplied by Allan Hendrickse's son, one would 
have to 'bear in mind that this statement might be reflecting 
SUbjective reality. 
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any event become blurred . Rabie, however, chafed at his 
inability to improve his position in the party. Although he 
was deputy-leader of the party, he had not been appointed to 
the five-man Minister's Council in the House of 
Representatives (the coloured cabinet).56 After Rabie's 
resignation in April 1987, the five MPs who had earlier 
resigned from the Labour Party formed the Democratic Party(DP) 
and became the official opposition in the HoR, replacing the 
DWp. 57 Rabie however did not join the DP but sat as an 
independent. However, in late 1987, the DP merged with the 
PCP and, together with Rabie, formed the eight-member united 
Democratic Party (UDP) with Rabie as leader. 58 
After the white election in May 1987, relations between the 
Labour Party and the government deteriorated steadily. P.W. 
Botha strained relations even further in a speech in the House 
of Representatives on 19 August 1987 in which he criticised 
coloured MPs for making insulting remarks about himself, the 
government and Afrikaners, and advised them to be grateful to 
the National Party, claiming that if it were not for 
Afrikaners and the government, "the coloured would not be in 
his privileged position in South Africa today. ,,59 He added: 
"This is the nearest you have ever come in your lives to 
governing South Africa. This dispensation is the nearest the 
56The members of the Minister's Council were Allan 
Hendrickse (Chairman), David Curry (Local Government, Housing and 
Agriculture), Andrew Julies (Budget), Chris April (Health 
Services and Welfare) and Carter Ebrahim (Education and Culture) • 
57Sunday Times, 26 April 1987; Behrens, "The Other Two 
Houses", 46 . The Democratic Party in the HoR had no connection 
with the Democratic Party whi ch was formed by white political 
parties before the 1989 general election. The HoR DP had already 
ceased to exist by then. 
SSWeekly Mai l , 27 March 1988. 
59Dehates of the House of Representatives, vol. 10 (17 
August 1987), cols. 2281-95. 
350 
Coloured population has ever come to governing South 
Africa. ,,60 Desmond Lockey retorted that Botha' s claim that 
coloured people should thank Afrikaners for their advancement 
was "paternalism at its worst. ,,61 
Stung by the humiliation it had endured at the hands of Botha 
over the "swimming incident," the subsequent criticism, loss 
of support, and the remarks by Botha in the HoR, the Labour 
Party began to assert a more confrontational stance. On 22 
August 1987, Hendrickse told a party congress that the party 
would demand the repeal of the Group Areas Act in exchange for 
its assent to the government's plans to postpone the 1989 
elections. 62 Hendrickse had however been party to a cabinet 
decision to postpone the 1989 elections to 1992 and Botha 
considered Hendrickse's statement as reneging on an agreement. 
He wrote to Hendrickse informing him that his membership of 
the cabinet was unacceptable. On 24 August 1987, Hendrickse 
announced his resignation from the cabinet. 63 In his 
resignation letter, he stated that the State President was not 
prepared to "acknowledge the feelings and perceptions of 
others if that perception is not in line" with that of himself 
and his party.64 The events surrounding Hendrickse's 
resignation then took a bizarre twist. While Hendrickse was 
announcing his resignation on SABC television, Botha 
telephoned the director-general of the SABC, Riaan Eksteen, to 
60Pottinger, . The Imperial Presidency, 412-13. See also Race 
Relations Survey (1987/88), 740. 
61Debates of the House of Representatives, vol 11 (24 August 
1987), col. 2367. 
62Cape Times, 20 August 1987; Sunday Times, 2 June 1991; 
Race Relations Survey (1987/88), 739-40. In terms of the 
tricameral constitlltion~ all three Houses would dissolve in 1989 
and a general election would have to be held. However, if all 
three Houses assented, it could be postponed. 
63Ibid, 25 August 1987 and 2 June 1991-
64Star, 25 August 1987; Allan Hendrickse, interview, 17 
September 1994. 
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inform him that he was not satisfied with the way Hendrickse's 
resignation was being portrayed. 65 Botha was annoyed that the 
SABC was presenting Hendrickse's resignation as if it had been 
his own initiative, rather than having come from the State 
President . 66 He berated Eksteen for allowing Hendrickse to 
appear on television news to explain why he had left the 
cabinet . 67 As a result of Botha's intervention, Freek 
Robinson, an SABC political correspondent, suddenly appeared 
on television after the weather report, which followed the 
news, had been presented. He then read in full the 
correspondence which had passed between Botha and Hendrickse 
on the cabinet membership issue, as well as a hastily-prepared 
statement by the Office of the State President on the matter . 
This was repeated twice in the following twelve hours.~ 
After the dramatic intervention, Botha insisted that Eksteen 
be dismissed but the chairman of SABC board resisted the 
demand. 69 However, in April 1988, Eksteen was effectively 
dismissed and given a "golden handshake" and his full 
pension. 70 His dismissal was linked to the "Hendrickse 
incident.,,7l Botha later confirmed his role in the incident 
and proclaimed that he would do the same thing again under 
similar circumstances . 72 Opposition spokesman, Dave Dalling, 
contended that the "president misused the office of the 
presidency in manipulating news in this instance - what is 
astounding is that he seems to be proud of it . ,,73 
65Race Relations Survey (1987/88), 740. 
66Star, 28 August 1987. 
67rbid, 27 August 1987. 
68Race Relations Survey (1987/88), 845. 
69Citizen, 28 August 1987. 
70Star, 21 April 1988. 
71Citizen, 21 April 1988; Weekly Mail, 22 April 1988. 
72Business Day, 16 September 1988; Star, 16 September 1988. 
73Eastern Province Herald, 16 September 1988. 
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The heavy-handed way in which Botha handled Hendrickse's 
resignation evoked a great deal of bitterness in the Labour 
Party. The party decided to embark on a program of 
"aggressive opposition" and warned that if any member of the 
party accepted an offer by the State President to take 
Hendrickse's place on the cabinet, it would result in the 
immediate expulsion of that member. Peter Hendrickse uttered 
a threat which the party was to repeat often in the next few 
years: 74 
If the NP maintains its present attitude and refuses to 
clearly outline its mandate as far as the Group Areas 
Act, Separate Amenities Act and Population Registration 
Act are concerned, then our principle of continued 
participation in the tricameral system will have to be 
seriously considered. 75 
The Labour Party had been tagged "a junior partner of the 
government" since it entered the HoR and Hendrickse's 
appointment as cabinet member in 1984. 76 Now that Hendrickse 
was no longer a member of the cabinet, the Labour Party 
adopted the position that it was in opposition to the 
government and embarked on a policy of obstruction. During 
the remaining weeks of the 1987 parliamentary session, the 
party rejected more bills than it had in the previous three 
years . It not only opposed all bills passed as part of 
apartheid legislation but bills relating to local authorities, 
regional services and others which were of a technical nature, 
i.e. bills relating to parliamentary procedure . 77 In previous 
years, all bills of this nature had been passed by the party. 
During the next parliamentary session, the Labour Party 
announced that it would boycott the Dias Festival, the 
74For example, Allan Hendrickse, Address to Labour Party 
National Conference, Pretoria, 28 December 1987. 
7~atal Witness, 26 August 1987. 
76Business Day, 7 January 1987. 
77 I bid, 6 October 1987. 
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commemorative festivities of the Great Trek and the arrival of 
the Huguenots, because they failed to constitute a reason for 
"any self-respecting person of Colour" to celebrate. 78 
Towards the latter part of 1987 relations between the Labour 
Party and P . W. Botha and the National Party broke down 
completely. Adverse reaction by the government to the Labour 
Party's increasingly confrontationist stance led Allan 
Hendrickse to accuse 
against the party. 79 
that it would block 
the government of a "total onslaught" 
When the party announced in November 
any attempt by the National Party to 
postpone the 1989 general election, the National Party is 
alleged to have attempted to "bribe" coloured MPs to support 
their move. 80 Carter Ebrahim expressed support for a 
postponement of the election during the party's national 
conference in Pretoria in December 1987, but his call received 
very little support in the party.81 However, because of his 
openly pro-NP stance, the party sought to relieve him of his 
post as Minister of Education and Culture, but the request was 
turned down by the State President. This led to accusations 
that Ebrahim was a government agent, trying to cause a split 
in the party.82 At the same conference, Hendrickse told 
delegates that the party had come to the crossroads regarding 
its future in the tricameral system. He openly attacked the 
government for continuing to strengthen apartheid, and called 
on the party to seriously consider its continued participation 
in the HoR. In a call to white South Africans, Hendrickse 
stated: "Ek wil vanaand in 'n mate van bitterheid aan die 
blanke suid-Afrikaner se, hou op om net aan jouself te dink. 
78Argus, 18 January 1988 . 
79Ibid, 19 October 1987. 
8oIbid, 7 November 1987. 
81Star, 30 December 1987; Business Day, 31 December 1987; 
Citizen, 31 December 1987 . 
82Mi~utes of Labour Party National Conference, Pretoria, 28-
30 December 1987 ; Argus, 29 December 1987. 
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Suid-Afrika bestaan nie net uit witmense •.•• ,,83 
During the 1988 parliamentary session, the government sought 
to make amendments to group areas legislation by introducing 
"free settlement areas" where persons of any population group 
could purchase land, build and live. The Labour Party however 
insisted that the Group Areas Act be abolished, and the HoR 
subsequently refused to discuss the bills. The Houses of 
Delegates and Representatives then forced the legislation to 
be discussed in a joint session. Hendrickse used the 
opportunity to launch an emotional attack on the Group Areas 
Act. In a lengthy speech, he outlined to members present the 
personal effect this bill had had on him and his family.84 
The government however pressed ahead with the legislation and 
referred the bills to the President's Council for 
ratification. Hendrickse responded by resuming the debate 
within the party on withdrawal from the tricameral system. 
Hendrickse's increasingly confrontational stance was a result 
of the personal humiliation he felt at having been publicly 
berated by Botha over his "swim," and being forced to 
apologise in public. Furthermore the Labour Party had had to 
face stinging criticism of the party's handling of the schools 
crisis between 1985-87, and of its powerless role in the 
tricameral system. The party felt peeved that, while the 
government appeared to respond and react to organisations 
involved in protest and boycotts, its participation in the HoR 
had not been rewarded. Hendrickse declared: "At great risk 
83Allan Hendrickse, Address to Labour Party National 
Conference, Pretoria, 28 December 1987. 
84House of Representatives, Group Areas Act: An excerpt from 
the Parliamentary Debate of 28 September 1988 by the Chairman of 
the Minister's Council of the House of Representatives, the Rev. 
Allan Hendrickse (Cape Town: Public Relations Department, 
Administration: House of Representatives, 1988); Sunday Times, 
2 June 1991. The consequences of the application of the Group 
Areas Act is dealt with in detail by D. Pinnock, Breakinq the 
Web: Economic Consequences of the Destruction of Extended 
families by the Group Areas Relocations in Cape Town (Cape Town: 
Second Carnegie Enquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern 
Africa, 1984). 
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and sacrifice we are participating in this particular 
structure, but sometimes one gets the feeling that it is 
better to throw stones outside .••• ,,85 
However, despite the adoption of a stridently confrontational 
posture and expressions of disenchantment with the tricameral 
system after 1987, the Labour Party never at any stage took a 
conscious decision to rethink its participation in the HoR. 
As much as members complained about the way they were being 
treated by the State President and the National Party, the 
Labour Party did not even consider taking into account the 
sentiments expressed by Allan Hendrickse soon after the Eshowe 
conference in 1983: "My intentions and indeed the Labour 
Party's intentions, are sincere and honest, but if cognizance 
is not taken of this fact, the new constitutional dispensation 
will not succeed. ,,86 He had also issued a veiled warning at 
the time that the Labour Party would give the new dispensation 
five years to see if it "delivers the goods" and that if they 
saw no positive results by then, the government could forget 
about "further Labour Party co-operation." 87 
However, while Hendrickse had committed the party to five 
years for the tricameral system to "deliver the goods, ,,88 as 
early as three years into the tricameral system, the party was 
already weighing up its participation in the tricameral 
system. In 1987, a confidential study was undertaken by the 
Labour Party regarding the state of the party. The report, 
entitled "From Eshowe to St James", outlined the responses of 
members of the party's caucus to a questionnaire. Among the 
85Debates of . the House of Representatives (1987), col. 874. 
86Coetzer, Awai tins Trial, 162. 
87Ibid. 
88At the Labour Party's National Conference in Pretoria, 28-
30 Decem\>er 1987, congress reaffirmed the party ' s 1983 decision 
to stay in the tricameral system for the full five years . See 
Minutes. 
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findings were that the party's participation in the tricameral 
system, the pre-occupation with "coloured affairs", and the 
strength of extra-parliamentary groups were the major threats 
to the party. While the report also discussed problems of a 
personal nature within the party, MPs were mostly concerned 
that they had very little credibility in the community because 
people believed that the party was collaborating with the 
government. MFs flinched at criticism that while the 
achievements of participation i n the tricameral system had 
been few, the material gains had been many . 89 However, no-one 
in the party had the courage or desire to suggest that the 
party withdraw from the HoR. At that stage, the party held 74 
of the 85 seats in the House . The withdrawal of the Labour 
Party would have dealt the tricameral system a crippling, 
though short-term blow. More importantly, it might have had 
the effect of forcing the government to speed up reform and 
hasten the end of the present constitutional dispensation 
which had never made any provision for Africans. However, the 
Labour Party baulked at the thought of abandoning the House of 
Representatives. The material benefits, prestige and power to 
give patronage militated against giving consideration to 
matters of principle and the opprobrium heaped upon them by 
their communities a nd extra-parliamentar y organisations . The 
only other way to extricate themselves from an uncomfortable 
position was to adopt a confrontational and obstructionist 
approach, a tactic which they had used in the days of the CRC 
when faced with a similar dilemma. 9o Thus, it is not 
surprising that from 1987, the Labour Party began to adopt a 
highly publicised confrontational stance and leaders 
increasingly began to issue threats that the party would 
reconsider its position in the HoR. Miley Richards confirms 
that the Labour Party's confrontational posturing after 1987 
was mainly designed to deflect criticism from outside the 
tricameral system: "During the tricameral period, it was 
89East ern Province Herald, 5 October 1987 . 
90See chapter 3 . 
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necessary for the Labour Party to impress the extra-
parliamentary opposition. ,,91 
Whi le the confidential report gave caucus members an 
opportunity to indulge in some introspection as far as the 
vulnerability of the Labour Party was concerned, their 
attitude to the party leadership was understandably not 
indicated. However, by 1988, dissatisfaction with the 
leadership of Allan Hendrickse began to surface. The decision 
in 1984 to allow his son, Peter Hendrickse and son-in-law, 
Desmond Lockey to be nominated as candidates for election 
caused unhappiness in the party.92 MPs accused him and his 
family of constituting the party's core decision-making unit. 
Members also complained of Hendrickse's "autocratic" style of 
leadership.93 However, despite the unhappiness of these MFs, 
none of them wanted to leave the party at that stage. With an 
eye on the 1989 election, they realised that their continued 
survival as MFs depended on their membership of the Labour 
Party. Because of the size of the Labour Party and the 
powerful position it occupied in the HoR, independents or 
members of the weaker opposition parties stood little chance 
of gaining re- election to the House. 94 Thus, it was not in 
their best interests to leave the party or to antagonise 
Hendrickse. As a result, splinter parties like the UDP failed 
to attract significant support from MPs in the HoR and by mid-
1988, began to fall apart. One by one, members resigned, 
resumed their independent status and then, shortly before the 
1989 election, rejoined the Labour Party in time to be 
91Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992. 
92In the 1989 election, another son, Michael stood 
successfully for the Labour Party. 
93Daily Dispatch, 8 March 1991; Sunday Times, 3 January 
1993. 
94wiilie Meyer, 21 January 1994. See also Citizen, 4 
November 1986 . 
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nominated as candidates for their respective seats. 95 
In the 1989 general election, the Labour Party again won the 
election for the HoR, albeit with a reduced majority. Having 
secured their places in parliament for a further five years, 
and with it their pensions and other benefits,96 many MFs who 
had been unhappy in the party now had little reason to remain. 
An exacerbating factor was that the Labour Party had received 
a 1/4 million Rand donation towards its election costs, but 
did not disclose where it came from. All that members were 
told was that it came from an anonymous source. Richards 
indicates that this was a major cause of unhappiness in the 
party and contributed to its downfall. Besides the suspicion 
that the money came from a government source and that it was 
intended to "buy them off, ,,97 an exacerbating factor was that 
this money, which came from a secret source, also went into a 
secret fund and was secretly disbursed. No attempt at 
establishing any form of accountability was made. Those MFs 
who were disenchanted with Allan Hendrickse began to sow 
discord within the party. They were soon dubbed the "Silver 
Forties," because they were drawn from the older MPs. 98 After 
President De Klerk announced on 2 February 1990 that he was 
unbanning all opposition movements and releasing Nelson 
Mandela, the National Party switched its attention to 
negotiations with the ANC. Hendrickse and the Labour Party 
were increasingly sidelined and the "Silver Forties" felt 
emboldened to increase their attacks on Hendrickse whom they 
now saw as vulnerable. De Klerk·s announcement on 1 February 
1991 that all apartheid laws would be repealed also meant that 
people would be free to join any political party. Party 
9&willie Meyer, interview, 21 January 1994. 
96Parliamentarians received a full pension and a "golden 
handshake" if they served in two parliaments, or for 7 1/2 years . 
97Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992 . 
9Bwillie Meyer, 
Hendrickse, interview, 
interview, 21 January 
18 September 1994. 
1994; Peter 
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dissidents then began to entertain thoughts of joining another 
party. Discussion revolved around the possibility of joining 
the Democratic Party which had been formed by the Progressive 
Federal Party (PFP) and certain independent parties just before 
the 1989 general election. However, the Labour Party had had 
an uneasy relationship with the PFP since it decided in 1983 
to participate. The PFP had heaped scorn on the party for 
participating, and during the tricameral years had treated 
Labour MPs with disdain. 99 As a result, MPs decided against 
seeking membership of the DP. 
Events in parliament eventually overtook the debate within the 
ranks of the dissidents. In May 1991 the government set about 
demolishing the "pillars" of apartheid, viz. the Group Areas 
Act which had provided for residential segregation; the 
Population Registration Act which had classified and racially 
labelled all South Africans; and the Land Acts of 1913 and 
1936 which had restricted Africans to 7% and 13% of the land 
respectively. The United States demanded that these laws be 
removed from the statute books by 30 June 1991 if South Africa 
wished to have sanctions lifted .100 However, the government 
devised five new laws to replace those laws. De Klerk 
promised that the replacement laws would only pass through 
parliament if all the participating Houses agreed with it . 
This of course was not necessary as any law which was held up 
by a House could be forced through parliament by the 
rubber-stamp of the National Party-dominated President ' s 
Council. However, mindful of the time frame imposed on it by 
the USA, and hesitant to use the PC to pass these laws which 
many perceived to be new apartheid laws, the government hoped 
that none of the three Houses would hold up the process. Thus 
the Labour Party's unhappiness with one of the new laws, the 
Residential Environment- Bill, caused great consternation in 
government ranks. After much opposition inside and outside 
9~i~lie Meyer, interview, 21 January 1994. 
100Du Pre, Strangers in their Own Country, 187. 
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parliament, the government dropped the bill and substituted it 
with the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Bill. 101 
At the heart of both these bills was an attempt by the 
government to grant communities the opportunity to uphold 
"norms and standards. ,,102 Simply put, communities would be 
able to decide who could and could not live in their suburbs . 
The government was merely giving the communities themselves 
the right to enforce the provisions of the old Group Areas 
Act. Hendrickse described these laws as "thinly disguised 
racial discrimination and a protection of white rights. ,,103 
When the Labour Party steadfastly refused to support this bill 
because of the "racial" clauses, the government was left with 
the option of "bludgeoning" it through the President's 
Council . This would have meant delays and lead to unwanted 
and damaging pUblicity for the government. Besides, the 
government had promised the Labour Party that it would not 
force the bill through the President's Council. Having 
painted itself into a corner, the government was forced to 
find another way around its dilemma. 
Earlier that year, De Klerk had already intimated that the 
National Party was considering opening its doors to other 
races but no attempt had yet been made to begin that process . 
When the government ran into opposition in May 1991 over the 
replacement bills, it conceived of the idea of attempting to 
influence as many HoR members as it could to vote for the 
bills. 104 The NP was aware of rumblings of discontent in the 
Labour Party and ·of the tentative discussions by dissidents 
with the Democratic Party with a view to joining. The idea of 
influencing HoR members then turned into a full-scale attempt 
lOlWeekly Mail, 30 May 1991. 
102Weekly Mail, 30 May 1991; Daily Dispatch, 20 June 1991. 
103D,!ily Dispatch, 20 June 1991. 
104Eveninq Post, 17 October 1991. 
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to encourage members to defect to the NP .105 The drive to win 
over HoR members was led by leading members of the National 
Party caucus, Barend Du Plessis and Hennie Bekker .106 HoR 
members faced an "orchestrated attack" as virtually the entire 
NP caucus set out to influence them. lO / Members were 
"accosted" and canvassed in elevators, parking garages, 
parliamentary dining rooms and telephoned at home .108 For 
example, according to Chris Leander, MP for Dal Josaphat, 
pressure was brought to bear on him by Hennie Bekker to "walk 
over." The implication was: "If you walk over, there will be 
something for you." 109 John Scholtz, a Ministerial 
Representative, was told that if he joined the NP, his tenure 
would be assured. When he refused, his post was terminated a 
month before he qualified for full pension. 110 Hendrickse 
later referred to the entire "recruitment" campaign as 
"tantamount to bribery. "lll 
The group in the HoR which the NP singled out for attention 
were those who had been elected to the HoR after 1984, i.e. 
those who had not yet served a full parliamentary term. The 
NP raised with them the question of the life-span of the HoR 
"and the matter of pensions. They were given assurances that 
the minimum life-span of the HoR would be determined by that 
chamber. However, as long as Hendrickse was in charge, he 
105Daily Dispatch, 20 June 1991. 
106Chris Lea"nder, interview with author, Uitenhage, 17 
September 1994. 
10/Daily Dispatch, 21 June 1994. 
108John Scholtz, interview, 17 September, 1994; Luwellyn 
Landers, interview, 17 September 1994; Desmond Lockey, interview, 
17 September 1994; Peter Hendrickse, interview, 18 September 
1994. 
109Chris Leander, interview, 17 September 1994. 
1l0John Scholtz, interview with author, Uitenhage, 17 
Septembe~ 1994. 
lllDaily Dispatch, 19 June 1991. 
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would determine the life-span of the HoR. However if 
dissident members joined the NP and the NP gained control of 
the House , they could determine the life-span of the HoR. The 
life-span of the House influenced the size of, and eligibility 
for, a pension, but "if you're in charge, you determine the 
life-span of the HoR and you decide that your pensions are 
assured . ,, 112 However, the "8gers" ,113 as these members were 
called, were not sufficient in number for their defection to 
break the Labour Party's control of the House. The NP then 
tried to influence longer-serving members who were disgruntled 
with the party and its leader. Together with independents in 
the HoR, they were offered an opportunity to gain control of 
the House with the added bonus of being able to take control 
of the Minister's Council, free from the control of the 
Hendrickse family and loyalists. With the final assurance 
that De Klerk and the NP would "look after them," 114 Labour 
Party members took the plunge and resigned, while independents 
crossed over and joined the NP. The majority of the 
defections took place over a period of four days in the last 
week of May 1991. 
As the count of defectors began, the NP discovered that they 
had not yet gained a majority. Defectors then went in search 
of members who had remained, in order to influence them to 
defect. Labour Party loyalists had to mount a guard outside 
the homes of wavering members "to prevent the Nationalist 
scavengers from 'getting' to them. ,, 115 When the Abolition of 
112Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992 . 
113The majority had entered parliament after the general 
election of 1989. 
114A number of members state that promises were made that if 
they joined the NP, their pensions would be guaranteed. For 
example, Willie Meyer, interview, 21 January 1994; Chris Leander, 
interview, 17 September 1994; John Scholtz, interview, 17 
September 1994. 
l15Daily Dispatch, 20 June 1991. 
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Racially Based Land Measures Bill eventually came before 
parliament on 5 June 1991, the Labour Party, which had 
threatened to block passage of the bill, suddenly withdrew its 
threat to vote against it . This was an amazing somersault, 
considering that the party's initial objections to the bill 
began the chain of events which led to the split in the Labour 
Party. However, because of the tenuous hold the party had on 
its majority in the HoR and threat of further losses, this 
step was taken to avoid further splitting the party, so giving 
control to the National Party.116 
On June 18, 1991, the "brown" Nationalists in the House of 
Representatives, who in the meantime had been dubbed 
"Hotnats",117 attempted a final takeover of the House by 
forcing a motion of no-confidence in the Labour Party. In the 
face of a determined onslaught, the Labour Party survived by a 
43 votes to 40. Relieved members responded by singing "We 
shall overcome. ,,118 As the 1991 parliamentary session came to 
an end soon after, the Labour Party survived as the majority 
party in the HoR . According to Richards the members in the 
HoR who left the party were those who were not eligible for 
pensions, and who only moved over because of guarantees of a 
longer period in order to qualify.119 Hendrickse concur red: 
"Those who crossed (to the NP) are those who had sought 
assurances and guarantees from me, that they would be part of 
parliamentary structures in the future; those who had no 
pensions; and (those) who had carrots dangled in front of 
them. ,,120 However, an interesting facet was that the longer-
serving defectors, i.e. those who did not cross over because 
116Star, 5 June 1991. 
117Daily Dispatch, 19 June 1991; Evening Post, 17 October 
1991. 
118Daily Dispatch, 19 June 1991. 
119Miley Richards, interview, 29 June 1992 . 
120Ailan Hendrickse, interview on Agenda, TV1, 22 October 
1991. 
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of fears regarding their pensions, were mainly former Federal 
Party members, and those who had been members of opposition 
parties between 1984 and 1991. The bulk of the members who 
were left behind were Labour Party stalwarts from the CRC era. 
Thus, in June 1991, the Labour Party was "returned to its 
original owners. ,,121 
In October 1991, the Labour Party joined the Patriotic Front, 
formed in Durban of all organisations opposed to the National 
Party government. 122 The invitation to join carne from the 
PAC .123 Explaining the Labour Party's decision, Hendrickse 
stated: "Joining the Patriotic Front is not expediency. It is 
identifying with people who were absent all the years and 
whose ideals we always supported." He added: "I believe the 
victims of apartheid must get together. That was the reason 
for the South African Black Alliance in 1978. Those who out 
of conviction belong together, should be together. ,,124 At the 
Labour Party's national conference in Durban in December 1991, 
Hendrickse suggested that the Labour Party take a decision to 
form an alliance with the ANC but this move was met with 
resistance by members .125 A decision was left to the 
following conference to be held in Port Elizabeth in December 
1992. 126 
When parliament resumed in January 1992, the Labour Party lost 
121R.H. du Pre, Address to Labour Party Special Conference, 
Uitenhage, 17 September 1994. 
1ZZEvening Post, 17 October 1991. 
123Allan Hendrickse, interview, 17 September 1994. 
124Allan Hendrickse, interview on Agenda, TV1, 22 October 
1991. 
1Z5Cape Times, 28 December 1991; Sunday Times, 29 December 
1991. 
126Sunday Times, 3 January 1993. At the Port Elizabeth 
conferenge, the party declined to endorse such an alliance with 
the ANC . This step was only taken at a conference in October 
1993. 
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control of the House of Representatives by 44-40 during the 
no-confidence motion on 30 January. 127 Labour Party members 
responded to this defeat by again singing "We shall overcome." 
As they left the chamber they shouted "Viva Labour" and "Viva 
Codesa." Later that evening they celebrated their 
"liberation" with a braai. Allan Hendrickse explained that 
the defeat was actually a "rebirth" for the party. Peter 
Hendrickse added that the loss was a " liberating experience 
for the party" which now no longer had to "accept 
responsibility for everything. The guys are on a high, but 
the struggle continues. ,,128 Having won control of the House, 
the National Party in the HoR was invited to form the 
Minister's Council. At a meeting in the backyard of the Cape 
Town home of one of the Labour Party defectors, Nic Isaacs, 129 
Barend du Plessis and Jac Rabie discussed the composition of 
the new Minister's Council . On the back of a matchbox, Du 
Plessis wrote out the names of the five-member council and 
presented it to Rabie who was listed as the chairman. 130 The 
names of the council members were then . presented to the new 
HoR NP caucus as a fait accompli. 131 The Labour Party 
subsequently lost interest in the HoR and concentrated its 
efforts on the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA) which had been constituted in December 1991. 132 The 
Labour Party's negotiating position, which it had already 
adopted in 1985, was that a federation was the only feasible 
constitutional possibility for South Africa and that such a 
federation should be on geographic and not ethnic lines. A 
127Star, 3 February 1992. 
128Ibid. 
129Isaacs was one of the leading dissidents who tried to 
secure the defection of his colleagues. See Weekly Mail, 30 May 
1991. 
130Lester Sampson, interview with author, Cape Town, 25 April 
1994; Trevor George, interview, 6 May 1994. 
131TI;evor George, interview, 6 May 1994. 
132Sunday- Times, 3 January 1993. 
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system of proportional representation was advocated. 133 
As the NP and ANC increasingly began to dominate the political 
scene after the latter was unbanned in 1990, the Labour Party 
sought to strengthen its position in South African politics. 
Allan Hendrickse again raised the question of an alliance with 
the ANC. Despite a decision by the Labour Party conference in 
1991 not to pursue links with the ANC, Hendrickse was keen to 
form an alliance and in June 1992, after his party lost the 
Diamant by-election to the NP, he expressed the view that the 
Labour Party's future lay with the ANC and not the NP and he 
saw the Labour Party's role as "weaning" coloured people away 
from the NP. 134 At a conference in Kuil s River in September 
1993, the Labour Party eventually announced that it would form 
an alliance with the ANC in the forthcoming general election. 
Hendrickse also announced that he wanted to step down as 
leader, whereupon he would join the ANC. He also urged 
members to join the ANC .135 Conference delegates successfully 
prevailed upon him to hold back his resignation as leader 
until after the general election in April 1994 . At the same 
time, the Labour Party admitted that it was probably too late 
to take all its members into the ANC camp as the National 
Party had already made great strides in its efforts to win the 
support of coloured people . Ironically, the Labour Party 
inadvertently assisted the National Party in its recruitment 
drive. In December 1993, the Labour Party held its annual 
conference at the Goodwood showgrounds in Cape Town. Party 
leaders invited the leaders of the NP, ANC and PAC to address 
the meeting. Only the NPs F.W. de Klerk attended . Richards 
considers this "one of the greatest mistakes of the Labour 
Party ever made. 5000 people turned up. FW was speechless. 
133Allan Hendrickse, Address to Labour Party Conference, Cape 
Town, 2 January 1986; Cape Times, 4 January, 1986; Race Relations 
Survey (1986), 156-57. 
134Weekly Mail, 26 June 1992. 
135The Labour Party allowed dual membership. 
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He used the meeting effectively to canvass the coloured 
people. Those who were weak went with De Klerk. The strong 
remained. By inviting FW, the Labour Party delivered the 
coloured people to the NP." 136 
In February and March 1994, Labour Party members were elected 
to the ANCs election lists both for the national assembly and 
the provincial legislatures. After the election results were 
confirmed, only four Labour Party members were elected to 
parliament: Luwellyn Landers, Peter Hendrickse, Desmond Lockey 
and Miley Richards. 137 At a meeting of the party's NEC 
immediately after the election, Hendrickse resigned as party 
leader and Miley Richards was elected acting leader until the 
party's next national conference . Hendrickse was subsequently 
nominated to the Senate. However, the same NEC meeting also 
discussed the future of the party and decided to call a 
special conference in September 1994 to discuss whether the 
party should continue to operate, or whether it should 
dissolve. 
A special conference of the Labour Party was held in 
Uitenhage, near Port Elizabeth, on 17 September 1994. Party 
chairman, Luwellyn Landers, was confident that delegates would 
vote to dissolve and that the Labour Party would be buried 
that day: "We have come to a funeral," he declared138 During 
the debate, members from the Western Cape made an impassioned 
plea for the party not to dissolve. The gist of the anti-
dissolution argument was that none of the parties in 
parliament had the interests of coloured people at heart, and 
coloured people needed a voice in the various institutions "to 
136Miley Richards, Address to Labour Party Special 
Conference, Uitenhage, 17 September 1994. 
137Minutes, Labour Party Special Conference, uitenhage, 17 
Septembe~ 1994. 
13~uwellyn Landers, interview, 17 September 1994 
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represent ·our people . ,,139 A Western Cape delegate summed up 
the feeling of opponents of dissolution: "If the Labour Party 
goes now, then where are we? In a gemors. ,,140 The pro-
dissolutionists, led by Miley Richards, argued that small 
formations would not survive in the present parliament141 and 
that the Labour Party should now disband because it had 
achieved its goals .142 Speakers called for members not to 
fear the ANC and to stand with Africans to build a better 
future. Sylvia Landers stated: "Coloureds must not fear 
Africans. This is what the LP fought for (a constitutional 
dispensation which includes Africans). We got it now let's 
disband. ,,143 
After an emotional four hour-long debate characterised by 
nostalgic reminiscences, tears and accusations, a vote was 
finally taken on the matter. Members voted by 96 to 5 that 
the party should dissolve. After 29 years, the Labour Party 
came to the end of the road. 144 
139Anonyrnous Western Cape Delegate, Labour Party Special 
Conference, Uitenhage, 17 September 1994. 
140Mr Gordon, Western Cape Delegate, Labour Party Special 
Conference, Uitenhage, 17 September 1994. 
141Miley Richards, Address to Labour Party Special 
Conference, uitenhage, 17 September 1994 . 
142Mr. Botes, Labour Party Special Conference, ui tenhage, 17 
September 1994. 
143Sylvia Landers, interview, 17 September 1994 . 
144Immediately after the decision to dissolve was taken, some 
Western Cape members decided to form a new party, also called the 
Labour Party. This party, under the leadership of Dougie 
Josephs,.a former Labour member of the HoR, positioned itself to 
fill the void left by the disbanded Labour Party of South Africa 
and to continue to represent the interests of coloured people. 
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LABOUR PARTY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
CONSTITUTION 
************ 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PREAMBLE TO CONSTITUTION 
WHEREAS the Labour Party of South Africa is a political party in the Republic of 
South Africa, unaffiliated to any other political party; and whereas the Labour 
Party is dedicated 
i) to promoting and advancing the dignity, rights, socio-economic and cultural 
well-being of all South Africans, through responsible negotiation with the 
Government of the day; -
i i) to furthering the econolnic, soc i..", 1 and cultural advancement of all South 
Africans. and to assist wherever possible in stimulating and developing 
their capacities in the widest manner possible; 
iii) to vigorously apposing Communism in all its forms, believing that the fun-
damental method of defeating Communistic influence is the positive mainte-
nance of a free democracy, and totally rejecting all forms of political 
totalitarianism as immoral in theory, and predoomed is practice; 
iv) to opposing all forms of"racial discrimination which undermine the civei1 
liberty and social justice of the individual; 
v) to the belief that the right of the individual is paramount, and that the 
State exists to serve the individual; 
vi) to support the rule of just law; 
vii) to opposing forced labour and the exploitation of cheap labour; 
viii) to working tirelessly towards a national economy based on the full produc-
tion, full employment and equal opportunity for all people in the Republic; 
ix) to seeking the introduction, maintenance and extension of social security 
for all, with special provision for the aged and infirm regardless of in-
come status; 
x) to advocating a free national educational system devised to enable all 
able stuaents of all races an equal opportunity of receiving the highest 
specialised training. 
Now therefore, the labour Party of South Africa adopts as its Constitution 
the foll owing: 
3 7\ 
1. NAME OF THE PARTY 
The -name of the Party shall be the "LABOUR PARTY OF SOUTH AFRICA". 
2. OBJECTS OF THE PARTY 
a) To organise and maint~_ in a political party in South Africa. 
b) To raise the statlJ£ of all workers in the Country by working for the 
provision of:- . 
(i) minimum basic wages at a civilised level; 
(ii) working conditions at accepted civilised standards; 
(iii) adequate pensions, sick benefits, etc.; 
(iv) adequate and compulsory education for all according to age, 
-aptitude and ability; . 
(v) housing at economic standards, with home ownership; 
(vi) equal opportunity for all people in all spheres of life in 
accordance with their ability; 
c) To strive for the effective participation of all people in the government_ 
of the country, by participation in the councils of the nation, in parti~ 
cular by ensuring that all persons attaining prescribed qualifications 
sh~11 vote for, a~d br. nliaiblc fQr member~hip of Parli~ment, Provincial 
Councils, MUJlicipal CoullviL and.'other instruments of central and lotal 
government. 
d) To work for the eliminiation of the colour bar in legislation, as well 
as the practical application thereof. 
e) To develop a political arrangement in the country such that all sections 
of the population are treated fairly and justly, so that the rights of 
all groups are protected; and in particular to ensure that all those qua-
lifyi~g for membership of the Party shall not be disqualified from full 
citizenship, or from participation in politics as in (c) above by reason 
of race or religion. 
f) Generally to promote, the Pol itical, 'Social and economic emancipation of 
of the people, and more particularly of those who depend directly upon 
their own exertions by hand or by brain for their means of life. 
g) To promote the above aims by such methods as the Party sahll from time to 
time decide, provided that only such methods may be employed as are con-
stitutional and legal by South African Law. 
3. LANGUAGES 
The Official language of the Party shall be English and Afrikaans. 
4. COLOURS AND SYMBOLS OF THE PARTY 
The colours and symbols of the Party shall be: A gold anchor imposed on 
a white and brown shaped diamond; the colours running diagonally. 
5. HEAD OFFICE 
The Head Office of the Party shall be situated at Cape Town. 
6. 
a) 
b) 
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MEMBERSHIP 
As ft is the intention cif the Party, in the first instance to coso1 idate .. ' 
the position of the Coloured people in South Africa, and a~ there ·are le-
gislative restrictions on the activities of political parties according 
to their membership, the Party can admit to membership only such persons 
as will not prevent it from carrying out its avowed aims (above) in re-
gard to the Colour'ed people, Provided, that nothing shall prevent the 
Party from reviewing this restrictions as conditions in the country change. 
Subject to Section (a) of this Clause, membership shall be open to persons, 
male and female, who have attained the age of 18 years, and who is prepared 
to accept the Constitution of the Party. 
c) Party membership shall be individual only. 
d)' No one shall be admitted to membership of the Party who is a member of any 
. other political party or any other political group whose aims are inconsis-
tent with aims of the Party. 
7. FINANCE (HEAD OFFICE) 
a) Branches shall pay He~d Office p.ach month 25% of monies received from mem-
bers of the Branch for Head Offlte expenses. 
b) The Party may also raise money by any other lawful means, and receive do-
nations. 
c) All monies collected by the Treasurer, on behalf of the Party, shall be 
deposited in a bank, decided upon by the officers of the Party, ~lithin 
seven days of receipt thereof. An audited balance sheet and statement of 
income and expenditure shall be prepared at the end of each financial year, 
and shall be made available to membersh of the National Executive Committee. 
8 . NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 
The National Executive Committee of the Party shall consist of a National 
President, National Vice-President, National Secretary/Treasurer, Public 
Relations Officer and Trustee, together with the Chairman of each Provin-
cial Executive. 
The National President, National Vice-President, National Secretary/Trea-
surer, Public Relations Officer and Trustee shall be elected by the Annu-
al Conference. 
The National Executive Committee shall meet at least three times a year 
at a place to be decided upon by the National President . 
The quorom for such a meeting shall be 50% of the Executive Committee 
members. They shall have powers to co-opt. 
9. PARTY CONFERENCE 
a) The Party conference shall be the supreme authority and the policy making 
body of the Pa rty. 
b) Members of the Branches in each a rea sha i1, voti ng by ba 11 ot, elect 4 mem-
bers to Tepresent their branch to the Annual Conference of the Party. All 
Branches shall be given at least 3 months notice of the date and venue of 
the Conference. 
c) Resolutions and any proposed alterations, amendments or additions to the 
Constitution shall be forwarded by Branches at least 60 (sixty) days before 
Annual Conference. 
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lV. PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATION 
a) The Provincial Division of the Party shall comprise of the following:-
Western Cape Region with , 'H.I). in Cape Town. 
Northern Cape Region with H.Q. in Kimberley. 
Eastern Cape Region with H.Q. in Port Elizabeth. 
Tnnw~~l, N~, hl, Orange Fr~e Stdte . 
b) In each Provincial Division there shall be a Provincial Executive which 
shall consist of :-
A Provincial Chairman. 
A Provincial Secretary. 
Chairmen of Branches. 
c) A Provincial Congress shall be convened anually where the Provincial 
Chairman and Secretary shall be elected unless the Provincial Executive 
sha 11 otherwi se determine. ' 
d) The expenses of a Provincial Congress shall be borne by branches of that 
Division. 
11. BRANCHES 
a) A Branch may be established in any area provided that there are not less 
than 10 persons aged lB years or more - present. 
b) At the inaugural Branch meeting, the following office-bearers shall be 
elected; Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary/Treasurer, Trustee and at 
least three members to the Branch Executive. 
c) Branch Executive Committee meetings shall be held at least once in every 
three months, and Branch general meetings at least once every six months. 
d) An entrance fee of 25c , ~hall be paid on acceptance of membership and 
thereafter a minimum monthly fee of 10c or Rl.00 per annum payable on 
the first month after enrolment to the Branch . 
e) 
f) 
g) 
h) 
Branches on receipt of the 25c entrance fee shall 'forward 15c thereof 
to their respective Provincial Division. 
Const i tuencies Committees. 
These will consist of representatives from all Branches within a particu-
lar Constituency as delimited for the particular election concerned. They 
will be specially concerned with these elections, the reg i stration of vo-
ters, and the actual conduct of the elections. They shall have an impor-
tant voice in the selection of candidates. . 
Branches may establish committees who could deal with fund raising propa-
ganda etc. 
Branches may do anything that is in the interest of the Party , provided 
that all their actions are constitutional and legal by South African Law. 
Branches shall forward to both Head Office and the Provincial Secretary 
monthly progress reports . 
************** ********** ***** 
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Appendix II 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF LABOUR PARTY LEADERS 
MARTIN D. ARENDSE 
Martin Arendse became involved in politics as a student at the 
Livingstone High School in Cape Town in the 1930s . During 
World War II, he helped to build fortifications on the West 
Coast but was court-martialled when he stirred up coloured 
workers by telling them that they were building boats and 
fortifications for the South African Defence Force but they 
were not allowed to vote.! 
In 1959 Arendse was nominated as a member of the UCCA and 
joined the Labour Party after it was formed in 1965. Although 
he was not a founder-member, he was elected deputy-leader at 
its inaugural conference in 1966 and succeeded Richard van der 
Ross as leader in 1967. In 1970, Arendse was replaced by 
Sonny Leon amidst accusations that he was having secret talks 
with the prime minister on the future of coloured people. 
Arendse then became a backbencher, resigned and then returned 
to the party before the 1975 election. However, he was not 
nominated as a candidate and again resigned from the party. 
In 1984, Arendse stood for the Labour Party in the Tafelberg 
constituency but was removed from his seat by the Cape Supreme 
Court after allegations that he had bribed four pensioners. 2 
His seat was given to Soheir Hoosen of the PCP . Martin 
Arendse is deceased. 
DAVID CURRY 
David Curry was a teacher in Stellenbosch when he stood as a 
candidate for the Labour Party in 1969. He immediately 
!Arthur Stanley, interview, 10 September 1992 . 
2Citizen, 8 August 1985; Behrens, "The Other Two Houses", 
40 . 
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attracted attention for his stridently public opposition to 
the government and the CRC. He was generally regarded as one 
of the "militants" in the Labour Party. He was elected 
deputy-leader in 1970 and after serving as acting leader for 
three months in 1978, became party chairman. Curry had often 
taken the lead in articulating the party's hard-line approach 
to the constitutional proposals between 1977 and 1982 . 
However a study of the Labour Party's private and public 
response to the proposals gives evidence that Curry had his 
feet in both camps . While he made some of the most telling 
attacks on the President's Council and the constitutional 
proposals, he was not consistent and often made strong calls 
at the same time to consider participation. 
appeared to be the most eager of the leaders 
At Eshowe, he 
to ensure that 
the conference voted to participate. His closing speech as 
chairman was considered by many who were present, as the 
deciding factor in the eventual outcome. 3 
After the Labour Party won the election in 1975, Curry served 
as a member of the CRC executive in charge of local government 
and housing, a position he also held in the Minister's Council 
of the HoR. After the Labour Party lost control of the HoR in 
1992, David Curry joined the Democratic Party and was elected 
to parliament on the DPs election list in 1994. 
HE LENARD J, (ALLAN) HENDRICKSE 
Allan Hendrickse "was a minister of the Congregational Church 
when he was recruited in 1969 to stand as a candidate for the 
Labour Party. At the outset he became the most vociferous and 
consistent opponent of apartheid, political separation and 
separate institutions of representation. In 1970, he was 
elected chairman of the" party. When the party won the 1975 
election, Hendrickse was elected to the CRC executive and 
given the portfolio of education. He had long been regarded 
3Peter Hendrickse, interview, 18 September 1994 . 
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as the leader of the "militants" in the Labour Party and had 
forged close links with the ANC, even publicly declaring his 
support for that organisation in 1978. Hendrickse had also 
been a supporter of the black consciousness movement and this 
factor, together with his anti-government stance in the CRC, 
led to his arrest and detention in Grahamstown in August 1976. 
He had a hand in the dismissal of two former Labour Party 
leaders because they had talked with the government, and 
claimed the credit for scrapping the CRC in 1980. Hendrickse 
was also offered an appointment to the President's Council in 
1980 but turned it down because he was "not prepared to sell 
out his people.,,4 Prior to, and for years after his election 
to the party leadership in 1978, Hendrickse was at the 
forefront of opposition to the constitutional proposals, but 
by the time of the Eshowe conference in 1983 supported 
participation. 
When the Labour Party won the 1984 election for the HoR, 
Hendrickse was appointed chairman of the Minister's Council 
and Cabinet Minister without Portfolio. In 1988, he took over 
the Education and Culture portfolio from Carter Ebrahim. 
Hendrickse became leader of the Opposition when the NP gained 
control of the HoR and Minister's Council in 1992. In July 
1994, Hendrickse stood down as leader of the Labour Party and 
was succeeded by Miley Richards. After the 1994 general 
election, he was nominated by the ANC to the Senate. 
LIONEL S . (SONNY) LEON 
Leon was the son of a cabinet-maker and attained the rank of 
Regimental Sergeant Major in World War II. Despite his lack 
of formal education, he became involved in politics in the 
1940s and established a close relationship with the United 
Party in Kimberley. He was also an active member of the 
"Coloured" Ex-Servicemen's League. Leon took part in trade 
4Coetzer, Awaiting Trial, 146. 
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union activities and served on the Kimberley City Council 
until coloureds were removed from municipal representation in 
1972 • 
Leon was a founder-member of the Labour Party and was elected 
deputy-leader in 1967. In 1970, he succeeded Arendse and 
proved to be a charismatic and popular leader. In March 1975, 
the Labour Party won the election and Leon was appointed 
chairlnan of the CRC executive but was dismissed in November of 
that year because of his refusal to sign the CRCs budget. In 
:978, Leon resigned as leader after being accused of being too 
friendly with the government. In 1980, he resigned from the 
Labour Party and became a member of the President's Council. 
In 1984, he campaigned on behalf of the PCP in the HoR 
election. Sonny Leon is deceased. 
NORMAN S. MIDDLETON 
Norman Middleton came from a trade union and sports background 
and was a founder-member and chairman of the South African 
Council on Sport (SACOS) which campaigned for world 
organisations to boycott South African sport because of 
apartheid. He was a member of the Coloured Ex-Servicemen's 
League at the time of the formation the Labour Party in 1965. 
In 1970, Middleton was elected deputy-chairman of the party 
and deputy-leader in 1978. When the party won the 1975 
election, Middleton became a member of the CRC executive in 
charge of Social welfare and Pensions. 
Middleton was regarded as one of the "militants" in the party 
and adopted a pro-black stance. He was the party's most 
ardent supporter of the BCM and was instrumental in pushing 
the party into an alliance with Buthelezi in 1978. Middleton 
was strongly opposed to participation in the tricameral system 
and when the decision was taken in 1983 to participate, he 
resigned from the party. He thereupon resumed his trade union 
activities in the Trade Union Congress of South Africa (TUCSA) 
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and in SACOS. 
JACOBUS (JAC) RABIE 
Jac Rabie was elected to the CRC as a member of the pro-
government, pro-apartheid Federal Party in 1969. Between 1969 
and 1975, he travelled back and forth between the Federal 
Party and the independents. In 1975, he again stood for the 
Federal Party but when he lost to Willie Bergins in a struggle 
for the leadership of the party, he resigned and became an 
independent. During his tenure as a Federal Party member in 
the CRC, Rabie forged close links with the government and 
attended a number of meetings called by the prime minister. 
Between 1973 and 1976, Rabie served on the Theron Commission, 
the only CRC member to do so. In 1978, he joined the Labour 
Party and after the dissolution of the CRC in 1980, was 
instrumental in encouraging the rump of the Federal Party to 
defect to the Labour Party. During the Eshowe conference in 
1983, Rabie is widely regarded as having engineered the 
victory in the debate on participation . He was apparently the 
"mastermind" behind the packing of the conference with pro-
participation supporters . 
In Apri l 1987, Rabie resigned from the Labour Party and became 
an independent, then joined the newly-formed United Democratic 
Party (UDP) in the latter part of that year, becoming its 
leader. He then served as the leader of the opposition in the 
HoR until the UDP disintegrated in 1988. Rabie won election 
to the HoR as an independent in 1989 and in 1991 joined the 
National Party. In January 1992, the National Party won 
control of the HoR and Rabie was appointed chairman of the 
Minister's Council . In 1993 he was appointed to the cabinet 
as Minister of Population Development and in the 1994 general 
election, was elected to parliament on the NPs election list • 
• 
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ISMAIL (MILEY) RICHARDS 
Miley Richards was elected as a Labour Party candidate in the 
Rus-ter-Vaal constituency in a by-election in 1973 and was re-
elected in 1975 . In 1982, he became deputy-chairman of the 
party and Leader of the House of Representatives in 1984. In 
July 1994, he succeeded All an Hendrickse as party leader. In 
the April 1994 general election, Richards was one of only four 
Labour Party MFs to be elected to parliament on the ANC ' s 
election list . 5 
RICHARD ERNEST VAN DER ROSS 
Van der Ross occupied a prominent position in coloured 
political and academic circles since the 1940s. In 1953 he 
founded the South African Coloured Peoples' Organisation 
(SACPO)1 was a co-leader of the Convention Movement in 19611 
founded the Labour Party in 19651 served as editor of the Cape 
Herald in 1969 and 1970, and became rector of the University 
of the Western Cape in 1975. Between 1973 and 1976, he served 
as a member of the Theron Commission. 
In the early 19606 Van der Ross became discouraged by the 
futility of opposition to the basic direction of the 
government ' s coloured policy and argued that apartheid should 
be opposed and demands made within this framework. He 
advocated a policy of working within the system and supported 
the Labour Party ; s decision to participate in 1983, but did 
not foresee the tricameral system as a permanent arrangement . 
Van der Ross retired as rector in 1986 and was succeeded by 
Jakes Gerwel. In 1992, he joined the Democratic Party and in 
the 1994 general election was elected to parliament on the DPs 
elect i on l ist . 
5The others were Peter Hendrickse, Luwellyn Landers and 
Desmond Lockey . 
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Appendix II I 
LABOUR PARTY MEMBERS ELECTED TO THE COLOURED 
PERSONS' REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL IN 19696 
M.D. Arendse 14. P. Meyer 
R. Arendse 15. W.J. Meyer 
D. Curry 16. N. Middleton 
E. Domingo 17. J.E. Nash 
E . D. Dunn 18 . J. Oosthuizen 
L.V. du Preez 19. F.E. Peters 
M.T. Fakier 20. J.D. Pieters en 
G. J. Fortuin 2I. N. Potts 
H. J. Hendrickse 22. E.G. Rooks 
W. Johannes 23. F. W. Theron 
E.F. Jones 24. V. Sass 
G.1. Julies 25 . J.L. Siegers 
L.S. Leon 26. A. Stanley 
6Tom Swartz Collection, "Table of Results" . 
• 
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Appendix IV 
A.LABOUR PARTY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 19847 
1 . L.C . Abrahams 28. N.M. Isaacs 55. N.J . Padiachy 
2 . Mr. T. Abrahams 29. P . S . Jacobs 56 . F . E. Peters 
3 . A. Adriaanse 30. L.J. Jenneke 57. J. Pilcher 
4 . B. J. Andrews 3I. A.F. Johannes 58 A.E. Poole 
5. C.J. April 32. J.D. Johnson 59 J.A. Rabie 
6. E.P.C . Buis 33. D. W. Josephs 60 A.E . Reeves 
7. G.M.E . Carelse 34. A. A. Julies 6I. C.R. Redcliffe 
8. W.J. Christians 35. C . J. Kippen 62. I . Richards 
9. D. Curry 36. P . J.Kleinsmidt 63 G. Rooskrans 
10. W.J. Dietrich 37. C. Koeberg 64 . H.P. Ross 
11. L. Dewrance 38. J . B. Krieger 65. P . T. Sanders 
12. L. Douw 39. R . J . Lac kay 66. V. Sass 
13. E.D. Dunn 40. L.T . Landers 67. J . J.A. Smith 
14 . C. Ebrahim 4I. K.H . Lategan 68. I . Solomons 
15. F.L. Erasmus 42 C.L . Leeuw 69. A. Stanley 
16. I. Essop 43 M.R. Lewis 70. J.J . Swartz 
17. M. Friedberg 44 D. Lockey 7I. M. Swartz 
18. A. D. Goosen 45. S . K. Louw 72. M.H . Swartz 
19. C.E. Green 46. D. Mateman 73. C.S . Sweetland 
20. B. Grobler 47. G.J. Mcalagh 74. J.D . Swigelaar 
2I. P.S. Harmse 48. p.e. McKenzie 75. J.G.v/d Heever 
22. P. Harris 49. W. Meyer 76. G. R. Wessels 
23. H.J. Hendrickse 50. W. J. Meyer 77 • A. Williams 
24. P.A. Hendrickse 5I. P. Meyer 78. R. Williams 
25. C.B. Herandien 52. G.N. Morkel 79. C. Wyngaardt 
26. F.G. Herwells 53. P. Mopp 80. D. Young 
27. L . J. Hollander 54. J.C.Oosthuizen 8I. R. O' Reilly 
B. LABOUR PARTY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AS AT 
THE LAST SESSION OF THE TRICAMERAL SYSTEM, APRIL 19949• 
I. T. Abrahams 15. C.J . Leander 
2 . B . J. Andrews 16. D. Lockey 
3 . J . Douw 17. M. Loonat 
4. A. Essop 18. J . C. Oosthuizen 
5. A. D. Goosen 19 . S . S. Oosthuizen 
6 . B. Grobler 20. R. O'Reilly 
7. H.J. Hendrickse 2I. I. Richards 
8. M. A. Hendrickse 22. H.P. Ross 
9. P .A. Hendrickse 23. J.D. Swigelaar 
10. D. W. Josephs 24. M.M. Theron 
1I. J . D. Kriegler 25. E.J. Twynham 
12. I.J. Kruger 26. S.H. Verveen 
13 . L . T . Landers 27. G.R. Wessels 
14. K.H . Lategan 
7p .A. 29, "List of Members of the Labour Party serving on 
Standing Committees" , 8 October 1984. The total of 81 members 
a r e made up of 76 e l ected members and 5 nomi nated members. 
8Supplied by James Swigelaar, Labour Party MP for 
Dysselsdorp, 21 April 1994 . 
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